698. Deinde cum dicit: dubitabit autem aliquis etc., movet quandam dubitationem circa praemissa: utrum scilicet ex necessitate sit unus specie motus, cum aliquid idem mutatur multoties de eodem in idem; sicut si unum punctum secundum geometras, qui imaginantur punctum moveri, moveatur ex hoc loco in hunc locum multoties. Et hoc quidem videtur secundum praemissa. Si enim motus qui in eandem speciem sunt, ut in albedinem, sunt idem specie, multo magis duo motus qui sunt in eundem locum numero. Si autem hoc concedatur, sequitur inconveniens, scilicet quod motus rectus sit unus specie motui circulari. Contingit enim ab hoc loco in hunc locum primo quidem moveri circulariter, quasi per arcum quendam; postmodum vero motu recto, quasi per lineam rectam. Et similiter sequitur in motibus animalium, quod ambulatio, quae est per lineam rectam, sit eadem secundum speciem volutationi, qua animal per lineam circularem volvendo se movetur. 698. Then, at a difficulty, however (227b14), he raises a question about the foregoing: whether a motion is specifically one and the same when the same thing changes frequently from the same thing to the same thing—for instance, when a point (according to the geometers who imagine that a point can be moved) changes again and again from this place to that. Now, according to the foregoing, it seems that the answer should be yes. For if all motions that tend to the same species, such as whiteness, are specifically the same, all the more should two motions from the same origin to the same terminus be specifically one. But, if that were so, then it would follow that a rectilinear motion is specifically the same as a circular motion. For it is possible to pass from this place to that by means of a circular motion—that is, by describing an arc—and afterward by going in a straight line. Likewise, it would follow that, in the motions of animals, walking (which is in a straight line) would be specifically the same as rolling, which consists in turning oneself in circles. Hanc autem dubitationem solvit secundum praemissa. However, he answers this difficulty in the light of the foregoing. Determinatum est enim quod, si id in quo est motus, est alterum specie, et motus est alter specie; For it has been decided that, if that in which the motion takes place is specifically different (as in the present instance the circular path is specifically different from the straight), the motion itself is also different. ut sic ad hoc quod motus sit idem specie, non solum requiratur identitas termini secundum speciem, sed etiam identitas eius per quod transit motus. Consequently, in order that two motions be specifically the same, not only must the goal be specifically the same, but also that through which the motion passes. Manifestum est autem quod linea recta et circularis sunt diversae secundum speciem: unde motus circularis et rectus, et volutatio et ambulatio, non sunt idem secundum speciem, quamvis sint inter eosdem terminos; quia via non est eadem secundum speciem. Now, it is clear that a straight line is specifically different from the curved. Consequently, a circular and a rectilinear motion, as well as walking and rolling, are not specifically the same, even though they tend to the same goal, because the paths are not specifically the same. Sed si sint idem termini, et eadem via secundum speciem, sunt idem motus secundum speciem. Et multo magis si termini et via sunt eadem numero, motus iterati erunt idem secundum speciem. But, if the goals are identical and the paths specifically the same, then the motions are specifically the same; and much more so, if the goals and the path are numerically the same, then the same repeated motions will be specifically the same. 699. Deinde cum dicit: simpliciter autem unus motus est etc., ponit tertium modum, quo motus dicitur unus numero. 699. Then, at motion is one in an unqualified sense (227b21), he posits the third way in which a motion is said to be one, namely, numerically. Et circa hoc duo facit: About this, he does two things: primo manifestat quis motus sit unus numero; first, he explains when a motion is numerically one; secundo circa hoc movet quasdam dubitationes, ibi: Socratem autem etc. second, he raises some question on this point, at suppose, however, that Socrates (228a3; [700]). Dicit ergo primo quod secundum praedictos modos non dicitur motus unus simpliciter, sed secundum quid, scilicet genere et specie. Tertio autem modo dicitur motus simpliciter unus, qui est unus numero secundum suam essentiam. He says first (227b6) that, in the first two senses, motions are not unqualifiedly one, but they are one only in a sense, that is, in genus and species. But, in the third sense, a motion is one in an unqualified sense, namely, when it is numerically one in its essence. Quis autem motus sit hoc modo unus, manifestum erit distinguendo ea quae requiruntur ad motum. Sunt enim numero tria circa quae consistit unitas motus: Which motion is one in this way will be clear if we distinguish the things required for motion, for there are numerically three things on which the unity of a motion depends: scilicet subiectum quod movetur; first, the subject that is being moved; et genus vel species, in qua est motus; second, the genus or species of the motion; et tempus quando movetur. third, the time in which the motion takes place. Et manifestat singula. And he explains each of these individually. Quod movetur quidem dictum est, quia necesse est aliquid esse in quocumque motu quod movetur, sicut hominem aut aurum vel quodcumque corpus. Et similiter necesse est hoc, vel quaecumque alia mobilia, moveri in aliquo genere vel specie, puta in loco aut in passione, idest in passibili qualitate. Et similiter necesse est considerare quando movetur: quia omne quod movetur, movetur in tempore. A subject of motion is required, for in every case of motion, there must be something that is being moved, like a man or gold or some body. Likewise, the subject must be affected by some genus or species of motion, such as place or a passion. Again, the time must be considered, because whatever is moved is moved in time. Contingit autem de numero horum trium inveniri unum genere aut specie in re in qua est motus, sicut in loco vel in qualitate. Sed in tempore non est attendenda quantum ad unitatem motus unitas generis vel speciei, cum non sit nisi unum tempus secundum speciem; sed quod sit habitum, idest continuo consequens absque interpolatione. Now, among these three things, the generic or specific unity of the motion can depend on the thing in which there is motion, such as the place or quality. But the time does not account for the generic or specific unity of the motion, for there is only one species of time; rather, it accounts for the contiguous, that is, that it flows on without interruption. Unitas autem motus secundum quam dicitur simpliciter unus, consistit in unitate omnium horum. But unity of motion in the sense of unqualified unity depends on all three. Oportet enim id in quo est motus, esse unum et indivisibile, eo modo quo species specialissima indivisibilis dicitur. For that in which the motion exists must be one and indivisible in the way that the most particular species, incapable of further subdivision, is said to be one. Et iterum oportet ipsum tempus, quando fit motus, esse unum continuum et non deficiens, idest absque interpolatione. Further, the time during which the motion occurs must be continuous, without any breaks. Et tertio oportet id quod movetur esse unum. Third, the subject in motion must be one. Sed excludit duos modos unitatis subiecti, qui non sufficiunt ad hoc, quod motus sit unus simpliciter. However, there are two types of unity of subject that are not sufficient to guarantee that the motion is unqualifiedly one. Primus modus est secundum accidens; sicut Coriscus et albus sunt unum secundum accidens, nec tamen motus proprius Corisci, et motus proprius albi est unus. Motus enim proprius albi est nigrum fieri, et motus proprius Corisci est ambulare; qui quidem motus differunt. The first type is accidental: for example, Coriscus and white are accidentally one, but the motion proper to Coriscus in not the same as the motion proper to white. For the proper motion of white is to become black, and the motion proper to Coriscus is to walk, and these are different. Secundus modus est unitas generis vel speciei: non enim ad hoc quod sit unus motus numero, sufficit quod subiectum sit unum sicut aliquid commune, vel genus vel species. Contingit enim duos homines in eodem tempore sanari, et secundum eandem speciem sanationis, puta quia sanantur de ophthalmia, quae est infirmitas oculorum: et sic concurrit unitas ipsius quando, et eius in quo, et unitas subiecti secundum speciem. Non tamen hae duae sanationes sunt unus motus numero, sed unus specie. The second type is generic and specific unity. For in order that a motion be numerically one, it is not enough that the subject be one as something common either generically or specifically. For it is possible that two men are being healed during the same period of time in regard to the same thing (for example, from inflammation of the eye), such that the time is one and the species is one, and the subject is one in species. Yet these two healings are not one numerically, but only specifically. 700. Deinde cum dicit: Socratem autem etc., introducit quandam dubitationem. 700. Then, at suppose, however, that Socrates (228a3), he raises a question. Et circa hoc tria facit: And about this, he does three things: primo ponit id quod videtur in primo aspectu de unitate motus secundum numerum; first, he mentions what at first glance seems to be a motion numerically one; secundo movet dubitationem circa hoc, ibi: habet autem dubitationem etc.; second, he raises a question about this, at and, akin to this difficulty (228a6; [701]); tertio determinat veritatem, ibi: eadem enim ratio est etc. third, he gives the true solution, at the same argument applies (228a12; [702]). Dicit ergo primo quod contingit aliquod unum mobile, ut Socratem, secundum alterationem eandem specie, alterari in uno tempore, et iterum in alio; sicut si sanetur bis de ophthalmia. Haec autem iterata alteratio erit unus motus numero, ut videtur in primo aspectu, si sanitas quae acquiritur sit eadem numero. Et hoc erit si contingat id quod est corruptum, iterum fieri unum numero, quod videtur impossibile. Sanitas enim quae in prima alteratione fuit acquisita, postmodum fuit corrupta; et non potest recuperari eadem numero. He says first (228a3) that it is possible for one mobile—for instance, Socrates—to be altered at two different times with respect to the same specific disease, such as if he is twice healed of eye inflammation. This repeated healing will at first sight be numerically one motion, if the health acquired is numerically the same in both cases. And this will be so if it is possible for that which ceased to be to come again into being as the same numerical thing—which seems impossible. For the health acquired after the first alteration was later lost, and the same numerical health cannot be regained. Sed videtur quod si recuperetur eadem numero, quod alteratio sequens esset unus numero motus cum prima: si vero non recuperetur eadem sanitas numero, erit quidem motus idem specie, sed non unus numero. But it seems that, if the same numerical health were regained, the second alteration would be numerically the same motion as the first. But, if the same numerical health is not regained, the motion will not be numerically the same, but specifically. 701. Deinde cum dicit: habet autem dubitationem etc., movet quandam aliam dubitationem circa hoc. Et dubitatio talis est: si aliquis continue perseveret in sanitate, vel in quocumque alio accidente, utrum una sanitas, vel quicumque alius habitus aut passio, possit esse in corporibus? Et videtur quod non; quia quibusdam philosophis visum fuit, quod omnia subiecta quae habent aliquas qualitates aut habitus, sint in continuo motu et fluxu. 701. Then, at and, akin to this difficulty (228a6), he raises another difficulty on this point: if someone continually perseveres in health or any other accident, could the health, or any other habit or passion in bodies, be one? It seems not, because certain philosophers believe that all subjects that possess certain qualities or habits are in continuous motion and flux. Si ergo in aliquo qui sanus perseverat, una et eadem sanitas est, quae fuit in mane et quae est nunc in meridie vel sero; non videtur posse reddi ratio quare, etiam si aliquis deficit a sanitate et iterum accipiat sanitatem, secunda sanitas recuperata non sit una numero cum sanitate prius habita. If, therefore, in the case of a person who remains healthy, there is one and the same health at dawn and at noon and in the evening, there seems to be no reason why, in the case of a person who gets sick and then recovers, the health recovered is not numerically the same as the one previously possessed. Hanc autem dubitationem Aristoteles non solvit, quia non est ad propositum; sed magis ad considerationem metaphysici pertinet, ad quem pertinet considerare communiter de uno et multo, et eodem et diverso. Et iterum quia illa dubitatio super falso fundatur, scilicet quod omnia sint in continuo motu et fluxu, quod Heraclitus opinatus est, et Aristoteles improbat in IV Metaphys. Nec tamen est similis ratio: quia quamdiu sanitas manet, licet varietur homo secundum sanitatem, ut puta si fiat homo magis vel minus sanus, non intercipitur esse sanitatis, sicut intercipitur quando totaliter corrumpitur sanitas. Aristotle does not settle this question because it is not to the point, since it pertains to metaphysics, whose province is to consider the one and the many, the same and the diverse; second, he refrains from answering because this difficulty is based on the false assumption that all things are in a state of continuous change and flux, as Heraclitus believed—an opinion that Aristotle refutes in Metaphysics 4. Moreover, the two cases are not the same: as long as health remains in spite of fluctuations in degree, the original health is not interrupted, as it is in the case of one who completely loses his health. 702. Deinde cum dicit: eadem enim ratio etc., determinat veritatem circa id quod praedixerat. Dixerat enim supra, quod si sit eadem qualitas quae recuperatur, erit idem motus numero secunda alteratio cum prima; si vero non redit eadem numero qualitas, sequitur quod non sit unus actus numero. 702. Then, at the same argument applies (228a12), he determines the truth in regard to the case mentioned above. He mentioned there that, if it is the same quality that is recovered, the second alteration will be numerically the same motion as the first; if the same numerical quality is not recovered, then it is not numerically the same act.