Dicimus enim frigus esse causam caloris abscedendo, sicut gubernator per sui absentiam est causa submersionis navis: similiter etiam frigus per accidens fit causa caloris, vel per maiorem elongationem, vel etiam per maiorem appropinquationem; sicut in hyeme interiora animalium sunt calidiora, calore ad interius recurrente propter frigus circumstans.
For we say that cold is the cause of warmth by departing in the way that a captain is, by his absence, the cause of the sinking of a ship. Again, cold becomes per accidens the cause of warmth either by moving farther away or by approaching closer, as in the winter, the interior of animals is warmer, because their heat retreats inward on account of the surrounding cold.
Sic etiam est in agente secundum intellectum. Scientia enim, licet sit una contrariorum, tamen non aequaliter utrorumque, sed unius principaliter; sicut medicina ad hoc est per se ordinata, quod faciat sanitatem. Si ergo contingat quod medicus utatur sua scientia in contrarium ad inducendum aegritudinem, hoc non erit ex scientia per se, sed per accidens, propter aliquid aliud. Et ad hoc quod illud aliud adveniat cum prius non esset, necesse est esse aliquam mutationem.
The same applies to things that act by intellect. For although knowledge is one thing dealing with contraries, it does not deal equally with them both, but with one principally, as medicine is per se ordained to causing health. Therefore, if it happens that a doctor uses his knowledge for the contrary purpose of causing sickness, this will not be per se from this science, but per accidens, on account of something else. And, in order that something else occur when previously it did not exist, some change is required.
978. Deinde cum dicit: sed igitur quaecumque etc., inducit probationem ad propositum ostendendum. Dicit ergo quod ex quo ita est, quod simili modo se habet in iis quae agunt secundum naturam et secundum intellectum, possumus universaliter de omnibus loquentes dicere, quod quaecumque sunt possibilia facere aut pati aut movere vel moveri, non penitus possibilia sunt, idest non possunt movere aut moveri in quacumque dispositione se habeant; sed prout se habent in aliqua determinata habitudine et propinquitate ad invicem.
978. Then, at but, at any rate (251b1), he sets forth the proof that manifests his proposition. Therefore, he says that, from the fact that things are such—that is, that a similar situation prevails with respect to things that act by nature and things that act by intellect—then, speaking universally of all, we can say that whatever things are possible to make, or to be acted upon, or to cause motion, or to be moved, are capable of it not under all conditions; that is, they cannot cause motion or be moved in just any disposition in which they find themselves, but according as they are in some definite state and nearness with respect to each other.
Et hoc concludit ex praemissis: quia iam dictum est, quod tam in agentibus secundum naturam, quam in agentibus secundum voluntatem, non est aliquid causa diversorum, nisi in aliqua alia habitudine se habens.
And this he concludes from the premises, because it has already been said that, both in things that act according to nature and in things that act according to will, nothing is the cause of diverse things except as it is a different state.
Et sic oportet quod quando appropinquant ad invicem movens et motum convenienti propinquitate, et similiter cum sunt in quacumque dispositione quae requiritur ad hoc quod unum moveat et aliud moveatur, necesse sit hoc moveri, et aliud movere.
Accordingly, it is necessary that, when the mover and the moved approach one another according to a suitable distance and, likewise, when they are in whatever disposition is required for one to cause motion and for the other to be moved, then the one must be moved and the other must cause motion.
Si ergo non semper erat motus, manifestum est quod non se habebant in ista habitudine ut tunc unum moveret et aliud moveretur; sed se habebant sicut non possibilia tunc movere et moveri; postmodum autem se habent in ista habitudine ut unum moveat et aliud moveatur. Ergo necesse est quod alterum eorum mutetur.
If, therefore, there was not always motion, it is clear that existing things were not in that state that allowed for one to cause motion and another to be moved; rather, they were in the state of not being able to cause motion and of being moved at that time. But they later reached that state in which one moves and the other is moved. Therefore, one or the other of them changed.
Hoc enim videmus accidere in omnibus quae dicuntur ad aliquid, quod nunquam advenit nova habitudo, nisi per mutationem utriusque vel alterius; sicut si aliquid, cum prius non esset duplum, nunc factum est duplum, etsi non mutetur utrumque extremorum, saltem oportet quod alterum mutetur. Et sic si de novo adveniat habitudo per quam aliquid moveat et aliud moveatur, oportet vel utrumque vel alterum moveri prius. Et sic sequitur quod sit mutatio quaedam prior mutatione, quae dicebatur esse prima.
For we see that, in all things that are said to be relative, it does not happen that a new relation arises except through a change affecting one or the other or both—as, for example, if something that previously was not double has now become double, even though not both of the extremes were changed, yet at least one of them was. Accordingly, if there newly arises a relationship by which something causes motion and something is moved, then one or the other or both had to be previously moved. Hence, it follows that there is a change prior to the one assumed to be the first.
979. Deinde cum dicit: adhuc autem prius et posterius etc., ostendit propositum, ratione sumpta ex parte temporis.
979. Then, at further, how can there be (251b10), he explains his proposition with an argument from time.
Et primo praemittit duo quae sunt necessaria ad sequentem probationem.
First, he sets down two things necessary for his proposition.
Quorum primum est, quod prius et posterius esse non possunt nisi tempus sit, cum tempus nihil sit aliud quam prius et posterius secundum quod sunt numerata.
The first of these is that prior and subsequent cannot occur unless there is time, since time is nothing else than prior and subsequent precisely as numbered.
Secundum est, quod tempus non potest esse nisi sit motus; et hoc etiam patet ex definitione temporis, quam supra in quarto posuit, dicens quod tempus est numerus motus secundum prius et posterius.
The second is that, time cannot exist unless there is motion. This too is clear from the definition given in book 4, describing time as the number of motion with respect to prior and subsequent.
980. Secundo ibi: si igitur tempus etc., concludit quandam conditionalem ex iis quae in quarto dicta sunt. Posuit enim ibi secundum suam sententiam, quod tempus est numerus motus: secundum vero aliorum philosophorum sententiam, tempus est motus quidam, ut ibidem dixit. Quodcumque autem horum sit verum, sequitur hanc conditionalem esse veram: si tempus semper est, necesse est motum esse perpetuum.
980. Second, at if, then, time (251b12), he argues for a conditional proposition from statements made in book 4. For there, according to his doctrine, he stated time to be the number of motion; according to the doctrine of the other philosophers, time is a motion, as he there stated. But, whichever of these is true, it follows that this conditional is true: if time always exists, it is necessary that motion be perpetual.
981. Tertio ibi: at vero de tempore etc., probat antecedens praedictae conditionalis dupliciter.
981. Third, at but, so far as time (251b13), he proves in two ways the antecedent of this conditional.
Primo quidem per opiniones aliorum. Et dicit quod omnes philosophi praeter unum, scilicet Platonem, concorditer videntur sentire de tempore quod sit ingenitum, idest quod non inceperit esse postquam prius non fuit. Unde et Democritus probat impossibile esse quod omnia sint facta, quasi de novo inceperint, quia impossibile est sic tempus esse factum, quod de novo inceperit.
He proves it first from the opinions of others. And he says that all the philosophers but one, Plato, seem to be in accord with regard to the opinion that time is not begotten, that is, that it did not begin to exist after previously not existing. From this, Democritus also proved that it is impossible that all things should have been made in the sense of newly beginning to be, because it is impossible that time have been so made that it begin newly to be.
Sed solus Plato generat tempus, idest dicit tempus de novo factum. Dicit enim Plato quod tempus est simul factum cum caelo; ponebat autem caelum esse factum, idest habere durationis principium, ut hic Aristoteles ei imponit, secundum quod eius verba superficietenus sonare videntur; quamvis Platonici dicant Platonem sic dixisse caelum esse factum, inquantum habet principium activum sui esse, non autem ita quod habeat durationis principium.
Only Plato generates time, that is, says that time was newly made. For he says that time was made at the same time as the heavens, and he supposed that the heavens had a generation, that is, that they have a beginning of their duration, as Aristotle here claims, and as Plato’s words seem at first glance to indicate—although Platonists say that Plato asserted that the heavens were made in the sense that they have an active principle of their existence but not as having a principle of their duration.
Sic igitur solus Plato intellexisse videtur quod tempus non potest esse sine motu; quia non posuit tempus esse ante motum caeli.
Thus, therefore, does Plato alone seem to have conceived that time cannot be without motion, for he did not suppose that time existed before the motion of the heavens.
982. Secundo ibi: si igitur impossibile etc., probat idem per rationem: quia impossibile est quod dicatur aut intelligatur esse tempus absque ipso nunc, sicut impossibile est quod sit linea sine puncto. Nunc autem est quoddam medium, habens de sui ratione quod sit simul et principium et finis, principium quidem futuri temporis, finis autem praeteriti. Ex quo apparet quod necesse est semper esse tempus. Quodcumque enim tempus accipiatur, eius extremum est aliquod nunc ex utraque parte. Et hoc patet per hoc, quod nihil est accipere in actu de tempore, nisi nunc: quia quod praeteritum est, iam abiit; quod autem futurum est, nondum est. Nunc autem quod accipitur in extremo temporis, est principium et finis, ut dictum est. Ergo necesse est quod ex utraque parte cuiuscumque temporis accepti, semper sit tempus: alioquin primum nunc non esset finis, et ultimum nunc non esset principium.
982. Second, at now, since time (251b17), he proves the same point by an argument from the fact that it is impossible to say or to understand that time exists without the now, just as it is impossible that there be a line without a point. The now, however, is something intermediate, having as part of its account that it be at once a beginning and an end—that is, the beginning of a future time but the end of a past. From this, it appears necessary for time always to be. For whatever time is taken, its boundary is a now in both senses. And this is clear from the fact that nothing is actual in time but the now, because what is past has gone by and what is future does not yet exist. But the now that is taken as the boundary of time is both a beginning and an end, as has been said. Therefore, it is necessary that, from both aspects of whatever time is taken, time always be; otherwise, the first now would not be an end and the last not a beginning.
Ex hoc autem quod tempus est sempiternum, concludit quod necesse est motum sempiternum esse. Et rationem consequentiae assignat: quia tempus est quaedam proprietas motus; est enim numerus eius, ut dictum est.
But, from the fact that time is eternal, he concludes that motion too must be eternal; the reason for this conclusion being that time is a property of motion, for it is its number, as was said.
983. Videtur autem quod Aristotelis ratio non sit efficax. Sic enim se habet nunc ad tempus, sicut punctum ad lineam, ut in sexto habitum est: non est autem de ratione puncti quod sit medium; sed aliquod punctum est quod est tantum principium lineae, aliquod autem quod est tantum finis: accideret autem omne punctum esse principium et finem, inquantum est lineae infinitae. Non ergo posset probari quod linea sit infinita, ex hoc quod omne punctum sit principium et finis:
983. But the argument of Aristotle does not appear efficacious. For the now is to time as the point is to the line, as was explained in book 6. But it is not necessary that a point be an intermediate, for some points are merely the beginnings of lines and others the ends, although every point would be both a beginning and an end if the line were infinite. One could not, therefore, prove that a line is infinite from the fact that every point is a beginning and an end.
sed potius e converso, ex hoc quod linea est infinita, probandum esset quod omne punctum esset principium et finis.
Rather, it is the other way around: from the fact of a line’s being infinite, one would go on to prove that every point would be both a beginning and an end.
Sic ergo videtur quod omne nunc esse principium et finem, non sic sit verum, nisi ex eo quod tempus ponitur sempiternum. Videtur ergo Aristoteles in assumptione huius medii supponere sempiternitatem temporis, quam debet probare.
Accordingly, it also appears that the claim that every now is a beginning and an end is not true unless time is assumed to be eternal. Therefore, in assuming this as a middle term (namely, that every now is a beginning and an end), Aristotle seems to suppose the eternity of time—the very thing he ought to prove.
Averroes autem volens salvare Aristotelis rationem, dicit quod hoc quod nunc semper sit principium et finis, convenit ei inquantum tempus non est stans sicut linea, sed fluens. Quod manifestum est nihil ad propositum pertinere. Ex hoc enim quod tempus est fluens et non stans, sequitur quod unum nunc non possit bis sumi, sicut bis sumitur unum punctum: sed fluxus temporis nihil facit ad hoc quod nunc sit principium et finis simul. Eiusdem enim rationis est inceptio et terminatio in omnibus continuis, sive sint permanentia, sive fluentia, ut ex sexto patet.
Now, Averroes, in trying to save Aristotle’s argument, says that the attribute of always being both a beginning and an end belongs to the now inasmuch as time is not stationary like a line, but flowing. But this does not pertain to the proposition. For from the fact that time is flowing and not stationary, it follows that one now cannot be taken twice in the way that one point is taken twice, but the flow of time has nothing to do with the now being at once a beginning and an end. For the account of beginning and end is the same in all continua, whether they be permanent or flowing, as is clear from book 6.
984. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, secundum intentionem Aristotelis, quod hoc quod omne nunc sit principium et finis, vult accipere ex eo quod primo supposuit, scilicet quod prius et posterius non sit, tempore non existente: hoc enim principio supposito ad nihil aliud usus est; sed ex hoc concluditur quod omne nunc sit principium et finis.
984. And, therefore, another explanation must be furnished in accord with the intention of Aristotle, which is that he wishes to derive the fact that every now is a beginning and an end from what he had first supposed, namely, that prior and subsequent would not exist if time did not exist. For he uses this principle, which he supposes for no other purpose, but deduces from it that every now is a beginning and an end.
Detur enim quod aliquod nunc sit principium alicuius temporis: manifestum est autem ex definitione principii, quod principium temporis est ante quod nihil eius existit: est ergo accipere aliquid ante vel prius quam ipsum nunc, quod ponitur principium temporis. Prius autem non est sine tempore: ergo nunc quod ponitur principium temporis, est etiam temporis finis. Et eodem modo si ponatur nunc esse finis temporis, sequitur quod sit etiam principium: quia de ratione finis est quod post ipsum nihil sit eius: posterius autem non est sine tempore: sequitur ergo quod nunc quod ponitur finis, sit etiam principium temporis.
For let us suppose that some now is the beginning of a time; but it is clear from the definition of a beginning that the beginning of a time is that before which nothing of the time existed. Therefore, there must be taken something before or prior to the now that is assumed as the beginning of the time. Prior, however, does not exist without time. Therefore, the now that is taken as the beginning of a time is also the end of a time. In the same way, if the now is given as the end of a time, it follows that it will also be a beginning, because an end is by definition that after which nothing of a thing exists; but after cannot be without time. Therefore, it follows that the now that is the end of a time is also a beginning.
985. Deinde cum dicit: eadem autem ratio est etc., ostendit quod motus semper sit futurus. Et ostendit hoc ex parte motus: quia ratio supra ex parte motus accepta, non concludebat nisi quod motus nunquam incipiat; ratio vero sumpta ex parte temporis, concludebat utrumque, et quod nunquam inceperit, et quod nunquam deficiat. Dicit ergo quod eadem ratione potest probari quod motus sit incorruptibilis, idest quod nunquam deficiat, per quam probatur quod motus nunquam incepit. Sicut enim ex hoc quod est motum incipere, sequitur quod sit quaedam mutatio prior mutatione quae ponitur prima; sic si ponatur quod motus quandoque deficiat, sequitur quod sit aliqua mutatio posterior ea quae ponitur postrema.
985. Then, at the same reasoning (251b28), he shows that motion will always be. And he shows this on the part of motion, because the argument from motion given above concluded only that motion never began, whereas the argument from time concluded both that it never began and that it never ceases. He says, therefore, that the very argument by which it was proved that motion never began can prove that motion is incorruptible, that is, that it will never end. For just as it followed from the assumption that motion began that there was a change prior to the change assumed to be first, so too, if it be supposed that motion at some time ceases, it follows that a change will occur after the one assumed to be the last.
Et quomodo hoc sequatur manifestat abbreviando quod supra diffusius dixerat circa inceptionem motus. Posuerat enim quod si motus incepit, aut mobilia et moventia inceperunt, aut semper fuerunt. Et similis divisio posset hic fieri; quia si motus deficiat, aut mobilia et moventia remanebunt, aut non: sed quia supra ostenderat quod idem sequitur secundum utrumque, ideo hic non utitur nisi altera via, scilicet quod ponatur sic motus deficere, quod mobilia et moventia deficiant.
How this follows he explains by abbreviating the more diffuse explanation he gave with regard to the beginning of motion. For he had supposed that, if motion began, the mobiles and movers either began or always were. The same alternatives can be taken here: if motion should cease, the mobiles and movers will remain or they will not. But, because he had previously shown that the same conclusion follows from either alternative, therefore he uses only the one alternative here, namely, the supposition that motion ceases in such a way that the mobiles and movers also pass away.
Hoc ergo supposito, dicit quod non simul quiescit, idest deficit, motus in actu et ipsum mobile: sed sicut prior est generatio mobilis quam motus eius, ita posterior est corruptio mobilis quam cessatio motus. Quod sic patet: quia contingit quod remaneat aliquid combustibile, postquam desinit comburi.
Therefore, beginning with the assumption mentioned, he says that both the actual motion and the mobile do not cease to move—that is, pass away—simultaneously; but, just as the generation of a mobile is prior to its motion, so the ceasing to be of a mobile is subsequent to the passing away of its motion. This is so because something combustible can remain after combustion ceases.
Et sicut dictum est de mobili, ita dicendum est de motivo: quia non simul desinit esse movens in actu, et esse motivum in potentia. Sic igitur patet quod si etiam ipsum mobile corrumpitur post cessationem motus, necessarium erit esse quandam corruptionem ipsius mobilis.
And what was said of the mobile must also be said of the mover, because a mover in act does not, in ceasing to be, cease at the same time to be a mover in potency. Accordingly, it is evident that, if even the mobile ceases to be after the destruction of its motion, then there has to be a process by which the mobile passes out of existence.
Et iterum quia ponitur quod omnia moventia et mota desinunt, necessarium erit posterius, quod etiam ipsum corruptivum corrumpatur. Cum ergo corruptio sit mutatio quaedam, sequetur quod post ultimam mutationem sint aliquae mutationes. Cum ergo hoc sit impossibile, sequitur quod motus in perpetuum duret.
And again, because we are supposing that all mobiles and motions are ceasing to be, it will be necessary later that even the cause of their ceasing to be ceases to be. But because ceasing to be is a type of motion, it will follow that, after the final change, other changes occur. But, since this is impossible, it follows that motion endures forever.
986. Hae igitur rationes sunt, ex quibus Aristoteles probare intendit motum semper fuisse et nunquam deficere. Quod quidem quantum ad unam partem fidei nostrae repugnat, scilicet quod ponatur motus semper fuisse. Nihil enim secundum fidem nostram ponitur semper fuisse, nisi solus Deus, qui est omnino immobilis: nisi forte quis ipsum divinum intelligere velit nominare motum; quod aequivoce intelligeretur: non enim de tali motu Aristoteles hic intelligit, sed de motu proprie dicto.
986. These, therefore, are the arguments by which Aristotle intends to prove that motion always has been and will never cease. The first part of this—namely, that motion always existed—conflicts with our faith. For our faith admits nothing as eternally existing but God alone, who is utterly immobile—unless, of course, you wish to refer to the act of the divine intellect as a motion. But that would be an equivocal sense, and Aristotle is not here speaking of motion in that sense, but of motion properly so called.
Quantum vero ad aliam partem, non omnino est contrarium fidei: quia ut supra dictum est, non agit Aristoteles de motu caeli, sed universaliter de motu. Ponimus autem secundum fidem nostram, substantiam mundi sic quandoque incepisse, quod tamen nunquam desinat esse. Ponimus etiam quod aliqui motus semper erunt, praesertim in hominibus, qui semper remanebunt, incorruptibilem vitam agentes, vel miseram vel beatam.
The other part of the conclusion is not entirely contrary to the faith, because, as was said above, Aristotle is not treating of the motion of the heavens in particular but of motion universally. Now, we believe according to our faith that the substance of the world indeed began, yet so as never to cease. For we posit that some motions will always exist, especially in men, who will always remain living an unceasing life either of happiness or misery.
Quidam vero frustra conantes Aristotelem ostendere non contra fidem locutum esse, dixerunt quod Aristoteles non intendit hic probare quasi verum, quod motus sit perpetuus; sed inducere rationem ad utramque partem, quasi ad rem dubiam: quod ex ipso modo procedendi frivolum apparet. Et praeterea, perpetuitate temporis et motus quasi principio utitur ad probandum primum principium esse, et hic in octavo et in XII Metaphys.; unde manifestum est, quod supponit hoc tanquam probatum.
But some, vainly trying to show that Aristotle concluded nothing contrary to the faith, have said that Aristotle does not intend here to prove as a truth that motion is eternal, but to allege reason for both sides of a question that is doubtful. But this is a foolish statement to anyone who investigates Aristotle’s procedure here. Moreover, he uses the eternity of time and of motion as a principle to prove the existence of a first principle both here in Physics 8 and in Metaphysics 12. This shows that he considered it proved.
987. Sed si quis recte rationes hic positas consideret, huiusmodi rationibus veritas fidei efficaciter impugnari non potest. Sunt enim huiusmodi rationes efficaces ad probandum quod motus non inceperit per viam naturae, sicut ab aliquibus ponebatur: sed quod non inceperit quasi rebus de novo productis a primo rerum principio, ut fides nostra ponit, hoc iis rationibus probari non potest; quod patet singulas illationes hic positas consideranti.
987. But, if one rightly considers the arguments here given, the truth of the faith is not assailed by them. For they prove that motion did not begin through the way of nature, as some taught it did; but it cannot be proved by these arguments that it did not begin by things being created by a first principle of things, as our faith holds. And that will be evident to anyone who considers each of the inferences here drawn by Aristotle.
Cum enim quaerit, si motus non semper fuit, utrum moventia et mobilia semper fuerunt vel non: respondendum est quod primum movens semper fuit; omnia vero alia, sive sint moventia sive mobilia, non semper fuerunt, sed inceperunt esse a causa universali totius esse. Ostensum est autem supra, quod productio totius esse a causa prima essendi, non est motus, sive ponatur quod haec rerum emanatio sit ab aeterno, sive non. Sic ergo non sequitur quod ante primam mutationem sit aliqua mutatio. Sequeretur autem si moventia et mobilia essent de novo producta in esse ab aliquo agente particulari, quod ageret aliquo subiecto praesupposito, quod transmutaretur de non esse in esse, sive de privatione ad formam: de hoc enim modo incipiendi procedit ratio Aristotelis.
For when he asks whether or not the movers and mobiles always existed if motion did not always exist, the reply must be that the first mover always existed; other things—movers or mobiles—did not always exist, but began to exist from the universal cause of all existence. But it has been pointed out above that the production of all being by the first cause of being is not a motion, whether this coming forth be taken to be from eternity or not. Accordingly, it does not follow that, before the first change, there was a previous change. But this would follow if the movers and mobiles were newly brought into existence by some particular agent acting upon some presupposed subject that would be changed from non-being to being, or from privation to form—and Aristotle’s argument concerns this way of coming into existence.
988. Sed quia ponimus saltem primum motorem semper fuisse, respondendum restat sequenti eius deductioni, qua concludit quod si, praeexistentibus moventibus et mobilibus, incipiat de novo esse motus, oportet quod moventia vel mobilia prius non essent in hac dispositione, in qua sunt dum est motus; et sic oportet quod primam mutationem praecedat aliqua mutatio.
988. But, because we posit that at least a first mover always existed, we need to give an answer to his subsequent deduction that, if movers and mobiles preexist and motion begins newly to be in them, then the movers or mobiles could not previously have been in that disposition in which they are while there is motion; therefore, some change must have preceded the first change.
Et si quidem de ipso motu loquamur, facilis est responsio: non enim mobilia prius erant in hac dispositione in qua nunc sunt, quia prius non erant; unde moveri non poterant. Sed sicut dictum est, ipsum esse non acquisiverunt per mutationem vel motum, sed per emanationem a primo rerum principio: et sic non sequitur quod ante primam mutationem sit aliqua mutatio. Sed ulterius remanet quaestio de prima rerum productione. Si enim primum principium, quod est Deus, non aliter se habet nunc quam prius, non magis nunc res producit quam prius: si vero aliter se habet, saltem mutatio quae est ex parte eius, erit prior mutatione quae ponitur prima.
Now, if we are speaking of the motion itself, the answer is easy. The mobiles were not previously in that disposition in which they now are, because previously they did not exist; hence, they could not be moved. But, as it has been said, they received their existence not through a change or motion, but through coming forth from the first principle of things; accordingly, it does not follow that, before the first change, there was a change. But there still remains the question about the first production of things. For if the first principle, which is God, is no different now than before, then neither does he produce things now any more than before; but if he is different, at least the change affecting him will be prior to the change that is supposed to be the first.