984. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, secundum intentionem Aristotelis, quod hoc quod omne nunc sit principium et finis, vult accipere ex eo quod primo supposuit, scilicet quod prius et posterius non sit, tempore non existente: hoc enim principio supposito ad nihil aliud usus est; sed ex hoc concluditur quod omne nunc sit principium et finis. 984. And, therefore, another explanation must be furnished in accord with the intention of Aristotle, which is that he wishes to derive the fact that every now is a beginning and an end from what he had first supposed, namely, that prior and subsequent would not exist if time did not exist. For he uses this principle, which he supposes for no other purpose, but deduces from it that every now is a beginning and an end. Detur enim quod aliquod nunc sit principium alicuius temporis: manifestum est autem ex definitione principii, quod principium temporis est ante quod nihil eius existit: est ergo accipere aliquid ante vel prius quam ipsum nunc, quod ponitur principium temporis. Prius autem non est sine tempore: ergo nunc quod ponitur principium temporis, est etiam temporis finis. Et eodem modo si ponatur nunc esse finis temporis, sequitur quod sit etiam principium: quia de ratione finis est quod post ipsum nihil sit eius: posterius autem non est sine tempore: sequitur ergo quod nunc quod ponitur finis, sit etiam principium temporis. For let us suppose that some now is the beginning of a time; but it is clear from the definition of a beginning that the beginning of a time is that before which nothing of the time existed. Therefore, there must be taken something before or prior to the now that is assumed as the beginning of the time. Prior, however, does not exist without time. Therefore, the now that is taken as the beginning of a time is also the end of a time. In the same way, if the now is given as the end of a time, it follows that it will also be a beginning, because an end is by definition that after which nothing of a thing exists; but after cannot be without time. Therefore, it follows that the now that is the end of a time is also a beginning. 985. Deinde cum dicit: eadem autem ratio est etc., ostendit quod motus semper sit futurus. Et ostendit hoc ex parte motus: quia ratio supra ex parte motus accepta, non concludebat nisi quod motus nunquam incipiat; ratio vero sumpta ex parte temporis, concludebat utrumque, et quod nunquam inceperit, et quod nunquam deficiat. Dicit ergo quod eadem ratione potest probari quod motus sit incorruptibilis, idest quod nunquam deficiat, per quam probatur quod motus nunquam incepit. Sicut enim ex hoc quod est motum incipere, sequitur quod sit quaedam mutatio prior mutatione quae ponitur prima; sic si ponatur quod motus quandoque deficiat, sequitur quod sit aliqua mutatio posterior ea quae ponitur postrema. 985. Then, at the same reasoning (251b28), he shows that motion will always be. And he shows this on the part of motion, because the argument from motion given above concluded only that motion never began, whereas the argument from time concluded both that it never began and that it never ceases. He says, therefore, that the very argument by which it was proved that motion never began can prove that motion is incorruptible, that is, that it will never end. For just as it followed from the assumption that motion began that there was a change prior to the change assumed to be first, so too, if it be supposed that motion at some time ceases, it follows that a change will occur after the one assumed to be the last. Et quomodo hoc sequatur manifestat abbreviando quod supra diffusius dixerat circa inceptionem motus. Posuerat enim quod si motus incepit, aut mobilia et moventia inceperunt, aut semper fuerunt. Et similis divisio posset hic fieri; quia si motus deficiat, aut mobilia et moventia remanebunt, aut non: sed quia supra ostenderat quod idem sequitur secundum utrumque, ideo hic non utitur nisi altera via, scilicet quod ponatur sic motus deficere, quod mobilia et moventia deficiant. How this follows he explains by abbreviating the more diffuse explanation he gave with regard to the beginning of motion. For he had supposed that, if motion began, the mobiles and movers either began or always were. The same alternatives can be taken here: if motion should cease, the mobiles and movers will remain or they will not. But, because he had previously shown that the same conclusion follows from either alternative, therefore he uses only the one alternative here, namely, the supposition that motion ceases in such a way that the mobiles and movers also pass away. Hoc ergo supposito, dicit quod non simul quiescit, idest deficit, motus in actu et ipsum mobile: sed sicut prior est generatio mobilis quam motus eius, ita posterior est corruptio mobilis quam cessatio motus. Quod sic patet: quia contingit quod remaneat aliquid combustibile, postquam desinit comburi. Therefore, beginning with the assumption mentioned, he says that both the actual motion and the mobile do not cease to move—that is, pass away—simultaneously; but, just as the generation of a mobile is prior to its motion, so the ceasing to be of a mobile is subsequent to the passing away of its motion. This is so because something combustible can remain after combustion ceases. Et sicut dictum est de mobili, ita dicendum est de motivo: quia non simul desinit esse movens in actu, et esse motivum in potentia. Sic igitur patet quod si etiam ipsum mobile corrumpitur post cessationem motus, necessarium erit esse quandam corruptionem ipsius mobilis. And what was said of the mobile must also be said of the mover, because a mover in act does not, in ceasing to be, cease at the same time to be a mover in potency. Accordingly, it is evident that, if even the mobile ceases to be after the destruction of its motion, then there has to be a process by which the mobile passes out of existence. Et iterum quia ponitur quod omnia moventia et mota desinunt, necessarium erit posterius, quod etiam ipsum corruptivum corrumpatur. Cum ergo corruptio sit mutatio quaedam, sequetur quod post ultimam mutationem sint aliquae mutationes. Cum ergo hoc sit impossibile, sequitur quod motus in perpetuum duret. And again, because we are supposing that all mobiles and motions are ceasing to be, it will be necessary later that even the cause of their ceasing to be ceases to be. But because ceasing to be is a type of motion, it will follow that, after the final change, other changes occur. But, since this is impossible, it follows that motion endures forever. 986. Hae igitur rationes sunt, ex quibus Aristoteles probare intendit motum semper fuisse et nunquam deficere. Quod quidem quantum ad unam partem fidei nostrae repugnat, scilicet quod ponatur motus semper fuisse. Nihil enim secundum fidem nostram ponitur semper fuisse, nisi solus Deus, qui est omnino immobilis: nisi forte quis ipsum divinum intelligere velit nominare motum; quod aequivoce intelligeretur: non enim de tali motu Aristoteles hic intelligit, sed de motu proprie dicto. 986. These, therefore, are the arguments by which Aristotle intends to prove that motion always has been and will never cease. The first part of this—namely, that motion always existed—conflicts with our faith. For our faith admits nothing as eternally existing but God alone, who is utterly immobile—unless, of course, you wish to refer to the act of the divine intellect as a motion. But that would be an equivocal sense, and Aristotle is not here speaking of motion in that sense, but of motion properly so called. Quantum vero ad aliam partem, non omnino est contrarium fidei: quia ut supra dictum est, non agit Aristoteles de motu caeli, sed universaliter de motu. Ponimus autem secundum fidem nostram, substantiam mundi sic quandoque incepisse, quod tamen nunquam desinat esse. Ponimus etiam quod aliqui motus semper erunt, praesertim in hominibus, qui semper remanebunt, incorruptibilem vitam agentes, vel miseram vel beatam. The other part of the conclusion is not entirely contrary to the faith, because, as was said above, Aristotle is not treating of the motion of the heavens in particular but of motion universally. Now, we believe according to our faith that the substance of the world indeed began, yet so as never to cease. For we posit that some motions will always exist, especially in men, who will always remain living an unceasing life either of happiness or misery. Quidam vero frustra conantes Aristotelem ostendere non contra fidem locutum esse, dixerunt quod Aristoteles non intendit hic probare quasi verum, quod motus sit perpetuus; sed inducere rationem ad utramque partem, quasi ad rem dubiam: quod ex ipso modo procedendi frivolum apparet. Et praeterea, perpetuitate temporis et motus quasi principio utitur ad probandum primum principium esse, et hic in octavo et in XII Metaphys.; unde manifestum est, quod supponit hoc tanquam probatum. But some, vainly trying to show that Aristotle concluded nothing contrary to the faith, have said that Aristotle does not intend here to prove as a truth that motion is eternal, but to allege reason for both sides of a question that is doubtful. But this is a foolish statement to anyone who investigates Aristotle’s procedure here. Moreover, he uses the eternity of time and of motion as a principle to prove the existence of a first principle both here in Physics 8 and in Metaphysics 12. This shows that he considered it proved. 987. Sed si quis recte rationes hic positas consideret, huiusmodi rationibus veritas fidei efficaciter impugnari non potest. Sunt enim huiusmodi rationes efficaces ad probandum quod motus non inceperit per viam naturae, sicut ab aliquibus ponebatur: sed quod non inceperit quasi rebus de novo productis a primo rerum principio, ut fides nostra ponit, hoc iis rationibus probari non potest; quod patet singulas illationes hic positas consideranti. 987. But, if one rightly considers the arguments here given, the truth of the faith is not assailed by them. For they prove that motion did not begin through the way of nature, as some taught it did; but it cannot be proved by these arguments that it did not begin by things being created by a first principle of things, as our faith holds. And that will be evident to anyone who considers each of the inferences here drawn by Aristotle. Cum enim quaerit, si motus non semper fuit, utrum moventia et mobilia semper fuerunt vel non: respondendum est quod primum movens semper fuit; omnia vero alia, sive sint moventia sive mobilia, non semper fuerunt, sed inceperunt esse a causa universali totius esse. Ostensum est autem supra, quod productio totius esse a causa prima essendi, non est motus, sive ponatur quod haec rerum emanatio sit ab aeterno, sive non. Sic ergo non sequitur quod ante primam mutationem sit aliqua mutatio. Sequeretur autem si moventia et mobilia essent de novo producta in esse ab aliquo agente particulari, quod ageret aliquo subiecto praesupposito, quod transmutaretur de non esse in esse, sive de privatione ad formam: de hoc enim modo incipiendi procedit ratio Aristotelis. For when he asks whether or not the movers and mobiles always existed if motion did not always exist, the reply must be that the first mover always existed; other things—movers or mobiles—did not always exist, but began to exist from the universal cause of all existence. But it has been pointed out above that the production of all being by the first cause of being is not a motion, whether this coming forth be taken to be from eternity or not. Accordingly, it does not follow that, before the first change, there was a previous change. But this would follow if the movers and mobiles were newly brought into existence by some particular agent acting upon some presupposed subject that would be changed from non-being to being, or from privation to form—and Aristotle’s argument concerns this way of coming into existence. 988. Sed quia ponimus saltem primum motorem semper fuisse, respondendum restat sequenti eius deductioni, qua concludit quod si, praeexistentibus moventibus et mobilibus, incipiat de novo esse motus, oportet quod moventia vel mobilia prius non essent in hac dispositione, in qua sunt dum est motus; et sic oportet quod primam mutationem praecedat aliqua mutatio. 988. But, because we posit that at least a first mover always existed, we need to give an answer to his subsequent deduction that, if movers and mobiles preexist and motion begins newly to be in them, then the movers or mobiles could not previously have been in that disposition in which they are while there is motion; therefore, some change must have preceded the first change. Et si quidem de ipso motu loquamur, facilis est responsio: non enim mobilia prius erant in hac dispositione in qua nunc sunt, quia prius non erant; unde moveri non poterant. Sed sicut dictum est, ipsum esse non acquisiverunt per mutationem vel motum, sed per emanationem a primo rerum principio: et sic non sequitur quod ante primam mutationem sit aliqua mutatio. Sed ulterius remanet quaestio de prima rerum productione. Si enim primum principium, quod est Deus, non aliter se habet nunc quam prius, non magis nunc res producit quam prius: si vero aliter se habet, saltem mutatio quae est ex parte eius, erit prior mutatione quae ponitur prima. Now, if we are speaking of the motion itself, the answer is easy. The mobiles were not previously in that disposition in which they now are, because previously they did not exist; hence, they could not be moved. But, as it has been said, they received their existence not through a change or motion, but through coming forth from the first principle of things; accordingly, it does not follow that, before the first change, there was a change. But there still remains the question about the first production of things. For if the first principle, which is God, is no different now than before, then neither does he produce things now any more than before; but if he is different, at least the change affecting him will be prior to the change that is supposed to be the first. Et quidem si esset agens per naturam tantum, et non per voluntatem et intellectum, ex necessitate concluderet ratio: sed quia agit per voluntatem, potest per voluntatem aeternam producere effectum non aeternum, sicut intellectu aeterno potest intelligere rem non aeternam: res enim intellecta est quodammodo principium actionis in agentibus per voluntatem, sicut forma naturalis in agentibus per naturam. And indeed, if he were a cause that acts only through nature and not through intellect and will, this reason would conclude necessarily. But, because he acts through will, he can produce an effect that is non-eternal through an eternal will, just as, by his eternal intellect, he can understand a thing that is non-eternal—the thing understood being in a certain way the principle of action in causes that act by intellect, as a natural form is in causes that act by nature. 989. Sed adhuc magis instat. Non enim videmus quod voluntas postponat facere quod vult, nisi propter hoc quod aliquid exspectatur in futurum, quod nondum est in praesenti; sicut si volo facere ignem non nunc, sed postea exspectatur in futurum frigus, cuius causa facio ignem; vel ad minus exspectatur praesentia temporis. Quod autem tempus succedat post tempus, hoc non est absque motu: non ergo potest esse quod voluntas, etiam si ponatur immutabilis, postponat facere id quod vult, nisi aliquo motu interveniente. Et sic non potest esse quod nova productio rerum proveniat a voluntate aeterna, nisi mediantibus motibus succedentibus sibi in infinitum. 989. But a further point must be pursued. For we do not say that a will postpones doing what it wants unless something is expected in the future that does not yet exist in the present, as, for example, when I will to make a fire later rather than now because it is expected to be cold in the future (or at least this is expected at the present time), on account of which I make the fire. But that time succeeds time does not occur without motion. Therefore, it cannot be that a will, even if it be immutable, postpones doing what it wills without some motion being involved. Accordingly, the new production of things cannot come forth from the eternal will except by means of motions succeeding one another to infinity. Latet autem sic obiicientes, quod haec obiectio procedit de agente in tempore, quod scilicet agit tempore praesupposito: in huiusmodi enim actione quae fit in tempore, oportet considerare aliquam determinatam habitudinem ad hoc tempus, vel ad aliquid eorum quae sunt in hoc tempore, ut fiat magis in hoc tempore quam in alio. Sed haec ratio locum non habet in agente universali, quod et ipsum tempus simul cum ceteris producit. Now, those who raise this objection fail to see that it assumes a thing acting in time, namely, something that acts on the assumption that time exists. For in this kind of action that occurs in time, one must consider some determinate relationship to this time or to things that exist in this time to explain why it be performed in this time rather than in some other time. But this reasoning has no place in the universal agent, which produces time itself at the same time that it produces other things. Cum enim dicimus res non semper fuisse a Deo productas, non intelligimus quod infinitum tempus praecesserit, in quo Deus ab agendo cessaverit, et postmodum tempore determinato agere ceperit: sed quod Deus tempus et res simul in esse produxerit postquam non fuerant. Et sic non restat in divina voluntate considerandum, quod voluerit facere res non tunc sed postea, quasi tempore iam existente: sed considerandum solum est hoc, quod voluit quod res et tempus durationis earum inceperint esse postquam non fuerant. For when we say that things have not always been produced by God, we do not understand that an infinite time preceded in which God refrained from acting, and that later, at a definite time, he began to act; rather, we understand that God produced at once both time and things after they did not exist. Accordingly, we must not consider in the divine will that it willed to make things not then but later, as though time were already existing; rather, we must solely consider the fact that he willed that things and the time of their duration should begin to be after they had not existed at all. Si autem quaeratur quare hoc voluit, sine dubio dicendum est quod propter seipsum. Sicut enim propter seipsum res fecit, ut in eis suae bonitatis similitudo manifestaretur; ita voluit eas non semper esse, ut sua sufficientia manifestaretur, in hoc quod omnibus aliis non existentibus, ipse in seipso omnem sufficientiam beatitudinis habuit, et virtutis ad rerum productionem. If it be asked why he willed this, it must be said without a doubt that it was for his own sake. For just as he made things because of himself, in order that, in them, the likeness of his goodness be manifested, so he willed that they not always be, in order to show his self-sufficiency through that, even though nothing else existed, he in himself had all sufficiency of happiness and of power to produce things. Et hoc quidem dici potest quantum humana ratio capere potest de divinis: salvo tamen secreto divinae sapientiae, quod a nobis comprehendi non potest. And this can indeed be said as far as human reason can grasp divine things, saving, of course, the secret of divine wisdom, which cannot be comprehended by us. 990. Quia igitur huius rationis solutio procedit supponendo quod tempus non fuerit semper, restat solvere rationem per quam ostendi videtur tempus semper fuisse: et ideo forte Aristoteles post rationem de motu posuit rationem de tempore, quia consideravit quod praemissa ratio de motu efficaciam non haberet, nisi poneretur tempus aeternum. Quod ergo dicit, quod quandocumque est tempus, necesse est ponere aliquod nunc esse, indubitanter concedendum est: omne autem nunc esse principium et finem temporis, concedi non oportet, nisi ponatur etiam motum semper esse; ut scilicet sic quodlibet indivisibile in motu acceptum, quod momentum dicitur, sit principium et finis motus: sic enim se habet nunc ad momentum, sicut tempus ad motum. Si ergo ponimus motum non semper fuisse, sed est accipere aliquod primum indivisibile in motu, ante quod nihil fuit motus; erit etiam accipere aliquod nunc in tempore, ante quod non fuit aliquod tempus. 990. Because the solution of this argument proceeded on the supposition that time did not always exist, there remains the problem of solving the argument that seems to prove that time always existed. And perhaps Aristotle, after the argument from motion, gave one from time, because he thought that the one from motion would be inefficacious unless time was assumed to be eternal. Thus, his statement that, whenever there is time, there must be a now existing, must be granted without demur. But the statement that every now is both a beginning and an end should not be conceded unless it be also granted that motion always existed, such that every indivisible of motion (which is called a “moment”) should be both a beginning and an end of motion, for the now is to the moment as time is to motion. If, therefore, we suppose that motion has not always existed, but that we can take some first indivisible in motion before which nothing of motion existed, we can also take some now in time before which there was no time. Iam autem ostendimus, exponendo litteram, quod id quod Averroes dicit ad hanc rationem confirmandam, efficaciam non habet. Sed nec illud quod Aristoteles ad hoc ponit, scilicet quod prius et posterius non sunt sine tempore, efficax esse potest. Now, we have already shown, in explaining the text, that what Averroes says to bolster this argument is inefficacious. But neither is there any efficacy in what Aristotle cites to bolster his own position, namely, that before and after do not exist without time. Cum enim dicimus quod principium temporis est ante quod nihil eius est, non propter hoc oportet quod ipsum nunc quod est principium temporis, praecedat tempus quod significatur cum dicitur ante: sicut si in magnitudine dicam quod principium magnitudinis est extra quod nihil est eius, non oportet quod extra illud principium significet aliquem locum in rerum natura existentem, sed imaginabilem tantum: For when we say that a time’s beginning is that before which nothing of the time existed, we are not thereby compelled to say that the now that is the beginning of the time is preceded by a time signified by the word “before,” any more than, in magnitudes, if I say that the beginning of a magnitude is that beyond which nothing exists of that magnitude, it is necessary to say that the phrase “beyond which beginning” signifies some real place existing in nature, for it signifies an imaginary one only. alioquin esset ponere locum extra caelum, cuius est magnitudo finita, habens principium et finem. Otherwise, it would be necessary to posit a place beyond the universe, whose magnitude is finite and has a beginning and an end. Similiter etiam primum nunc quod est principium temporis, non praecedit tempus in rerum natura existens, sed secundum imaginationem nostram tantum. Et hoc tempus designatur, cum dicitur quod primum nunc est principium temporis, ante quod nihil est temporis. Similarly, the first now that is the beginning of time is not preceded by a time existing in reality, but only in our imagination. And this is the time that is described when one says that the first now is the beginning of time, before which nothing of time exists. Vel potest dici, quod cum dicitur principium temporis est ante quod nihil est temporis, ly ante non remanet affirmatum, sed negatur; et sic non oportet ponere tempus ante principium temporis. In iis enim quae sunt in tempore, accidit quod eorum principio tempus aliquod praeexistat: sicut cum dicitur quod principium iuventutis est ante quod nihil est de iuventute, potest intelligi ly ante etiam affirmative, quia iuventus tempore mensuratur. Tempus autem non mensuratur tempore; unde eius principio tempus non praeexistit: et sic ly ante, quod ponitur in definitione principii temporis, non oportet quod remaneat affirmatum, sed negatur. Or it may be said that, in the expression “the beginning of time is that before which nothing of time exists,” the word “before” is not affirmed, but denied—and so it is not necessary to posit a time before the beginning of time. For in things that exist in time, it happens that some certain time precedes their beginning, as, when it is said that the beginning of youth is that before which there was nothing of youth, the word “before” can be taken in an affirmative sense, because youth is measured by time. But time is not measured by time, and thus no time preceded its beginning; hence the word “before” in the definition of time is not taken affirmatively but negatively. Est tamen ante tempus aliqua duratio, scilicet aeternitas Dei, quae non habet extensionem aut prius et posterius, sicut tempus, sed est tota simul; et non est eiusdem rationis cum tempore, sicut nec magnitudo divina cum magnitudine corporali. But, before time, there does exist a duration, namely, the eternity of God. But this eternity has no extension or any before or after as time does; rather, it is all at once and is not of the same account as time any more than the divine magnitude is of the same account as a bodily magnitude. Sicut ergo, cum dicimus extra mundum non esse nisi Deum, non ponimus aliquam dimensionem extra mundum; ita cum dicimus ante mundum nihil fuisse, non ponimus aliquam successivam durationem ante mundum. Therefore, just as we are not positing some dimension outside the world when we say that, outside the universe, there is nothing but God, so too, when we say that, before the universe, nothing existed, we are not positing any sort of successive duration before the universe. Lectio 3 Lecture 3 Rationes contra Anaxagoram et Empedoclem, qui ponebant motum non semper esse Arguments against Anaxagoras and Empedocles Sed non aliquando quidem erat, aliquando autem non: It is clear then that motion cannot have existed at one time and not at another: et namque assimilatur sic dicere figmento magis. in fact, such a view can hardly be described as anything else than fantastic. Similiter autem et dicere quia aptum natum sic est: et hoc oportet opinari esse principium. And much the same may be said of the view that such is the ordinance of nature and that this must be regarded as a principle. Et hoc videtur utique Empedocles dicere, quod tenere et movere in parte amicitiam et discordiam, inest rebus ex necessitate, quiescere autem per medium tempus. And this seems to be the view of Empedocles when he says that the constitution of the world is of necessity such that love and strife alternately predominate and cause motion but rest in the intermediate period of time. Fortassis autem et unum principium facientes, sicut Anaxagoras, sic utique dicerent. Probably also those who, like Anaxagoras, assert a single principle (of motion) would hold this view to be true. At vero nihil inordinatum eorum quae natura et secundum naturam sunt: natura enim omnibus causa ordinationis est. But that which is produced or directed by nature can never be anything disorderly, for nature is everywhere the cause of order.