990. Quia igitur huius rationis solutio procedit supponendo quod tempus non fuerit semper, restat solvere rationem per quam ostendi videtur tempus semper fuisse: et ideo forte Aristoteles post rationem de motu posuit rationem de tempore, quia consideravit quod praemissa ratio de motu efficaciam non haberet, nisi poneretur tempus aeternum. Quod ergo dicit, quod quandocumque est tempus, necesse est ponere aliquod nunc esse, indubitanter concedendum est: omne autem nunc esse principium et finem temporis, concedi non oportet, nisi ponatur etiam motum semper esse; ut scilicet sic quodlibet indivisibile in motu acceptum, quod momentum dicitur, sit principium et finis motus: sic enim se habet nunc ad momentum, sicut tempus ad motum. Si ergo ponimus motum non semper fuisse, sed est accipere aliquod primum indivisibile in motu, ante quod nihil fuit motus; erit etiam accipere aliquod nunc in tempore, ante quod non fuit aliquod tempus. 990. Because the solution of this argument proceeded on the supposition that time did not always exist, there remains the problem of solving the argument that seems to prove that time always existed. And perhaps Aristotle, after the argument from motion, gave one from time, because he thought that the one from motion would be inefficacious unless time was assumed to be eternal. Thus, his statement that, whenever there is time, there must be a now existing, must be granted without demur. But the statement that every now is both a beginning and an end should not be conceded unless it be also granted that motion always existed, such that every indivisible of motion (which is called a “moment”) should be both a beginning and an end of motion, for the now is to the moment as time is to motion. If, therefore, we suppose that motion has not always existed, but that we can take some first indivisible in motion before which nothing of motion existed, we can also take some now in time before which there was no time. Iam autem ostendimus, exponendo litteram, quod id quod Averroes dicit ad hanc rationem confirmandam, efficaciam non habet. Sed nec illud quod Aristoteles ad hoc ponit, scilicet quod prius et posterius non sunt sine tempore, efficax esse potest. Now, we have already shown, in explaining the text, that what Averroes says to bolster this argument is inefficacious. But neither is there any efficacy in what Aristotle cites to bolster his own position, namely, that before and after do not exist without time. Cum enim dicimus quod principium temporis est ante quod nihil eius est, non propter hoc oportet quod ipsum nunc quod est principium temporis, praecedat tempus quod significatur cum dicitur ante: sicut si in magnitudine dicam quod principium magnitudinis est extra quod nihil est eius, non oportet quod extra illud principium significet aliquem locum in rerum natura existentem, sed imaginabilem tantum: For when we say that a time’s beginning is that before which nothing of the time existed, we are not thereby compelled to say that the now that is the beginning of the time is preceded by a time signified by the word “before,” any more than, in magnitudes, if I say that the beginning of a magnitude is that beyond which nothing exists of that magnitude, it is necessary to say that the phrase “beyond which beginning” signifies some real place existing in nature, for it signifies an imaginary one only. alioquin esset ponere locum extra caelum, cuius est magnitudo finita, habens principium et finem. Otherwise, it would be necessary to posit a place beyond the universe, whose magnitude is finite and has a beginning and an end. Similiter etiam primum nunc quod est principium temporis, non praecedit tempus in rerum natura existens, sed secundum imaginationem nostram tantum. Et hoc tempus designatur, cum dicitur quod primum nunc est principium temporis, ante quod nihil est temporis. Similarly, the first now that is the beginning of time is not preceded by a time existing in reality, but only in our imagination. And this is the time that is described when one says that the first now is the beginning of time, before which nothing of time exists. Vel potest dici, quod cum dicitur principium temporis est ante quod nihil est temporis, ly ante non remanet affirmatum, sed negatur; et sic non oportet ponere tempus ante principium temporis. In iis enim quae sunt in tempore, accidit quod eorum principio tempus aliquod praeexistat: sicut cum dicitur quod principium iuventutis est ante quod nihil est de iuventute, potest intelligi ly ante etiam affirmative, quia iuventus tempore mensuratur. Tempus autem non mensuratur tempore; unde eius principio tempus non praeexistit: et sic ly ante, quod ponitur in definitione principii temporis, non oportet quod remaneat affirmatum, sed negatur. Or it may be said that, in the expression “the beginning of time is that before which nothing of time exists,” the word “before” is not affirmed, but denied—and so it is not necessary to posit a time before the beginning of time. For in things that exist in time, it happens that some certain time precedes their beginning, as, when it is said that the beginning of youth is that before which there was nothing of youth, the word “before” can be taken in an affirmative sense, because youth is measured by time. But time is not measured by time, and thus no time preceded its beginning; hence the word “before” in the definition of time is not taken affirmatively but negatively. Est tamen ante tempus aliqua duratio, scilicet aeternitas Dei, quae non habet extensionem aut prius et posterius, sicut tempus, sed est tota simul; et non est eiusdem rationis cum tempore, sicut nec magnitudo divina cum magnitudine corporali. But, before time, there does exist a duration, namely, the eternity of God. But this eternity has no extension or any before or after as time does; rather, it is all at once and is not of the same account as time any more than the divine magnitude is of the same account as a bodily magnitude. Sicut ergo, cum dicimus extra mundum non esse nisi Deum, non ponimus aliquam dimensionem extra mundum; ita cum dicimus ante mundum nihil fuisse, non ponimus aliquam successivam durationem ante mundum. Therefore, just as we are not positing some dimension outside the world when we say that, outside the universe, there is nothing but God, so too, when we say that, before the universe, nothing existed, we are not positing any sort of successive duration before the universe. Lectio 3 Lecture 3 Rationes contra Anaxagoram et Empedoclem, qui ponebant motum non semper esse Arguments against Anaxagoras and Empedocles Sed non aliquando quidem erat, aliquando autem non: It is clear then that motion cannot have existed at one time and not at another: et namque assimilatur sic dicere figmento magis. in fact, such a view can hardly be described as anything else than fantastic. Similiter autem et dicere quia aptum natum sic est: et hoc oportet opinari esse principium. And much the same may be said of the view that such is the ordinance of nature and that this must be regarded as a principle. Et hoc videtur utique Empedocles dicere, quod tenere et movere in parte amicitiam et discordiam, inest rebus ex necessitate, quiescere autem per medium tempus. And this seems to be the view of Empedocles when he says that the constitution of the world is of necessity such that love and strife alternately predominate and cause motion but rest in the intermediate period of time. Fortassis autem et unum principium facientes, sicut Anaxagoras, sic utique dicerent. Probably also those who, like Anaxagoras, assert a single principle (of motion) would hold this view to be true. At vero nihil inordinatum eorum quae natura et secundum naturam sunt: natura enim omnibus causa ordinationis est. But that which is produced or directed by nature can never be anything disorderly, for nature is everywhere the cause of order. Infinitum autem ad infinitum nullam rationem habet: ordinatio autem omnis ratio est. Moreover, there is no ratio in the relation of the infinite to the infinite, but order always means ratio. Infinito autem tempore quiescere, postea motum esse aliquando; huius autem neque unam differentiam esse quare nunc magis quam prius, neque iterum aliquam ordinationem habere; non iam naturae est opus. But, if we say that there is first a state of rest for an infinite time, and then motion is started at some moment, and that the fact that it is this rather than a previous moment is of no importance, and involves no order, then we can no longer say that it is nature’s work. Aut enim simpliciter se habet quod est naturae, et non aliquando quidem sic, aliquando vero aliter, ut ignis natura sursum fertur, et non aliquando quidem sic, aliquando vero non; aut rationem habet quod non est simpliciter. For if anything is simply of a certain character naturally, either it is so invariably and not sometimes this character and sometimes another (for instance, fire, which travels upwards naturally, does not sometimes do so and sometimes not) or there is a ratio in the variation. Quare dignius est, sicut Empedocles et si quis alter dixit sic habere, in parte quiescere omne et moveri iterum: ordinationem enim iam habet quandam huiusmodi. It would be better, therefore, to say with Empedocles and anyone else who may have maintained such a theory as his that the universe is alternately at rest and in motion, for in a system of this kind, we have at once a certain order. Sed et oportet hoc dicentem non affirmare solum, sed causam ipsius dicere, But, even here, the holder of the theory ought not only to assert the fact; he ought to explain the cause of it. et non apponere nihil, neque velle dignitatem irrationabilem; sed aut inductionem aut demonstrationem afferre. He should not make any mere assumption or lay down any gratuitous axiom, but should employ either inductive or demonstrative reasoning. Haec enim non causae positae sunt; neque in hoc erat amicitiae vel inimicitiae esse; sed huius quidem congregare, illius vero disgregare. The love and strife postulated by Empedocles are not in themselves causes of the fact in question, nor is it of the essence of either that it should be so—the essential function of the former being to unite, of the latter to separate. Si vero determinetur quod est in parte, dicendum est in quibus sic sunt: sicut quia est aliquid quod congregat homines, amicitia, et fugiunt inimici ab invicem. If he is to go on to explain this alternate predominance, he should adduce cases where such a state of things exists, as he points to the fact that, among mankind, we have something that unites men, namely love, while, on the other hand, enemies avoid one another. Hoc enim supponitur et in toto esse: videtur enim in quibusdam esse sic. Thus, from the observed fact that this occurs in certain cases comes the assumption that it occurs also in the universe. Quod autem et secundum aequalia tempora, indiget aliqua ratione. Then, again, some argument is needed to explain why the predominance of each of the two forces lasts for an equal period of time. Omnino enim existimare principium hoc esse sufficiens, quod semper aut est sic aut fit, non recte se habet opinari. But it is a wrong assumption to suppose universally that we have an adequate first principle in virtue of the fact that something always is so or always happens so. In quo Democritus reducit de natura causas, quod sic quidem prius factum est; ipsius autem semper noluit principium quaerere: Thus, Democritus reduces the causes that explain nature to the fact that things happened in the past in the same way as they happen now, but he does not think fit to seek for a first principle to explain this “always.” in quibusdam dicens recte; quod autem in omnibus, non recte. Therefore, while his theory is right insofar as it is applied to certain individual cases, he is wrong in making it of universal application. Etenim triangulus semper habet duobus rectis aequales angulos; sed tamen est perpetuitatis huius altera causa. Principiorum igitur non est altera causa; sed perpetua sunt. Thus, a triangle always has its angles equal to two right angles, but there is nevertheless an ulterior cause of the eternity of this truth, whereas first principles are eternal and have no ulterior cause. Quod quidem igitur nullum tempus erit neque erat, quando motus non erit, sive non erat, tanta dicta sunt. Let this conclude what we have to say in support of our contention that there never was a time when there was not motion, and never will be a time when there will not be motion. 991. Postquam Philosophus posuit rationes ad ostendendum motum semper esse, hic ponit rationes contra Anaxagoram et Empedoclem, qui contrarium ponebant. 991. After presenting the reasons showing that motion always existed, the Philosopher here gives arguments against Anaxagoras and Empedocles, who posited the contrary. Et circa hoc duo facit: About this, he does two things: primo ponit rationem contra eorum positionem; first, he gives an argument against their position; secundo contra rationem quam supponebant, ibi: similiter autem et dicere etc. second, he gives an argument against the argument they presupposed, at and much the same (252a5; [992]). Dicit ergo primo, quod cum ostensum sit quod motus semper est, non erit dicendum quod aliquando sit motus et aliquando non, sicut dixerunt Empedocles et Anaxagoras: sic enim dicere sicut ipsi posuerunt, assimilatur cuidam figmento, quia scilicet absque ratione hoc ponebant; omne enim quod ponitur absque ratione vel auctoritate divina, fictitium esse videtur. Auctoritas autem divina praevalet etiam rationi humanae, multo magis quam auctoritas alicuius philosophi praevaleret alicui debili rationi, quam aliquis puer induceret. Non ergo assimilantur figmento quae per fidem tenentur, licet absque ratione credantur: credimus enim divinae auctoritati miraculis approbatae, idest illis operibus quae solus Deus facere potest. He says first (252a4) that, since it has been shown that motion always exists, it is wrong to say, as Empedocles and Anaxagoras did, that, at some time, motion exists, and at another time, it does not, for to make such a claim is a figment, because it has no basis. Something stated without a reason or the support of divine authority seems, indeed, to be a fiction. However, divine authority is stronger than human reason, much more indeed than is the authority of a philosopher more valuable than the weak argument some child might give. Therefore, what is held by faith, even though it be believed without an argument, is not a figment of the mind, because we believe on the divine authority approved by miracles—works that God alone can produce.