Sed sciendum est quod Aristoteles in sexto determinabat de motu in communi, non applicando ad aliqua mobilia; et ideo ea quae ibi de motu tractavit, accipienda sunt secundum exigentiam continuitatis motus: hic autem loquitur de motu, applicando ad determinata mobilia, in quibus contingit aliquem motum interrumpi et non continuari, qui secundum rationem communem motus posset esse continuus. But it should be recognized that, in book 6, Aristotle was talking about motion in common, without application to definite mobiles. Therefore, what he discussed there must be taken according to the requirements of motion’s continuity, but at present, he is speaking of motion with application to definite mobiles, in which a motion can be interrupted and not be continuous, which, when viewed under the common account, could be continuous. 1010. Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius cum infirmetur aliquis etc. Et dicit quod si aliquis qui infirmatur, debeat sanari, necesse est quod sanetur in aliquo tempore, et non in termino temporis. Et necesse est ulterius quod ipsa mutatio sanationis tendat in determinatum terminum, scilicet in sanitatem, et in nihil aliud. Sic ergo omnis alteratio requirit determinatum tempus et determinatum terminum (quia omnis alteratio est in contrarium, ut in quinto dictum est): nulla autem talis mutatio est semper continua: dicere ergo quod aliquid semper et continue alteretur, est dubitare de manifestis. 1010. He gives the second argument at again, when anyone has fallen ill (253b26), and he says that, if a sick person is to get well, he has to be healed in a period of time, and not in an instant of the time. And it is further necessary that the very change, which is healing, tend to a definite terminus, namely, to health, and not to anything else. Accordingly, every alteration requires a definite time and a definite terminus, because every alteration tends to a contrary, as was said in book 5. But no such change is always continuous. Therefore, to say that something is being always and continuously altered is to speak against the facts. 1011. Tertiam rationem ponit ibi: atque lapis etc. Et dicit quod lapis non fit neque durior neque mollior, etiam per temporis longinquitatem: et sic stultum est dicere quod omnia semper alterentur. 1011. The third argument he gives at moreover, we notice (253b30), and he says that a stone does not become harder or softer, even after a very great period of time; thus, it is foolish to say that all things are always being altered. 1012. Deinde cum dicit: et secundum quod fertur etc., contradicit praedictae opinioni quantum ad motum localem, dupliciter. 1012. Then, at again, in the matter of locomotion (253b31), he contradicts the opinion at issue with respect to local motion, on two counts. Primo quidem, quia aliqui motus locales et quietes ita sunt manifesti, quod latere non possunt: mirabile enim videtur si lateat quando lapis fertur deorsum, aut quando quiescit in terra. Et sic non potest dici quod propter latentiam motus localis ponantur omnia semper moveri localiter. The first is that some local motions and rests are so evident that they cannot be hidden. For it would be strange if it were hidden from us when a stone is carried downwards or when it is at rest on the earth. Consequently, it cannot be said that, because of the concealment of local motions, all things should be supposed to be always being moved locally. 1013. Secundo ibi: amplius autem terra etc., ratiocinatur sic. Terra et quodlibet aliud corpus naturale, quando sunt in propriis locis, ex necessitate naturae quiescunt, et non removentur ex propriis locis, nisi per violentiam: sed manifestum est quaedam corporum naturalium esse in propriis locis: necesse est ergo dicere quod quaedam quiescant secundum locum, et quod non omnia localiter moveantur. 1013. Second, at further, it is a law (253b33), he argues thus: earth and any other natural body, when they are in their due places, rest from a necessity of nature and are not removed except by force. But it is evident that certain natural bodies are in their due place. Therefore, it is necessary to say that some things are at rest with respect to place and that not all things are being moved locally. Ultimo autem epilogando concludit, quod ex praemissis et aliis similibus potest aliquis scire, quod impossibile est aut semper omnia moveri, sicut dixit Heraclitus, aut semper omnia quiescere, sicut dixit Zeno et Parmenides et Melissus. Finally, he concludes in summary that, from the foregoing and other things similar to the foregoing, anyone can know that it is impossible for all things always to be in motion as Heraclitus said, or for all things always to be at rest as Zeno and Parmenides and Melissus said. Lectio 6 Lecture 6 Reprobatur tertium membrum divisionis positae in superiori lectione—reassumuntur dicta in hac et praec. lectione, et ostenditur quid remanet dicendum It cannot be said that some things are always at rest and all other things are always moved At vero neque alia quidem semper contingit quiescere, alia vero semper moveri, aliquando autem quiescere et aliquando moveri nullum. Dicendum est autem quod impossibile sit, sicut et in dictis prius et in his: videmus enim in eisdem fieri dictas mutationes. Nor again can it be that some things are always at rest, others always in motion, and nothing sometimes at rest and sometimes in motion. This theory must be pronounced impossible on the same grounds as those previously mentioned: we see the above-mentioned changes occurring in the case of the same things. Et adhuc quia oppugnat manifestis dubitans. Neque enim augmentum; We may further point out that the defender of this position is fighting against the obvious, for on this theory there can be no such thing as increase; neque violentus erit motus, nisi movebitur extra naturam quiescens prius. Generationem igitur removet et corruptionem haec ratio. nor can there be any such thing as motion by force, if it is impossible that a thing can be at rest before being set in motion unnaturally. This theory, then, does away with generation and corruption. Fere autem et moveri fieri quoddam et corrumpi videtur omnibus: in quod quidem enim mutatur, fit hoc aut in hoc; ex quo autem mutatur, corrumpitur hoc aut ab hinc. Quare manifestum est quod alia quidem moventur, alia vero quiescunt aliquando. Moreover, motion, it would seem, is generally thought to be a sort of generation and corruption, for this to which a thing changes comes to be, or in which it comes to be, and that from which a thing changes ceases to be, or there ceases to be occupancy of it. It is clear, therefore, that there are cases of occasional motion and occasional rest. Omnia autem velle aliquando quidem quiescere, aliquando autem moveri, hoc iam copulandum ad antiquas rationes. We have now to take the assertion that all things are sometimes at rest and sometimes in motion and to confront it with the arguments previously advanced. Principium autem iterum faciendum a nunc determinatis, a quo quidem incepimus prius. Aut enim omnia quiescunt; aut omnia moventur; aut haec quidem quiescunt, haec autem moventur eorum quae sunt. We must take our start, as before, from the possibilities that we distinguished just above. Either all things are at rest, or all things are in motion, or some things are at rest and others in motion. Et si alia quidem quiescunt, alia vero moventur eorum quae sunt, necesse est aut omnia aliquando quidem quiescere, aliquando vero moveri; aut quaedam semper quiescere, alia vero moveri ipsorum, aut alia autem aliquando quidem quiescere, alia vero aliquando moveri. And if some things are at rest and others in motion, then it must be that either all things are sometimes at rest and sometimes in motion, or some things are always at rest and the remainder always in motion, or some of the things are always at rest and others always in motion while yet others, again, are sometimes at rest and sometimes in motion. Quod quidem igitur non possibile sit omnia quiescere, dictum est prius: dicamus autem et nunc. Now, we have said before that it is impossible that all things should be at rest. Nevertheless, we may now repeat that assertion. Si enim secundum veritatem sic se habet, sicut quidam dicunt, esse id quod est infinitum et immobile: sed non videtur aliquid secundum sensum, sed moventur multa eorum quae sunt. We may point out that, even if it is really the case, as certain persons assert, that the existent is infinite and motionless, it certainly does not appear to be so if we follow sense perception, since many things that exist appear to be in motion. Si igitur opinio est falsa, aut omnino opinio, et motus est; et utique si phantasia sit; et si aliquando quidem sic videatur esse, aliquando autem aliter. Phantasia quidem enim et opinio motus quidam esse videntur. Now, if there is such a thing as false opinion or opinion at all, there is also motion, and similarly if there is such a thing as imagination, or if it is the case that anything seems to be different at different times, for imagination and opinion are thought to be motions of a kind. Sed de hoc quidem intendere, et quaerere rationem quorum dignius habemus quam ratione indigere, male iudicare est id quod melius et peius, et credibile et non credibile, et principium et non principium. But to investigate this question at all—to seek a reasoned justification of a belief with regard to which we are too well off to require reasoned justification—implies bad judgment of what is better and what is worse, what commends itself to belief and what does not, what is ultimate and what is not. Similiter autem et impossibile est et omnia moveri; aut alia quidem semper moveri, alia vero semper quiescere. Ad omnia enim haec sufficiens est una fides; videmus enim quaedam aliquando quidem moveri, aliquando quidem quiescere. It is likewise impossible that all things should be in motion or that some things should be always in motion and the remainder always at rest. We have sufficient ground for rejecting all these theories in the single fact that we see some things that are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest. Quare manifestum est quod impossibile sit similiter omnia quiescere et omnia moveri continue, eo quod alia quidem semper moventur, alia vero quiescunt semper. It is evident, therefore, that it is no less impossible that some things should be always in motion and the remainder always at rest than that all things should be at rest or that all things should be in motion continuously. Reliquum ergo considerandum est, utrum omnia sint huiusmodi possibilia moveri et quiescere; aut quaedam quidem sic, aliqua vero semper quiescant, aliqua vero semper moveantur. Hoc enim demonstrandum est a nobis. It remains, then, to consider whether all things are so constituted as to be capable both of being in motion and of being at rest, or whether, while some things are so constituted, some are always at rest and some are always in motion; for it is this last view that we have to show to be true. 1014. Reprobatis duobus membris praemissae divisionis, hic reprobat tertium, quod scilicet poni posset entia dividi in duas dispositiones tantum, ita quod quaedam semper quiescerent; alia semper moverentur; et non sit tertium genus entium, quae quandoque moveantur, quandoque quiescant. 1014. Having disposed of two members of the foregoing division, the Philosopher now rejects a third, that in which it was posited that things are divided into two dispositions only, in such a way that some things are always at rest and others always in motion, and there is not a third class of things that are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest. Hoc autem reprobat dupliciter. He rejects this in two ways. Primo quidem, sicut et praedictas duas positiones, ex eo quod repugnat sensui. Non solum enim videmus ad sensum quod quaedam moventur, per quod destruitur prima positio ponentium omnia quiescere semper; et quod quaedam quiescunt, per quod destruitur secunda positio ponentium omnia moveri semper: sed etiam videmus quod in eisdem rebus fiunt praedictae mutationes seu variationes de motu in quietem, et de quiete in motum; per quod apparet quod aliqua sunt quae quandoque moventur et quandoque quiescunt. He does this first (254a3) in the same way that he rejected the two previous positions, on the ground that they are contrary to sense observation. For we see by the senses not only that some things are in motion (which destroys the first position, namely, of those who posit all things to be always at rest) and that some are at rest (by which is destroyed the second position, that all things are always in motion) but also that the aforementioned changes or variations from motion to rest, and from rest to motion, occur in the same things. This shows that there are some things that are sometimes moved and sometimes at rest. 1015. Secundo ibi: et adhuc quia oppugnat etc., reprobat idem per hoc quod qui hanc dubitationem induceret, repugnaret iis quae sunt manifesta in natura. 1015. In a second way, at we may further point out (254a8), he rejects the same opinion on the ground that the one who would engender this doubt would resist what is evident in nature. Primo enim tolleretur motus augmenti: videmus enim motum augmenti esse in his quae non semper augebantur; alioquin, si semper augerentur, non esset augmentum ad determinatam quantitatem, sed in infinitum. In the first place, it would deny the motion of growth, for we see that growth takes place in things that are not always growing, because, were they always growing, they would be tending not to a definite quantity but to the infinite. Secundo tollitur motus localis violentus: non enim est motus violentus, nisi sit aliquid quod extra naturam moveatur, quod prius quieverit secundum naturam; cum motus violentus non sit nisi recessus a quiete naturali. Si ergo nullum quiescens potest moveri, sequetur quod id quod quiescit naturaliter, non possit postmodum per violentiam moveri. In the second place, it would deny forced local motion, for a motion is not by force unless something is moved outside of its nature when previously it was naturally at rest; for a forced motion is nothing more than a departure from natural rest. If, therefore, nothing at rest can be moved, it will follow that what is naturally at rest cannot later be moved by force. Tertio excluditur generatio et corruptio per hanc positionem. Generatio enim est mutatio de non esse in esse, corruptio vero de esse in non esse. Ad hoc ergo quod aliquid corrumpatur, oportet quod prius fuerit ens per aliquod tempus; et ad hoc quod generetur, oportet quod prius fuerit non ens per aliquod tempus. Quod autem per aliquod tempus est ens vel non ens, quiescit (ut large de quiete loquamur): si igitur nullum quiescens potest moveri, sequitur quod nihil quod non est per aliquod tempus, possit generari, et nihil quod est in aliquo tempore, possit corrumpi. In the third place, generation and ceasing to be would be excluded by this opinion. For the former is a change from non-being to being, and the latter from being to non-being. Therefore, in order that a thing cease to be, it ought previously to have been existing for a time, and in order that a thing be generated, it ought previously not to have been existing for a time. But whatever is a being or a non-being for some time is at rest (where rest is taken in a very general sense). If, therefore, nothing at rest can be moved, it follows that nothing that does not exist for some time can be generated, and that nothing that exists for a time can cease to be. Quarto autem ulterius haec positio destruit universaliter omnem motum: quia in omni motu est quaedam generatio et corruptio, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid. Quod enim in aliquid movetur sicut in terminum, generatur hoc, quantum ad motum alterationis et augmenti; aut in hoc, quantum ad motum localem; sicut quod movetur de nigro in album, aut de parvo in magnum, fit album aut magnum; quod autem movetur ad aliquem locum, fit existens in loco illo. Sed ex quo aliquid mutatur sicut a termino a quo, corrumpitur hoc in motu alterationis et augmenti, ut nigrum aut parvum; aut ab hinc quantum ad motum localem. Quia ergo in omni motu est generatio et corruptio, dum praedicta positio tollit generationem et corruptionem, per consequens tollit omnem motum. In the fourth place, this position destroys all motion universally, because every motion involves generation and ceasing to be either absolutely or in a qualified sense. For what is being moved toward something as toward a terminus is being made this, so far as alteration and growth are concerned, or being made to be in which, so far as local motion is concerned; for example, what is being changed from black to white, or from small to large, becomes white or large, but whatever is being moved to a place comes to exist in that place. But, when something is changed from its terminus from which, then, when it is a case of alteration and growth, a this has ceased to be, and when it is a case of local motion, a there has ceased to be. Therefore, because in every motion there is generation and ceasing to be, this position consequently rejects all motion. Quia ergo haec quae dicta sunt, sunt impossibilia, manifestum fit quod quaedam moventur non quidem semper, sed aliquando; et quaedam quiescunt non semper, sed aliquando. Because such things are impossible, it becomes clear that some things are being moved, but not always, and that some things are at rest not always, but sometimes. 1016. Deinde cum dicit: omnia autem velle etc., inquirit de aliis duobus membris praemissae divisionis. 1016. Then, at we have now to take (254a15), he studies the other two members of his division. Et primo manifestat suam intentionem; First, he reveals his intention; secundo exequitur ipsam, ibi: moventium igitur et eorum quae moventur etc. second, he pursues it, at now, of things that cause motion (254b7; [1021]). Circa primum tria facit: About the first, he does three things: