Lectio 5 Lecture 5 Causam autem deviationis Socrati oportet putare suppositionem non entem rectam. Oportet quidem enim esse modo aliquo unam et domum et civitatem, sed non omnino: est quidem enim ut non erit procedens civitas, est autem ut erit quidem, prope autem existens ut non sit civitas, erit deterior civitas, quaemadmodum utique si quis symphoniam faciat omofoniam, aut rithmon basem unam. Sed oportet multitudinem existentem quaemadmodum dictum est prius, propter disciplinam communem et unam facere; et futurum disciplinam inducere et putantem per hanc fore civitatem studiosam, inconveniens talibus existimare dirigere, sed non consuetudinibus et philosophia et legibus, quaemadmodum quae circa possessiones in Lacedemonia et Creta pro conviviis legislator communicavit. The error of Socrates must be attributed to the false notion of unity from which he starts. Unity there should be, both of the family and of the state, but in some respects only. For there is a point at which a state may attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state, or at which, without actually ceasing to exist, it will become an inferior state, like harmony passing into unison, or rhythm which has been reduced to a single foot. The state, as I was saying, is a plurality which should be united and made into a community by education; and it is strange that the author of a system of education which he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his citizens by regulations of this sort, and not by philosophy or by customs and laws, like those which prevail at Sparta and Crete respecting common meals, whereby the legislator has made property common. Oportet autem non hoc ipsum ignorare, quia oportet attendere multo tempore et multis annis, in quibus non utique lateat si haec bene se habuerunt. Omnia enim fere inventa sunt quidem, sed haec quidem non conducta sunt, his autem non utuntur cognoscentes. Maxime autem fiet utique manifestum si quis operibus videat talem politiam constructam. Non enim poterit non partiens ipsa et segregans, facere civitatem, haec quidem in convivia, haec autem in confraternitates et tribus; itaque et nihil aliud accidet esse lege statutum, praeter non agros colere municipes, quod et nunc Lacedemonii facere conantur. Let us remember that we should not disregard the experience of ages; in the multitude of years these things, if they were good, would certainly not have been unknown; for almost everything has been found out, although sometimes they are not put together; in other cases men do not use the knowledge which they have. Great light would be thrown on this subject if we could see such a form of government in the actual process of construction; for the legislator could not form a state at all without distributing and dividing its constituents into associations for common meals, and into phratries and tribes. But all this legislation ends only in forbidding agriculture to the guardians, a prohibition which the Lacedaemonians try to enforce already. Quin immo sed neque modus totius politiae quis erit communicantibus, neque dixit Socrates, neque facile dicere; equidem fere multitudo civitatis diversorum civium fit multitudo, de quibus nihil determinatum est prius, et agricolis communes esse oportet possessiones, aut secundum unumquemque proprias. Adhuc autem uxores et pueros proprios aut communes. Si quidem enim eodem modo communia omnia omnibus, quid different isti ab illis municipibus, aut quid plus sustinentibus principatum ipsorum, aut quid passi sufferunt principatum, nisi aliquid sapiant tale quale Cretenses? Illi enim alia haec servis dimittentes, solum negant gymnasia et armorum possessionem. Si autem quaemadmodum in aliis civitatibus et apud ilos erunt talia, quis modus erit communitatis? In una enim civitate duas civitates esse necessarium, et has subcontrarias invicem; faciunt enim hos quidem municipes velut custodes, agricolas autem et artifices et alios cives. But, indeed, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to decide, what in such a community will be the general form of the state. The citizens who are not guardians are the majority, and about them nothing has been determined: are the husbandmen, too, to have their property in common? Or is each individual to have his own? And are the wives and children to be individual or common. If, like the guardians, they are to have all things in common, what do they differ from them, or what will they gain by submitting to their government? Or, upon what principle would they submit, unless indeed the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the Cretans, who give their slaves the same institutions as their own, but forbid them gymnastic exercises and the possession of arms. If, on the other hand, the inferior classes are to be like other cities in respect of marriage and property, what will be the form of the community? Must it not contain two states in one, each hostile to the other? He makes the guardians into a mere occupying garrison, while the husbandmen and artisans and the rest are the real citizens. Accusationes autem et disceptationes et quaecumque alia civitatibus existere inquid mala, omnia existent et his, quamvis dicat Socrates quod non multis indigebunt legalibus propter disciplinam; puta legibus circa municipium et circa forum et aliis talibus, attribuens solum disciplinam municipus. But if so the suits and quarrels, and all the evils which Socrates affirms to exist in other states, will exist equally among them. He says indeed that, having so good an education, the citizens will not need many laws, for example laws about the city or about the markets; but then he confines his education to the guardians. Adhuc autem dominos facit rerum possessarum agricolas oblationem ferentes. Sed multo magis verisimile est graves esse et astutiis plenos quam a quibusdam obsequia et humiliationes et servitutes. Again, he makes the husbandmen owners of the property upon condition of their paying a tribute. But in that case they are likely to be much more unmanageable and conceited than the Helots, or Penestae, or slaves in general. Sed sive necessaria haec similiter sive non, nunc nihil determinatum est, et de habitis quae horum politia et disciplina et leges quales. Est autem neque invenire facile, neque differens modicum, quales quosdam esse hos ad salvandum municipum communitatem. And whether community of wives and property be necessary for the lower equally with the higher class or not, and the questions akin to this, what will be the education, form of government, laws of the lower class, Socrates has nowhere determined: neither is it easy to discover this, nor is their character of small importance if the common life of the guardians is to be maintained. At vero si uxores quidem faciet communes, possessiones autem proprias, quis dispensabit? Quamvis si communes possessiones et agricolarum uxores, quaemadmodum quae in agris viri ipsarum. Inconveniens autem et ex bestiis fieri parabolam, quia oportet eadem tractare mulieres viris, quibus yconomie nihil attinet. Again, if Socrates makes the women common, and retains private property, the men will see to the fields, but who will see to the house? And who will do so if the agricultural class have both their property and their wives in common? Once more: it is absurd to argue, from the analogy of the animals, that men and women should follow the same pursuits, for animals have not to manage a household. Insecurum autem et principes quomodo instituit Socrates; semper enim facit eosdem principes; hoc autem seditionis causa fit, et apud nullam dignitatem possidentes si alicunde utique apud animosos et bellicosos viros. Quod autem necessarium ipsi facere eosdem principes manifestum: non enim quandoque quidem aliis, quandoque autem aliis mixtum est animabus a deo aurum, sed semper eisdem; ait autem his quidem mox genitis misceri aurum, his autem argentum, es autem et ferrum artificibus futuris et agricolis. The government, too, as constituted by Socrates, contains elements of danger; for he makes the same persons always rule. And if this is often a cause of disturbance among the meaner sort, how much more among high-spirited warriors? But that the persons whom he makes rulers must be the same is evident; for the gold which the God mingles in the souls of men is not at one time given to one, at another time to another, but always to the same: as he says, 'God mingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their very birth; but brass and iron in those who are meant to be artisans and husbandmen.' Adhuc autem et felicitatem auferens a municipibus totam inquit oportere felicem facere civitatem legislatorem. Impossibile autem felicitare totam, non pluribus aut non omnibus partibus aut quibusdam habentibus felicitatem. Non enim eorundem felicitare quorum et par: hoc quidem enim contingit toti inesse, partium autem neutri; felicitare autem impossibile. At vero si municipes non felices, qui alteri? Non enim utique artifices et multitudo banausorum. Politia quidem igitur de qua Socrates dixit has dubitationes habet, et his non minores alteras. Again, he deprives the guardians even of happiness, and says that the legislator ought to make the whole state happy. But the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy happiness. In this respect happiness is not like the even principle in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but in neither of the parts; not so happiness. And if the guardians are not happy, who are? Surely not the artisans, or the common people. The Republic of which Socrates discourses has all these difficulties, and others quite as great. Causam autem deviationis et cetera. Postquam Philosophus impugnavit legem Socratis ostendens eam esse inconvenientem, hic impugnat eam ostendens esse insufficientem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Causam autem deviationis, etc. After the philosopher objected to the law of Socrates by showing that it is unfitting, he here objects to it by showing that it is insufficient. Concerning this he does two things. Primo ostendit quod non habuit sufficiens motivum. First, he shows that [Socrates] did not have a sufficient motive. Secundo ostendit quod id quod ponebatur, insufficiens erat, ibi, quinimmo sed neque modus et cetera. Second, he shows that what [Socrates] laid out was insufficient, at quinimmo sed neque modus, [II.5.5] etc. Circa primum duo facit. Concerning the first he does two things. Primo ostendit motivum esse insufficiens propter falsam suppositionem. First, he shows that the motive is insufficient because of a false supposition [II.5.2]. Secundo propter defectum experientiae quae requiritur in legibus condendis, ibi, oportet autem non hoc ipsum ignorare et cetera. Second, because of a shortage of the experience that is required in crafting laws, at oportet autem non hoc ipsum ignorare, [II.5.4] etc. Dicit ergo primo, quod causa quare Socrates deviavit a veritate circa legem de communitate possessionum, filiorum et uxorum, oportet putare hanc esse, quia supponebat quamdam suppositionem non rectam: scilicet quod summum bonum civitatum esset quod ipsa esset maxime una. Haec autem suppositio ideo non est recta, quia ad civitatem et domum, sicut supra dictum est, requiritur aliqua unitas, sed non omnimoda. Unde intantum potest procedere unitas civitatis, quod iam non erit civitas; puta si omnes sint unius artis et cohabitantes in una domo. Intantum autem potest procedere unitas quod erit in propinquo ad hoc quod non sit civitas. Unde sequitur quod sit peior: quia unumquodque tanto deterius est, quanto magis appropinquat ad suum non esse; sicut si tollatur aliqua distinctio officiorum, quae sunt necessaria ad bene esse civitatis. Et ponit exemplum, sicut si aliquis faciat homofoniam, idest omnes cantantes in una voce, iam non erit symphonia id est consonantia vocum, cui similatur civitas ex diversis consistens. Et similiter tolleretur rismon, id est ordinatio figurae puta trianguli, si quis vellet facere unam solam basim. Et ita potest in tantum procedere unitas quod tollatur civitas. Therefore, he first says that the cause why Socrates deviated from the truth concerning the law about the community of possessions, of wives, and of children, must be deemed to be because he supposed some supposition that was not correct: that the highest good of the city is that it be maximally one. But this supposition is not correct because for the city and the household, as has been said above, a sort of unity is required, but not in every way. For the unity of the city can proceed to such a degree that it will no longer be a city; for instance, if all practice one art, and dwell together in one household. Moreover, unity can proceed to such a degree that it will approach being what is not a city. So it follows that it is worse, because by how much each thing approaches its own non-being, by so much more is it inferior—as [would happen] if someone were to destroy the distinction of offices that is necessary for the well-being of the city. And he lays out an example: just as if someone were to make homophonia—that is, everyone singing in one voice—there will no longer be symphonia—that is, a harmony of voices; to this, he likens the city, constructed out of diverse things. And likewise, rismon—that is, the order of a figure, like a triangle—would be destroyed if someone wished to make only one base. And so unity can proceed to such a degree that the city would be destroyed. Sed, sicut supra dictum est, oportet in civitate esse quidem diversorum multitudinem, sed quod civitas fiat una et communis propter quamdam disciplinam legum recte positarum. Sed si aliquis qui erat inducturus disciplinam ad uniendum civitatem putet per hanc legem de communitate filiorum et uxorum fieri civitatem bonam, inconveniens est si aestimet quod per tales communitates possit rectificare civitatem, et non magis per bonas consuetudines et leges, et per philosophiam, id est sapientiam circa talia: sicut dictum est supra, quod Lacedaemones possessiones proprias faciebant communes quantum ad usum; et in Creta etiam fecit legislator esse aliqua communia, ut fierent quaedam convivia publica civibus, secundum aliqua tempora ad hoc ut inter eos maior familiaritas esset. But as was said above, in the city there must certainly be a multitude of diverse people, but the city becomes one and common because of some discipline of laws that are set up correctly. But if someone who was about to introduce discipline for uniting the city were to deem that through this law about the community of wives and children, a good city would come to be, it is unfitting if he were to deem that through such communities he could make the city correct, and not more through good customs and laws, and through philosophy—that is, wisdom about such things. Just as it was said above that the Lacedaemonians made private possessions common with regard to use, and in Crete also, the legislator made some things common, so that there would be public feasts for the citizens, at certain times, so that there would be greater intimacy among them. Deinde cum dicit oportet non hoc ipsum etc., ostendit insufficientiam motivi propter defectum experientiae: et dicit quod ad hoc quod leges bene ponantur, oportet hoc non ignorare, quia debet aliquis multo tempore considerare et multis annis, ut manifestum sit per experientiam, si tales leges vel statuta bene se habeant. Aestimandum est enim quod in longitudine praecedentium temporum fere omnia inventa sunt circa conversationem humanam, quae excogitari possunt: sed quaedam eorum non sunt conducta, idest non est usque ad hoc in eis processum quod lege statuerentur, quia statim eorum inconvenientia apparebat: quaedam vero sunt quidem statuta, sed recesserunt ab usu dum cognoverunt homines quod non erant utilia. Et hoc maxime manifestum fit, si quis per experientiam operis inspiciat talem ordinem civitatis institutum, qualem Socrates dixit. Impossibile enim est, quod fiat civitas nisi per aliquam partitionem et segregationem; puta quod de bonis communibus fiat distributio per diversa convivia, vel per diversas confraternitates, aut per diversas tribus, idest societates civitatis aut regionis. Quia igitur necesse est omnino, quod fiat distributio bonorum communium quantum ad rem, nihil aliud affertur per statutum talis legis de communitate possessionum, nisi quod municipes, idest qui continue morantur in civitate, non habeant curam de agris colendis, quasi non habentes agros proprios. Sed etiam si non sint agri communes, hoc ipsum fieri potest, sicut Lacedaemonii facere conantur, ut scilicet per alios agri colantur, quamvis sunt proprii. Then, where he says oportet non hoc ipsum, etc., he shows the insufficiency of motive [power] because of a shortage of experience: and he says that for the laws to be well set up, one must not be ignorant, because someone ought to consider for much time and for many years, so that it will be clear through experience if such laws or statutes are well arranged [se habeant]. For one must deem that in the length of preceding time, almost all things have been discovered about human associations that can be thought up. But some of these have not been employed—that is, to this point, it has not proceeded for them that they should be established as law, because it was immediately apparent that they were unfitting. Some, truly, have indeed been established, but they fell out of use when men learned that they were not useful. And this becomes maximally clear if someone, through experience of the work, looks into an order of the city instituted such as Socrates discussed. For it is impossible that a city come to be except through some partition and separation; consider that with common goods, there comes to be a distribution through diverse feasts, or diverse societies, or through diverse tribes—that is, companies of the city or the region. Therefore, because it is utterly necessary that there comes to be a distribution of common goods—with reference to things—nothing other is brought forth through the establishment of such a law about the community of possessions, except that the townsmen [municipes]--that is, those who continually dwell in the city—will not have care for cultivating the farms, as though they do not have their own farms. But this can come to be even if the farms are not in common, just as the Lacedaemonians attempted to make it—so that the farms were cultivated by others as though they were their own. Deinde cum dicit quinimmo, etc., ostendit inconvenientiam legis Platonicae quantum ad id quod ponebatur. Et circa hoc duo facit. Then, where he says quinimmo, etc., he shows that the Platonic law is unfitting with reference to what has been laid out. Concerning this he does two things. Primo ostendit insufficientiam praedictae legis quantum ad ea de quibus est. First, he shows the insufficiency of the aforementioned law with reference to those things that it is about. Secundo quantum ad quaedam consequentia, ibi, sed sive necessaria et cetera. Second, with reference to some of its consequences, at sed sive necessaria, [II.5.10] etc. Circa primum inducit tres rationes: Concerning the first, he introduces three reasons. quarum prima ostendit insufficientiam praedictae legis quantum ad hoc, quod non poterat secundum eam sufficienter distingui multitudo civitatis. Et dicit, quod non solum lex Socratis (nichil aliud) facere videbatur, nisi quod municipes agros non colerent tamquam non proprios existentes, sed neque etiam Socrates dixit quis modus esset totius conversationis politicae instituendae secundum suam legem communicantibus, idest habentibus omnia communia, neque etiam possibile est a quovis alio dici hac lege servata. The first shows the insufficiency of the aforementioned law with reference to this: that it could not sufficiently distinguish the multitude of the city according to the thing [secundum id]. And he says that not only did the law of Socrates seem to accomplish nothing else than that the townsmen did not cultivate the farms—as though the fields were not their own—but Socrates did not even say what the method would be of instituting a whole political association, following his law, for communing—that is, for having all things in common; nor is it even possible for it to be explained by someone else anywhere at all, from the law having been kept. Necesse enim est, quod multitudo civitatis sit multitudo hominum diversorum secundum diversos status. De quorum diversitate qualiter esse possit, nihil est determinatum a Socrate: necesse enim est dicere, quod agricolis sint possessiones communes simul cum aliis civibus, et filii et uxores, aut quod habeant seorsum proprios filios et possessiones et uxores praeter alios cives. Hoc autem secundo modo contingit assignare diversitatem eorum ab aliis civibus, tum propter differentiam eorum in possessionibus, tum etiam propter parentum originem: sed si eodem modo sint communia omnia praedicta omnibus aliis, nulla differentia invenitur, secundum quam possunt diversificari agricolae a municipibus; id est ab illis qui communiter incolunt civitatem. Neque etiam poterit assignari, quid plus consequantur illi qui portant pondus principatus in regendo civitatem, et sic inutiliter laborabunt: nunc autem habent hoc emolumentum, quod attribuuntur eis plures possessiones, et filii eorum nobilitantur. Similiter etiam non poterit assignari, quid passi sufferunt principatum, idest propter quam eorum conditionem praecedentem ad principatum assumantur nunc enim consueverunt ad principatus assumi, qui sunt nobiliores origine vel excellentiores divites: excellentia autem secundum virtutem non semper est ita manifesta, quod secundum eam solam sufficienter possint inveniri homines, qui assumantur ad principatus. For it is necessary that the multitude of the city be a multitude of diverse men of diverse states [of life]. Nothing was determined by Socrates about how their diversity would be able to be: for it is necessary to say that there are common possessions for farmers, just as with the other citizens, and sons and wives, or that they separately have their own sons and possessions and wives, beyond what the other citizens have. But with this second manner, he happens to indicate their diversity from the other citizens, both because of their difference in possessions, and also because of the origin of their parentage: but if, in the same manner, all the aforementioned things are common to all the others, no difference will be found according to which they can diversify the farmers from the townsmen [municipibus]—that is, from those who cultivate the city in common. Nor can it even be indicated what further consequence will follow for those who carry the weight of government in ruling the city, and so they will labor uselessly: but now they have this comfort—that they are allotted more possessions, and their sons are ennobled. Likewise, also, they will not be able to indicate what steps will permit government—that is, because of which of their preceding conditions will they be assumed to government; for now it is customary for those to assume government who are more noble in origin, or more excellent in wealth—for excellence in virtue is not always so clear that men can be found according to it alone who will be assumed to government. Posset autem aliquis dicere, quod illi qui servarent legem Socratis, susciperent tale aliquid observandum, quale observant Cretenses, qui agriculturam et alia huiusmodi artificia dimittunt exercenda per servos, quibus solum interdicunt gymnasia, idest exercitia corporalia, et usum armorum, ut secundum hoc non oporteat distinguere inter agricolas et alios municipes, quia exercentes agriculturam et artifices secundum hoc non erunt cives, sed servi. Sed si in civitate, quam Socrates intendit instituere, erunt huiusmodi ordinata sicut in aliis civitatibus, ut scilicet quidam civium sint agricolae et artifices, non videbitur esse una communitas, quia in una civitate necessarium erit esse quasi duas civitates sibi contrarias: ex una enim parte erunt municipes, qui custodiunt civitatem, nihil aliud operantes; et ex alia parte erunt agricolae et artifices operantes, quos oportet esse contrarios adinvicem, ex hoc ipso quod quibusdam laborantibus, alii non laborant, et tamen plura de fructibus recipiunt, sicut etiam supra dictum est. Si vero possessiones non sint communes, non erit ex hoc litigium, quia quilibet procurabit, quod colantur agri sui, vel per alium, vel per seipsum: et dum minores servient maioribus, ab eis aliquod lucrum recipientes, erit una communicatio inter eos. But someone could say that those who keep the law of Socrates would undertake to observe in some way something like what the Cretans observe, who dismiss agriculture and other artful things of this sort for the slaves to exercise, to whom they forbid only gymnasia—that is, bodily exercise, and the use of arms, so that according to this, one does not need to distinguish between farmers and other townsmen, because those exercising agriculture and artisans, according to this, will not be citizens, but slaves. But if in the city that Socrates intended to fashion, something of this sort were set in order, as in other cities—so that some of the citizens were farmers and artisans—there will not seem to be one community, because in one city it will be necessary for it to be as if there were two cities opposed [contrarias] to each other. For in one part there will be the townsmen, who guard the city, working at nothing else; and in the other part there will be those working as farmers and artisans, and these two parts much be opposed to each other from this very thing: that while some are laboring, others do not labor, and nevertheless they receive more of the produce, as was also said above. But if possessions are not common, there will not be quarrels from this, because everyone will direct the cultivation of his own field, either through someone else, or through himself, and when the lesser serve the greater, they will receive gain from this, and there will be one union among them. Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, accusationes autem et cetera. Et dicit, quod in civitate habente omnia communia, sicut Socrates dixit, invenientur mutuae accusationes et disceptationes, et omnia alia mala, quae Socrates dicit nunc esse in civitatibus. Disceptabunt enim cives adinvicem de hoc quod non aequaliter laborant, nec aequaliter fructum recipiunt, et de multis etiam aliis; quamvis Socrates putaverat, quod ista mala in civitate, in qua essent omnia communia, non essent. Et propter hoc dicebat, quod propter huiusmodi disciplinam non indigeret civitas multis legibus, sed solum quibusdam paucis, scilicet circa habitationem municipii, et circa forum iudiciorum, vel etiam circa forum rerum venalium, et circa alia huiusmodi, sine quorum ordinatione civitas esse non potest: ita tamen quod huiusmodi disciplinam legum attribuebat solum municipibus, id est custodibus civitatis, non autem agricolis, qui extra civitatem municipum morabantur. Et sic patet, quod lex Socratis erat insufficiens, quia non poterat a civitate extirpare mala quae tollere conabatur. He lays out a second reason at accusationes autem, etc., and he says that in a city having all things in common, as Socrates discussed, will be found mutual accusations and disputes, and all the other evils that Socrates says are now in cities. For citizens dispute with each other about this: that they do not labor equally, nor do they equally receive the produce of their labor, and about many other things also; although Socrates had deemed that there would not be such evils in a city in which all things were in common. And because of this he said that because of this sort of discipline, the city would not require many laws, but only a few—concerning the dwelling place of the townsmen, and about a place of judgment, and a place for selling things, and other things of this sort, without the ordering of which the city is not able to be: thus, nevertheless, that this sort of discipline of the laws should be allotted only to the townsmen—that is, to the guardians of the city—but not the farmers, who dwell beyond the city of the townsmen. And so it is evident that the law of Socrates was insufficient, because it could not root out the evils that he attempted to destroy. Tertiam rationem ponit, ibi, adhuc autem dominos facit et cetera. Et dicit quod Socrates committebat secundum suam legem totam dispositionem possessionum agricolis, quibus dicebat esse committendum, quod fructus agrorum offerrent quibuscumque circa alia vacantibus: et ex hoc putabat, quod agricolae propter hanc potestatem efficerentur obsequiosi et humiliter servientes aliis civibus. Sed totum contrarium accideret: multo enim magis est verisimile, quod ex quo haberent omnia in sua potestate, quod essent graves aliis civibus, et adinvenirent astutias ad defraudandum eos, quam quod humiliter eis servirent. Et sic patet, quod lex Socratis de communitate mulierum et possessionum insufficiens erat, quia non poterat implere quod conabatur. He lays out a third reason at adhuc autem dominos facit, etc., and says that Socrates entrusted, following his law, the whole organization of possessions to the farmers, to whom he said that it should be entrusted, so that the produce of the farms would be offered to whoever was freed up for other things: and from this he deemed that the farmers, because this power, would be effected compliant and would humbly serve the other citizens. But the complete contrary would happen: for it is more more likely that from this, since they held all things in their power, they would be a burden to the other citizens, and would discover the cunning to defraud them, rather than that they would humbly serve them. And so it is clear that the law of Socrates about the community of women and possessions was insufficient, because it could not fulfill what it attempted. Deinde cum dicit sed sive necessaria etc., ostendit insufficientiam legis Socraticae quantum ad alia consequentia. Then, where he says sed sive necessaria, etc., he shows the insufficiency of the Socratic law regarding its other consequences. Et primo in generali. And first in general. Secundo in speciali, ibi, at vero si uxores et cetera. Second, particularly, at at vero si uxores, [II.5.11] etc. Dicit ergo primo, quod sive ista quae Socrates posuit de communitatem mulierum et possessionum, sint necessaria civitati, sive non, tamen de habitis, id est de consequentibus nihil determinavit, scilicet qualis debeat esse ordinatio politicae conversationis, et qualis disciplina, et quales leges propriae eorum, qui sic habent omnia communia: non enim est de facili invenire aliquas tales: nec etiam oportet eos parum differre ab aliis, qui praedictam civitatem servare possint: unde quibusdam specialibus legibus et speciali disciplina essent imbuendi. Therefore, he first says that either such things as Socrates laid out about the community of women and possessions are necessary for the city, or they are not; however, about its habits—that is, about its consequences—he determined nothing: of what should be the order of the political associations, what should the discipline be, and which laws are proper to those who have all things in common like this? For it is not easy to discover anyone like this, and those who would be able to serve the aforementioned city must differ from others by no small amount. And so they would need to be saturated by some particular laws and a particular discipline. Deinde cum dicit at vero si uxores etc., ostendit insufficientiam in speciali. Then, where he says at vero si uxores, etc., he shows the insufficiency in particular. Et primo quantum ad mulieres. And first with reference to women. Secundo quantum ad principes, ibi, insecurum autem et cetera. Second, with reference to governors, at insecurum autem, [II.5.13] etc.