Deinde cum dicit aut homines quidem etc., solvens hanc dubitationem ostendit veram rationem unitatis civitatis. Et dicit quod propter praedictam successionem hominum unius generis potest aliqualiter dici eadem multitudo hominum; non tamen potest dici eadem civitas, si mutetur ordo politiae. Cum enim communicatio civium, quae politia dicitur, sit de ratione civitatis, manifestum est quod mutata politia non remanet eadem civitas, sicut videmus in illis qui dicunt cantiones in choreis quod non est idem chorus, si quandoque sit comicus, idest dicens cantiones comediales de factis infimarum personarum, quandoque autem tragicus, idest dicens tragicas cantiones de bellis principum: et ita etiam videmus in omnibus aliis quae consistunt in quadam compositione vel communione, quod quandocumque fit alia species compositionis non remanet identitas: sicut non est eadem harmonia, si quandoque sit Dorica, idest septimi vel octavi toni, quandoque autem Phrygia idest tertii vel quarti. Cum igitur omnia talia habeant hunc modum, manifestum est quod civitas est dicenda eadem respiciendo ad ordinem politiae; ita quod mutato ordine politiae, licet remaneat idem locus et iidem homines, non est eadem civitas, quamvis materialiter sit eadem. Potest autem civitas sic mutata vocari, vel eodem vel altero nomine, sive sint iidem, sive alii: sed si est idem nomen, erit aequivoce dictum. Utrum autem propter hoc quod non remanet eadem civitas facta transmutatione politiae, sit iustum, quod conventiones prioris politiae adimpleantur, vel non, pertinet ad aliam considerationem, quod quidem in sequentibus determinabitur. Then, where he says aut homines quidem, etc., untangling [solvens] this doubt, he shows the true reason for the city’s unity. And he says that because of the aforementioned succession of men of one genus, the multitude of men can be called the same in a sense; but it cannot be called the same city if the order of the regime has changed. For since the union of the citizens—which is called the regime—is the rationale of the city, it is clear that a changed regime does not remain the same city, just as we see with those who sing songs in a chorus that it is not the same chorus if at one time it sings comedic songs about the deeds of lowly persons, and at another it is tragic, singing tragic songs about the wars of the governors. And so, also, we see in all other things that consist in some composition or communion, that whenever another species of composition comes to be, the same identity does not remain: just as it is not the same harmony if it is at one time Dorian, on the seventh or the eighth tone, but at another time Phrygian, on the third or the fourth. Since, therefore, all such things have this mode, it is clear that the city is said to be the same with respect to the order of the regime; so that when the order of the regime is changed, the same place and the same men may remain, but it is not the same city, although it may be materially the same. Now a city thus changed can be called either by the same or a different name whether they are the same or different: but if the name is the same, it will be used equivocally. But on account of this--that it does not remain the same city when the regime has made a change-over --whether or not it is just that the conventions of a previous regime should be fulfilled belongs to another consideration--which, indeed, will be determined in what follows. Lectio 3 Lecture 3 His autem quae dicta sunt habitum est considerare utrum eandem virtutem ponendum boni viri et civis studiosi, vel non eandem. At vero si quidem hoc oportet sortiri inquisitione eam quae civis, typo quodam primo sumendum. There is a point nearly allied to the preceding: Whether the virtue of a good man and a good citizen is the same or not. But, before entering on this discussion, we must certainly first obtain some general notion of the virtue of the citizen. Sicut igitur nauta unus aliquis communionum est, ita et civem dicimus. Nautarum autem quamvis dissimilium existentium potentia, hic quidem enim est remigator, hic autem gubernator, hic autem prorarius, hic autem aliam quandam talem habens denominationem, palam quod diligentissima uniuscuiusque ratio propria virtutis erit. Similiter autem et communis quaedam congruet omnibus. Salus enim navigationis opus est ipsorum omnium; hoc enim desiderat uniusquisque nautarum. Similiter igitur civium quamvis dissimilium existentium, opus est salus communitatis; communicatio autem est politia, propter quod quidem necessarium est esse civis virtutem ad politiam. Siquidem igitur sunt plures politiae species, palam quod non contingit studiosi civis unam esse virtutem perfectam. Bonum autem virum dicimus esse secundum unam virtutem perfectam. Quod quidem igitur contingit civem existentem studiosum non possidere virtutem secundum quam est studiosus vir, manifestum. Like the sailor, the citizen is a member of a community. Now, sailors have different functions, for one of them is a rower, another a pilot, and a third a look-out man, a fourth is described by some similar term; and while the precise definition of each individual's virtue applies exclusively to him, there is, at the same time, a common definition applicable to them all. For they have all of them a common object, which is safety in navigation. Similarly, one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community is the common business of them all. This community is the constitution; the virtue of the citizen must therefore be relative to the constitution of which he is a member. If, then, there are many forms of government, it is evident that there is not one single virtue of the good citizen which is perfect virtue. But we say that the good man is he who has one single virtue which is perfect virtue. Hence it is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man. Quin immo et secundum alium modum est dubitantes venire ad eandem rationem de optima politia. Si enim impossibile est ex omnibus studiosis existentibus esse civitatem, oportet autem unumquemque quod secundum ipsum opus bene facere, hoc autem a virtute, quoniam impossibile similes esse omnes cives, non utique erit virtus una civis et viri boni; eam quidem enim quae studiosi civis oportet omnibus inesse. Sic enim optimam necessarium esse civitatem, eam autem quae viri boni impossibile, si non omnes necessarium bonos esse eos qui in studiosa civitate cives. The same question may also be approached by another road, from a consideration of the best constitution. If the state cannot be entirely composed of good men, and yet each citizen is expected to do his own business well, and must therefore have virtue, still inasmuch as all the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the citizen and of the good man cannot coincide. All must have the virtue of the good citizen- thus, and thus only, can the state be perfect; but they will not have the virtue of a good man, unless we assume that in the good state all the citizens must be good. Adhuc quoniam ex dissimilibus est civitas, sicut animal mox ex anima et corpore, et anima ex ratione et appetitu, et domus ex viro et muliere, et possessio ex domino et servo, eodem modo et civitas ex omnibus his et ad haec ex aliis dissimilibus speciebus consistit, necesse non unam esse civium omnium virtutem, sicut neque chorizantium summi et astantis. Quod quidem igitur non eadem manifestum ex his. Again, the state, as composed of unlikes, may be compared to the living being: as the first elements into which a living being is resolved are soul and body, as soul is made up of rational principle and appetite, the family of husband and wife, property of master and slave, so of all these, as well as other dissimilar elements, the state is composed; and, therefore, the virtue of all the citizens cannot possibly be the same, any more than the excellence of the leader of a chorus is the same as that of the performer who stands by his side. I have said enough to show why the two kinds of virtue cannot be absolutely and always the same. Sed forte erit alicuius eadem virtus civis studiosi et viri studiosi. Dicimus itaque principem studiosum esse bonum et prudentem, politicum autem necessarium esse prudentem. But will there then be no case in which the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man coincide? To this we answer that the good ruler is a good and wise man, and that he who would be a statesman must be a wise man. Et disciplinam autem mox alteram esse dicunt quidam principis, sicut et videntur regum filii equestrem et bellicam erudiri; et Euripides ait. Non mihi quae varia et alta sed quorum civitati opus est; tanquam sit quaedam principis disciplina. Si itaque eadem principis boni et viri boni, civis autem est et qui subditus, non eadem utique erit simpliciter civis et viri, alicuius tamen scilicet potentis principari solius civis. Non enim eadem principis et civis, et propter hoc Iason ait esurire quando tyrannizat, tanquam nesciens idiota esse. And some persons say that even the education of the ruler should be of a special kind; for are not the children of kings instructed in riding and military exercises? As Euripides says: no subtle arts for me, but what the state requires. As though there were a special education needed by a ruler. If then the virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a good man, and we assume further that the subject is a citizen as well as the ruler, the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man cannot be absolutely the same, although in some cases they may; for the virtue of a ruler differs from that of a citizen. It was the sense of this difference which made Jason say that he felt hungry when he was not a tyrant, meaning that he could not endure to live in a private station. At vero laudatur posse principari et subici, et propati civis virtus esse posse principari et subici bene. Si igitur eam quidem quae boni viri ponimus principativam, eam autem quae civis ambo, non utique erunt ambo laudabilia similiter. But, on the other hand, it may be argued that men are praised for knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and he is said to be a citizen of approved virtue who is able to do both. Now if we suppose the virtue of a good man to be that which rules, and the virtue of the citizen to include ruling and obeying, it cannot be said that they are equally worthy of praise. Quoniam igitur aliquando videtur utraque et non eadem oportere principem discere et subditum, civem autem ambo scire et participare ambobus, et hinc utique considerabit aliquis. Since, then, it is sometimes thought that the ruler and the ruled must learn different things and not the same, but that the citizen must know and share in them both, the inference is obvious. Est enim principatus despoticus, hunc autem qui circa necessaria dicta scire facere principem non necessarium, sed uti magis, alterum autem servile. Dico autem alterum posse et servire ministerialibus actionibus. Servi autem species plures dicimus, operationes enim plures, quarum unam partem tenent manuales, isti autem sunt sicut et nomen significat ipsos qui vivunt de manibus in quibus banausus artifex est, propter quod apud quosdam non participabant principatibus antiquitus artifices, antequam fuisset demus extremus; opera quidem igitur subditorum sic non oportet bonum neque politicum, neque civem bonum addiscere, nisi quandoque gratia oportunitatis sibi ad se ipsum. Non enim adhuc accidit fieri hunc quidem despotam, hunc autem servum. There is, indeed, the rule of a master, which is concerned with menial offices—the master need not know how to perform these, but may employ others in the execution of them: the other would be degrading; and by the other I mean the power actually to do menial duties, which vary much in character and are executed by various classes of slaves, such, for example, as handicraftsmen, who, as their name signifies, live by the labor of their hands: under these the mechanic is included. Hence in ancient times, and among some nations, the working classes had no share in the government—a privilege which they only acquired under the extreme democracy. Certainly the good man and the statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts of inferiors except for their own occasional use; if they habitually practice them, there will cease to be a distinction between master and slave. Sed est quidam principatus secundum quem principatur similibus genere et liberis, hunc enim dicimus esse civilem principatum, quem oportet principem subditum addiscere, velut equestribus principari eum qui inter illos subditus fuit, et exercitum ducere in exercitu ductum, et qui ordini praefuit et insidias disposuit; propter quod dicitur et hoc bene, quod non est bene principari eum qui non sub principe fuit. This is not the rule of which we are speaking; but there is a rule of another kind, which is exercised over freemen and equals by birth—a constitutional rule, which the ruler must learn by obeying, as he would learn the duties of a general of cavalry by being under the orders of a general of cavalry, or the duties of a general of infantry by being under the orders of a general of infantry, and by having had the command of a regiment and of a company. It has been well said that 'he who has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander.' Horum autem virtus quidem altera, oportet autem civem bonum scire et posse principari et subici, et haec virtus civis scire principatum liberorum ad utraque, et boni etiam viri ambo, et si altera species temperantiae et iustitiae principativae; et enim subiecti quidem liberi autem boni, palam quia non una utique erit virtus, puta iustitia, sed habens species secundum quas principabitur et subicietur. Sicut enim viri et mulieris alia temperantia et fortitudo. Videbitur enim utique vir timidus esse, si sic fortis fuerit sicut mulier fortis, et mulier loquax, si sic ornata fuerit sicut vir bonus, quoniam et yconomia altera viri et mulieris: huius quidem enim acquirere, huius autem servare opus est; prudentia autem principis propria virtus sola; alias enim videtur necessarium esse communes subditorum eet principum. Subditi autem non est virtus prudentia, sed opinio vera. Sicut enim fistularum factor subiectus, princeps autem fistulator qui utitur. Utrum quidem igitur eadem virtus viri boni et civis studiosi, vel altera, et quomodo eadem, et quomodo altera, manifestum ex his. The two are not the same, but the good citizen ought to be capable of both; he should know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a freeman—these are the virtues of a citizen. And, although the temperance and justice of a ruler are distinct from those of a subject, the virtue of a good man will include both; for the virtue of the good man who is free and also a subject, e.g., his justice, will not be one but will comprise distinct kinds, the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey, and differing as the temperance and courage of men and women differ. For a man would be thought a coward if he had no more courage than a courageous woman, and a woman would be thought loquacious if she imposed no more restraint on her conversation than the good man; and indeed their part in the management of the household is different, for the duty of the one is to acquire, and of the other to preserve. Practical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler: it would seem that all other virtues must equally belong to ruler and subject. The virtue of the subject is certainly not wisdom, but only true opinion; he may be compared to the maker of the flute, while his master is like the flute-player or user of the flute.From these considerations may be gathered the answer to the question, whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen, or different, and how far the same, and how far different. His autem quae dicta sunt et cetera. Postquam Philosophus ostendit quid sit civis, hic inquirit de virtute civis. Et dividitur in partes duas. Hiis autem quae dicta sunt, etc. After the philosopher shows what a citizen is, he inquires after the virtue of the citizen. This is divided into two parts. In prima ostendit, quod non est simpliciter eadem virtus civis, et virtus boni viri. In the first part, he shows that the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man are not the same simply. In secunda parte movet circa hoc quasdam dubitationes, ibi, circa civem autem et cetera. In the second part, he raises certain difficulties about this, at circa civem autem, [III.4.1] etc. Circa primum duo facit. About the first he does two things. Primo ostendit, quod non est eadem simpliciter virtus civis, et boni viri. First, he shows that the virtue of the citizen and of the good man are not the same simply. In secunda ostendit, quod alicuius civis est eadem virtus, quae et boni viri, ibi, sed forte erit alicuius et cetera. In the second, he shows that for a certain citizen, there is the same virtue as for a good man, at sed forte erit alicuius, [III.3.5] etc. Circa primum duo facit. About the first of these he does two things. Primo dicit de quo est intentio: quia post praedicta habitum est, id est consequens considerare, utrum debeamus ponere eamdem virtutem boni civis et boni viri, vel non: quod est quaerere, utrum ab eodem dicatur aliquis bonus vir, et bonus civis: nam virtus est, quae bonum facit habentem. Ad hoc autem, quod ista quaestio debitam inquisitionem accipiat, oportet primo ostendere, quae sit virtus civis, quodam typo, id est sub quadam figura et similitudine. First, he says what his intention is: because after the aforementioned things have been grasped, it is necessary to consider, as a consequence, whether we ought to posit as the same virtue that of the good citizen and of the good man, or not--which is to seek whether it is from the same thing that someone is called a good man and a good citizen: for virtue is what makes good the one who has it. For this, therefore, so that such a question may receive a worthy inquiry, it is necessary to show first what the virtue of the citizen is, but as a certain type—that is, under a certain figure and likeness. Secundo, ibi, sicut igitur nauta etc., ostendit, quod non sit eadem virtus civis et boni viri, tribus rationibus. Second, at sicut igitur nauta, etc., he shows that the virtue of the citizen and of the good man are not the same—for three reasons. In quarum prima praemittit similitudinem, ad ostendendum, quae sit virtus boni civis: et dicit, quod sicut nauta significat aliquid commune multis, ita et civis. Quod autem nauta sit communis multis, manifestat, quia cum multi dissimiles in potentia, idest arte et officio, dicantur nautae, quidam eorum est remigator, qui movet navem remis, quidam gubernator, qui dirigit motum navis gubernaculo, quidam autem est prorarius, idest custos prorae, quae est anterior pars navis, et alii habent alia nomina et alia officia. Manifestum est autem, quod unicuique horum convenit aliquid secundum propriam virtutem, et aliquid secundum communem. Ad propriam enim virtutem uniuscuiusque pertinet, quod habeat diligentem rationem et curam de proprio officio, sicut gubernator de gubernatione, et sic de aliis. Communis autem virtus est quaedam, quae convenit omnibus: omnium enim eorum opus ad hoc tendit, ut navigatio sit salva: ad hoc enim tendit desiderium et intentio cuiuslibet nautarum: et ad hoc ordinatur virtus communis nautarum, quae est virtus nautae inquantum est nauta. Ita etiam cum sint diversi cives habentes dissimilia officia, et status dissimiles in civitate, opus commune omnium est salus communitatis: quae quidem communitas consistit in ordine politiae. Unde patet, quod virtus civis inquantum est civis, consideretur in ordine ad politiam; ut scilicet ille sit bonus civis, qui bene operatur ad conservationem politiae. Sunt autem plures species politiae, ut infra dicetur, et ex superioribus aliqualiter est manifestum: ad diversas autem politias ordinantur homines bene, secundum diversas virtutes. Alio enim modo conservatur democratia, et alio modo oligarchia, aut tyrannis. Unde manifestum est quod non est una virtus perfecta secundum quam civis possit simpliciter dici bonus; sed aliquis dicitur bonus vir secundum unam virtutem perfectam, scilicet secundum prudentiam, ex qua omnes virtutes morales dependent. Contingit igitur aliquem esse bonum civem, qui tamen non habet virtutem secundum quam aliquis est bonus vir; et hoc in politiis, quae sunt praeter optimam politiam. In the first, he presents a likeness in order to show what the virtue of the good citizen is: and he says that just as “sailor” signifies something common to many things, even so does “citizen.” And he clarifies that “sailor” is common to many because, although many people unlike each other in powers—that is, in art and office—are called “sailor,” yet a certain one of them is an “oarsman” who moves the ship with an oar, another is a “helmsman” [gubernator], who directs [dirigit] the movement of the ship from the helm [gubernaculo], and another is “prowsman,” that is, the guard of the prow, which is the forward part of the ship, and others have other names and other offices. It is clear, therefore, that for each of these [people], something [i.e. some name] is fitting for them according to their proper virtue, and something according to what is common. For it belongs to the proper virtue of each to have diligent reason, and care for his proper office, just as the helmsman for the helm, and so also the others. However, the virtue of what is common is a certain thing that is fitting for everyone: for the work of all of them intends this—that the voyage be healthy [salva]: for toward this tends the desire and intention of any of the sailors: and toward this is ordered the common virtue of the sailors, which is the virtue of the sailor inasmuch as he is a sailor. Thus, also, although there are diverse citizens holding dissimilar offices, and dissimilar states in the city, the common work of all is the health [salus] of the community: which community, indeed, consists in the order of the regime. Whence it is clear that the virtue of the citizen, inasmuch as he is a citizen, should be considered in the order toward the regime; so that, evidently, he is a good citizen who works well for the preservation of the regime. Now there are several kinds of regime, as will be said later, and from the above it is also somewhat clear: therefore, men are well-ordered to diverse regimes following diverse virtues. For in one way, democracy will be preserved, and in another mode oligarchy—or tyranny. Whence it is clear that there is not one perfect virtue following which a citizen can be called simply good; but someone is called a good man according to one perfect virtue, namely, according to prudence, from which all the moral virtues hang. It happens, therefore, that someone may be a good citizen who nevertheless does not have the virtue according to which someone is a good man; and this happens in regimes which are other than the best regime. Secundam rationem ponit, ibi, quinimmo et secundum alium modum et cetera. Et dicit, quod per alium modum possumus inquirendo sive obiiciendo pervenire ad eamdem rationem, et circa optimam politiam, scilicet quod non sit eadem virtus boni civis et boni viri: quia impossibile est, quantumcumque sit bona politia, quod omnes cives sint virtuosi: sed tamen oportet, quod unusquisque faciat opus suum quod ad civitatem pertinet, bene: quod quidem fit secundum virtutem civis, inquantum est civis. Et ideo dico, opus quod secundum ipsum, quia non possunt esse omnes cives similes, ut idem opus ad omnes pertineat. Et ex hoc sequitur, quod non sit una virtus civis et boni viri. Quam quidem consequentiam sic manifestat. Quia in optima politia, oportet quod quilibet civis habeat virtutem boni civis. Per hunc enim modum civitas erit optima: sed virtutem boni viri, impossibile est quod omnes habeant, quia non omnes sunt virtuosi in una civitate, ut dictum est. He puts forward a second reason, at quinimmo et secundum alium modum, etc., and he says that, through another way, by inquiring or arguing, we can arrive at the same reason, and about the best regime—namely, that there is not the same virtue of a good citizen and a good man: because it is impossible, however good the regime may be, that all the citizens should be virtuous: but it is nevertheless necessary that each one should do his own work well that pertains to the city; which, indeed, occurs according to the virtue of the citizen inasmuch as he is a citizen. And therefore I say: “the work which is his own” because not all citizens can be the same, such that the same work belongs to all of them. And from this it follows that there is not one virtue of the citizen and of the good man, which consequence is clear thus: because in the best regime, it is necessary that any citizen have the virtue of a good citizen. For in this way, the city will be the best: but as for the virtue of the good man, it is impossible that everyone have it, since not everyone is virtuous in one city, as was said. Tertiam rationem ponit, ibi, adhuc quoniam et ex dissimilibus et cetera. Et dicit, quod omnis civitas constat ex dissimilibus partibus, sicut animal constat statim quidem ex dissimilibus, scilicet ex anima et corpore, et similiter anima humana constat dissimilibus, scilicet ex vi rationabili et appetitiva, et iterum domestica societas consistit ex dissimilibus, scilicet ex viro et muliere, et possessio etiam constat ex domino et servo. Civitas autem constat ex omnibus istis diversitatibus, et ex multis aliis. Dictum est autem in primo, quod non est eadem virtus principantis et subiecti, neque in anima, neque etiam in aliis: unde etiam relinquitur, quod non sit una et eadem virtus omnium civium: sicut videmus, quod in choreis non est eadem virtus summi, idest illius qui ducit choream, et astantis, idest illius qui assistit. Manifestum est autem, quod una et eadem est virtus boni viri: relinquitur ergo, quod non sit eadem virtus boni civis et boni viri. He puts forward a third reason, at adhuc quoniam et ex dissimilibus, etc., and he says that every city is built out of dissimilar parts, just as an animal is built—usually, at least—out of dissimilar parts, namely, out of soul and body, and likewise, the human soul is built out of the dissimilar, namely, from the rational power and appetitive, and again, household society is built from the dissimilar, namely, from man and wife, and an estate is also built out of master and slave. Now the city is built out of all these differences, and out of many others. But it was said in Bk. I that the virtues of governing and of being subject are not the same, nor is the soul the same, nor are various other things: whence it remains that there is not one and the same virtue for all citizens: just as we see that in the chorus there is not the same virtue for the summi, that is, for he who leads the chorus, and for the astantis, that is, for he who assists. But it is clear that the virtue of the good man is one and the same: it remains, therefore, that the virtue of the good citizen and of the good man are not the same. Deinde cum dicit sed forte erit alicuius eadem etc., ostendit, quod alicuius civis est eadem virtus, quae et boni viri. Et circa hoc tria facit. Then, where he says sed forte erit alicuius eadem, etc., he shows that the virtue of a certain citizen is the same virtue as that of the good man. And about this he does three things. Primo ostendit propositum. First, he shows what was proposed. Secundo ex hoc concludit conclusionem probatam in praemissis, ibi, et disciplinam autem et cetera. Second, from this he concludes that the conclusion is proved in the aforementioned things, at et disciplinam autem, [II.3.6] etc. Tertio movet quamdam dubitationem circa praemissa, et solvit, ibi, at vero laudatur et cetera. Third, he raises a certain difficulty about the aforementioned, and resolves it, at at vero laudatur, [II.3.7] etc. Dicit ergo primo, quod forte poterit dici, quod alicuius civis, ad hoc quod sit bonus, requiritur eadem virtus, quae est boni viri. Non enim dicitur aliquis esse bonus princeps, nisi sit bonus per virtutes morales et prudens. Dictum est enim in sexto Ethicorum quod politica est quaedam pars prudentiae: unde oportet politicum, idest rectorem politiae, esse prudentem, et per consequens bonum virum. He says first, therefore, that by chance it will be able to be said that, for that which is the good of a certain citizen, the same virtue is required which is that of the good man. For it is not said that someone is a good prince unless he is good through the moral virtues and prudence. For it was said in Bk. VI of the Ethics that politics is a certain part of prudence: whence it is necessary that someone political, that is, the ruler of a regime, is prudent, and consequently, a good man. Deinde cum dicit et disciplinam autem etc., concludit ex hoc, quod non sit eadem virtus boni civis simpliciter, et boni viri. Et ad hoc probandum primo inducit, quod quidam dicunt aliam esse disciplinam principis, qua est instruendus ad virtutem, et disciplinam civis, ut apparet ex hoc quod filii regum erudiuntur in equestri et bellica disciplina. Unde, et Euripides dixit loquens ex persona principis: non ad me pertinet scire quae sunt varia, et alta, quae scilicet philosophi considerant, sed ea quorum opus est ad regimen civitatis. Et hoc dixit ad significandum, quod est quaedam propria disciplina principis. Et quo concludit, quod si eadem sit disciplina et virtus boni principis et boni viri, non autem omnis civis est princeps, sed etiam subditi sunt cives; sequitur, quod non sit simpliciter eadem virtus civis, et viri, nisi forte alicuius civis, illius scilicet, qui potest esse princeps. Et hoc ideo, quia non est eadem virtus principis et civis. Propter quod Iason dixit, quod esuriebat quando non tyrannizabat, ac si nesciret vivere sicut ydiota, id est sicut privata persona. Then, where he says et disciplinam autem, etc., he concludes from this that the virtue of the good citizen and of the good man are not simply the same. And to prove this, he first introduces what some say, that the discipline of a prince, who should be instructed for virtue, is other than the discipline of the citizen--as will appear from this, that the sons of a king are developed in riding and military discipline. Whence Euripides also said, speaking in the person of a prince: “It does not belong to me to know things various and high, which philosophers consider, but those things whose work is for the regime of the city.” And he said this in order to signify what is a certain proper discipline for a prince. And from this he concludes that if the discipline and virtue of a good prince and a good man are the same, and not every citizen is a prince, but even subjects are citizens, then it follows that the virtue of a citizen and of a man are not simply the same, unless by chance of a certain citizen, of him, namely, who is able to be a prince. And this is so because the virtue of a prince and of a citizen are not the same. Because of this Jason said that he used to hunger when he was not tyrannizing, as if he did not know how to live as an ydiota, that is, as a private person. Deinde cum dicit at vero laudatur etc., movet dubitationem circa praemissa. Et circa hoc duo facit. Then, where he says at vero laudatur, etc., he raises a difficulty about the aforementioned things, and he does two things concerning this. Primo obiicit contra praemissa. First, he argues against the aforementioned things. Secundo solvit, ibi, quoniam igitur aliquando videtur et cetera. Second, he resolves the difficulty, at quoniam igitur aliquando videtur, [III.3.8] etc. Dicit ergo primo, quod quandoque laudatur civis ex hoc, quod potest bene principari et subiici. Si ergo virtus boni viri est, quae est virtus boni principis; virtus autem boni civis est, quae se habet ad utrumque, scilicet ad principandum et subiiciendum: sequitur, quod non sunt ambo similiter laudabilia, scilicet esse bonum civem et bonum virum; sed esse bonum civem sit multo melius. Therefore, he says first that sometimes a citizen is praised because of this--that he is well able to govern and to be subject. If, therefore, the virtue of a good man is the virtue of a good prince, but the virtue of a good citizen is inclined toward both, namely, toward governing and being subject, it follows that they are not both similarly praiseworthy—to be a good citizen and a good man—but to be a good citizen is much better.