Multis autem factis huiusmodi, iam quaedam differentia fit, ut his quidem fiat ratiocinatio ex talium mansione, aliis vero non. a1. and when such persistence is frequently repeated a further distinction at once arises between those which out of the persistence of such sense-impressions develop a power of systematizing them and those which do not. Ex sensu quidem igitur fit memoria, sicut diximus, ex memoria autem multoties eiusdem facta, experimentum. Multae enim memoriae numero, experimentum unum sunt. —Ex experimento autem aut ex omni quiescente universali in anima, uno praeter multa, quodcumque in omnibus insit illis idem, artis est principium et scientiae. —Si quidem circa generationem, artis; si vero circa ens, scientiae. —Neque igitur insunt determinati habitus, neque ab aliis habitibus fiunt notioribus, sed a sensu. —Ut in pugna, versione fiente, unus cum perfecerit statum, alter stat, postea alter quousque in principium veniant. —Anima autem existit talis ens qualis possit pati hoc. a4. So out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory, and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience; for a number of memories constitute a single experience. From experience again—that is, from the universal now stabilized in its entirety within the soul, the one beside the many which is a single identity within them all—originate the skill of the craftsman and the knowledge of the man of science, skill in the sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being. We conclude that these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form, nor developed from other higher states of knowledge, but from sense-perception. It is like a rout in battle stopped by first one man making a stand and then another, until the original formation has been restored. The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process. Quod autem dictum est olim, non autem plane dictum est, iterum dicamus. Exstante enim indifferentium uno, primum quidem in anima universale est. —Et namque sentitur quidem singulare, sensus autem universalis est, ut hominis, sed non Calliae hominis. —Iterum in his statur, quousque impartibilia stent et universalia, ut puta huiusmodi animal, quousque animal, et in hoc similiter. —Manifestum itaque quoniam nobis prima inductione cognoscere necessarium est; et namque sic sensus universale facit. a14. Let us now restate the account given already, though with insufficient clearness. When one of a number of logically indiscriminable particulars has made a stand, the earliest universal is present in the soul: for though the act of sense-perception is of the particular, its content is universal — is man, for example, not the man Callias. A fresh stand is made among these rudimentary universals, and the process does not cease until the indivisible concepts, the true universals, are established: e.g., such and such a species of animal is a step towards the genus animal, which by the same process is a step towards a further generalization. Thus it is clear that we must get to know the primary premises by induction; for the method by which even sense-perception implants the universal is inductive. Quoniam autem eorum qui circa intelligentiam habituum, quibus verum dicimus, alii quidem semper veri sunt, alii autem recipiunt falsitatem, ut opinio et ratio, vera autem semper scientia et intellectus, et nullum scientia certius aliud genus quam intellectus, principia autem demonstrationum notiora, scientia autem omnis cum ratione est, principiorum scientia quidem non utique erit. Quoniam autem nihil verius contingit esse scientia aut intellectus, intellectus utique erit principiorum ex his considerantibus. —Et quia demonstrationis principium non demonstratio, quare neque scientiae scientia est. Si igitur nullum aliud genus praeter scientiam habemus verum, intellectus utique erit scientiae principium, et hoc principium principii utique erit, hoc autem omne similiter se habet ad omnem rem. b5. Now, of the thinking states by which we grasp truth, some are unfailingly true, others admit of error — opinion, for instance, and calculation, whereas scientific knowing and intuition are always true: further, no other kind of thought except intuition is more accurate than scientific knowledge, whereas primary premises are more knowable than demonstrations, and all scientific knowledge is discursive. From these considerations it follows that there will be no scientific knowledge of the primary premises, and since except intuition nothing can be truer than scientific knowledge, it will be intuition that apprehends the primary premises — a result which also follows from the fact that demonstration cannot be the originative source of demonstration, nor, consequently, scientific knowledge of scientific knowledge. If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking except scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative source of scientific knowledge. And the originative source of science grasps the original basic premise, while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact. 582. De principiis autem qualiter fiant cognita etc. Postquam Philosophus ostendit quomodo cognoscatur illud quod est principium demonstrationis sicut medium, scilicet ‘quid’ et ‘propter quid’, hic ostendit quomodo cognoscantur prima principia demonstrationis communia. As to the basic premises. After showing how that which is the principle of demonstration in the sense of a middle comes to be known, the Philosopher now shows how the first common principles come to be known. Et primo dicit de quo est intentio; First, he states his intention. secundo exequitur propositum, ibi: quod quidem igitur etc. Second, he pursues it, at: we have already said (100b20; [583]). Dicit ergo primo quod ex his quae sequuntur manifestum erit de principiis primis indemonstrabilibus, qualiter eorum cognitio fiat in nobis et quo habitu cognoscantur, hoc tamen ordine observato ut prius circa hoc dubitationes ponamus. He says therefore first (100b18), that from what follows it will be clear concerning indemonstrable principles both how we come to know them and by what habit they are known. However, the plan we shall observe calls for us first to propose certain problems touching this matter. 583. Deinde cum dicit: <quod> quidem igitur etc., exequitur propositum. Then, at: we have already said (100b20) he pursues his plan. Et circa hoc duo facit: Concerning this he does two things. primo movet dubitationem; First, he raises the problem. secundo solvit, ibi: necesse itaque est habere etc. Second, he settles it, at: therefore, we must possess (100b32; [588]). Circa primum tria facit: In regard to the first he does three things. primo praemittit quiddam ex quo ostenditur necessitas huius inquisitionis; First, he prefaces something from which the need for an inquiry of this kind is indicated. secundo movet quaestiones, ibi: immediatorum autem etc.; Second, he raises the questions, at: but there are questions (100b23; [584]). tertio obiicit ad quaestionem, ibi: si quidem igitur etc. Third, he objects to a question, at: now, it is strange (100b26; [585]). Dicit ergo primo quod iam supra dictum est quod non contingit aliquid scire per demonstrationem, nisi praecognoscantur prima principia immediata. Et ideo ad scientiam quae est de demonstratione, utile est ut sciatur qualiter prima principia cognoscantur. He says therefore first (100b20), that it has already been established above that nothing is scientifically known through demonstration, unless the first immediate principles are known beforehand. Therefore, in order to have scientific knowledge of demonstration, it is useful to know how the first principles are acquired. 584. Deinde cum dicit: immediatorum autem cognitionem etc., movet dubitationes tres circa praedictam cognitionem principiorum. Then, at: but there are questions (100b23) he raises three questions touching this knowledge of the principles. Quarum prima est, utrum omnium immediatorum principiorum sit eadem cognitio vel non; The first question is whether the knowledge of all immediate principles is the same or not. secunda dubitatio est, utrum omnium immediatorum principiorum sit scientia vel nullorum, aut quorumdam sit scientia, aliorum vero aliud genus cognitionis; The second is whether there is a science of all immediate principles or of none; or is there science of some, and some other type of knowledge of the others. tertia quaestio est, utrum habitus istorum principiorum fiant in nobis, cum prius non fuerint, vel semper infuerunt, sed tamen nos latebat. The third question is whether the habitual knowledge of those principles comes to exist in us after previously not existing, or have they always been in us but escaped our notice. 585. Deinde cum dicit: si quidem igitur etc., obiicit ad quaestionem ultimam, ad quam aliae ordinantur. Then, at: now, it is strange (100b26) he objects to the last question to which the others are ordered. Et primo obiicit ad unam partem. Et dicit quod est inconveniens dicere quod habeamus habitus horum principiorum et lateat nos. Manifestum est enim quod illi qui habent cognitionem principiorum habent certiorem cognitionem cognitione quae est per demonstrationem; sed cognitio quae est per demonstrationem non potest haberi ita quod lateat habentem (dictum est enim in principio huius libri quod ille qui habet scientiam scit quod impossibile est aliter se habere); ergo multo minus potest esse quod aliquis habeat cognitionem principiorum immediatorum et lateat ipsum. Quod tamen inconveniens sequeretur si habitus huiusmodi inessent et laterent. First, he objects to the second side, saying that it is unsuitable to claim that we have the habitual knowledge of these principles but they escape our notice. For it is obvious that those who have knowledge of the principles have a knowledge which is more certain than that which is acquired through demonstration. But knowledge through demonstration cannot be had such that it escapes the notice of the one having it. For it was established in the beginning of this book that a person who has scientific knowledge of something knows that it is impossible for it to be otherwise. Therefore, it is far less possible for someone having a knowledge of the first principles to have it escape his notice. Yet this absurdity would follow, if habitual knowledge of this kind were in us but escaped our notice. 586. Secundo ibi: si autem accipimus etc., obiicit ad contrarium. Si enim aliquis dicat quod accipimus de novo habitus principiorum cum prius eos non habuerimus, relinquitur ulterius dubitatio qualiter possimus huiusmodi principia de novo cognoscere et addiscere, et hoc non ex aliqua praeexistenti cognitione? Impossibile est enim aliquid addiscere nisi <ex> praeexistenti cognitione, sicut etiam supra circa demonstrationem diximus. Immediata autem principia ideo ex praeexistenti cognitione addiscere non possumus, quia praeexistens cognitio est certior, cum sit causa certitudinis his quae per eam innotescunt; nulla autem cognitio est certior cognitione huiusmodi principiorum; unde non videtur quod possimus ea cognoscere cum prius non cognoverimus. Second, at: if, on the other hand (100b28), he objects to the other side. For if a person states that we acquire these habits or principles de novo after previously not having them, we are left with the further problem of how we can know and learn such principles de novo without some previous knowledge existing in us: for it is impossible to learn anything save from preexisting knowledge, as we have established above in regard to demonstration. But the reason why we cannot learn the immediate principles from preexisting knowledge is that preexisting knowledge is more certain, since it is a cause of certitude of the things which are made known through it. But no knowledge is more certain than the knowledge of these principles. Hence it does not seem that we can begin to know them, when previously we did not know. 587. Tertio ibi: manifestum igitur etc., concludit ex praemissis duabus rationibus quod neque possibile est semper habere cognitionem horum principiorum quae nos lateat, neque etiam possibile est quod in nobis generetur de novo talis cognitio, omnimoda ignorantia praecedente et non habito aliquo alio habitu. Third, at: so it emerges that neither (100b30), he concludes from the above two arguments that it is neither possible always to have had the knowledge of these principles but it escaped our notice, nor possible that such knowledge is generated de novo in us to supplant a state of absolute ignorance in which no other habitual knowledge was possessed. 588. Deinde cum dicit: necesse itaque est etc., solvit praemissas quaestiones. Then, at: therefore, we must possess (100b32) he solves these questions. Et primo solvit ultimam; First, he solves the last one. secundo solvit duas primas, ibi: quoniam autem eorum qui circa intellectum etc. Second, he solves the first two, at: now, of the thinking states (101b5; [596]). Circa primum duo facit: In regard to the first he does two things. primo solvit dubitationem; First, he solves a doubt. secundo manifestat solutionem positam, ibi: quod autem dictum est olim etc. Second, he shows the solution set down, at: let us now restate the account (101a14; [594]). Circa primum tria facit: In regard to the first he does three things. primo proponit quod oportet aliquid cognoscitivum in nobis praeexistere; First, he proposes that some principle of knowing must preexist in us. secundo ostendit quid sit illud, ibi: videtur autem hoc etc.; Second, he shows what it is, at: and this at least (100b34; [589]). tertio ostendit quomodo ex praeexistenti cognoscitivo principio fiat in nobis principiorum cognitio, ibi: ex sensu quidem igitur etc. Third, he shows how from a preexisting principle of knowing we attain the knowledge of principles, at: so out of sense-perception (101a4; [594]). Dicit ergo primo quod necesse est a principio in nobis esse quamdam potentiam cognoscitivam, quae scilicet praeexistat cognitioni principiorum, non tamen talem quae sit potior quantum ad certitudinem cognitione principiorum. Unde non eodem modo principiorum cognitio fit in nobis ex praeexistenti cognitione sicut accidit in his quae cognoscuntur per demonstrationem. He says therefore first (100b32), that there must be in us from the beginning a certain cognitive power that exists previously to the knowledge of principles, but not such that it is stronger as to certitude than the knowledge of principles. Hence the knowledge of principles does not come about in us from preexisting knowledge in the same way as things which are known through demonstration.