Quaestiones disputatae de anima Disputed Questions on the Soul Prooemium Prologue Et primo quaeritur utrum anima humana possit esse forma et hoc aliquid. 1. Whether the soul can be a form and a particular thing? Secundo utrum anima humana sit separata secundum esse a corpore. 2. Whether the human soul, so far as its act of existing is concerned, is separated from the body? Tertio utrum intellectus possibilis, sive anima intellectiva, sit una in omnibus. 3. Whether there is one potential intellect, or intellective soul, for all men? Quarto utrum necesse sit ponere intellectum agentem. 4. Whether it is necessary to admit that an agent intellect exists? Quinto utrum intellectus agens sit unus et separatus. 5. Whether there is one separately existing agent intellect for all men? Sexto utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma. 6. Whether the soul is composed of matter and form? Septimo utrum Angelus et anima differant specie. 7. Whether the angel and the soul are of different species? Octavo utrum anima rationalis tali corpori debeat uniri quale est corpus humanum. 8. Whether the rational soul should be united to a body such as man possesses? Nono utrum anima uniatur materiae corporali. 9. Whether the soul is united to corporeal matter through a medium? Decimo utrum anima sit tota in toto corpore, et in qualibet parte eius. 10. Whether the soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts? Undecimo utrum in homine anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis sit una substantia. 11. Whether the rational, sentient, and vegetal souls in man are substantially one and the same? Duodecimo utrum anima sit suae potentiae. 12. Whether the soul is its powers? Decimotertio de distinctione potentiarum animae, utrum videlicet distinguantur per obiecta. 13. Whether the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another by their objects? Decimoquarto de immortalitate animae humanae, et utrum sit immortalis. 14. Whether the human soul is incorruptible? Decimoquinto utrum anima separata a corpore possit intelligere. 15. Whether the soul, when separated from the body, is capable of understanding? Decimosexto utrum anima coniuncta corpori possit intelligere substantias separatas. 16. Whether the soul, when united to the body, can understand separate substances? Decimoseptimo utrum anima separata possit intelligere substantias separatas. 17. Whether the soul, when separated from the body, can understand separate substances? Decimoctavo utrum anima separata cognoscat omnia naturalia. 18. Whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows all natural things? Decimonono utrum potentiae sensitivae remaneant in anima separata. 19. Whether the sentient powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body? Vicesimo utrum anima separata singularia cognoscat. 20. Whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows singular things? Vicesimoprimo utrum anima separata possit pati poenam ab igne corporeo. 21. Whether the soul, when separated from the body, can suffer punishment by corporeal fire? Quaestio 1 Question 1 Utrum anima humana possit esse forma et hoc aliquid Whether the human soul can be a form and a particular thing Et primo quaeritur utrum anima humana possit esse forma et hoc aliquid. And first we examine this question: whether the human soul can be a form and a particular thing. Et videtur quod non. Si enim anima humana est hoc aliquid, est subsistens et habens per se esse completum. Quod autem advenit alicui post esse completum advenit ei accidentaliter, ut albedo homini aut etiam vestimentum corpori. Corpus igitur unitum animae advenit ei accidentaliter. Si ergo anima est hoc aliquid, non est forma substantialis corporis. Obj. 1: It seems that the human soul cannot be a form and a particular thing. For if the human soul is a particular thing, it is a subsisting thing having a complete act of existing in virtue of its own nature. Now whatever accrues to a thing over and above its complete existence is an accident of that thing as whiteness and clothing are accidents of man. Therefore, when the body is united to the soul, it is united to it accidentally. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, it is not the substantial form of the body. Praeterea. Si anima est hoc aliquid, oportet quod sit aliquid individuatum. Nullum enim universalium est hoc aliquid. Aut igitur individuatur ex aliquo alio aut ex se. Si ex alio, et est forma corporis, oportet quod individuetur ex corpore, nam formae individuantur ex propria materia, et sic sequitur quod remoto corpore tollitur individuatio animae, et sic anima non poterit esse per se subsistens nec hoc aliquid. Si autem ex se individuatur, aut est forma simplex aut est aliquid compositum ex materia et forma. Si est forma simplex, sequitur quod una anima individuata ab alia differre non poterit nisi secundum formam; differentia autem secundum formam facit diversitatem speciei; sequitur igitur quod animae diversorum hominum sint specie differentes; unde et homines specie differrent, si anima est forma corporis, cum unumquodque a propria forma speciem sortiatur. Si autem anima est composita ex materia et forma, impossibile est quod secundum se totam sit forma corporis, nam materia nullius est forma. Relinquitur igitur quod impossible sit animam simul esse hoc aliquid et formam. Obj. 2: Further, if the soul is a particular thing, it must be an individuated thing, for a universal is not a particular thing. Now the soul is individuated either by something other than itself, or by itself. If the soul is individuated by something other than itself, and is the form of the body, it must be individuated by the body (for forms are individuated by their proper matter). And thus it follows that when the body is separated from the soul, the latter loses its individuation. In that case the soul could not subsist of itself nor be a particular thing. On the other hand, if the soul is individuated by itself, it is either a form in its entirety or is something composed of matter and form. If it is a form in its entirety, it follows that one individuated soul could differ from another only according to form. But difference in form causes difference in species. Hence it would follow that the souls of different men are specifically diverse; and if the soul is the form of the body, men differ specifically among themselves because each and every thing derives its species from its proper form. On the other hand, if the soul is composed of matter and form, it would be impossible for the soul as a whole to be the form of the body, for the matter of a thing never has the nature of a form. It follows, then, that the soul cannot be at once both a particular thing and a form. Praeterea. Si anima est hoc aliquid, sequitur quod sit individuum quoddam. Omne autem individuum est in aliqua specie et in aliquo genere. Relinquitur igitur quod anima habet proprium genus et propriam speciem. Impossibile est autem quod aliquid habens propriam speciem recipiat superadditionem alterius ad speciei eiusdem constitutionem, quia ut dicit Philosophus VIII Metaphysicae species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus quidquid subtrahitur vel additur speciem variat. Materia autem et forma uniuntur ad speciei constitutionem. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid non unietur corpori ut forma materiae. Obj. 3: Further, if the soul is a particular thing, it follows that it is an individual. Now every individual belongs to a species and a genus. Consequently the soul will have a proper species and a proper genus. But a thing possessing its own species cannot have anything else super-added to it in order to give it its species, because, as the Philosopher points out in the Metaphysics, the forms or species of things are like numbers whose species change if a unit is added or subtracted. Matter and form, however, are united in order to constitute a species. Therefore, if the soul is a particular thing, it is not united to the body as a form to matter. Praeterea. Cum Deus res propter suam bonitatem fecerit, quae in diversis rerum gradibus manifestatur, tot gradus entium instituit quot potuit rerum natura pati. Si igitur anima humana potest per se subsistere, quod oportet dicere si est hoc aliquid, sequitur quod animae per se existentes sint unus gradus entium. Formae autem non sunt unus gradus entium seorsum sine materiis. Igitur anima, si est hoc aliquid, non erit forma alicuius materiae. Obj. 4: Further, since God made things because of His goodness, which is manifested in the different grades of things, he instituted as many grades of beings as nature could admit. Hence, if the human soul can subsist in itself (which must be maintained if it is a particular thing), it would then constitute a distinct grade of being. But forms without matter do not themselves constitute a distinct grade of being. Thus, if the soul is a particular thing, it will not be the form of any matter. Praeterea. Si anima est hoc aliquid et per se subsistens, oportet quod sit incorruptibilis, cum neque contrarium habeat, neque ex contrariis composita sit. Si autem est incorruptibilis non potest esse proportionata corpori corruptibili quale est corpus humanum. Omnis autem forma est proportionata suae materiae. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid non erit forma corporis humani. Obj. 5: Further, if the soul is a particular thing subsisting in itself, it must be incorruptible, for neither has it a contrary, nor is it composed of contraries. But if the soul is incorruptible, it cannot be proportioned to a corruptible body such as the human body is. Now every form is proportioned to its matter. So if the soul is a particular thing, it will not be the form of the human body. Praeterea. Nihil subsistens est actus purus nisi Deus. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid, utpote per se subsistens, erit in ea aliqua compositio actus et potentiae. Et sic non poterit esse forma, quia potentia non est alicuius actus. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid, non erit forma. Obj. 6: Further, the only subsisting being that is pure act is God. Therefore, if the soul is a particular self-subsisting thing, it will be composed of act and potentiality, and thus will not be a form, because no potentiality is an act. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, it will not be a form. Praeterea. Si anima est hoc aliquid, potens per se subsistere, non oportet quod corpori uniatur nisi propter aliquod bonum ipsius. Aut igitur propter aliquod bonum essentiale, aut accidentale. Propter bonum essentiale non, quia sine corpore potest subsistere; nec etiam propter bonum accidentale, quod praecipue videtur esse cognitio veritatis quam anima humana per sensus accipit, qui sine organis corporeis esse non possunt, quia animae puerorum etiam antequam nascantur morientium dicuntur a quibusdam certam cognitionem rerum naturalium habere, quam tamen constat quod per sensus non acquisierunt. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid, nulla ratio est quare corpori uniatur ut forma. Obj. 7: Further, if the soul is a particular thing capable of subsisting in itself, it would need to be united to a body only for a good accruing to the soul, either for an essential good or an accidental one. Not for an essential good, however, because it can subsist without the body. Nor even for an accidental good; for the knowledge of truth which the human soul can acquire through the senses (themselves incapable of existing without bodily organs) is evidently a pre-eminent good of this sort; but some hold that the souls of still-born infants have a perfect knowledge of things, and these certainly never acquired that knowledge through their senses. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, there is no reason why it should be united as a form to the body. Praeterea. Forma et hoc aliquid ex opposito dividuntur. Dicit enim Philosophus in II De anima quod substantia dividitur in tria, quorum unum est forma, aliud materia, et tertium quod est hoc aliquid. Opposita autem non dicuntur de eodem. Ergo anima humana non potest esse forma et hoc aliquid. Obj. 8: Further, a form and a particular thing are distinguished from each other as opposites; for the Philosopher says in On the Soul that substance has a threefold division: the first is form, the second, matter, and the third, this particular thing. But opposites are not predicated of one and the same thing. Therefore, the human soul cannot be a form and a particular thing. Praeterea. Id quod est hoc aliquid per se subsistit; formae autem proprium est ut sit in alio; quae videntur esse opposita. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid, non videtur quod sit forma. Obj. 9: Further, it belongs to the very essence of a particular thing to subsist of itself. But it is proper to a form to exist in something else. These seem to be contradictory. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, it is apparently not a form. Sed dicebat quod corrupto corpore anima remanet hoc aliquid et per se subsistens, sed tunc perit in ea ratio formae. —Sed contra. Omne quod potest abscedere ab aliquo, manente substantia eius, inest ei accidentaliter. Si igitur anima remanente post corpus perit in ea ratio formae, sequitur quod ratio formae conveniat ei accidentaliter. Sed non unitur corpori ad constitutionem hominis nisi prout est forma. Ergo unitur corpori accidentaliter, et per consequens homo erit ens per accidens, quod est inconveniens. Obj. 10: But it might be said that when the body corrupts, the soul still remains a particular self-subsisting thing, but then loses the nature of a form. On the other hand, whatever can exist apart from a thing and retain the nature of a substance exists in that thing accidentally. Therefore, if the soul continues to exist after the body corrupts, the soul ceases to have the character of a form; and thus the nature of a form belongs to it only accidentally. But it is only as a form that the soul is united to the body in order to constitute a man. Hence the soul is united to the body accidentally, and thus man will be a being per accidens. This is incongruous.