Quaestio 1 Question 1 Utrum anima humana possit esse forma et hoc aliquid Whether the human soul can be a form and a particular thing Et primo quaeritur utrum anima humana possit esse forma et hoc aliquid. And first it is asked whether the human soul can be a form and a particular thing. Et videtur quod non. Si enim anima humana est hoc aliquid, est subsistens et habens per se esse completum. Quod autem advenit alicui post esse completum advenit ei accidentaliter, ut albedo homini aut etiam vestimentum corpori. Corpus igitur unitum animae advenit ei accidentaliter. Si ergo anima est hoc aliquid, non est forma substantialis corporis. Obj. 1: It seems that it cannot. For if the human soul is a particular thing, it is a subsisting thing having a complete act of existing in virtue of its own nature. Now whatever accrues to a thing over and above its complete existence is an accident of that thing, just as whiteness and clothing are accidents of man. Therefore, when the body is united to the soul, it is united to it accidentally. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, it is not the substantial form of the body. Praeterea. Si anima est hoc aliquid, oportet quod sit aliquid individuatum. Nullum enim universalium est hoc aliquid. Aut igitur individuatur ex aliquo alio aut ex se. Si ex alio, et est forma corporis, oportet quod individuetur ex corpore, nam formae individuantur ex propria materia, et sic sequitur quod remoto corpore tollitur individuatio animae, et sic anima non poterit esse per se subsistens nec hoc aliquid. Si autem ex se individuatur, aut est forma simplex aut est aliquid compositum ex materia et forma. Si est forma simplex, sequitur quod una anima individuata ab alia differre non poterit nisi secundum formam; differentia autem secundum formam facit diversitatem speciei; sequitur igitur quod animae diversorum hominum sint specie differentes; unde et homines specie differrent, si anima est forma corporis, cum unumquodque a propria forma speciem sortiatur. Si autem anima est composita ex materia et forma, impossibile est quod secundum se totam sit forma corporis, nam materia nullius est forma. Relinquitur igitur quod impossible sit animam simul esse hoc aliquid et formam. Obj. 2: Further, if the soul is a particular thing, it must be an individuated thing, for a universal is not a particular thing. Now the soul is individuated either by something other than itself, or by itself. If the soul is individuated by something other than itself, and is the form of the body, it must be individuated by the body, for forms are individuated by their proper matter. And thus, it follows that when the body is separated from the soul, the latter loses its individuation. In that case, the soul could not subsist of itself nor be a particular thing. On the other hand, if the soul is individuated by itself, it is either a form in its entirety or is something composed of matter and form. If it is a form in its entirety, it follows that one individuated soul could differ from another only according to form. But difference in form causes difference in species. Hence it would follow that the souls of different men are diverse in species; and if the soul is the form of the body, men differ among themselves in species because each and every thing derives its species from its proper form. On the other hand, if the soul is composed of matter and form, it would be impossible for the soul as a whole to be the form of the body, for the matter of a thing never has the nature of a form. It follows, then, that the soul cannot be at once both a particular thing and a form. Praeterea. Si anima est hoc aliquid, sequitur quod sit individuum quoddam. Omne autem individuum est in aliqua specie et in aliquo genere. Relinquitur igitur quod anima habet proprium genus et propriam speciem. Impossibile est autem quod aliquid habens propriam speciem recipiat superadditionem alterius ad speciei eiusdem constitutionem, quia ut dicit Philosophus 8 Metaphysicae species rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus quidquid subtrahitur vel additur speciem variat. Materia autem et forma uniuntur ad speciei constitutionem. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid non unietur corpori ut forma materiae. Obj. 3: Further, if the soul is a particular thing, it follows that it is an individual. Now every individual belongs to a species and a genus. Consequently, the soul will have a proper species and a proper genus. But a thing possessing its own species cannot have anything else superadded to it in order to give it its species, because, as the Philosopher points out in the Metaphysics, the forms or species of things are like numbers whose species change if a unit is added or subtracted. Matter and form, however, are united in order to constitute a species. Therefore, if the soul is a particular thing, it is not united to the body as a form to matter. Praeterea. Cum Deus res propter suam bonitatem fecerit, quae in diversis rerum gradibus manifestatur, tot gradus entium instituit quot potuit rerum natura pati. Si igitur anima humana potest per se subsistere, quod oportet dicere si est hoc aliquid, sequitur quod animae per se existentes sint unus gradus entium. Formae autem non sunt unus gradus entium seorsum sine materiis. Igitur anima, si est hoc aliquid, non erit forma alicuius materiae. Obj. 4: Further, since God made things because of his goodness, which is manifested in the different grades of things, he instituted as many grades of beings as nature could admit. Hence, if the human soul can subsist in itself, which must be maintained if it is a particular thing, it would then constitute a distinct grade of being. But forms without matter do not themselves constitute a distinct grade of being. Thus, if the soul is a particular thing, it will not be the form of any matter. Praeterea. Si anima est hoc aliquid et per se subsistens, oportet quod sit incorruptibilis, cum neque contrarium habeat, neque ex contrariis composita sit. Si autem est incorruptibilis non potest esse proportionata corpori corruptibili quale est corpus humanum. Omnis autem forma est proportionata suae materiae. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid non erit forma corporis humani. Obj. 5: Further, if the soul is a particular thing subsisting in itself, it must be incorruptible, for neither has it a contrary, nor is it composed of contraries. But if the soul is incorruptible, it cannot be proportioned to a corruptible body such as the human body is. Now every form is proportioned to its matter. So if the soul is a particular thing, it will not be the form of the human body. Praeterea. Nihil subsistens est actus purus nisi Deus. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid, utpote per se subsistens, erit in ea aliqua compositio actus et potentiae. Et sic non poterit esse forma, quia potentia non est alicuius actus. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid, non erit forma. Obj. 6: Further, the only subsisting being that is pure act is God. Therefore, if the soul is a particular self-subsisting thing, it will be composed of act and potentiality, and thus will not be a form, because no potentiality is an act. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, it will not be a form. Praeterea. Si anima est hoc aliquid, potens per se subsistere, non oportet quod corpori uniatur nisi propter aliquod bonum ipsius. Aut igitur propter aliquod bonum essentiale, aut accidentale. Propter bonum essentiale non, quia sine corpore potest subsistere; nec etiam propter bonum accidentale, quod praecipue videtur esse cognitio veritatis quam anima humana per sensus accipit, qui sine organis corporeis esse non possunt, quia animae puerorum etiam antequam nascantur morientium dicuntur a quibusdam certam cognitionem rerum naturalium habere, quam tamen constat quod per sensus non acquisierunt. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid, nulla ratio est quare corpori uniatur ut forma. Obj. 7: Further, if the soul is a particular thing capable of subsisting in itself, it would need to be united to a body only for a good accruing to the soul, either for an essential good or an accidental one. It is not united for an essential good, however, because it can subsist without the body. Nor is it even for an accidental good; for the knowledge of truth which the human soul can acquire through the senses, themselves incapable of existing without bodily organs, is evidently a preeminent good of this sort. But some hold that the souls of stillborn infants have a perfect knowledge of things, and these certainly never acquired that knowledge through their senses. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, there is no reason why it should be united as a form to the body. Praeterea. Forma et hoc aliquid ex opposito dividuntur. Dicit enim Philosophus in 2 De anima quod substantia dividitur in tria, quorum unum est forma, aliud materia, et tertium quod est hoc aliquid. Opposita autem non dicuntur de eodem. Ergo anima humana non potest esse forma et hoc aliquid. Obj. 8: Further, a form and a particular thing are distinguished from each other as opposites; for the Philosopher says in On the Soul 2 that substance has a threefold division: the first is form, the second, matter, and the third, this particular thing. But opposites are not predicated of one and the same thing. Therefore, the human soul cannot be a form and a particular thing. Praeterea. Id quod est hoc aliquid per se subsistit; formae autem proprium est ut sit in alio; quae videntur esse opposita. Si igitur anima est hoc aliquid, non videtur quod sit forma. Obj. 9: Further, it belongs to the very essence of a particular thing to subsist of itself. But it is proper to a form to exist in something else. These seem to be contradictory. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, it is apparently not a form. Sed dicebat quod corrupto corpore anima remanet hoc aliquid et per se subsistens, sed tunc perit in ea ratio formae. Obj. 10: But it might be said that when the body corrupts, the soul still remains a particular self-subsisting thing, but the account of a form then perishes in it. Sed contra. Omne quod potest abscedere ab aliquo, manente substantia eius, inest ei accidentaliter. Si igitur anima remanente post corpus perit in ea ratio formae, sequitur quod ratio formae conveniat ei accidentaliter. Sed non unitur corpori ad constitutionem hominis nisi prout est forma. Ergo unitur corpori accidentaliter, et per consequens homo erit ens per accidens, quod est inconveniens. On the contrary, whatever can exist apart from a thing and retain the nature of a substance exists in that thing accidentally. Therefore, if the soul continues to exist after the body corrupts, the soul ceases to have the account of a form; and thus, the account of a form belongs to it only accidentally. But it is only as a form that the soul is united to the body in order to constitute a man. Hence, the soul is united to the body accidentally, and thus man will be a being accidentally. This is incongruous. Praeterea. Si anima humana est hoc aliquid et per se existens, oportet quod per se habeat aliquam propriam operationem, quia uniuscuiusque rei per se existentis est aliqua propria operatio. Sed anima humana non habet aliquam propriam operationem quia ipsum intelligere, quod maxime videtur esse eius proprium, non est animae sed hominis per animam, ut dicitur in 1 De anima. Ergo anima humana non est hoc aliquid. Obj. 11: Further, if the human soul is a particular self-subsisting thing, it must have an operation of its own because a thing that exists of itself has its own proper operation. But the human soul does not have its own proper operation, because the act of understanding itself, which seems to be proper above all to the soul, is not an activity of the soul, but that of a man through his soul, as is stated in On the Soul 1. Therefore, the human soul is not a particular thing. Praeterea. Si anima humana est forma corporis, oportet quod habeat aliquam dependentiam ad corpus. Forma enim et materia a se invicem dependent. Sed quod dependet ab aliquo non est hoc aliquid. Si igitur anima est forma corporis, non est hoc aliquid. Obj. 12: Further, if the human soul is the form of the body, it must depend in some way on the body, for form and matter depend on each other. But whatever depends on something else in this way is not a particular thing. Therefore, if the soul is the form of the body, it will not be a particular thing. Praeterea. Si anima est forma corporis oportet quod animae et corporis sit unum esse, nam ex materia et forma fit unum secundum esse. Sed animae et corporis non potest esse unum esse, cum sint diversorum generum. Anima enim est in genere substantiae incorporeae, corpus vero in genere substantiae corporeae. Igitur anima non potest esse forma corporis. Obj. 13: Further, if the soul is the form of the body, there must be one act of existing common to the soul and the body; because from the union of matter and form there results a thing having one act of existing. But there cannot be one act of existing common to the soul and the body, since they are diverse in genus; for the soul belongs to the genus of incorporeal substance, and the body to that of corporeal substance. Hence the soul cannot be the form of the body. Praeterea. Anima habet esse proprium ex suis principiis. Si igitur habet aliquod esse commune corpori sequitur quod habeat duplex esse, quod est impossibile. Obj. 13b: The soul has its own proper act of existing from its own principles. Therefore, if it has some act of existing in common with the body, it follows that it would have a double act of existing, which is impossible. Praeterea. Esse corporis est corruptibile et ex partibus quantitativis resultans. Esse autem animae est incorruptibile et simplex. Ergo corporis et animae non est unum esse. Obj. 14: Further, the body’s act of existing is a corruptible one resulting from quantitative parts. The soul’s act of existing, on the other hand, is incorruptible and simple. Therefore, there is not one act of existing possessed in common by the body and the soul. Sed dicebat quod corpus humanum ipsum esse corporis habet per animam. Obj. 15: But it was said that the human body itself has the act of existing of a body through the soul. Sed contra. Philosophus dicit in 2 De anima quod anima est actus corporis physici organici. Hoc igitur quod comparatur ad animam ut materia ad actum est iam corpus physicum organicum, quod non potest esse nisi per aliquam formam qua constituatur in genere corporis. Habet igitur corpus humanum suum esse praeter esse animae. On the contrary, the Philosopher says that the soul is the act of a physical organic body. Therefore, that entity which is related to the soul as matter to act is now a physical organic body; and this body can exist only through a form whereby it is placed in the genus of body. Consequently, the human body possesses its own act of existing distinct from that of the soul. Praeterea. Principia essentialia, quae sunt materia et forma, ordinantur ad esse. Sed ad id quod potest haberi in natura ab uno non requiruntur duo. Si igitur anima, cum sit hoc aliquid, habet in se proprium esse, non adiungetur ei secundum naturam corpus ut materia formae. Obj. 16: Further, the essential principles of matter and form are ordered to the act of existing. But whatever can be brought about in nature by one principle does not require two. Therefore, if the soul has in itself its own act of existing because it is a particular thing, then the body by nature is united to the soul only as a matter to a form. Praeterea. Esse comparatur ad substantiam animae ut actus eius, et sic oportet quod sit supremum in anima. Inferius autem non contingit id quod est superius secundum supremum in eo, sed magis secundum infimum. Dicit enim Dionysius 7 cap. De divinis nominibus quod divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum. Corpus igitur quod est inferius anima non contingit ad esse, quod est supremum in ipsa. Obj. 17: Further, the act of existing is related to the substance of the soul as its act. Hence, the act of existing must be supreme in the soul. But an inferior being is not related to a superior one with respect to that which is supreme in the superior, but rather with respect to that which is lowest in it. For Dionysius says in On the Divine Names 7 that divine wisdom joins that which is highest in primary things to that which is lowest in secondary ones. Therefore, the body, which is inferior to the soul, does not attain to that act of existing which is supreme in the soul. Praeterea. Quorum est unum esse, et una operatio. Si igitur esse animae humanae coniungatur corpori, et operatio eius, quae est intelligere, erit communis animae et corpori, quod est impossibile, ut probatur in 3 De anima. Non est igitur unum esse animae humanae et corporis. Unde sequitur quod anima non sit forma corporis et hoc aliquid. Obj. 18: Further, things having one and the same act of existing have one and the same operation. Therefore, if the act of existing of the human soul, when joined to the body, belongs also to the body, the act of understanding, which is the operation of the soul, will belong both to the soul and the body. This is impossible, as is proved in On the Soul 3. Consequently, there is not one act of existing for both the human soul and the body. Hence, it follows that the soul is not the form of the body and a particular thing. Sed contra. Unumquodque sortitur speciem per propriam formam. Sed homo est homo in quantum est rationalis. Ergo anima rationalis est propria forma hominis. Est autem hoc aliquid et per se subsistens cum per se operetur: non enim est intelligere per organum corporeum, ut probatur in 3 De anima. Anima igitur humana est hoc aliquid et forma. On the contrary (1), a thing receives its species through its proper form. But man is man because he is rational. Hence, the rational soul is the proper form of man. Moreover, the soul is a particular self-subsisting thing because it operates of itself; for its act of understanding is not performed through a bodily organ, as is proved in On the Soul 3. Consequently, the human soul is a particular thing and a form. Praeterea. Ultima perfectio animae humanae consistit in cognitione veritatis quae est per intellectum. Ad hoc autem quod perficiatur anima in cognitione veritatis indiget uniri corpori, quia intelligit per phantasmata quae non sunt sine corpore. Ergo necesse est quod anima uniatur corpori ut forma, etiam si sit hoc aliquid. Furthermore (2), the highest perfection of the human soul consists in the knowledge of truth, which is acquired through the intellect. Moreover, the soul must be united to the body in order to be perfected in knowledge of truth because it understands through phantasms which are non-existent without the body. Consequently, the soul must be united as a form to the body and must be a particular thing as well. Respondeo. Dicendum quod hoc aliquid proprie dicitur individuum in genere substantiae. Dicit enim Philosophus in Praedicamentis quod primae substantiae indubitanter hoc aliquid significant, secundae vero substantiae, etsi videantur hoc aliquid significare, magis tamen significant quale quid. Individuum autem in genere substantiae non solum habet ut per se possit subsistere, sed quod sit aliquid completum in aliqua specie et genere substantiae. Unde Philosophus in Praedicamentis manus, pedes et huiusmodi nominat partes substantiarum magis quam substantias primas vel secundas, quia licet non sint in alio sicut in subiecto, quod proprium substantiae est, non tamen participant complete naturam alicuius speciei. Unde non sunt in aliqua specie neque in aliquo genere nisi per reductionem. I answer that, “a particular thing,” properly speaking, designates an individual in the genus of substance. For the Philosopher says that first substances undoubtedly signify particular things; second substances, indeed, although they seem to signify particular things, rather signify the specific essence. Furthermore, an individual in the genus of substance is capable not only of subsisting of itself, but is also a complete entity belonging to a definite species and genus of substance. Wherefore the Philosopher also calls a hand and a foot and things of this sort parts of substances rather than first or second substances. For although they do not exist in another as a subject, which is characteristic of a substance, they still do not possess completely the nature of a species. Hence, they belong to a species or to a genus only by reduction. Duobus igitur existentibus de ratione eius quod est hoc aliquid, quidam utrumque animae humanae abstulerunt, dicentes animam esse harmoniam, ut Empedocles, aut complexionem, ut Galienus, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Sic enim anima neque per se subsistere poterit, neque erit aliquid completum in aliqua specie vel in aliquo genere substantiae, sed erit forma tantum, similis aliis materialibus formis. Now some men have denied that the human soul possesses these two real characteristics belonging to a particular thing by its very nature because they said that the soul is a harmony, as Empedocles did, or a combination of the elements, as Galen did, or something of this kind. For then the soul will neither be able to subsist of itself, nor will it be a complete thing belonging to a species or genus of substance, but will be a form similar only to other material forms. Sed haec positio stare non potest. Nec quantum ad animam vegetabilem, cuius operationes oportet habere aliquod principium supergrediens qualitates passivas et activas, quae in nutriendo et augendo se habent instrumentaliter tantum, ut probatur in 2 De anima; complexio autem et harmonia qualitates elementares non transcendunt. Similiter autem non potest stare quantum ad animam sensibilem, cuius operationes sunt in recipiendo species sine materia, ut probatur in 2 De anima, cum tamen qualitates activae et passivae ultra materiam se non extendant, utpote materiae dispositiones existentes. Multo autem minus potest stare quantum ad animam rationalem, cuius operationes sunt in abstrahendo species non solum a materia sed ab omnibus conditionibus materialibus individuantibus, quod requiritur ad cognitionem universalis. But this position is untenable as regards the vegetative soul, whose operations necessarily require some principle surpassing the active and passive qualities of the elements, which play only an instrumental role in nutrition and growth, as is proved in On the Soul 2. Moreover, a combination and a harmony do not transcend the elemental qualities. This position is likewise untenable as regards the sensitive soul, whose operations consist in receiving species separated from matter, as is shown in On the Soul 2. For inasmuch as active and passive qualities are dispositions of matter, they do not transcend matter. Again, this position is even less tenable as regards the rational soul, whose operation consists in understanding, and in abstracting species not only from matter, but from all individuating conditions, this being required for the understanding of universals. Sed adhuc aliquid amplius proprie in anima rationali considerari oportet, quia non solum absque materia et conditionibus materiae species intelligibiles recipit, sed nec etiam in eius propria operatione possibile est communicare aliquod organum corporale, ut sic aliquid corporeum sit organum intelligendi, sicut oculus est organum videndi, ut probatur in 3 De anima. Et sic oportet quod anima intellectiva per se agat, utpote propriam operationem habens absque corporis communione. Et quia unumquodque agit secundum quod est in actu, oportet quod anima intellectiva habeat esse per se absolutum, non dependens a corpore. Formae enim quae habent esse dependens a materia vel subiecto non habent per se operationem. Non enim calor agit, sed calidum. However, in the case of the rational soul, something of special importance must still be considered because not only does it receive intelligible species without matter and material conditions, but it is also quite impossible for it, in performing its proper operation, to have anything in common with a bodily organ, as though something bodily might be an organ of understanding, just as the eye is the organ of sight, as is proved in On the Soul 3. Thus, the intellective soul, inasmuch as it performs its proper operation without communicating in any way with the body, must act of itself. And because a thing acts so far as it is actual, the intellective soul must have a complete act of existing in itself, depending in no way on the body. For forms whose act of existing depends on matter or on a subject do not operate of themselves. Heat, for instance, does not act, but something hot. Et propter hoc posteriores philosophi iudicaverunt partem animae intellectivam esse aliquid per se subsistens. Dicit enim Aristotiles in 1 De anima quod intellectus videtur esse substantia quaedam et non corrumpi. Et in idem redit dictum Platonis, ponentis animam immortalem et per se subsistentem ex eo quod movet se ipsam. Large enim accipit motum pro omni operatione, ut sic intelligatur quod intellectus movet se ipsum quia se ipso operatur. Sed ulterius posuit Plato quod anima non solum per se subsisteret, sed quod etiam haberet in se completam naturam speciei. Ponebat enim totam naturam speciei in anima esse, diffiniens hominem non aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, sed animam corpore utentem, ut sit comparatio animae ad corpus sicut nautae ad navem, vel sicut induti ad vestem. For this reason, the later Greek philosophers came to the conclusion that the intellective part of the soul is a self-subsisting thing. For the Philosopher says that the intellect is a substance, and is not corrupted. The teaching of Plato, who maintains that the soul is incorruptible and subsists of itself, in view of the fact that it moves itself, amounts to the same thing. For he took “motion” in a broad sense to signify every operation; hence, he understands that the soul moves itself because it moves itself by itself. But elsewhere, Plato maintained that the human soul not only subsists of itself but also has the complete nature of a species. For he held that the complete nature of the human species is found in the soul, saying that a man is not a composite of soul and body, but a soul joined to a body in such a way that it is related to the body as a pilot is to a ship, or as one clothed to his clothing. Sed haec positio stare non potest. Manifestum est enim id quo vivit corpus animam esse. Vivere autem est esse viventium. Anima ergo est quo habet corpus humanum esse actu. Huiusmodi autem forma est. Est igitur anima humana corporis forma. Iterum, si anima esset in corpore sicut nauta in navi, non daret speciem neque corpori neque partibus eius; cuius contrarium apparet ex hoc quod, recedente anima, singulae partes corporis non retinent pristinum nomen nisi aequivoce. Dicitur enim oculus mortui aequivoce oculus, sicut pictus aut lapideus, et simile est de aliis partibus. Et praeterea, si anima esset in corpore sicut nauta in navi, sequeretur quod unio animae et corporis esset accidentalis. Mors igitur, quae significat eorum separationem, non esset corruptio substantialis, quod patet esse falsum. Relinquitur igitur quod anima est hoc aliquid ut per se potens subsistere, non quasi habens in se completam speciem, sed quasi perficiens speciem humanam ut est forma corporis. Et sic simul est forma et hoc aliquid. However, this position is untenable because it is obvious that the soul is the reality which gives life to the body. Moreover, vital activity is the act of existing of living things. Consequently, the soul is that which gives the human body its act of existing. Now a form is of this nature. Therefore, the human soul is the form of the body. But if the soul were in the body as a pilot is in a ship, it would give neither the body nor its parts their specific nature. The contrary of this is seen to be true because when the soul leaves the body, the body’s individual parts retain their original names only in an equivocal sense. For the eye of a dead man, like the eye of a portrait or that of a statue, is called an eye equivocally; and similarly for the other parts of the body. Furthermore, if the soul were in the body as a pilot in a ship, it would follow that the union of soul and body would be an accidental one. Then death, which brings about their separation, would not be a substantial corruption, which is clearly false. So it follows that the soul is a particular thing, and that it can subsist of itself, not as a thing having a complete species of its own, but as completing the human species by being the form of the body. Hence, it likewise follows that it is both a form and a particular thing. Quod quidem ex ordine formarum naturalium considerari potest. Invenitur enim inter formas inferiorum corporum tanto aliqua altior quanto superioribus principiis magis assimilatur et appropinquatur. Quod quidem ex propriis formarum operationibus perpendi potest. Formae enim elementorum, quae sunt infimae et materiae propinquissimae, non habent aliquam operationem excedentem qualitates activas et passivas, et rarum et densum et alia huiusmodi, quae videntur esse materiae dispositiones. Super has autem sunt formae mixtorum corporum, quae praeter praedictas operationes habent aliquam operationem consequentem speciem quam sortiuntur ex corporibus caelestibus, sicut quod adamas attrahit ferrum, non propter calorem aut frigus aut aliquid huiusmodi, sed ex quadam participatione virtutis caelestis. Super has autem formas sunt iterum animae plantarum, quae habent similitudinem non solum ad ipsa corpora caelestia sed ad motores ipsorum, in quantum sunt principia cuiusdam motus, quibusdam se ipsa moventibus. Super has autem sunt ulterius animae brutorum, quae similitudinem iam habent ad substantiam moventem caelestia corpora, non solum in operatione qua movent corpora sed etiam in hoc quod in se ipsis cognoscitivae sunt, licet brutorum cognitio sit materialium tantum et materialiter, unde organis corporalibus indigent. Super has autem ultimo sunt animae humanae, quae similitudinem habent ad superiores substantias etiam in genere cognitionis, quia immaterialia cognoscere possunt intelligendo. In hoc tamen ab eis deficiunt, quod cognitionem immaterialem intellectus ex cognitione quae est per sensum materialium animae humanae naturam acquirendi habent. Indeed, this can be shown from the order of natural forms. For we find among the forms of lower bodies that the higher a form is, the more it resembles and approaches higher principles. This can be seen from the proper operation of forms. For the forms of the elements, being lowest and nearest to matter, possess no operation surpassing their active and passive qualities, such as rarefaction and condensation, and the like, which appear to be material dispositions. Over and above these forms are those of the mixed bodies, and these forms have, in addition to the above mentioned operations, a certain activity, consequent upon their species, which they receive from the heavenly bodies. The magnet, for instance, attracts iron not because of its heat or its cold or anything of this sort, but because it shares in the powers of the heavens. Again, surpassing these forms are the souls of plants, which resemble not only the forms of earthly bodies but also the movers of the heavenly bodies inasmuch as they are principles of a certain motion, themselves being moved. Still higher are brute beasts’ forms, which now resemble a substance moving a heavenly body not only because of the operation whereby they move bodies but also because they are capable of knowledge, although their knowledge is concerned merely with material things and belongs to the material order, for which reason they require bodily organs. Again, over and above these forms, and in the highest place, are human souls, which certainly resemble superior substances with respect to the kind of knowledge they possess because they are capable of knowing immaterial things by their act of understanding. However, human souls differ from superior substances inasmuch as the human soul’s intellective power, by its very nature, must acquire its immaterial knowledge from the knowledge of material things attained through the senses. Sic igitur ex operatione animae humanae modus esse ipsius cognosci potest. In quantum enim habet operationem materialia transcendentem, esse etiam suum est supra corpus elevatum, non dependens ex ipso. In quantum vero immaterialem cognitionem ex materiali nata est acquirere, manifestum est quod complementum suae speciei esse non potest absque corporis unione. Non enim aliquid completum est in specie nisi habeat ea quae requiruntur ad propriam operationem speciei. Sic igitur anima humana in quantum unitur corpori ut forma et tamen habet esse elevatum supra corpus, non dependens ab eo, manifestum est quod ipsa est in confinio corporalium et separatarum substantiarum constituta. Consequently, the human soul’s mode of existing can be known from its operation. For inasmuch as the human soul has an operation transcending the material order, its act of existing transcends the body and does not depend on the body. Indeed, inasmuch as the soul is naturally capable of acquiring immaterial knowledge from material things, evidently its species can be complete only when it is united to a body. For a thing’s species is complete only if it has the things necessary for the proper operation of its species. Consequently, if the human soul, inasmuch as it is united as a form to the body, has an act of existing which transcends the body and does not depend on it, obviously the soul itself is established on the boundary line dividing corporeal from separate substances. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet anima habeat esse completum, non tamen sequitur quod corpus ei accidentaliter uniatur, tum quia illud idem esse quod est animae communicatur corpori ut sit unum esse totius compositi, tum etiam quia etsi possit per se subsistere non tamen habet speciem completam, sed corpus advenit ei ad complementum speciei. Reply Obj. 1: Although the soul has a complete act of existing of its own, it does not follow that the body is united to it accidentally: first, because the same act of existing that belongs to the soul is conferred on the body by the soul so that there is one act of existing for the whole composite; second, because, while the soul can subsist of itself, it does not have a complete species, for the soul needs the body in order to complete its species. Ad secundum dicendum quod unumquodque secundum idem habet esse et individuationem. Universalia enim non habent esse in rerum natura ut universalia sunt, sed solum secundum quod sunt individuata. Sicut ergo esse animae est a Deo sicut a principio activo, et est in corpore sicut in materia, nec tamen esse animae perit pereunte corpore, ita etiam individuatio animae, etsi aliquam relationem habeat ad corpus, non tamen perit corpore pereunte. Reply Obj. 2: The act of existing and individuation of a thing are always found together. For universals do not exist in reality inasmuch as they are universals, but only inasmuch as they are individuated. Therefore, although the soul receives its act of existing from God as from an active principle, and exists in the body as in matter, nevertheless the soul’s act of existing does not cease when the body corrupts, nor does the soul’s individuation cease when the body corrupts, even though it has a relationship to the body.