Praeterea. Sicut homo et animal est quoddam totum ex diversis partibus consistens, ita et domus. Sed forma domus non est in qualibet parte domus, sed in tota. Ergo et anima, quae est forma animalis, non est tota in qualibet parte corporis, sed in toto. Obj. 16: Further, as a man and an animal are certain wholes composed of different parts, so also is a house. But the form of a house does not exist in each of its parts but in the whole. Therefore the whole soul, which is the form of the animal, does not exist in each part of the animal but in the whole. Praeterea. Anima dat esse corpori in quantum est forma eius. Est autem forma eius secundum suam essentiam, quae simplex est. Ergo secundum suam essentiam simplicem dat esse corpori. Sed ab uno non est naturaliter nisi unum. Si igitur sit in qualibet parte corporis sicut forma, sequetur quod cuilibet parti corporis det esse uniforme. Obj. 17: Further, the soul as a form gives to the body its act of existing. However, the soul is the form of the body through its essence, which is simple. Therefore the simple essence of the soul gives to the body its act of existing. But only one thing comes naturally from something that is one. Therefore, if the soul as a form were in each part of the body, it would follow that it would give existence uniformly to each part of the body. Praeterea. Magis intime unitur forma materiae quam locatum loco. Sed unum locatum non potest esse in diversis locis simul, etiam si sit substantia spiritualis: non enim conceditur a magistris quod angelus sit in diversis locis simul. Ergo nec anima potest esse in diversis partibus corporis. Obj. 18: Further, a form is united to matter more intimately than a thing in place is united to its place. But a thing existing in one place cannot exist in different places simultaneously, especially if it is a spiritual substance. For the teachers of theology do not admit that an angel exists in different places simultaneously. Therefore, the soul cannot exist in different parts of the body. Sed contra. Augustinus dicit, in VI De Trinitate, quod anima est tota in toto corpore, et tota in qualibet parte eius. On the contrary (1), Augustine says in On the Trinity that the whole soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts. Praeterea. Anima non dat esse corpori nisi secundum quod unitur ei. Sed anima dat esse toti corpori et cuilibet parti eius. Ergo anima est in toto corpore et in qualibet parte eius. Furthermore (2), the soul gives to the body its act of existing only by being united to the body. But the soul confers the act of existing on the whole body and on each of its parts. Therefore, the whole soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts. Praeterea. Anima non operatur nisi ubi est. Sed operationes animae apparent in qualibet parte corporis. Ergo anima est in qualibet parte corporis. Furthermore (3), the soul operates only where it exists. But the operations of the soul are seen to exist in each part of the body. Therefore, the soul exists in each part of the body. Respondeo. Dicendum quod veritas huius quaestionis ex praecedenti dependet. Ostensum est enim quod anima secundum quod est forma corporis non unitur toti corpori mediante aliqua parte, sed toti corpori immediate. Est enim forma et totius corporis et cuiuslibet partis eius. Et hoc necesse est dicere. Cum enim corpus hominis aut cuiuslibet alterius animalis sit quoddam totum naturale, dicetur unum ex eo quod unam formam habeat, qua perficitur non solum secundum aggregationem aut compositionem, ut accidit in domo et in aliis huiusmodi. Unde oportet quod quaelibet pars hominis et animalis recipiat esse et speciem ab anima sicut a propria forma. Unde Philosophus dicit quod, recedente anima, neque oculus neque caro neque aliqua pars remanet nisi aequivoce. I answer that the true solution to this question depends on the preceding one. For it was shown that the soul as the form of the body is not united to the whole body through the medium of any of its parts, but is united directly to the whole body because it is the form of the body as a whole and of each of its parts. And this must be maintained, for, since the body of a man or that of any other animal is a certain natural whole, it will be said to be one because it has one form whereby it is perfected, and not simply because it is an aggregate or a composition, as occurs in the case of a house and other things of this kind. Hence each part of a man and that of an animal must receive its act of existing and species from the soul as its proper form. Therefore, the Philosopher says that when the soul leaves the body, neither the eye nor the flesh nor any part remains except in an equivocal sense. Non est autem possibile quod aliquid recipiat esse et speciem ab aliquo separato sicut a forma (hoc enim simile esset Platonis positioni, qui posuit huiusmodi sensibilia recipere esse et speciem per participationem formarum separatarum), sed oportet quod forma sit aliquid eius cui dat esse, nam forma et materia sunt principia intrinsecus constituentia essentiam rei. Unde oportet quod si anima dat esse et speciem ut forma cuilibet parti corporis secundum sententiam Aristotilis, quod sit in qualibet parte corporis, nam et ea ratione dicimus animam esse in toto, quia est forma totius. Unde si est forma cuiuslibet partis, oportet quod sit in qualibet parte, et non in toto tantum, neque in una parte tantum. Et hoc definitio animae ostendit: est enim anima actus corporis organici. Corpus autem organicum est constitutum ex diversis organis. Si ergo anima esset in una parte tantum ut forma, non esset actus corporis organici, sed actus unius organi tantum, puta cordis aut alicuius alterius, et reliquae partes essent perfectae per alias formas. Et sic totum non esset unum quid naturale, sed compositione tantum. Relinquitur igitur quod anima sit in toto corpore et in qualibet parte eius. Moreover, it is impossible for a thing to receive its act of existing and species, as it does from a form, from a principle existing in separation from it, because this would be similar to the position of the Platonists, who maintained that such sensible things receive their act of existing and species by participating in forms which exist apart from things themselves. But a form must be an intrinsic principle of the thing whose act of existing it is responsible for, because form and matter are the intrinsic principles constituting the essence of a corporeal thing. Hence, according to the teaching of Aristotle, if the soul as a form gives to each part of the body its act of existing and species, it must be present as a form in each part of the body. And for this reason the soul is said to exist in the whole body because it is the form of the whole. Therefore, if it is the form of each part of the body, it must exist in each part and not in the whole alone, nor in one part alone. Moreover, this definition of the soul is an appropriate one, for the soul is the act of an organic body. However, an organic body is composed of different organs. Hence, if the soul as a form existed in one part of the body only, it would not be the act of an organic body, but that of one organ alone, for instance, the heart or some other part; and the remaining parts would be perfected by different forms. And thus the whole would not be one thing by nature but merely by composition. Hence it follows that the soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts. Sed quia etiam quaeritur an sit tota in toto et in qualibet parte eius, considerandum est qualiter dicitur et hoc. Potest autem attribui totalitas alicui formae tripliciter, secundum quod tribus modis convenit aliquid habere partes. Uno enim modo aliquid habet partes secundum divisionem quantitatis, prout scilicet dividitur numerus aut magnitudo: uni autem formae non competit totalitas numeri nec magnitudinis nisi forte per accidens, puta in formis quae per accidens dividuntur divisione continui, sicut albedo per divisionem superficiei. Alio modo dicitur aliquid totum per comparationem ad partes essentiales speciei, sicut materia et forma dicuntur partes compositi, et genus et differentia quodammodo partes speciei: et hic modus totalitatis attribuitur etiam essentiis simplicibus ratione suae perfectionis, eo quod sicut composita habent perfectam speciem ex coniunctione principiorum essentialium, ita substantiae et formae simplices habent perfectas species per se ipsas. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid totum per comparationem ad partes virtutis seu potestatis, quae quidem partes accipiuntur secundum divisionem operat-ionum. But since it is also asked whether the whole soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts, we must consider how this is to be explained. For totality can be attributed to a form in a threefold manner, according to the three ways in which it is proper for a thing to have parts. For a thing has parts, in one way, resulting from quantitative division, that is, according as a number or a magnitude is divided. However, totality of number or that of magnitude does not apply to a form, except perhaps in an accidental way; for instance, in the case of forms which are divided accidentally by the division of a continuum, as whiteness is divided as a result of dividing a surface. A thing is said to be a totality in another way in relation to the essential parts of its species, as matter and form are said to be parts of a composite, and genus and difference, in a certain respect, parts of a species. This kind of totality is also attributed to simple essences by reason of their perfection, in this way, that as composites have a perfect species from the union of their essential principles, so also do substances and simple forms which have a perfect species in virtue of themselves. A thing is said to be a totality in a third way in relation to its active and passive powers, inasmuch as these are considered to be parts of it which are distinguished from one another because their operations differ. Si qua igitur forma accipiatur quae dividitur per continui divisionem, et quaeratur de ea utrum sit in qualibet parte corporis tota, ut puta utrum albedo sit in qualibet parte superficiei tota, si accipiatur totum per comparationem ad partes quantitativas—quae quidem totalitas pertinet ad albedinem per accidens—, non est tota in qualibet parte, sed tota in toto et pars in parte. Si autem quaeratur de totalitate quae pertinet ad speciem, sic tota est in qualibet parte, nam aeque intensa est albedo in aliqua parte sicut in toto. Sed verum est quod adhuc secundum virtutem non est tota in qualibet parte: non enim tantum potest in disgregando albedo quae est in parte superficiei sicut albedo quae est in tota superficie, sicut neque tantum potest calor qui est in parvo igne ad calefaciendum sicut calor qui est in magno igne. Therefore, if we take a form which is divided as a result of dividing a continuum, and inquire whether the whole form is in each part of the body (for example, whether whiteness exists in its entirety in a part of the surface), and if the form is considered in relation to quantitative parts (which totality, indeed, pertains to whiteness accidentally), then the whole form does not exist in each part of the body, but the whole form exists in the whole body, and a part of the form in a part of the whole. However, if it is a question of totality so far as the species is concerned, then the whole form exists in each part of the body; for whiteness is as equally intense in any part as it is in the whole. But so far as its power is concerned, it is true that the whole form does not exist in each part, for the whiteness existing in a part of the surface cannot disperse as much light as the whiteness existing in the whole surface; just as the heat in a small fire alone cannot cause warmth like the heat in a large fire. Supposito autem ad praesens quod sit una tantum anima in corpore hominis (de hoc enim postea quaeretur), non dividitur divisione quantitatis quae est numerus. Planum est etiam quod non dividitur divisione continui, praecipue anima animalium perfectorum, quae decisa non vivunt; secus autem forte esset de animabus animalium anulosorum, in quibus est una anima in actu et plures in potentia, ut Philosophus docet. Relinquitur igitur quod in anima hominis et cuiuslibet animalis perfecti non potest accipi totalitas nisi secundum perfectionem speciei, et secundum potentiam seu virtutem. Now if we suppose, for the present, that there is only one soul in the human body (we will explain this later), we must maintain that it is not divided by dividing that species of quantity which is numerical in nature. It is also obvious that the soul is not divided by dividing a continuum. This is particularly true of the souls of perfect animals which do not live when dissected. However, it would perhaps be different in the case of the souls of ring-worms, in which there is one soul actually and many potentially, as the Philosopher teaches. Therefore, in the case of the soul of man and that of any perfect animal, it follows that totality can be considered only so far as the soul’s species and its passive or active power are concerned. Dicimus ergo quod, cum perfectio speciei pertineat ad animam secundum suam essentiam, anima autem secundum suam essentiam est forma corporis, et prout est forma corporis est in qualibet parte corporis, ut ostensum est, relinquitur quod anima tota sit in qualibet parte corporis secundum totalitatem perfectionis speciei. Hence we say that the soul by its very essence is the form of the body, and that it exists as such in each part of the body, as has been shown, because the perfection of the species comes from the soul in virtue of its very essence. Consequently, the whole soul exists in each part of the body according to the whole of its specific perfection. Si autem accipiatur totalitas quantum ad virtutem et potestatem, sic non est tota in qualibet parte corporis, nec etiam tota in toto, si loquamur de anima hominis. Ostensum est enim ex superioribus quaestionibus quod anima humana, quia excedit corporis capacitatem, remanet ei virtus ad operandum operationes quasdam sine communicatione corporis, sicut intelligere et velle. Unde intellectus et voluntas non sunt actus alicuius organi corporalis. Sed quantum ad alias operationes quas exercet per organa corporalia, tota virtus et potestas eius est in toto corpore, non autem in qualibet parte corporis, quia diversae partes corporis sunt proportionatae ad diversas operationes animae. Unde secundum illam potentiam tantum est in aliqua parte, quae respicit operationem quae per illam partem corporis exercetur. However, if totality is taken so far as the soul’s active and passive powers are concerned, then the whole soul does not exist in each part of the body. Nor, if we speak of the soul of man, does the whole soul, according to the totality of its powers, exist in the whole body. For it was shown in the preceding articles that the human soul possesses the power of performing certain operations without communicating in any way with the body, that is, the acts of understanding and willing, as it exceeds the capacity of the body. Hence the intellect and the will are not the acts of any bodily organ. However, with respect to those operations which the soul exercises through bodily organs, the soul’s active and passive powers as a whole exist in the whole body, although not in each part of the body, because different parts of the body are proportioned to different operations of the soul. Consequently, with respect to any one power, the soul exists only in that part of the body which takes care of the operations exercised by that particular part. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, cum materia sit propter formam, forma autem ordinetur ad propriam operationem, oportet quod talis sit materia uniuscuiusque formae ut competat operationi illius formae: sicut materiam serrae oportet esse ferream, quod competit ad opus serrae propter suam duritiem. Cum ergo anima propter suae virtutis perfectionem possit in diversas operationes, necessarium est quod materia eius sit corpus constitutum ex partibus congruentibus ad diversas operationes animae, quae dicuntur organa, et propter hoc totum corpus cui principaliter respondet anima ut forma est organicum. Partes autem sunt propter totum. Unde animae non respondet pars corporis sicut proprium et principale perfectibile, sed secundum quod habet ordinem ad totum. Unde non oportet quod quaelibet pars corporis sit corpus organicum, licet anima sit forma eius. Reply Obj. 1: Since matter exists for the sake of form, and since a form is directed to a proper operation, the matter to which a form is united must be one that is suitable for the proper operations of that form, just as the matter of a saw must be iron, which is suitable for sawing due to its hardness. Hence, since the soul can exercise different operations because of the perfect power which it has, its matter must be a body composed of different parts (which parts are called organs) suitable for the different operations of the soul. And for this reason the whole body, to which the soul is related principally as a form, is the organ of the soul. However, parts exist for the sake of the whole. Hence it is only by being intrinsically related to the body as a whole that a part of the body is related to the soul as that which is properly and principally capable of being perfected by the soul. Consequently, it is not necessary for each part of an animal to be an organic body, even though the soul is the form of each of the animal’s parts. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum materia sit propter formam, hoc modo forma dat esse et speciem materiae secundum quod congruit suae operationi. Et quia corpus perfectibile ab anima, ad hoc quod congruat diversis operationibus animae, requirit diversitatem in partibus, ideo anima, licet sit una et simplex secundum suam essentiam, diversimode partes corporis perficit. Reply Obj. 2: Since matter exists for the sake of form, form gives an act of existing and species to matter inasmuch as matter is disposed for the operations of the form. And therefore the soul, even though it is one and simple in its essence, perfects the parts of the body in different ways, because the body, which is capable of being perfected by the soul, requires diversity in its parts in order that it may be disposed for the different operations of the soul. Ad tertium dicendum quod, cum anima sit in una parte corporis eo modo quo dictum est, nihil animae est extra animam quae est in hac parte corporis. Non tamen sequitur quod animae nihil sit extra hanc partem corporis, sed quod nihil sit extra totum corpus quod principaliter perficit. Reply Obj. 3: Since the soul exists in a part of the body in the manner just described, no part of the soul is found outside the soul which is in this part of the body. However, it does not follow that no part of the soul exists outside this part of the body, but rather than no part of the soul exists outside the whole body which the soul perfects as a principle. Ad quartum dicendum quod Philosophus ibi loquitur de anima quantum ad potentiam motivam. Principium enim motus corporis est in aliqua parte corporis, scilicet in corde, et per illam partem movet totum corpus. Et hoc patet per exemplum quod ponit de rectore. Reply Obj. 4: In this passage the Philosopher is speaking about the motive power of the soul. For the body’s principle of motion exists in one part, namely, in the heart, and moves the whole body through this part. This is clear from the example which he gives of the ruler. Ad quintum dicendum quod motor caeli non circumscribitur loco secundum suam substantiam. Sed Philosophus intendit ostendere ubi sit quantum ad principium movendi. Et hoc modo, quantum ad principium motus, anima est in corde. Reply Obj. 5: The mover of the heavens, so far as its substance is concerned, is not confined to some particular place. But the Philosopher intends to show where it is inasmuch as it is a principle of moving. And in this way, inasmuch as it is a principle of motion, the soul is in the heart. Ad sextum dicendum quod etiam in plantis anima dicitur esse in medio eius quod est sursum et deorsum, in quantum est principium quarumdam operationum; et similiter est in animalibus. Reply Obj. 6: The soul in plants, inasmuch as it is the principle of certain operations, is also said to exist in the midst of their upper and lower parts. The soul exists in animals in the same way. Ad septimum dicendum quod ideo non quaelibet pars animalis est animal, sicut quaelibet pars ignis est ignis, quia omnes operationes ignis salvantur in qualibet parte ignis, non autem omnes operationes animalis salvantur in qualibet parte eius, maxime in animalibus perfectis. Reply Obj. 7: Therefore, each part of an animal is not an animal as each part of fire is fire, because every operation of fire is found in each part of fire. However, all the operations of an animal are not found in each of its parts. This is particularly true of perfect animals. Ad octavum dicendum quod ratio illa concludit animam non esse totam in partibus corporis secundum suam virtutem; quod dictum est esse verum. Reply Obj. 8: The conclusion of this argument is that the whole soul, so far as its power is concerned, does not exist in each part of the body. This was shown to be true. Ad nonum dicendum quod partes animae accipiuntur a Philosopho non quantum ad essentiam animae, sed quantum ad eius potestatem. Et ideo dicit quod sicut anima est in toto corpore, ita pars animae in parte corporis: quia sicut totum corpus organicum se habet ut deserviat omnibus operationibus animae quae per corpus exercentur, ita se habet unum organum ad aliquam determinatam operationem. Reply Obj. 9: The Philosopher does not distinguish parts in the soul with respect to its essence, but with respect to its powers. Hence he says that, as the soul exists in the whole body, so also does a part of the soul exist in a part of the body. For as the whole organic body is so constituted that it may serve the operations of the soul which are exercised through it, so also is one organ disposed to one particular operation. Ad decimum dicendum quod potentia animae radicatur in essentia; et ideo ubicumque est aliqua potentia animae, ibi est essentia animae. Quod ergo Philosophus dicit quod si oculus esset animal, visus esset anima eius, non intelligitur de potentia animae sine eius essentia; sicut et totius corporis dicitur anima sensibilis esse forma per essentiam suam, non per potentiam sensitivam. Reply Obj. 10: A power of the soul is rooted in its essence. Therefore, wherever a power of the soul exists, there also does the essence of the soul exist. Hence the Philosopher’s statement that, if the eye of an animal were itself an animal, sight would be its soul, is not to be understood of a power of the soul without its essence, just as the sentient soul is said to be the form of the whole body through its essence, not through its sensory power. Ad undecimum dicendum quod, cum anima operetur in alias partes corporis per aliquam unam primam, corpus autem disponitur ad hoc quod sit proportionatum animae per actionem animae quae est causa efficiens corporis, ut Aristoteles dicit in II De anima, necesse est quod dispositio aliarum partium, secundum quam sunt perfectibiles ab anima, dependeat ab una prima parte, scilicet a corde. Et pro tanto vita aliarum partium dependet a corde, quia postquam desinit esse in aliqua parte debita dispositio, anima non unitur ei ut forma. Non autem propter hoc removetur quin anima sit immediate forma cuiuslibet partis corporis. Reply Obj. 11: Since the soul operates in different parts of the body through one particular power (moreover the body is disposed in this way that it is proportioned to the soul’s act of existing through the action of the soul itself which is the efficient cause of the body, as Aristotle says in the On the Soul 2,) it is necessary that the disposition of the different parts of the body, inasmuch as they are capable of being perfected by the soul, depend on one first part of the body, namely, on the heart. For this reason the life of the other parts depends upon the heart because, after the necessary dispositions cease to exist, the soul is not united as a form to the body. However, this does not prevent the soul from being the form of each part of the body directly. Ad duodecimum dicendum quod anima non movetur neque quiescit, moto seu quiescente corpore, nisi per accidens. Non est autem inconveniens si aliquid movetur et quiescit simul per accidens, sicut non est inconveniens quod aliquid moveatur per accidens contrariis motibus, ut puta si quis in navi deferretur contra cursum navis. Reply Obj. 12: The soul is moved or at rest only in an accidental way when the body is moved or at rest. Moreover, it is not incongruous for a thing to be moved and at rest accidentally at one and the same time, just as it is not implausible for a thing to be moved accidentally by contrary movements, as for instance, when someone on a ship walks in the direction opposite to that of the course of the ship. Ad tertium decimum dicendum quod licet omnes potentiae animae radicentur in essentia animae, tamen quaelibet pars corporis recipit animam secundum suum modum; et ideo in diversis partibus est secundum diversas potentias, neque oportet quod in una secundum omnes. Reply Obj. 13: Although all powers of the soul are rooted in its essence, yet each part of the body is informed by the soul in the manner befitting each. Therefore different powers of the soul exist in different parts of the body. But it is not necessary that all of the soul’s powers exist in each part of the body. Ad quartum decimum dicendum quod cum dicitur unumquodque esse in alio secundum modum eius in quo est, intelligitur quantum ad modum capacitatis ipsius, non autem quantum ad naturam eius. Non enim oportet ut id quod est in aliquo habeat naturam et proprietatem eius in quo est, sed quod recipiatur in eo secundum capacitatem ipsius: manifestum est enim quod aqua non habet naturam amphorae. Unde non oportet quod anima habeat istam naturam corporis ut ubi est una pars eius, ibi non sit alia. Reply Obj. 14: When it is said that one thing exists in another in accordance with the mode of the thing in which it exists, this is understood of the mode of its capacity, not of its nature. For it is not necessary that whatever exists in something else have the nature and properties of that thing in which it exists, but that it be received in that thing according to the thing’s capacity; because it is obvious that water does not have the nature of the vessel in which it exists. Hence it is not necessary for the soul to possess this characteristic of a body, namely, that wherever one part exists, another may not exist. Ad quintum decimum dicendum quod animalia anulosa decisa vivunt non solum quia anima est in qualibet parte corporis, sed quia anima eorum, cum sit imperfecta et paucarum operationum, requirit paucam diversitatem in partibus, quae etiam invenitur in parte decisa vivente. Unde, cum retineat dispositionem per quam totum corpus est perfectibile ab anima, remanet in ea anima. Secus autem est in animalibus perfectis. Reply Obj. 15: Ringworms continue to live after they have been dissected, not only because their soul exists in each part of the body, but because their soul, being imperfect and performing a minimum of operations, requires the least diversity of parts. This is also found in any part segregated from a living thing of this sort. Hence a soul remains in each part because each part retains that disposition whereby the whole body is made capable of being perfected by a soul. However, the soul exists differently in perfect animals. Ad sextum decimum dicendum quod forma domus, sicut et aliae formae artificiales, est forma accidentalis. Unde non dat esse et speciem toti et cuilibet parti; neque totum est unum simpliciter, sed unum aggregatione. Anima autem est forma substantialis corporis dans esse et speciem toti et partibus; et totum ex partibus constitutum est unum simpliciter. Unde non est simile. Reply Obj. 16: The form of a house, like other artificial forms, is an accidental one. Hence it does not give to the whole house and to each of its parts their act of existing and species. Indeed, a whole of this sort is not a substantial unity, but is a one by aggregation. However, the soul is the substantial form of the body, giving to the whole body and to each of its parts their act of existing and species. Furthermore, the whole constituted of these parts is a substantial unity. Hence there is no similarity. Ad septimum decimum dicendum quod anima, quamvis sit una et simplex in essentia, habet tamen virtutem ad diversas operationes. Et quia naturaliter dat esse et speciem suo perfectibili in quantum est forma corporis secundum essentiam, ea autem quae sunt naturaliter sunt propter finem, oportet quod anima constituat in corpore diversitatem partium prout congruit diversis operationibus. Et verum est quod propter huiusmodi diversitatem, cuius ratio est ex fine et non ex forma tantum, in constitutione viventium magis apparet quod natura operetur propter finem quam in aliis rebus naturalibus, in quibus una forma uniformiter perficit suum perfectibile. Reply Obj. 17: Although the soul is one and simple in essence, yet it is capable of performing different operations. And because the soul by nature gives to its perfectible its act of existing and species, inasmuch as it is the form of the body by its very essence (moreover, those things existing naturally, exist for an end), the soul must establish a diversity of parts in the body inasmuch as this is required for its different operations. It is also true in the light of such diversity (which is to be attributed to the end, and not to the form alone) that it is more apparent that nature acts for an end in the constitution of living things than it is in the case of other natural things in which one form perfects, in a uniform way, the thing capable of being perfected by it. Ad octavum decimum dicendum quod simplicitas animae et angeli non est estimanda ad modum simplicitatis puncti, quod habet determinatum situm in continuo; et ideo quod simplex est non potest esse simul in diversis partibus continui. Sed angelus et anima dicuntur simplicia per hoc quod omnino carent quantitate; et ideo non applicantur ad continuum nisi per contactum virtutis. Unde totum illud, quod virtute contingitur, respondet angelo, qui non unitur ut forma, ut locus unus, et animae, quae unitur ut forma, ut perfectibile unum. Et sicut angelus est in qualibet parte sui loci totus, ita et anima in qualibet parte sui perfectibilis tota. Reply Obj. 18: The simplicity of the soul and that of an angel must not be thought of in terms of the simplicity of the point, which has a definite position in a continuum, and, therefore, because it is simple cannot exist in different parts of the continuum at one and the same time. But the angel and the soul are said to be simple because they lack quantity altogether, and thus are related to a continuum only by contact of power. Hence that whole, which it contacted by an angel’s power, is present to the angel (which is not united to it as a form) as a single place; and it is present to the soul (which is united to it as a form) as a single perfectible thing. And just as the whole angel exists in each part of the place it is present in by contact of power, so also does the whole soul exist in each part of the thing perfectible by it. Quaestio 11 Question 11 Utrum in homine anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis sit una substantia Whether the rational, sentient, and vegetal souls in man are substantially one and the same Undecimo quaeritur utrum in homine anima rationalis, sensibilis et vegetabilis sit una substantia. In the eleventh place we examine this question: whether the rational, sentient, and vegetal souls in man are substantially one and the same. Et videtur quod non. Ubicumque est actus animae, ibi est et anima. Sed in embryone actus animae vegetabilis praecedit actum animae sensibilis; et actus animae sensibilis, actum animae rationalis. Ergo in concepto prius est anima vegetabilis quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam rationalis; et ita non sunt idem secundum substantiam. Obj. 1: It seems that they are not substantially one and the same. For wherever an act of a soul exists, there also does a soul exist. Now in the embryo the act of a vegetal soul precedes that of a sentient soul, and the act of a sentient soul precedes that of a rational soul. Therefore, in pregnancy the vegetal soul is prior to the sentient, and the sentient is prior to the rational. Consequently, they are not substantially one and the same. Sed dicebat quod actus animae vegetabilis et sensibilis non est in embryone ab anima quae sit in embryone, sed a virtute in eo existente ab anima parentis. —Sed contra. Nullum agens finitum agit sua virtute nisi secundum determinatam distantiam, ut patet in motu proiectionis: proiiciens enim usque ad locum determinatum proiicit secundum modum suae virtutis. Sed in embryone apparent motus et operationes animae, quantumcumque parens distet, cuius tamen virtus finita est. Non igitur operationes animae sunt in embryone per virtutem animae parentis. Obj. 2: But it has been said that the act of a vegetal soul and that of a sentient soul which are present in the embryo do not belong to a soul existing in the embryo, but to a power of the parent’s soul existing therein. On the other hand, a finite agent acts by its power only with respect to a limited distance, as is evident in the motion of throwing. For a thrower casts an object to a definite place according to the power which he possesses. But the movements and operations of a soul appear in the embryo no matter how distant the male parent may be, although his power is finite. Therefore, the operations of a soul do not exist in the embryo as a result of a power of the parent’s soul.