Ad septimum dicendum quod tria sunt genera accidentium: quaedam enim causantur ex principiis speciei et dicuntur propria, sicut risibile homini; quaedam causantur ex principiis individui, et hoc dupliciter: quia vel habent causam permanentem in subiecto, et haec sunt accidentia inseparabilia, sicut masculinum et femininum et alia huiusmodi; quaedam vero habent causam non semper permanentem in subiecto, et haec sunt accidentia separabilia, ut sedere et ambulare. Est autem commune omni accidenti quod non sit de essentia rei; et ita non cadit in definitione rei. Unde de re intelligimus quid est absque hoc quod intelligamus aliquid accidentium eius. Sed species non potest intelligi esse sine accidentibus quae consequuntur principium speciei; potest tamen intelligi esse sine accidentibus individui, etiam inseparabilibus. Sine separabilibus vero esse potest non solum species, sed etiam individuum. Potentiae autem animae sunt accidentia sicut proprietates. Unde sine eis intelligitur quid est anima; non autem sine eis animam esse est possibile neque intelligibile. Reply Obj. 7: There are three genera of accidents: some are caused by the principles of the species, and are called proper accidents: for example, risibility in man; others are caused by the principles of the individual, and this class is spoken of in two ways: first, those that have a permanent cause in their subject, for example, masculine and feminine, and other things of this kind, and these are called inseparable accidents; secondly, those that do not have a permanent cause in their subject, such as to sit and to walk, and these are called separable accidents. Now no accident of any kind ever constitutes part of the essence of a thing, and thus an accident is never found in a thing’s definition. Hence we understand the essence of a thing without thinking of any of its accidents. However, the species cannot be understood without the accidents which result from the principles of the species, although the species can be understood without the accidents of the individual, even the inseparable accidents. Indeed, there can be not only a species but also an individual without the separable accidents. Now the powers of the soul are accidents in the sense of properties. Therefore, although the essence of the soul is understood without them, still the existence of the soul is neither possible nor intelligible without them. Ad octavum dicendum quod sensibile et rationale, secundum quod sunt differentiae essentiales, non sumuntur a sensu et intellectu, sed ab anima sensitiva et intellectiva. Reply Obj. 8: Inasmuch as sensible and rational are essential differences, they are not derived from sense and intellect, but from the sentient and intellective soul. Ad nonum dicendum quod quare forma substantialis non sit principium immediatum actionis in agentibus inferioribus ostensum est. Reply Obj. 9: For this reason the substantial form is not the immediate principle of action in inferior agents, as we have shown. Ad decimum dicendum quod anima est principium operandi, sed primum, non proximum. Operantur enim potentiae in virtute animae, sicut et qualitates elementorum in virtute formarum substantialium. Reply Obj. 10: The soul is the principle of operation; however, it is the first principle, not a proximate one, for powers operate by virtue of the soul itself, just as the qualities of the elements operate by virtue of their substantial forms. Ad undecimum dicendum quod ipsa anima est in potentia ad ipsas formas intelligibiles. Sed ista potentia non est essentia animae, sicut nec potentia ad statuam quae est in aere est essentia aeris. Esse enim actu et potentia non sunt de essentia rei quando actus non est essentialis. Reply Obj. 11: The soul itself is in potency to the intelligible forms themselves, but this potency is not the essence of the soul; just as the potency to be a statue, which is in the copper, is not the essence of copper. For actual and potential existence do not belong to the essence of a thing, because act is not of the essence. Ad duodecimum dicendum quod materia prima est in potentia ad actum substantialem qui est forma; et ideo ipsa potentia est ipsa essentia eius. Reply Obj. 12: Prime matter is in potency to substantial act which is form; and therefore potency is the very essence of prime matter. Ad tertium decimum dicendum quod homo dicitur esse intellectus quia intellectus est id quod est potius in homine, sicut civitas dicitur esse rector civitatis. Non autem hoc dictum est eo quod essentia animae sit ipsa potentia intellectus. Reply Obj. 13: Man is said to be an intellect because the intellect is said to be the highest thing in man, just as the state is said to be the governor of the state. However, this does not mean that the essence of the soul is the intellective power itself. Ad quartum decimum dicendum quod similitudo inter animam et scientiam attenditur in eo quod utraque est actus primus, non autem quantum ad omnia. Unde non oportet quod anima sit immediatum principium operationum sicut scientia. Reply Obj. 14: The soul is seen to be similar to a science inasmuch as each is a first act, but such similarity does not exist in every respect. Consequently, the soul is not necessarily the immediate principle of its operations, just as a science is. Ad quintum decimum dicendum quod potentiae animae non sunt partes essentiales animae, quasi constituentes essentiam eius, sed partes potentiales, quia virtus animae distinguitur per huiusmodi potentias. Reply Obj. 15: The powers of the soul are not essential parts of it as though constituting its essence, but are potential parts, because a virtue of the soul is distinguished by powers of this kind. Ad sextum decimum dicendum quod forma simplex quae non est subsistens, vel si subsistit est actus purus, non potest esse subiectum accidentis. Anima autem est forma subsistens, et non est actus purus, loquendo de anima humana. Et ideo potest esse subiectum potentiarum quarumdam, scilicet intellectus et voluntatis. Potentiae vero nutritivae et sensitivae partis sunt in composito sicut in subiecto; quia cuius est actus, eius est potentia, ut patet per Philosophum in libro De somno et vigilia. Reply Obj. 16: Whatever is a form in its entirety and is not a subsisting thing, or if it is a subsisting thing that is pure act, cannot be the subject of an accident. Now the soul is a subsisting form and is not pure act, that is, if we speak of the human soul. Therefore, it can be the subject of certain powers, such as the intellect and the will. Moreover, the powers of the sentient and nutritive parts are in the composite as a subject, because whatever has an act, has a power, as is shown by the Philosopher in the work On Sleep and Sleeplessness. Ad septimum decimum dicendum quod licet anima sit una in essentia, tamen est in ea potentia et actus; et habet diversam habitudinem ad res; et diversimode etiam comparatur ad corpus. Et propter hoc ab una essentia animae possunt procedere diversae potentiae. Reply Obj. 17: Although the soul is one in essence, yet it contains potency and act and is diversely related to things. It is also related in a different way to the body; and for this reason different powers can proceed from one and the same essence of the soul. Quaestio 13 Question 13 De distinctione potentiarum animae The distinction between the powers of the soul Tertiodecimo quaeritur de distinctione potentiarum animae, utrum videlicet distinguantur per obiecta. In the thirteenth place we examine the distinction between the powers of the soul, that is, whether the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another by their objects. Et videtur quod non, quia contraria sunt quae maxime distant. Sed contrarietas obiectorum non diversificat potentias: eadem enim potentia albi et nigri est visus. Ergo nulla differentia obiectorum diversificat potentias. Obj. 1: It seems that the powers of the soul are not distinguished in this way. For the things which differ most from one another are contraries. But a contrariety of objects does not diversify powers, because the same power of vision apprehends both white and black. Therefore a difference of objects does not diversify powers. Praeterea. Magis differunt quae differunt secundum substantiam quam quae differunt secundum accidens. Sed homo et lapis differunt secundum substantiam; sonorum autem et coloratum differunt secundum accidens. Cum igitur homo et lapis ad eamdem potentiam pertineant, multo magis sonorum et coloratum; et ita nulla differentia obiectorum facit differre potentias. Obj. 2: Further, things which differ substantially differ more than those which differ accidentally. Now a man and a stone differ substantially, whereas a sound and something colored differ accidentally. Therefore, since a man and a stone are apprehended by the same power, so much the more so are a sound and something colored. Hence a diversity of objects is not the cause of the diversity of powers. Praeterea. Si differentia obiectorum esset causa diversitatis potentiarum, oporteret quod unitas obiecti esset causa identitatis in potentiis. Videmus autem quod idem obiectum ad diversas potentias se habet: idem enim est quod intelligitur et desideratur (bonum enim intelligibile est obiectum voluntatis). Ergo differentia obiectorum non est causa diversitatis potentiarum. Obj. 3: Further, if a difference of objects were the cause of the diversity of powers, one and the same object would necessarily cause powers to be identical. Now we see that one and the same object is apprehended by different powers. For the same object is known and desired because an intelligible good is the object of the will. Consequently, a diversity of objects is not the cause of the diversity of powers. Praeterea. Ubi est eadem causa, est idem effectus. Si igitur obiecta diversa diversificarent potentias aliquas, oporteret quod diversitatem facerent ubique in potentiis. Hoc autem non videmus, nam quaedam obiecta diversa comparantur quidem ad diversas potentias, sicut sonus et color ad auditum et visum, et iterum ad unam potentiam, scilicet ad imaginationem et intellectum. Relinquitur igitur quod differentia obiectorum non sit causa diversitatis potentiarum. Obj. 4: Further, wherever the cause is the same, the effect is also the same. Therefore, if different objects diversified some powers, they would necessarily have to cause a diversity of powers in every case. However, we do not observe this. For sometimes different objects are certainly related to different powers, as sound and color are related to hearing and to vision respectively; and, at other times, these same objects are related to one and the same power, namely, to the imagination and to the intellect. Hence it follows that a diversity of objects is not the cause of the diversity of powers. Praeterea. Habitus sunt perfectiones potentiarum. Perfectibilia enim distinguuntur per perfectiones proprias. Ergo potentiae distinguuntur secundum habitum et non secundum obiecta. Obj. 5: Further, habits are perfections of powers. Moreover, perfectible things are distinguished from one another by their proper perfections. Consequently, powers are distinguished by their habits and not by their objects. Praeterea. Omne quod est in alio, est in eo per modum recipientis. Sed potentiae animae sunt in organis corporis: sunt enim actus organorum. Ergo distinguuntur secundum organa corporis et non secundum obiecta. Obj. 6: Further, whatever exists in a thing exists in it according to the mode of the recipient. But the powers of the soul exist in the organs of the body, for they are the acts of these organs. Therefore, the powers of the soul are distinguished by the organs of the body and not by their objects. Praeterea. Potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae, sed proprietates eius. Proprietates autem rei fluunt ab essentia eius. Ab uno autem non est nisi unum immediate. Ergo est una sola potentia animae prima fluens ab essentia animae, et mediante ea fluunt aliae secundum aliquem ordinem. Ergo potentiae animae differunt secundum originem et non secundum obiecta. Obj. 7: Further, the powers of the soul are not the essence itself of the soul, but are properties of it. Now the properties of a thing spring from its essence. However, only one thing comes directly from a single thing. Therefore, first of all one single power of the soul comes from its essence, and then the other powers proceed therefrom in a certain order through the medium of this power. Hence the powers of the soul differ according to origin and not according to objects. Praeterea. Si potentiae animae sunt diversae, oportet quod una oriatur ab alia, quia non possunt omnes oriri ab essentia animae immediate, cum sit una et simplex. Sed impossibile videtur quod una potentia animae oriatur ex alia, tum quia omnes potentiae animae sunt simul, tum etiam quia accidens oritur a subiecto (unum autem accidens non potest esse subiectum alterius). Non igitur possunt esse diversae potentiae animae propter diversitatem obiectorum. Obj. 8: Further, if the powers of the soul are diverse, one of them must come from another, for all of them do not come directly from the essence of the soul, because it is one and simple. But it is seen to be impossible for one power of the soul to come from another. First, because all powers of the soul exist simultaneously. Secondly, because accidents have their existence in a subject, and one accident cannot be the subject of another. Therefore, the diversity among the soul’s powers cannot be a result of the diversity among objects. Praeterea. Quanto aliqua substantia est altior, tanto eius virtus est maior, et per consequens minus multiplicata, quia omnis virtus unita plus est infinita quam multiplicata, ut dicitur in libro De causis. Anima autem inter omnia inferiora est sublimior. Ergo virtus eius est magis una et tamen ad plura se habens. Non ergo multiplicatur secundum differentiam obiectorum. Obj. 9: Further, the higher a substance is, the greater is its power and, as a result, less diversified, because every simple power is unlimited more than it is multiplied, as is said in the Book of Causes. Now the soul is the most perfect of all inferior beings. Therefore its power is more unified than theirs, and still extends to many things. Consequently, its power is not multiplied because of the diversity among objects. Praeterea. Si diversitas potentiarum animae est secundum differentiam obiectorum, oportet etiam quod ordo potentiarum sit secundum ordinem obiectorum. Hoc autem non videmus, nam intellectus, cuius obiectum est quod quid est et substantia, est posterius sensu, cuius obiecta sunt accidentia, ut color et sonus; tactus etiam est prior visu, cum tamen visibile sit prius et communius tangibili. Ergo nec diversitas potentiarum est secundum differentiam obiectorum. Obj. 10: Further, if the diversity among the soul’s powers depends on the diversity among objects, the order among the soul’s powers must also depend on the order among these objects. However, this is seen not to be the case, for the intellect, whose object is the quiddity and substance, is subsequent to the senses, whose objects are accidents such as color and sound. Furthermore, touch is prior to sight, while the visible is prior to and more common than the tangible. Consequently, there is not a diversity of powers merely because there is a difference of objects. Praeterea. Omne appetibile est sensibile vel intelligibile. Intelligibile autem est perfectio intellectus, et sensibile, perfectio sensus. Cum igitur unumquodque appetat naturaliter suam perfectionem, sequitur quod intellectus et sensus appetant naturaliter omne appetibile. Non igitur oportet ponere potentiam appetitivam praeter sensitivam et intellectivam. Obj. 11: Further, every appetible object is either sensible or intelligible. Now the intelligible is the perfection of the intellect, and the sensible is the perfection of sense. Therefore, since any being naturally desires its perfection, it follows that intellect and sense naturally desire every appetible object. Hence it is unnecessary to admit the existence of any appetitive power other than the sentient. Praeterea. Non est appetitus nisi voluntas, irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Sed voluntas est in intellectu, irascibilis et concupiscibilis in sensu, ut dicitur in III De anima. Ergo potentia appetitiva non est ponenda praeter sensitivam et intellectivam. Obj. 12: Further, no appetite exists except the will and the irascible and concupiscible appetite. But the will belongs to the intellective order, and the concupiscible and irascible appetites belong to the order of sense, as is pointed out in the On the Soul 3. Therefore, no appetitive power must be held to exist in addition to the sentient and intellective. Praeterea. Philosophus probat in III De anima quod principia motus localis in animalibus sunt sensus sive imaginatio, intellectus et appetitus. Sed potentia motiva in animalibus nihil aliud est quam principium motus animalium. Ergo potentia motiva non est praeter cognoscitivam et appetitivam. Obj. 13: Further, the Philosopher proves in On the Soul 3, that the principles of local motion in an animal are sense or imagination, intellect and appetite. But a power in animals is nothing else than a principle of movement. Therefore, there is no motive power except the cognitive and appetitive powers. Praeterea. Potentiae animae ordinantur ad aliquid altius quam natura, alias in omnibus corporibus naturalibus essent vires animae. Sed potentiae quae attribuuntur animae vegetabili non videntur ordinari ad aliquid altius quam natura: ordinantur enim ad conservationem speciei per generationem, et conservationem individui per nutrimentum, et perfectam quantitatem per augmentum; quae omnia operatur natura etiam in rebus naturalibus. Non igitur ad huiusmodi ordinandae sunt potentiae animae. Obj. 14: Further, the powers of the soul are directed to something higher than nature, otherwise there would be powers of the soul in all natural things. But the powers which are assigned to the vegetal soul do not appear to be directed to anything higher than nature. For the vegetal soul is directed to the conservation of the species through generation, to the preservation of the individual through nutrition, and to the development of the individual’s proper size through augmentation. Now in natural things, nature, too, performs all of these activities. Consequently, the powers of the soul must not be directed to such activities. Praeterea. Quanto aliqua virtus est altior, tanto una existens ad plura se extendit. Sed virtus animae est supra virtutem naturae. Cum igitur natura eadem virtute producat in esse corpus naturale, et det ei debitam quantitatem, et conservet ipsum in esse, videtur hoc fortius quod anima una virtute operetur. Non igitur sunt diversae potentiae generativa, nutritiva et augmentativa. Obj. 15: Further, the higher a power, the greater is its unity and the more numerous are the things to which it extends. But a power of the soul is higher than a power of nature. Therefore, since nature by one and the same power gives existence to a natural body, bestows on it its proper size, and preserves it in existence, it seems a fortiori that the soul does these things through one power. Therefore, the generative, nutritive, and augmentative powers are not diverse powers. Praeterea. Sensus est cognoscitivus accidentium. Sed aliqua alia accidentia magis ad invicem differunt quam sonus et color et huiusmodi, quae sunt non solum in eodem genere qualitatis, sed etiam in eadem eius specie, quae est tertia. Si igitur potentiae distinguantur secundum differentiam obiectorum, non deberent potentiae animae distingui penes huiusmodi accidentia, sed magis penes alia quae magis distant. Obj. 16: Further, sense is cognizant of accidents. But certain other accidents differ from one another to a greater degree than do sound and color and the like, which exist not only in the same genus of quality, but also in the same species, namely, the third kind of quality. Therefore, if powers are distinguished according to the difference of objects, the powers of the soul should not be distinguished by accidents of this kind, but rather by others which differ from each other to a greater degree. Praeterea. Cuiuslibet generis est una contrarietas prima. Si igitur penes diversa genera qualitatum passibilium diversificantur potentiae sensitivae, videtur quod ubicumque sunt diversae contrarietates, sint diversae potentiae sensitivae. Sed hoc alicubi invenitur: visus enim est albi et nigri, auditus gravis et acuti; alicubi vero non: tactus enim est calidi et frigidi, humidi et sicci, mollis et duri, et huiusmodi. Ergo potentiae non distinguuntur penes obiecta. Obj. 17: Further, there is one first contrary in any genus. Therefore, if the sentient powers are diversified because of the different genera of possible qualities, it seems that there are diverse sentient powers wherever there are diverse contraries. Now in some cases this does occur, for sight apprehends both white and black, and hearing apprehends both low and high notes; but in other cases it does not, for touch apprehends both hot and cold, wet and dry, soft and hard, and so on. Consequently, powers are not distinguished from one another by their objects. Praeterea. Memoria non videtur esse alia potentia a sensu: est enim passio primi sensitivi, secundum Philosophum. Obiecta tamen eorum differunt, quia obiectum sensus est praesens, obiectum vero memoriae praeteritum. Ergo potentiae non distinguuntur penes obiecta. Obj. 18: Further, memory does not appear to be a power distinct from sense. For, according to the Philosopher, memory is a passion of a first sense. However, their objects differ because the object of sense exists in the present, and the object of memory in the past. Hence powers are not distinguished from one another by their objects. Praeterea. Omnia quae cognoscuntur per sensum, cognoscuntur etiam per intellectum, et alia plura. Si igitur potentiae sensitivae distinguuntur secundum pluralitatem obiectorum, oporteret etiam quod intellectus distingueretur in diversas potentias, sicut et sensus; quod patet esse falsum. Obj. 19: Further, all things known by the senses are also known by the intellect, which is cognizant of many other things as well. Therefore, if the sentient powers are distinguished from one another by reason of a plurality of objects, the intellect must also be distinguished into different powers, just as sense is. This is evidently false. Praeterea. Intellectus possibilis et agens sunt diversae potentiae, ut supra ostensum est. Sed idem est obiectum utriusque. Non igitur potentiae distinguuntur secundum differentiam obiectorum. Obj. 20: Further, the possible and agent intellect are different powers, as has been shown above. But the object of both is the same. Therefore, powers are not distinguished from one another because of a difference of objects. Sed contra est quod dicitur in II De anima, quod potentiae distinguuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta. On the contrary (1), it is said in the On the Soul that powers are distinguished by acts, and acts by objects. Praeterea. Perfectibilia distinguuntur penes perfectiones. Sed obiecta sunt perfectiones potentiarum. Ergo potentiae distinguuntur penes obiecta. Furthermore (2), perfectible things are distinguished from one another by their perfections. But the objects of powers are the perfections of powers. Therefore, powers are distinguished by their objects.