Quaestio 8 Question 8 Utrum anima rationalis tali corpori debuerit uniri quale est corpus humanum Whether the rational soul should be united to a body such as man possesses Octavo quaeritur utrum anima rationalis tali corpori debuerit uniri quale est corpus humanum. In the eighth place we examine this question: whether the rational soul should be united to a body such as man possesses. Et videtur quod non. Anima enim rationalis est subtilissima formarum corpori unitarum. Terra autem est infimum corporum. Non ergo fuit conveniens quod corpori terreno uniretur. Obj. 1: It seems that it should not. For the rational soul is the subtlest of all forms united to a body. Now earth is the lowest of all bodies. Therefore, the soul is not fittingly united to an earthly body. Sed dicebat: hoc corpus terrenum, ex hoc quod reductum est ad aequalitatem complexionis, similitudinem habet cum caelo, quod omnino caret contrariis, et sic nobilitatur ut ei anima rationalis convenienter possit uniri.—Sed contra. Si nobilitas corporis humani in hoc consistit quod corpori caelesti assimilatur, sequitur quod corpus caeleste nobilius sit. Sed anima rationalis quolibet corpore nobilior est, cum capacitate sui intellectus omnia corpora transcendat. Ergo anima rationalis magis deberet corpori caelesti uniri. Obj. 2: But in view of the fact that an earthly body is reduced to a harmonious combination of the elements, it must be said that such a body is similar to a celestial body, which is without contraries altogether, and thus is ennobled in order that a rational soul may be fittingly united to it. On the other hand, if the nobility of the human body consists in its likeness to a celestial body, it follows that a celestial body is nobler. But the rational soul is nobler than all other forms because it transcends all bodies by its intellectual capacity. Therefore, the rational soul should be united rather to a celestial body. Sed dicebat quod corpus caeleste nobiliori perfectione perficitur quam sit anima rationalis. —Sed contra. Si perfectio corporis caelestis nobilior est anima rationali, oportet quod sit intelligens, quia quodcumque intelligens quolibet non intelligente nobilius est. Si igitur corpus caeleste aliqua substantia intellectuali perficitur, aut erit motor eius tantum, aut etiam forma. Si tantum motor, adhuc remanet quod corpus humanum sit nobiliori modo perfectum quam corpus caeleste: forma enim dat speciem ei cuius est forma, non autem motor. Unde etiam nihil prohibet aliqua quae secundum sui naturam ignobilia sunt, esse instrumenta nobilissimi agentis. Si autem substantia intellectualis est etiam forma corporis caelestis, aut huiusmodi substantia habet intellectum tantum, aut cum intellectu sensum et alias potentias. Si habet sensum et alias potentias, cum huiusmodi potentias necesse sit esse actus organorum quibus indigent ad operandum, sequetur quod corpus caeleste sit corpus organicum, quod ipsius simplicitati et uniformitati et unitati repugnat. Si vero habet intellectum tantum, a sensu nihil accipientem, huiusmodi substantia in nullo indigebit unione corporis, quia operatio intellectus non fit per organum corporale. Cum igitur unio corporis et animae non sit propter corpus, sed propter animam, quia materiae sunt propter formas et non e converso, sequitur quod intellectualis substantia non uniatur corpori caelesti ut forma. Obj. 3: But it must be said that a celestial body is perfected by a nobler perfection than the rational soul. On the other hand, if the perfection of a celestial body is nobler than that of a rational soul, it must be intelligent, because any intelligent being is nobler than any non-intelligent being whatever. Therefore, if a celestial body is perfected by an intellectual substance, this substance will be either the mover only of such a body, or will be its form. If it is only a mover, it follows that the human body is perfected in a nobler way than a celestial body is, for a form gives species to the thing of which it is the form, whereas a mover does not. Again, nothing prevents certain things ignoble by nature from being instruments of the noblest agent. However, if an intellectual substance is the form of a celestial body, such a substance has either an intellect alone, or senses and other powers together with an intellect. If it has senses and other powers, it follows that a celestial body is an organic body, because powers of this sort must be the acts of organs, which are required for the operations of such powers. This is opposed to the simplicity, uniformity, and unity of a celestial body. If, indeed, such a substance has an intellect alone and receives nothing from sense, then it does not need to be united to a body, because the operation of an intellect is not performed through a bodily organ. Therefore, since the body is united to the soul not for the sake of the body but for that of the soul (because any matter exists for the sake of form, and not vice versa), it follows that an intellectual substance is not united as a form to a celestial body. Praeterea. Omnis substantia intellectualis creata habet ex sui natura possibilitatem ad peccandum, quia potest averti a summo bono quod est Deus. Si igitur aliquae substantiae intellectuales uniantur corporibus caelestibus ut formae, sequitur quod peccare poterunt. Poena autem peccati est mors, id est separatio animae a corpore, et cruciatio peccantium in inferno. Potuit ergo fieri quod corpora caelestia morerentur per separationem animarum, et quod animae in inferno retruderentur. Obj. 4: Further, every created intellectual substance is capable of sinning by reason of its nature, because it can turn away from the highest good, which is God. Therefore, if intellectual substances were united as forms to celestial bodies, it would follow that they could commit sin. But the punishment for sin is death, that is, the separation of the soul from the body, and the punishment of the sinners in hell. Consequently, it could happen that celestial bodies would corrupt by having their souls separated from them, and that these souls would be cast into hell. Praeterea. Omnis intellectualis substantia capax est beatitudinis. Si igitur corpora caelestia sunt animata animabus intellectualibus, huiusmodi animae sunt capaces beatitudinis. Et sic in aeterna beatitudine non solum sunt angeli et homines, sed etiam quaedam naturae mediae; cum tamen sancti doctores tradant societatem sanctorum ex hominibus constare et angelis. Obj. 5: Further, every intellectual substance is capable of attaining beatitude. Therefore, if celestial bodies are animated by intellectual souls, such souls are capable of beatitude; and thus not only angels and men, but also certain intermediate natures enjoy eternal beatitude. However, when the holy doctors consider this matter, they say that the society of the blessed is composed of men and angels. Praeterea. Corpus Adae proportionatum fuit animae rationali. Sed corpus nostrum dissimile est illi corpori: illud enim corpus ante peccatum fuit immortale et impassibile, quod nostra corpora non habent. Ergo huiusmodi corpora, qualia nos habemus, non sunt proportionata animae rationali. Obj. 6: Further, the body of Adam was proportioned to a rational soul. But our body is unlike his, for his body was immortal and unchangeable before he sinned. Our bodies do not have these characteristics. Therefore, bodies such as we possess are not proportioned to a rational soul. Praeterea. Nobilissimo motori debentur instrumenta optime disposita et obedientia ad operationem. Anima autem rationalis est nobilior inter motores inferiores. Ergo debetur sibi corpus maxime obediens ad suas operationes. Huiusmodi autem non est corpus quale nos habemus, quia caro resistit spiritui, et anima propter pugnam concupiscentiarum distrahitur hac atque illac. Non igitur anima rationalis tali corpori debuit uniri. Obj. 7: Further, the best disposed instruments, and those which cooperate in operation, belong to the noblest mover. Now the rational soul is nobler than all other inferior movers. Hence the rational soul should have a body that cooperates with it to the fullest extent in carrying out its operations. However, a body such as ours is not of this sort, because the flesh lusts against the spirit (Gal 5:17), and the soul is drawn here and there as a result of the struggle between concupiscences. Consequently, the rational soul should not be united to a body such as we possess. Praeterea. Animae rationali convenit abundantia spirituum in corpore perfectibili. Unde cor hominis est calidissimum inter caetera animalia quantum ad virtutem generandi spiritus; quod significat ipsa corporis humani rectitudo ex virtute caloris et spirituum proveniens. Convenientissimum igitur fuisset quod anima rationalis totaliter spirituali corpori fuisset unita. Obj. 8: Further, an abundance of spirits falls to the lot of a rational soul in a perfectible body. Hence in contrast to other animals, the heart of man is the hottest so far as the power of generating spirits is concerned. The human body’s erectness, resulting from the power of heat and spirits, is a sign of this. Therefore, it would be most fitting for the rational soul to be united entirely to a spiritual body. Praeterea. Anima est substantia incorruptibilis. Corpora autem nostra sunt corruptibilia. Non ergo convenienter talibus corporibus anima rationalis unitur. Obj. 9: Further, the soul is an incorruptible substance. However, our bodies are corruptible. Consequently, rational souls are not fittingly united to bodies such as we possess. Praeterea. Anima rationalis unitur corpori ad speciem humanam constituendam. Sed melius conservaretur humana species si corpus cui anima unitur esset incorruptibile: non enim esset necessarium quod per generationem species conservaretur, sed in eisdem secundum numerum conservari posset. Ergo anima humana incorruptibilibus corporibus uniri debuit. Obj. 10: Further, the rational soul is united to the body in order to constitute the human species. Now the human species would be better preserved if the body to which the rational soul is united were incorruptible, because then it would not be necessary for the human species to be preserved by generation, for it would be preserved numerically in the same individuals. Hence the human soul should be united to an incorruptible body. Praeterea. Corpus humanum, ut sit nobilissimum inter inferiora corpora, debet esse simillimum corpori caelesti, quod est nobilissimum corporum. Sed corpus caeleste omnino caret contrarietate. Ergo corpus humanum minimum debuit de contrarietate habere. Corpora autem nostra non habent minimum de contrarietate: alia enim corpora, ut lapidum et arborum, sunt durabiliora, cum tamen contrarietas sit principium dissolutionis. Non igitur anima rationalis debuit talibus corporibus uniri qualia nos habemus. Obj. 11: Further, the human body, being the noblest of inferior bodies, should resemble most a celestial body, which is the noblest of bodies. However, a celestial body lacks contrariety altogether. Therefore the human body ought to have the least contrariety. But our bodies do not have the least contrariety, because other bodies, such as stones and trees, are more enduring, and contrariety is the principle of disintegration. Consequently, the rational soul should not be united to bodies such as we have. Praeterea. Anima est forma simplex. Formae autem simplici competit materia simplex. Debuit igitur anima rationalis alicui corpori simplici uniri, utpote igni vel aeri vel alicui huiusmodi. Obj. 12: Further, the soul is a simple form. Now a simple matter befits a simple form. Hence the rational soul should be united to some simple body such as fire or gold or something of this kind. Praeterea. Anima humana videtur cum principiis communionem habere; unde antiqui philosophi posuerunt animam esse de natura principiorum, ut patet in I De anima. Principia autem corporum sunt elementa. Igitur etsi anima non sit elementum aut ex elementis, saltem alicui corpori elementari debuit uniri, ut igni vel aeri vel alicui aliorum. Obj. 13: Further, the human soul seems to have something in common with principles. Hence the ancient philosophers maintained that the soul is composed of principles, as is clear in the On the Soul. Now the principles of bodies are the elements. Therefore, if the soul is not an element, nor composed of elements, it should at least be united to some elementary body such as fire or gold, or something of this sort. Praeterea. Corpora similium partium minus recedunt a simplicitate quam corpora dissimilium partium. Cum igitur anima sit forma simplex, magis debuit uniri corpori similium partium quam corpori dissimilium. Obj. 14: Further, bodies composed of similar parts come closer to being simple than bodies composed of dissimilar parts. Consequently, the soul should be united to a body composed of similar parts rather than to one composed of dissimilar parts because the soul is a form in its entirety. Praeterea. Anima unitur corpori ut forma et ut motor. Debuit igitur anima rationalis, quae est nobilissima formarum, uniri corpori agillimo ad motum; cuius contrarium videmus, nam corpora avium sunt agiliora ad motum, et similiter corpora multorum animalium, quam corpora hominum. Obj. 15: Further, the soul is united both as a form and as a mover to the body. Therefore the rational soul, which is the noblest of forms, should be united to a body best adapted for movement. But we see that the contrary of this is true, for the bodies of birds and those of many other animals as well are better adapted for movement than the human body is. Praeterea. Plato dicit quod formae dantur a datore secundum merita materiae, quae dicuntur materiae dispositiones. Sed corpus humanum non habet dispositionem respectu tam nobilis formae, ut videtur, cum sit grossum et corruptibile. Non igitur anima debuit tali corpori uniri. Obj. 16: Further, Plato says that forms are conferred by the giver of forms according to the merits of matter, which are called material dispositions. But apparently the human body does not have a disposition in keeping with the nobility of its form, for the body is “gross” and corruptible. Therefore the soul should not be united to such a body. Praeterea. In anima humana sunt formae intelligibiles maxime particulatae secundum comparationem ad substantias intelligibiles superiores. Sed tales formae competerent operationi corporis caelestis, quod est causa generationis et corruptionis horum particularium. Ergo anima humana debuit uniri corporibus caelestibus. Obj. 17: Further, the intelligible forms existing in the human soul, in contrast to those in superior intellectual substances, are in the highest degree representative of particulars. But such forms befit the operation of a celestial body, which is the cause of the generation and corruption of these particulars. Consequently, the human soul should be united to a celestial body. Praeterea. Nihil movetur naturaliter dum est in suo ubi, sed solum quando est extra proprium ubi. Caelum autem movetur in suo ubi existens. Ergo non movetur naturaliter. Movetur ergo ab anima, et ita habet animam sibi unitam. Obj. 18: Further, nothing is moved naturally so long as it occupies its proper place, but only when it is outside its proper place. However, a heaven is moved while it exists in its proper place. Therefore it is not moved naturally. Consequently, it is moved with respect to place by a soul, and thus has a soul united to it. Praeterea. Enarrare est actus substantiae intelligentis. Sed Caeli enarrant gloriam Dei, ut in Psalmo dicitur. Ergo caeli sunt intelligentes; ergo habent animam intellectivam. Obj. 19: Further, “to proclaim” is an act of an intellectual substance. But the heavens are telling the glory of God (Ps 19:1) as is said in the Psalms. Hence the heavens are intelligent, and therefore possess an intellective soul. Praeterea. Anima est perfectissima formarum. Debuit ergo uniri perfecto corpori. Corpus autem humanum videtur esse imperfectissimum: non enim habet neque arma ad defendendum vel impugnandum, neque operimenta, neque aliquid huiusmodi quae natura corporibus aliorum animalium tribuit. Non igitur talis anima tali corpori debuit uniri. Obj. 20: Further, the soul is the most perfect of forms. Therefore, it should be united to a most perfect body. However, the human body seems to be most imperfect, for it neither has arms to defend itself and to fight, nor covering nor anything of this sort which nature has bestowed on the bodies of other animals. Therefore, a soul of this kind should not be united to a body such as ours. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccles. XVII: Deus de terra creavit hominem et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum. Sed opera Dei sunt convenientia. Dicitur enim Gen. I: Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat et erant valde bona. Ergo conveniens fuit ut anima rationalis, in qua est Dei imago, corpori terreno uniretur. On the contrary, it is said, God created man of the earth and made him after His image (Eccl 17:1). But the works of God are fitting works, for it is said, God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good (Gen 1:31). Therefore the rational soul, in which the image of God exists, is fittingly united to an earthly body. Respondeo. Dicendum quod cum materia sit propter formam et non e converso, ex parte animae oportet accipere rationem quale debeat esse corpus cui unitur. Unde in II De anima dicitur quod anima non solum est corporis forma et motor, sed etiam finis. Est autem ex superioribus disputatis quaestionibus manifestum quod ideo naturale est animae humanae corpori uniri quia, cum sit infima in ordine intelligibilium substantiarum sicut materia prima est infima in ordine rerum sensibilium, non habet anima humana intelligibiles species sibi naturaliter inditas quibus in operationem propriam exire possit—quae est intelligere—, sicut habent superiores substantiae intelligibiles; sed est in potentia ad eas, cum sit sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in III De anima. Unde oportet quod species intelligibiles a rebus exterioribus accipiat mediantibus potentiis sensitivis, quae sine corporeis organis operationes proprias habere non possunt. Unde et animam humanam necesse est corpori uniri. I answer that: Since matter exists for the sake of form and not vice versa, we must discover, on the side of the soul, the reason why the body should be united to it. Hence it is said in the On the Soul 2 that the soul is not only the form and mover of the body but also its end. Moreover, it is evident from the preceding Disputed Questions that it is natural for the human soul to be united to the body. For, although the soul is lowest in the order of intellectual substances (as primary matter is lowest in the order of sensible things), it does not have intelligible species naturally impressed on it, as superior intellectual substances have, whereby it can perform its proper operation of intellection; but is in potency to them because it is like a wax tablet on which nothing is written, as is said in the On the Soul 3. For this reason it must receive its intelligible species from external things through its sensory powers, which cannot perform their proper operations without bodily organs. Consequently, it is necessary for the human soul to be united to a body. Si igitur propter hoc anima humana unibilis est corpori, quia indiget accipere species intelligibiles a rebus mediante sensu, necessarium est quod corpus, cui anima rationalis unitur, tale sit ut possit esse aptissimum ad repraesentandum species sensibiles ex quibus in intellectu species intelligibiles resultent. Sic igitur oportet corpus cui anima rationalis unitur esse optime dispositum ad sentiendum. Therefore, if the human soul is capable of being united to a body, because it needs to receive intelligible species from things through the intermediary of the senses, then the body, to which the rational soul is united, must be one which can most adequately present to the intellect those sensible species from which are derived the intelligible species existing in the intellect. Hence the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for sensory operation. Sed cum plures sint sensus, unus tamen est qui est fundamentum aliorum, scilicet tactus, in quo principaliter tota natura sensitiva consistit. Unde et in II De anima dicitur quod propter hunc sensum primo animal dicitur. Et inde est quod immobilitato hoc sensu, ut in somno accidit, omnes alii sensus immobilitantur. Et iterum: omnes alii sensus non solum solvuntur ab excellentia propriorum sensibilium, sicut visus a rebus multum fulgidis et auditus a maximis sonis, sed etiam ab excellentia sensibilium secundum tactum, ut a forti calore vel frigore. Cum igitur corpus cui anima rationalis unitur debeat esse optime dispositum ad naturam sensitivam, necessarium est ut sit convenientissimum organum sensus tactus. Propter quod dicitur in II De anima quod hunc sensum habemus certiorem inter omnia animalia, et quod propter bonitatem huius sensus etiam unus homo alio est habilior ad intellectuales operationes. Molles enim carne, qui sunt boni tactus, aptos mente videmus. But although there are several sensory powers, still there is one which is the basis of the others, namely touch, in which every sensible nature is principally rooted. For this reason it is also said in the On the Soul that an animal derives its name from this sense. This is the reason why, when this sense is unmoved, as occurs during sleep, all other senses are unmoved. Again, not only are all the other senses rendered inactive by an excess of their proper sensible objects, as sight, for instance, is made inoperative by very bright objects, and hearing by too intense sounds, but so also is the sense of touch rendered incapable of performing its proper operation by an excess of its sensible object, for example, excessive warmth or cold. Therefore, since the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for a sentient nature, it must have the most competent organ of touch. And so it is said in the On the Soul that among all animals we have this sense to a greater degree, and also that one man is more adept than another in intellectual operations as a result of this sense. For we see that those who have tender flesh (those who are of good touch) are well-endowed mentally. Cum autem organum cuiuslibet sensus non debeat habere in actu contraria quorum sensus est perceptivus, sed esse in potentia ad illa ut possit ea recipere—quia recipiens debet esse denudatum a recepto—, aliter necesse est hoc esse in organo sensus tactus et in organis aliorum sensuum. Organum enim visus, scilicet pupilla, caret omnino albo et nigro, et universaliter omni genere coloris; et similiter est in auditu et in olfactu. Hoc autem in tactu accidere non potuit, nam tactus est cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus necesse est componi corpus animalis, scilicet caloris et frigoris, humidi et sicci. Unde impossibile est quod organum tactus omnino sit denudatum a genere sui sensibilis, sed oportet quod sit reductum ad medium: sic enim est in potentia ad contraria. Corpus igitur cui anima rationalis unitur, cum debeat esse convenientissimum ad sensum tactus, oportet quod sit maxime reductum ad medium per aequalitatem complexionis. Now since the organ of any sense must not possess actually any of the contraries of which a sense is perceptive, but must be in potency to them in order that it may be able to receive them (because the recipient must be deprived of the thing received), the case must be otherwise for the organ of touch than it is for the organs of the other senses. For the organ of sight, that is, the pupil of the eye, is deprived completely of white and of black, and of every kind of color whatever. It is similar in the case of hearing and smell. But this cannot occur in the case of the sense of touch, for touch is capable of experiencing those qualities which the animal body must be composed of, namely, hot and cold, wet and dry. For this reason it is impossible for the organ of touch to be deprived completely of its sensible objects; rather must it be reduced to a mean, because in this way it is in potency to contraries. Therefore, since the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for the sense of touch, it must be brought in the fullest measure to an intermediate state by the harmonious combination of its constituent elements and their qualities. In quo apparet quod tota operatio naturae inferioris terminatur ad hominem sicut ad perfectissimum. Videmus enim operationem naturae procedere gradatim a simplicibus elementis, commiscendo ea quousque perveniatur ad perfectissimum commixtionis modum, qui est in corpore humano. Hanc igitur oportet esse dispositionem in communi corporis cui anima rationalis unitur, ut scilicet sit temperatissimae complexionis. In this way it is evident that the total operation of an inferior nature reaches its highest peak in man as a most perfect being. For we see that the operation of nature ascends progressively from the simple elements, by blending them, until it reaches the most perfect mode of combination, which is the human body. Consequently, this disposition of the human body, to which the rational soul is united, must exist in order that the body may possess the most tempered combination. Si quis autem considerare velit etiam particulares humani corporis dispositiones, ad hoc inveniet ordinatas, ut homo sit optimi sensus. Unde, quia ad bonam habitudinem potentiarum sensitivarum interiorum, puta imaginationis et memoriae et cogitativae virtutis, necessaria est bona dispositio cerebri, factus est homo habens maius cerebrum inter omnia animalia, secundum proportionem suae quantitatis. Et ut liberior sit eius operatio, habet caput sursum positum, quia solus homo est animal rectum, alia vero animalia curva incedunt. Et ad hanc rectitudinem habendam et conservandam necessaria fuit abundantia caloris in corde, per quam multi spiritus generarentur, ut per caloris abundantiam et spirituum corpus possit in directum sustineri. Et per hunc modum ratio dispositionis corporis humani est assignanda quantum ad singula quae sunt hominis propria. Moreover, if anyone also wishes to examine the particular dispositions of the human body, he will find them ordered to this end, that man may have the best sense. Therefore man, in proportion to his size, has a larger brain than any other animal, because a good disposition of the brain is necessary for the good condition of the internal sentient powers, namely, the imagination, the memory, and the cogitative power. And in order that his operation may be freer, he has his head placed on high. For man is the only erect animal; the others, indeed, are bent over. Furthermore, in order to have this erectness and to preserve it, there must exist in the heart an abundance of heat (by which many spirits are generated) so that the body may be maintained erect by this copious amount of heat and spirits. The fact that a man stoops over when he is old is a sign of this, because his natural heat is diminished. In the light of what is stated above, the nature of a disposition of the human body must be determined in relation to the particular dispositions proper to man. Sed tamen considerandum est quod in his quae sunt ex materia sunt quaedam dispositiones in ipsa materia propter quas talis materia eligitur ad hanc formam; et sunt aliquae consequuntur ex necessitate materiae, et non ex electione agentis. Sicut ad faciendum serram artifex eligit duritiem in ferro, ut serra sit utilis ad secandum; sed quod acies serre hebetari possit et fieri rubiginosa, hoc accidit ex necessitate materiae. Magis enim artifex eligeret materiam ad quam hoc non consequeretur, si posset inveniri; sed quia inveniri non potest, propter huiusmodi defectus consequentes non praetermittit ex materia convenienti facere opus. Sic igitur et in corpore humano contingit: quod enim taliter sit commixtum et secundum partes dispositum, ut sit convenientissimum ad operationes sensitivas, est electum in hac materia a factore hominis; sed quod hoc corpus sit corruptibile, fatigabile et huiusmodi defectus habeat, consequitur ex necessitate materiae. Necesse est enim corpus sic commixtum ex contrariis, talibus subiacere defectibus. Nec potest obviari per hoc quod Deus potuit aliter facere, quia in institutione naturae non quaeritur quid Deus facere possit, sed quid habeat rerum natura ut fiat, secundum Augustinum Super Genesim ad litteram. However, we must take into consideration that in those things which are constituted of matter, some dispositions exist in the matter itself, and that on account of these a definite matter is chosen for a definite form. There are also some dispositions which proceed from the necessary character of matter, and not from the choice of the agent. For instance, when an artisan chooses hardness in iron to make a saw in order that it may be useful for sawing. But the fact that sharpness can be given to iron, and that it can rust, results from the necessary character of matter. For the artisan would rather choose a matter in which defects are not present, if it could be found. But because it cannot be found, the artisan does not neglect to work with the available matter of this kind simply because of the defects intrinsic to such matter. This also occurs in the human body, for, likewise, whatever is combined and disposed according to parts in order that such a body may be best fitted for sentient operations, is selected in this matter by the maker of man. But that this body is corruptible, that it may become fatigued, and have defects of this kind, follows from the necessary character of this matter. For the body, as a mixture of contraries, must be subject to such defects. Nor can any objection be raised in view of the fact that God could make it otherwise, because we do not investigate what God could make in the establishment of nature, but what the nature of things undergoes as made, as Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis. Sciendum tamen est quod in remedium horum defectuum, Deus homini in sua institutione contulit auxilium iustitiae originalis, per quam corpus esset omnino subditum animae quamdiu anima Deo subderetur; ita quod nec mors, nec aliqua passio vel defectus, homini accideret nisi prius anima separaretur a Deo. Sed per peccatum anima recedente a Deo, homo privatus est hoc beneficio, et subiacet defectibus secundum quod natura materiae requirit. Moreover, it must be recognized that when God remedied these defects in man at his creation, he employed the help of original justice whereby the body was made subject completely to the soul and the soul to God, so that neither death nor passion nor any defect could affect man unless the soul were first separated from God. But when the soul turned away from God through sin, man was deprived of this gift, and is subject to the defects which are intrinsic to the nature of matter. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet anima sit subtilissima formarum in quantum est intelligens, quia tamen, cum sit infima in genere formarum intelligibilium, indiget corpori uniri quod sit medie complexionis ad hoc quod per sensus species intelligibiles acquirere possit, necessarium fuit quod corpus cui unitur haberet plus in quantitate de gravibus elementis, scilicet terra et aqua. Cum enim ignis sit efficacioris virtutis in agendo, nisi secundum quantitatem inferiora elementa excederent, non posset fieri commixtio, et maxime reducta ad medium: ignis enim alia elementa consumeret. Unde, in II De generatione, dicit Philosophus quod in corporibus mixtis naturaliter abundat plus terra et aqua. Reply Obj. 1: The soul, being intellectual, is the subtlest of forms, but it is lowest in the order of intellectual forms, and must be united to a body in order to acquire intelligible species through the senses. This union is effected through a combination of the elements. The body, to which the soul is united, had to contain a greater quantity of the heavy elements, namely, of earth and water. For fire is the most active of all the elements. If the lower elements were not present in greater quantity, the aforesaid combination could not be brought about nor above all be reduced to a mean, because fire would consume the other elements. For this reason the Philosopher, in On Generation and Corruption 2, states that earth and water are more abundant in mixed bodies. Ad secundum dicendum quod anima rationalis unitur tali corpori non quia est simile caelo, sed quia est aequalis commixtionis; sed ad hoc sequitur aliqua similitudo ad caelum secundum elongationem a contrariis. Sed tamen secundum opinionem Avicennae unitur tali corpori propter similitudinem caeli. Ipse enim voluit inferiora a superioribus causari, ut scilicet corpora inferiora causarentur a corporibus caelestibus; et cum pervenirent ad similitudinem corporum caelestium per aequalitatem complexionis sortirentur formam similem corporis caelestis, quod dicit esse animatum. Reply Obj. 2: The rational soul is united to this kind of body, not because it is like a celestial body, but because it is composed of a harmonious combination of the elements. But it follows that it bears some likeness to a celestial body, in this way, by being relatively independent of contraries. However, according to the opinion of Avicenna, the soul is united to such a body particularly because of its likeness to a celestial body. For he desired that inferior things be caused by the superior beings, in order that inferior bodies might be caused by the celestial bodies. And he maintained that these inferior bodies possess a form similar to that of a celestial body (which is considered to be animated), since such inferior bodies bear some likeness to celestial bodies because of their harmonious combination. Ad tertium dicendum quod de animatione corporum caelestium est diversa opinio et apud philosophos et apud fidei doctores. Nam apud philosophos Anaxagoras posuit intellectum regentem omnia esse omnino immixtum et separatum, et corpora caelestia esse inanimata; unde etiam damnatus ad mortem dicitur esse propter hoc quod dixit solem esse quasi lapidem ignitum, ut Augustinus narrat in libro De civitate Dei. Alii vero philosophi posuerunt corpora caelestia esse animata. Quorum quidam dixerunt Deum esse animam caeli, quod fuit ratio idolatriae, ut scilicet caelo et corporibus caelestibus cultus divinus attribueretur. Alii vero, ut Plato et Aristoteles, licet ponerent corpora caelestia animata, ponebant tamen Deum esse aliquid superius anima caeli, omnino separatum. Apud doctores etiam fidei, Origenes et sequaces ipsius posuerunt corpora caelestia esse animata. Quidam vero posuerunt ea inanimata, ut Damascenus ponit: quae etiam positio apud modernos theologos communior est. Augustinus relinquit sub dubio, II Super Genesim ad litteram et in libro Enchiridion. Hoc igitur pro firmo tenentes, quod corpora caelestia ab aliquo intellectu moventur, saltem separato, propter argumenta utramque partem sustinentes, dicamus aliquam substantiam intellectualem esse perfectionem corporis caelestis ut forma, quae quidem habet solam potentiam intellectivam non autem sensitivam, ut ex verbis Aristotilis accipi potest in II De anima et in XI Metaphysicae; quamvis Avicenna ponat quod anima caeli cum intellectu etiam habeat imaginationem. Si autem habet intellectum tantum, unitur tamen corpori ut forma, non propter operationem intellectualem, sed propter executionem virtutis activae, secundum quam potest adipisci divinam similitudinem in causando per motum caeli. Reply Obj. 3: There is a diversity of opinion, both among philosophers and among the doctors of the faith, concerning the animation of the celestial bodies. For among the philosophers, Anaxagoras maintained that the agent intellect was altogether simple and existed apart from things, and that the celestial bodies were inanimate. Hence it is said that he was even condemned to death because he claimed that the sun was a fiery stone, as Augustine relates in the work City of God. Other philosophers, indeed, maintained that the celestial bodies are animated. Some of these stated that God is the soul of the heavens, which was idolatrous inasmuch as it attributed divine worship to the heavens and the heavenly bodies. Others, indeed, such as Plato and Aristotle, who, although they claimed that the celestial bodies are animated, nevertheless maintained that God is a supreme being, quite distinct from the soul of the heavens. Among the doctors of the faith as well, Origen and his followers held that such bodies are inanimate, as Damascene did. This is also the more common position among modern theologians. That Augustine remained in doubt on the question is shown in the On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, and in the work Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity. Therefore, holding this for a fact, that the celestial bodies are moved by an intellect which is separate, we say (maintaining both positions on account of the arguments supporting both sides) that an intellectual substance, as a form, is the perfection of the celestial body, and that it has an intellective power alone but no sensory power, as can be seen from the words of Aristotle in the On the Soul and in the Metaphysics, even though Avicenna maintains that the soul of the heavens has an imagination in addition to its intellect. However, if it has an intellect only, it is still united as a form to the body, not for the sake of intellectual operation, but for the sake of executing its active power according to which it can attain a certain likeness to divine causality by moving the heavens. Ad quartum dicendum quod licet secundum naturam suam omnes substantiae intellectuales creatae possint peccare, tamen ex electione divina et praedestinatione per auxilium gratiae plures conservatae sunt ne peccarent, inter quas posset aliquis ponere animas corporum caelestium; et praecipue si daemones qui peccaverunt fuerunt inferioris ordinis secundum Damascenum. Reply Obj. 4: Although all created intellectual substances by nature are capable of committing sin, still many are preserved from so doing by divine choice and predestination through the aid of grace. One can maintain that the souls of the celestial bodies are among this number, particularly if the demons who sinned were of an inferior order, as Damascene held.