Praeterea. Nihil movetur naturaliter dum est in suo ubi, sed solum quando est extra proprium ubi. Caelum autem movetur in suo ubi existens. Ergo non movetur naturaliter. Movetur ergo ab anima, et ita habet animam sibi unitam. Obj. 18: Further, nothing is moved naturally so long as it occupies its proper place, but only when it is outside its proper place. However, a heaven is moved while it exists in its proper place. Therefore it is not moved naturally. Consequently, it is moved with respect to place by a soul, and thus has a soul united to it. Praeterea. Enarrare est actus substantiae intelligentis. Sed caeli enarrant gloriam Dei, ut in Psalmo dicitur. Ergo caeli sunt intelligentes; ergo habent animam intellectivam. Obj. 19: Further, “to proclaim” is an act of an intellectual substance. But the heavens are telling the glory of God (Ps 19:1) as is said in the Psalms. Hence the heavens are intelligent, and therefore possess an intellective soul. Praeterea. Anima est perfectissima formarum. Debuit ergo uniri perfecto corpori. Corpus autem humanum videtur esse imperfectissimum: non enim habet neque arma ad defendendum vel impugnandum, neque operimenta, neque aliquid huiusmodi quae natura corporibus aliorum animalium tribuit. Non igitur talis anima tali corpori debuit uniri. Obj. 20: Further, the soul is the most perfect of forms. Therefore, it should be united to a most perfect body. However, the human body seems to be most imperfect, for it neither has arms to defend itself and to fight, nor covering nor anything of this sort which nature has bestowed on the bodies of other animals. Therefore, a soul of this kind should not be united to a body such as ours. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccles. XVII: Deus de terra creavit hominem et secundum imaginem suam fecit illum. Sed opera Dei sunt convenientia. Dicitur enim Gen. I: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat et erant valde bona. Ergo conveniens fuit ut anima rationalis, in qua est Dei imago, corpori terreno uniretur. On the contrary, it is said, God created man of the earth and made him after his image (Eccl 17:1–3). But the works of God are fitting works, for it is said, God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good (Gen 1:31). Therefore the rational soul, in which the image of God exists, is fittingly united to an earthly body. Respondeo. Dicendum quod cum materia sit propter formam et non e converso, ex parte animae oportet accipere rationem quale debeat esse corpus cui unitur. Unde in II De anima dicitur quod anima non solum est corporis forma et motor, sed etiam finis. Est autem ex superioribus disputatis quaestionibus manifestum quod ideo naturale est animae humanae corpori uniri quia, cum sit infima in ordine intelligibilium substantiarum sicut materia prima est infima in ordine rerum sensibilium, non habet anima humana intelligibiles species sibi naturaliter inditas quibus in operationem propriam exire possit—quae est intelligere—, sicut habent superiores substantiae intelligibiles; sed est in potentia ad eas, cum sit sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur in III De anima. Unde oportet quod species intelligibiles a rebus exterioribus accipiat mediantibus potentiis sensitivis, quae sine corporeis organis operationes proprias habere non possunt. Unde et animam humanam necesse est corpori uniri. I answer that, since matter exists for the sake of form and not vice versa, we must discover, on the side of the soul, the reason why the body should be united to it. Hence it is said in the On the Soul 2 that the soul is not only the form and mover of the body but also its end. Moreover, it is evident from the preceding Disputed Questions that it is natural for the human soul to be united to the body. For, although the soul is lowest in the order of intellectual substances, as primary matter is lowest in the order of sensible things, it does not have intelligible species naturally impressed on it, as superior intellectual substances have, whereby it can perform its proper operation of intellection; but is in potency to them because it is like a wax tablet on which nothing is written, as is said in the On the Soul 3. For this reason it must receive its intelligible species from external things through its sensory powers, which cannot perform their proper operations without bodily organs. Consequently, it is necessary for the human soul to be united to a body. Si igitur propter hoc anima humana unibilis est corpori, quia indiget accipere species intelligibiles a rebus mediante sensu, necessarium est quod corpus, cui anima rationalis unitur, tale sit ut possit esse aptissimum ad repraesentandum species sensibiles ex quibus in intellectu species intelligibiles resultent. Sic igitur oportet corpus cui anima rationalis unitur esse optime dispositum ad sentiendum. Therefore, if the human soul is capable of being united to a body, because it needs to receive intelligible species from things through the intermediary of the senses, then the body, to which the rational soul is united, must be one which can most adequately present to the intellect those sensible species from which are derived the intelligible species existing in the intellect. Hence the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for sensory operation. Sed cum plures sint sensus, unus tamen est qui est fundamentum aliorum, scilicet tactus, in quo principaliter tota natura sensitiva consistit. Unde et in II De anima dicitur quod propter hunc sensum primo animal dicitur. Et inde est quod immobilitato hoc sensu, ut in somno accidit, omnes alii sensus immobilitantur. Et iterum: omnes alii sensus non solum solvuntur ab excellentia propriorum sensibilium, sicut visus a rebus multum fulgidis et auditus a maximis sonis, sed etiam ab excellentia sensibilium secundum tactum, ut a forti calore vel frigore. Cum igitur corpus cui anima rationalis unitur debeat esse optime dispositum ad naturam sensitivam, necessarium est ut sit convenientissimum organum sensus tactus. Propter quod dicitur in II De anima quod hunc sensum habemus certiorem inter omnia animalia, et quod propter bonitatem huius sensus etiam unus homo alio est habilior ad intellectuales operationes. Molles enim carne, qui sunt boni tactus, aptos mente videmus. But although there are several sensory powers, still there is one which is the basis of the others, namely touch, in which every sensible nature is principally rooted. For this reason it is also said in the On the Soul that an animal derives its name from this sense. This is the reason why, when this sense is unmoved, as occurs during sleep, all other senses are unmoved. Again, not only are all the other senses rendered inactive by an excess of their proper sensible objects, as sight, for instance, is made inoperative by very bright objects, and hearing by too intense sounds, but so also is the sense of touch rendered incapable of performing its proper operation by an excess of its sensible object, for example, excessive warmth or cold. Therefore, since the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for a sentient nature, it must have the most competent organ of touch. And so it is said in the On the Soul that among all animals we have this sense to a greater degree, and also that one man is more adept than another in intellectual operations as a result of this sense. For we see that those who have tender flesh, that is, those who are of good touch, are well-endowed mentally. Cum autem organum cuiuslibet sensus non debeat habere in actu contraria quorum sensus est perceptivus, sed esse in potentia ad illa ut possit ea recipere—quia recipiens debet esse denudatum a recepto—, aliter necesse est hoc esse in organo sensus tactus et in organis aliorum sensuum. Organum enim visus, scilicet pupilla, caret omnino albo et nigro, et universaliter omni genere coloris; et similiter est in auditu et in olfactu. Hoc autem in tactu accidere non potuit, nam tactus est cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus necesse est componi corpus animalis, scilicet caloris et frigoris, humidi et sicci. Unde impossibile est quod organum tactus omnino sit denudatum a genere sui sensibilis, sed oportet quod sit reductum ad medium: sic enim est in potentia ad contraria. Corpus igitur cui anima rationalis unitur, cum debeat esse convenientissimum ad sensum tactus, oportet quod sit maxime reductum ad medium per aequalitatem complexionis. Now since the organ of any sense must not possess actually any of the contraries of which a sense is perceptive, but must be in potency to them in order that it may be able to receive them—because the recipient must be deprived of the thing received—, the case must be otherwise for the organ of touch than it is for the organs of the other senses. For the organ of sight, that is, the pupil of the eye, is deprived completely of white and of black, and of every kind of color whatever. It is similar in the case of hearing and smell. But this cannot occur in the case of the sense of touch, for touch is capable of experiencing those qualities which the animal body must be composed of, namely, hot and cold, wet and dry. For this reason it is impossible for the organ of touch to be deprived completely of its sensible objects; rather must it be reduced to a mean, because in this way it is in potency to contraries. Therefore, since the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for the sense of touch, it must be brought in the fullest measure to an intermediate state by the harmonious combination of its constituent elements and their qualities. In quo apparet quod tota operatio naturae inferioris terminatur ad hominem sicut ad perfectissimum. Videmus enim operationem naturae procedere gradatim a simplicibus elementis, commiscendo ea quousque perveniatur ad perfectissimum commixtionis modum, qui est in corpore humano. Hanc igitur oportet esse dispositionem in communi corporis cui anima rationalis unitur, ut scilicet sit temperatissimae complexionis. In this way it is evident that the total operation of an inferior nature reaches its highest peak in man as a most perfect being. For we see that the operation of nature ascends progressively from the simple elements, by blending them, until it reaches the most perfect mode of combination, which is the human body. Consequently, this disposition of the human body, to which the rational soul is united, must exist in order that the body may possess the most tempered combination. Si quis autem considerare velit etiam particulares humani corporis dispositiones, ad hoc inveniet ordinatas, ut homo sit optimi sensus. Unde, quia ad bonam habitudinem potentiarum sensitivarum interiorum, puta imaginationis et memoriae et cogitativae virtutis, necessaria est bona dispositio cerebri, factus est homo habens maius cerebrum inter omnia animalia, secundum proportionem suae quantitatis. Et ut liberior sit eius operatio, habet caput sursum positum, quia solus homo est animal rectum, alia vero animalia curva incedunt. Et ad hanc rectitudinem habendam et conservandam necessaria fuit abundantia caloris in corde, per quam multi spiritus generarentur, ut per caloris abundantiam et spirituum corpus possit in directum sustineri. Et per hunc modum ratio dispositionis corporis humani est assignanda quantum ad singula quae sunt hominis propria. Moreover, if anyone also wishes to examine the particular dispositions of the human body, he will find them ordered to this end, that man may have the best sense. Therefore man, in proportion to his size, has a larger brain than any other animal, because a good disposition of the brain is necessary for the good condition of the internal sentient powers, namely, the imagination, the memory, and the cogitative power. And in order that his operation may be freer, he has his head placed on high. For man is the only erect animal; the others, indeed, are bent over. Furthermore, in order to have this erectness and to preserve it, there must exist in the heart an abundance of heat, by which many spirits are generated, so that the body may be maintained erect by this copious amount of heat and spirits. The fact that a man stoops over when he is old is a sign of this, because his natural heat is diminished. In the light of what is stated above, the nature of a disposition of the human body must be determined in relation to the particular dispositions proper to man. Sed tamen considerandum est quod in his quae sunt ex materia sunt quaedam dispositiones in ipsa materia propter quas talis materia eligitur ad hanc formam; et sunt aliquae consequuntur ex necessitate materiae, et non ex electione agentis. Sicut ad faciendum serram artifex eligit duritiem in ferro, ut serra sit utilis ad secandum; sed quod acies serre hebetari possit et fieri rubiginosa, hoc accidit ex necessitate materiae. Magis enim artifex eligeret materiam ad quam hoc non consequeretur, si posset inveniri; sed quia inveniri non potest, propter huiusmodi defectus consequentes non praetermittit ex materia convenienti facere opus. Sic igitur et in corpore humano contingit: quod enim taliter sit commixtum et secundum partes dispositum, ut sit convenientissimum ad operationes sensitivas, est electum in hac materia a factore hominis; sed quod hoc corpus sit corruptibile, fatigabile et huiusmodi defectus habeat, consequitur ex necessitate materiae. Necesse est enim corpus sic commixtum ex contrariis, talibus subiacere defectibus. Nec potest obviari per hoc quod Deus potuit aliter facere, quia in institutione naturae non quaeritur quid Deus facere possit, sed quid habeat rerum natura ut fiat, secundum Augustinum Super Genesim ad litteram. However, we must take into consideration that in those things which are constituted of matter, some dispositions exist in the matter itself, and that on account of these a definite matter is chosen for a definite form. There are also some dispositions which proceed from the necessary character of matter, and not from the choice of the agent. For instance, when an artisan chooses hardness in iron to make a saw in order that it may be useful for sawing. But the fact that sharpness can be given to iron, and that it can rust, results from the necessary character of matter. For the artisan would rather choose a matter in which defects are not present, if it could be found. But because it cannot be found, the artisan does not neglect to work with the available matter of this kind simply because of the defects intrinsic to such matter. This also occurs in the human body, for, likewise, whatever is combined and disposed according to parts in order that such a body may be best fitted for sentient operations, is selected in this matter by the maker of man. But that this body is corruptible, that it may become fatigued, and have defects of this kind, follows from the necessary character of this matter. For the body, as a mixture of contraries, must be subject to such defects. Nor can any objection be raised in view of the fact that God could make it otherwise, because we do not investigate what God could make in the establishment of nature, but what the nature of things undergoes as made, as Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis. Sciendum tamen est quod in remedium horum defectuum, Deus homini in sua institutione contulit auxilium iustitiae originalis, per quam corpus esset omnino subditum animae quamdiu anima Deo subderetur; ita quod nec mors, nec aliqua passio vel defectus, homini accideret nisi prius anima separaretur a Deo. Sed per peccatum anima recedente a Deo, homo privatus est hoc beneficio, et subiacet defectibus secundum quod natura materiae requirit. Moreover, it must be recognized that when God remedied these defects in man at his creation, he employed the help of original justice whereby the body was made subject completely to the soul and the soul to God, so that neither death nor passion nor any defect could affect man unless the soul were first separated from God. But when the soul turned away from God through sin, man was deprived of this gift, and is subject to the defects which are intrinsic to the nature of matter. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet anima sit subtilissima formarum in quantum est intelligens, quia tamen, cum sit infima in genere formarum intelligibilium, indiget corpori uniri quod sit medie complexionis ad hoc quod per sensus species intelligibiles acquirere possit, necessarium fuit quod corpus cui unitur haberet plus in quantitate de gravibus elementis, scilicet terra et aqua. Cum enim ignis sit efficacioris virtutis in agendo, nisi secundum quantitatem inferiora elementa excederent, non posset fieri commixtio, et maxime reducta ad medium: ignis enim alia elementa consumeret. Unde, in II De generatione, dicit Philosophus quod in corporibus mixtis naturaliter abundat plus terra et aqua. Reply Obj. 1: The soul, being intellectual, is the subtlest of forms, but it is lowest in the order of intellectual forms, and must be united to a body in order to acquire intelligible species through the senses. This union is effected through a combination of the elements. The body, to which the soul is united, had to contain a greater quantity of the heavy elements, namely, of earth and water. For fire is the most active of all the elements. If the lower elements were not present in greater quantity, the aforesaid combination could not be brought about nor above all be reduced to a mean, because fire would consume the other elements. For this reason the Philosopher, in On Generation and Corruption 2, states that earth and water are more abundant in mixed bodies. Ad secundum dicendum quod anima rationalis unitur tali corpori non quia est simile caelo, sed quia est aequalis commixtionis; sed ad hoc sequitur aliqua similitudo ad caelum secundum elongationem a contrariis. Sed tamen secundum opinionem Avicennae unitur tali corpori propter similitudinem caeli. Ipse enim voluit inferiora a superioribus causari, ut scilicet corpora inferiora causarentur a corporibus caelestibus; et cum pervenirent ad similitudinem corporum caelestium per aequalitatem complexionis sortirentur formam similem corporis caelestis, quod dicit esse animatum. Reply Obj. 2: The rational soul is united to this kind of body, not because it is like a celestial body, but because it is composed of a harmonious combination of the elements. But it follows that it bears some likeness to a celestial body, in this way, by being relatively independent of contraries. However, according to the opinion of Avicenna, the soul is united to such a body particularly because of its likeness to a celestial body. For he desired that inferior things be caused by the superior beings, in order that inferior bodies might be caused by the celestial bodies. And he maintained that these inferior bodies possess a form similar to that of a celestial body, which is considered to be animated, since such inferior bodies bear some likeness to celestial bodies because of their harmonious combination. Ad tertium dicendum quod de animatione corporum caelestium est diversa opinio et apud philosophos et apud fidei doctores. Nam apud philosophos Anaxagoras posuit intellectum regentem omnia esse omnino immixtum et separatum, et corpora caelestia esse inanimata; unde etiam damnatus ad mortem dicitur esse propter hoc quod dixit solem esse quasi lapidem ignitum, ut Augustinus narrat in libro De civitate Dei. Alii vero philosophi posuerunt corpora caelestia esse animata. Quorum quidam dixerunt Deum esse animam caeli, quod fuit ratio idolatriae, ut scilicet caelo et corporibus caelestibus cultus divinus attribueretur. Alii vero, ut Plato et Aristoteles, licet ponerent corpora caelestia animata, ponebant tamen Deum esse aliquid superius anima caeli, omnino separatum. Apud doctores etiam fidei, Origenes et sequaces ipsius posuerunt corpora caelestia esse animata. Quidam vero posuerunt ea inanimata, ut Damascenus ponit: quae etiam positio apud modernos theologos communior est. Augustinus relinquit sub dubio, II Super Genesim ad litteram et in libro Enchiridion. Hoc igitur pro firmo tenentes, quod corpora caelestia ab aliquo intellectu moventur, saltem separato, propter argumenta utramque partem sustinentes, dicamus aliquam substantiam intellectualem esse perfectionem corporis caelestis ut forma, quae quidem habet solam potentiam intellectivam non autem sensitivam, ut ex verbis Aristotilis accipi potest in II De anima et in XI Metaphysicae; quamvis Avicenna ponat quod anima caeli cum intellectu etiam habeat imaginationem. Si autem habet intellectum tantum, unitur tamen corpori ut forma, non propter operationem intellectualem, sed propter executionem virtutis activae, secundum quam potest adipisci divinam similitudinem in causando per motum caeli. Reply Obj. 3: There is a diversity of opinion, both among philosophers and among the doctors of the faith, concerning the animation of the celestial bodies. For among the philosophers, Anaxagoras maintained that the agent intellect was altogether simple and existed apart from things, and that the celestial bodies were inanimate. Hence it is said that he was even condemned to death because he claimed that the sun was a fiery stone, as Augustine relates in the work City of God. Other philosophers, indeed, maintained that the celestial bodies are animated. Some of these stated that God is the soul of the heavens, which was idolatrous inasmuch as it attributed divine worship to the heavens and the heavenly bodies. Others, indeed, such as Plato and Aristotle, who, although they claimed that the celestial bodies are animated, nevertheless maintained that God is a supreme being, quite distinct from the soul of the heavens. Among the doctors of the faith as well, Origen and his followers held that such bodies are inanimate, as Damascene did. This is also the more common position among modern theologians. That Augustine remained in doubt on the question is shown in the On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, and in the work Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity. Therefore, holding this for a fact, that the celestial bodies are moved by an intellect which is separate, we say—maintaining both positions on account of the arguments supporting both sides—that an intellectual substance, as a form, is the perfection of the celestial body, and that it has an intellective power alone but no sensory power, as can be seen from the words of Aristotle in the On the Soul and in the Metaphysics, even though Avicenna maintains that the soul of the heavens has an imagination in addition to its intellect. However, if it has an intellect only, it is still united as a form to the body, not for the sake of intellectual operation, but for the sake of executing its active power according to which it can attain a certain likeness to divine causality by moving the heavens. Ad quartum dicendum quod licet secundum naturam suam omnes substantiae intellectuales creatae possint peccare, tamen ex electione divina et praedestinatione per auxilium gratiae plures conservatae sunt ne peccarent, inter quas posset aliquis ponere animas corporum caelestium; et praecipue si daemones qui peccaverunt fuerunt inferioris ordinis secundum Damascenum. Reply Obj. 4: Although all created intellectual substances by nature are capable of committing sin, still many are preserved from so doing by divine choice and predestination through the aid of grace. One can maintain that the souls of the celestial bodies are among this number, particularly if the demons who sinned were of an inferior order, as Damascene held. Ad quintum dicendum quod si corpora caelestia sunt animata, animae eorum pertinent ad societatem angelorum. Dicit enim Augustinus in Enchiridion: nec illud quidem certum habeo utrum ad eamdem societatem, scilicet angelorum, pertineant sol et luna et cuncta sidera: quamvis nonnullis lucida esse corpora, non cum sensu vel intelligentia, videantur. Reply Obj. 5: If the celestial bodies are animated, their souls belong to the society of the angels. For Augustine says, I do not hold for certain that the sun and moon, and the other stars belong to the same society, namely, that of the angels, for although some are luminous bodies, still they do not appear to be sentient or intellective. Ad sextum dicendum quod corpus Adae fuit proportionatum animae humanae, ut dictum est, non solum secundum quod requirit natura, sed secundum quod contulit gratia, qua quidem gratia privamur, natura eadem manente. Reply Obj. 6: The body of Adam was made proportionate to a human soul, as was explained, not only with respect to what nature requires, but also with respect to what grace conferred. Now, we are deprived of this grace, but our nature remains the same. Ad septimum dicendum quod pugna quae est in homine ex contrariis concupiscentiis etiam ex necessitate materiae provenit. Necesse enim fuit, si homo haberet sensum, quod sentiret delectabilia et quod eum consequeretur concupiscentia delectabilium, quae plerumque repugnat rationi. Sed contra hoc etiam homini datum fuit remedium per gratiam in statu innocentiae, ut scilicet inferiores vires in nullo contra rationem moverentur; sed hoc homo perdidit per peccatum. Reply Obj. 7: The struggle which occurs in man as a result of contrary concupiscences also results from the necessary character of matter. For, given the fact that man has sense, it is necessary that he sense delectable objects, and that he pursue his concupiscence for such objects, which is generally opposed to reason. But in the state of innocence, man was also given a remedy against this through grace so that the inferior powers were not moved in any way contrary to reason. However, man lost this through sin. Ad octavum dicendum quod spiritus, licet sint vehicula virtutum, non tamen possunt esse organa sensuum. Et ideo non potuit corpus hominis ex solis spiritibus constare. Reply Obj. 8: Although spirits are the vehicles of powers, they still cannot be organs of the senses. Therefore the human body could not be composed of spirits alone. Ad nonum dicendum quod corruptibilitas est ex defectibus qui consequuntur corpus humanum ex necessitate materiae, et maxime post peccatum, quod subtraxit auxilium gratiae. Reply Obj. 9: Corruptibility is a result of the defects which belong intrinsically to the human body from the necessary character of matter. This is particularly true after man sinned because sin removes the assistance of grace. Ad decimum dicendum quod quid melius sit requirendum est in his quae sunt propter finem, non autem in his quae ex necessitate materiae proveniunt. Melius enim esset quod corpus animalis esset incorruptibile, si hoc secundum naturam pateretur talis materia qualem forma animalis requirit. Reply Obj. 10: Whatever is better must necessarily exist in those things which exist for an end, but not in those things which are a result of the necessary character of matter. For it would be better if an animal body were incorruptible, and if this were permitted by nature, an animal form would require such a matter. Ad undecimum dicendum quod ea quae sunt maxime propinqua elementis et plus habent de contrarietate, ut lapides et metalla, magis durabilia sunt quia minor est in eis harmonia; unde non ita de facili solvuntur. Eorum enim quae subtiliter proportionantur facile solvitur harmonia. Nihilominus tamen in animalibus causa longitudinis vitae est ut humidum non sit facile desiccabile vel congelabile, et calidum non sit facile extinguibile; quia vita in calido et humido consistit. Hoc autem in homine invenitur secundum aliquam mensuram quam requirit complexio reducta ad medium. Unde quaedam sunt homine durabiliora et quaedam minus durabilia. Reply Obj. 11: Those things which are most akin in nature to the elements and possess greater contrariety, such as stones and metals, are more enduring, because in them the elements are less subtly proportioned, and thus they are not easily disintegrated. For the blending of the elements in those things which are subtly proportioned is easily destroyed. Notwithstanding, the cause of longevity in animals is attributed to the fact that the moisture which they contain is not easily dried up or made inactive, nor is their heat easily extinguished, because heat and moisture are indispensable for life. Moreover, this is found in man to the extent that it is necessary for a combination of the elements reduced to a mean. Hence in men some combinations are more enduring, others less so, and as a result of this some men live longer than others. Ad duodecimum dicendum quod corpus hominis non potuit esse corpus simplex: nec corpus caeleste, quod non potuit esse propter impossibilitatem organi sensus et praecipue tactus; neque corpus simplex elementare, quia in elemento sunt contraria in actu, corpus autem humanum oportet esse reductum ad medium. Reply Obj. 12: The human body could not be a simple body, nor could it be a celestial body, because of the determinable character of a sense organ, particularly that of touch. Nor could it be a simple elementary body, because actual contraries exist in an element, whereas the human body must be reduced to a mean. Ad tertium decimum dicendum quod antiqui naturales estimaverunt quod oporteret animam, quae cognoscit omnia, esse similem actu omnibus. Et ideo ponebant eam de natura elementi quod ponebant principium ex quo omnia constare dicebant, ut sic anima esset similis omnibus et omnia cognosceret. Sed Aristoteles postmodum ostendit quod anima cognoscit omnia in quantum est similis omnibus in potentia, non in actu. Unde oportet corpus cui unitur non esse in extremo sed in medio, ut sic sit in potentia ad contraria. Reply Obj. 13: The nature philosophers of antiquity thought that the soul, which knows all things, must actually be like all things. And therefore they maintained that the soul possessed the nature of an element, which they held was the principle from which all things are said to be constituted, so that in this way the soul knew all things inasmuch as it was like all things. However, Aristotle later showed that the soul knows all things inasmuch as it is like all things potentially, not actually. Consequently, the body to which it is united must be composed not of extremes but of a mean, so that it may thus be in potency to contraries. Ad quartum decimum dicendum quod quamvis anima sit simplex in essentia, est tamen multiplex in virtute; et tanto magis quanto fuerit perfectior. Et ideo requirit corpus organicum quod sit dissimilium partium. Reply Obj. 14: Although a soul is simple in essence, yet it has many powers. And the more numerous its powers, the more perfect will it be. For this reason it requires an organic body constituted of dissimilar parts. Ad quintum decimum dicendum quod anima non unitur corpori propter motum localem, sed magis motus localis hominis, sicut et aliorum animalium, ordinatur ad conservationem corporis uniti animae. Sed anima unitur corpori propter intelligere, quod est propria et principalis eius operatio. Et ideo requiritur quod corpus unitum animae rationali sit optime dispositum ad serviendum animae in his quae sunt necessaria ad intelligendum, et quod de agilitate et de aliis huiusmodi habeat quantum talis dispositio patitur. Reply Obj. 15: The soul is not united to the body for the sake of local motion; rather is the local motion of man, like that of other animals, directed to conserving the body which is united to the soul. But the soul is united to the body for the sake of intellection, which is its proper and principal operation. For this reason the body, being united to the rational soul, must be best disposed to serve the soul with respect to the things necessary for intellection. It is also necessary that the body possess agility and other things of this kind, so far as such a disposition permits this. Ad sextum decimum dicendum quod Plato ponebat formas rerum per se subsistentes, et quod participatio formarum a materiis est propter materias ut perficiantur, non autem propter formas, quae per se subsistunt. Et ideo consequebatur quod formae darentur materiis secundum merita earum. Sed secundum sententiam Aristotilis formae naturales non per se subsistunt: unde unio formae ad materiam non est propter materiam sed propter formam. Non igitur quia materia est sic disposita, talis forma sibi datur; sed ut forma sit talis, oportuit materiam sic disponi. Et sic supra dictum est quod corpus hominis dispositum est secundum quod competit tali formae. Reply Obj. 16: Plato maintained that the form of things subsisted of themselves, and that the participation of forms by material things is for the sake of material things inasmuch as they are thereby perfected, and not for the sake of the forms themselves, which subsist of themselves. From this it follows that forms are given to material things so far as they merit them. Now according to the view of Aristotle, natural forms do not subsist of themselves. Hence a form is united to matter not for the sake of matter, but for the sake of form. Therefore, a certain form is given to matter not because matter is so disposed, but because a certain form requires matter to be so disposed. For this reason it was said above that the human body is disposed in a manner befitting such a form as the human soul. Ad septimum decimum dicendum quod corpus caeleste, licet sit causa particularium quae generantur et corrumpuntur, est tamen eorum causa ut agens commune: propter quod sub eo requiruntur determinata agentia ad determinatas species. Unde motor corporis caelestis non oportet quod habeat formas particulares sed universales, sive sit anima, sive sit motor separatus. Avicenna tamen posuit quod oportebat animam caeli habere imaginationem per quam particularia apprehenderet. Cum enim sit causa motus caeli, secundum quem renovatur caelum in hoc ubi et in illo, oportet animam caeli, quae est causa motus, cognoscere hic et nunc: et ita oportet quod habeat aliquam potentiam sensitivam. Sed hoc non est necessarium. Primo quidem quia motus caelestis est semper uniformis et non recipit impedimentum; et ideo universalis conceptio sufficit ad causandum talem motum (particularis enim conceptio requiritur in motibus animalium propter irregularitatem motus et impedimenta quae possunt provenire). Deinde quia etiam substantiae intellectuales superiores possunt particularia cognoscere sine potentia sensitiva, sicut alibi ostensum est. Reply Obj. 17: Although a celestial body is the cause of the particular things which are generated and corrupted, nevertheless it causes them as a common agent. For this reason determinate agents of a particular species are required beneath it. Hence it is not necessary for the mover of a celestial body, whether it be a soul or a separate mover, to have particular forms, but only universal ones. Now Avicenna maintained that the soul of a celestial body had to have an imagination through which it could apprehend particulars. For the soul of a heaven, being the cause of its motion, must know the here and the now, and therefore must have some sensory power, because it is the cause of the celestial motion whereby a heaven revolves in this or that particular place. But this is not necessary. First, indeed, because celestial motion is always uniform and is not hindered, and therefore a universal conception is sufficient to cause such movement. For a knowledge of the particular is required in the case of animal movements on account of the irregularity of such movement, and because obstacles can hinder such movement. Secondly, because superior intellectual substances can apprehend particulars without a sensory power, as was shown elsewhere. Ad octavum decimum dicendum quod motus caeli est naturalis propter principium passivum sive receptivum motus, quia tali corpori competit naturaliter talis motus; sed principium activum huius motus est aliqua substantia intellectualis. Quod autem dicitur quod nullum corpus in suo ubi existens movetur naturaliter, intelligitur de corpore mobili motu recto, quod mutat locum secundum totum, non solum ratione sed etiam subiecto. Corpus autem quod circulariter movetur, totum quidem non mutat locum subiecto, sed ratione tantum. Unde numquam est extra suum ubi. Reply Obj. 18: The movement of a heaven is natural on account of a passive principle or of movement received, because such movement belongs naturally to such a body. But the active principle of this movement is a certain intellectual substance. Now the statement that no body is moved naturally when it is in its proper place is understood of a body moved by rectilinear movement, and this body changes place with respect to the whole of itself, not only from the point of view of reason, but also from that of the subject itself. But a body which is moved circularly does not change place with respect to the whole of itself from the point of view of the subject, but only from that of reason. Hence it never is outside its proper place. Ad nonum decimum dicendum quod probatio illa frivola est, licet Rabbi Moyses eam ponat, quia si enarrare proprie accipitur, cum dicitur caeli enarrant gloriam Dei, oportet quod caelum non solum habeat intellectum, sed etiam linguam. Dicuntur enim caeli enarrare gloriam Dei, si ad litteram exponatur, in quantum ex eis manifestatur hominibus gloria Dei, per quem modum etiam creaturae insensibiles Deum laudare dicuntur. Reply Obj. 19: This argument is foolish despite the fact that Rabbi Moses proposes it. Because, if “to proclaim” is taken in its proper sense, when it is said that the heavens proclaim the glory of God, the heavens would require not only an intellect but also a tongue. Therefore, the heavens are said to proclaim the glory of God, if taken in a literal sense, inasmuch as through them the glory of God is made manifest to men. In this way, also, insensible creatures are said to praise God. Ad vicesimum dicendum quod alia animalia habent aestimativam naturalem determinatam ad aliqua certa, et ideo sufficienter potuit eis provideri a natura aliquibus certis auxiliis; non autem homini, qui propter rationem est infinitarum conceptionum. Et ideo loco omnium auxiliorum quae alia animalia naturaliter habent, habet homo intellectum, qui est species specierum, et manus, quae sunt organum organorum, per quas potest sibi praeparare omnia necessaria. Reply Obj. 20: Other animals have a natural estimative power directed to definite activities, and therefore nature could provide them sufficiently with certain definite aids. But not so in the case of man who is capable of an unlimited number of conceptions because of his reason. And therefore, in place of all the aids which other animals possess by nature, man has an intellect, which is a mirror of all forms, and hands, which are the organs of organs, whereby he can provide for himself whatever he requires. Quaestio 9 Question 9 Utrum anima uniatur materie corporali per medium Whether the soul is united to corporeal matter through a medium Nono quaeritur utrum anima uniatur materie corporali per medium. Ninth, it is asked whether the soul is united to corporeal matter through a medium. Et videtur quod sic. Quia in libro De spiritu et anima dicitur quod anima habet vires quibus miscetur corpori. Sed vires animae sunt aliud quam eius essentia. Ergo anima unitur corpori per aliquod medium. Obj. 1: It seems that the soul is united to the body in this way, because it is stated in the work The Spirit and the Soul that the soul has powers by which it is united to the body. But the powers of the soul are distinct from the soul’s essence. Therefore, the soul is united to the body through some medium.