Ad nonum decimum dicendum quod corpus humanum habet aliquam communicationem cum corpore caelesti; non quod aliquid corporis caelestis, ut lux, interveniat medium inter animam et corpus; sed secundum quod est constitutum in quadam aequalitate complexionis, remotum a contrarietate, ut in superioribus expositum est. Reply Obj. 19: The human body has something in common with a celestial body, not inasmuch as something characteristic of a celestial body, such as light, intervenes as a medium between the soul and the body, but inasmuch as the human body is given a certain tempered combination lacking contrariety, as was shown in preceding questions. Quaestio 10 Question 10 Utrum anima sit in toto corpore et in qualibet parte eius Whether the soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts Decimo quaeritur utrum anima sit in toto corpore et in qualibet parte eius. Tenth, it is asked whether the soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts. Et videtur quod non. Anima enim est in corpore sicut perfectio in perfectibili. Sed perfectibile ab anima est corpus organicum: est enim anima actus corporis physici organici, potentia vitam habentis, ut dicitur in II De anima. Ergo anima non est nisi in corpore organico. Sed non quaelibet pars corporis est organicum corpus. Ergo anima non est in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 1: It seems that the soul does not. For the soul exists in the body as a perfection in something perfectible. But the thing capable of being perfected by the soul is an organic body because the soul is the actuality of a physical organic body having life potentially, as is stated in book 2 of On the Soul. Therefore, the soul exists only in an organic body. But each part of the body is not an organic body. Therefore, the soul does not exist in each part of the body. Praeterea. Forma est proportionata materiae. Sed anima, prout est forma corporis, est quaedam essentia simplex. Ergo non respondet ei materia multiplex. Sed diversae partes corporis, vel hominis vel animalis, sunt sicut materia multiplex, cum habeant magnam diversitatem ad invicem. Non igitur anima est forma cuiuslibet partis corporis; et ita non est anima in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 2: Further, a form is proportioned to a matter. But the soul as the form of the body is a certain simple essence. Therefore, a complex matter is not proportioned to the soul. But the diverse parts of the body, either of a man or of an animal, are certainly complex matter, because these parts differ greatly from one another. Therefore, the soul is not the form of each part of the body, and thus it does not exist in each part of the body. Praeterea. Extra totum nihil est sumere. Si igitur anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis, extra illam partem nihil est de anima. Ergo impossibile est quod sit tota in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 3: Further, no part of a whole exists in separation from the whole. Therefore, if the whole soul exists in one part of the body, no part of the soul can exist outside that part of the body. Therefore, it is impossible for the soul to exist in each part of the body. Praeterea. Philosophus dicit, in libro De causa motus animalium: existimandum autem constare animal quemadmodum civitatem bene legibus rectam. In civitate enim quando semel stabilitus fuerit ordo, nihil opus est separato monarcho—quem non oportet esse per singula eorum quae fiunt—, sed ipse quilibet facit quae ipsius sicut ordinatum est, et fit hoc post hoc propter consuetudinem. In animalibus autem idem hoc propter naturam fit, et quia natum est unumquodque sic constitutum facere proprium opus, ut nihil opus sit in unoquoque esse animam, sed in quodam principio corporis existente, alia quidem vivere eo quod adnata sunt, facere autem proprium opus propter naturam. Non igitur anima est in qualibet parte corporis, sed in una tantum. Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says in the book On the Motion of Animals that the animal must be considered as similar to a state which is well governed by laws. For when order is once established in it, there is no further need of a separate monarch to preside over each particular work. But each individual performs the task to which he is directed by the authority of the ruler, and these things are done continually in a customary manner. In animals, however, the same order results from their nature, and each part performs the proper work for which it has been constituted by nature. Hence, there is not a soul for each part, but one single principle of the body exists, and the different parts of the body live because they are connected to one another. Moreover, they perform the proper operation allotted to them by nature. Therefore, the soul does not exist in each part of the body, but only in one part. Praeterea. Philosophus dicit, in VIII Physicorum, quod motor caeli oportet quod sit in centro vel in aliquo signo circumferentiae, quia haec duo sunt principia in motu circulari. Et ostendit quod non potest esse in centro sed in circumferentia, quia quanto aliqua sunt propinquiora circumferentiae et remotiora a centro, tanto sunt velocioris motus. Ergo a simili, oportet quod motor animalis sit in illa parte animalis in qua praecipue apparet motus. Hoc autem est cor. Ergo anima est tantum in corde. Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says in Physics 8 that the mover of the heavens must occupy either the center or some sign of the circumference, since these two things are the principles of circular motion. Now he proves that it cannot occupy the center but must exist at the circumference, for the nearer things are to the circumference and the farther away from the center, the swifter is their motion. Therefore, similarly, the movement of the soul must exist in that part of the animal in which movement is most apparent. Now this part is the heart. Therefore, the soul exists only in the heart. Praeterea. Philosophus dicit, in libro De iuventute et senectute, quod plantae habent principium nutritivum in medio superioris et inferioris. Sed sicut superius et inferius est in plantis, ita in animalibus superius et inferius, dexterum et sinistrum, ante et retro. Ergo oportet principium vitae, quod est anima, esse in animali in medio harum particularium. Hoc autem est cor. Ergo anima est tantum in corde. Obj. 6: Further, the Philosopher says in the book On Youth and Old Age that plants have a nutritive principle midway between their upper and lower parts. But upper and lower are found not only in plants, but in animals as well, and these also have a right and left side, a front and a back. Therefore, the principle of life, namely, the soul, exists in an animal in the midst of its particular parts. But this position is occupied by the heart. Therefore, the soul exists only in the heart. Praeterea. Omnis forma quae est in aliquo toto et qualibet parte eius denominat totum et quamlibet partem, sicut patet de forma ignis, nam quaelibet pars ignis est ignis. Non autem quaelibet pars animalis animal est. Non igitur anima est in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 7: Further, every form existing in a whole and in each of its parts is predicated of the whole and of each of its parts, as is evident in the case of fire, for each part of fire is fire. However, each part of an animal is not an animal. Therefore, the soul does not exist in each part of the body. Praeterea. Intelligere ad aliquam partem animae pertinet. Sed intelligere non est in aliqua parte corporis. Non ergo tota anima est in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 8: Further, the act of intellection belongs to a part of the soul. But this act is not present in any part of the body. Therefore, the whole soul does not exist in each part of the body. Praeterea. Philosophus dicit, in II De anima, quod sicut anima se habet ad corpus, ita pars animae ad partem corporis. Si igitur anima est in toto corpore, non erit in qualibet parte corporis tota, sed pars eius. Obj. 9: Further, the Philosopher says in book 2 of On the Soul that as the soul is related to the body, so also is a part of the soul related to a part of the body. Therefore, if the soul exists in the whole body, the whole soul will not exist in each part of the body, but a part of the soul only will exist in a part of the body. Sed dicebat quod Philosophus loquitur de anima et partibus eius in quantum est motor, non in quantum est forma. Obj. 10: But it has been said that the Philosopher is speaking of the soul and of its parts inasmuch as it is a mover and not a form. Sed contra. Philosophus dicit ibidem quod si oculus esset animal, visus esset anima eius. Sed anima est forma animalis. Ergo pars animae est in corpore ut forma, et non ut motor tantum. On the contrary, the Philosopher says in another place that if the eye were an animal, sight would be its soul. But the soul is the form of an animal. Hence, in the body, part of the soul has the character of a form, so that the soul is not merely a mover. Praeterea. Anima est principium vitae in animali. Si igitur anima esset in qualibet parte corporis, quaelibet pars corporis immediate acciperet vitam ab anima; et ita una pars non dependeret ab alia in vivendo; quod patet esse falsum, nam aliae partes in vivendo dependent a corde. Obj. 11: Further, the soul is the principle of life in an animal. Therefore, if the soul were in each part of the body, each part would receive life directly from the soul. Then one part would not depend on another for life, which is clearly false, for the other parts of the body depend on the heart for life. Praeterea. Anima movetur per accidens ad motum corporis in quo est; et similiter quiescit per accidens quiescente corpore in quo est. Contingit autem, quiescente una parte corporis, aliam moveri. Si igitur anima est in qualibet parte corporis, oportet quod anima simul moveatur et quiescat; quod videtur impossibile. Obj. 12: Further, the soul is moved accidentally by the movement of the body in which it exists. Similarly, it is at rest accidentally when the body in which it exists is at rest. However, it happens that when one part of a body is at rest, another is moved. Therefore, if the soul exists in each part of the body, the soul must be moved and at rest simultaneously, which is evidently impossible. Praeterea. Omnes potentiae animae radicantur in essentia animae. Si igitur essentia animae sit in qualibet parte corporis, oportet quod quaelibet potentia animae sit in qualibet parte corporis; quod patet esse falsum, nam auditus non est in oculo sed in aure tantum, et sic de aliis. Obj. 13: Further, all powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. Therefore, if the essence of the soul exists in each part of the body, each power of the soul must exist in each part of the body. This is obviously false, for the sense of hearing does not exist in the eye but in the ear alone, and similarly for the other powers. Praeterea. Omne quod est in altero est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Si igitur anima est in corpore, oportet quod sit in eo per modum corporis. Sed modus corporis est ut ubi est una pars, non sit alia. Ergo ubi est una pars animae, non est alia; et ita non est tota in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 14: Further, whatever exists in another exists there according to the mode of the thing in which it exists. Therefore, if the soul exists in the body, it must exist there in a manner proper to the body. But it is proper to a body that no part of it may exist where another part exists. Therefore, where one part of the soul exists, another does not exist; and thus, the whole soul does not exist in each part of the body. Praeterea. Quaedam animalia imperfecta, quae dicuntur anulosa, decisa vivunt propter hoc quod anima remanet in qualibet parte corporis post decisionem. Sed homo et alia animalia perfecta non vivunt decisa. Non igitur in eis anima est in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 15: Further, certain imperfect animals, called ring-worms, continue to live after they have been dissected, because a soul exists in each part of the body after its dissection. But man and the other perfect animals do not live after they have been dissected. Consequently, in them the soul does not exist in each part of the body. Praeterea. Sicut homo et animal est quoddam totum ex diversis partibus consistens, ita et domus. Sed forma domus non est in qualibet parte domus, sed in tota. Ergo et anima, quae est forma animalis, non est tota in qualibet parte corporis, sed in toto. Obj. 16: Further, as a man and an animal are certain wholes composed of different parts, so also is a house. But the form of a house does not exist in each of its parts but in the whole. Therefore, the whole soul, which is the form of the animal, does not exist in each part of the animal but in the whole. Praeterea. Anima dat esse corpori in quantum est forma eius. Est autem forma eius secundum suam essentiam, quae simplex est. Ergo secundum suam essentiam simplicem dat esse corpori. Sed ab uno non est naturaliter nisi unum. Si igitur sit in qualibet parte corporis sicut forma, sequetur quod cuilibet parti corporis det esse uniforme. Obj. 17: Further, the soul as a form gives to the body its act of existing. However, the soul is the form of the body through its essence, which is simple. Therefore, the simple essence of the soul gives to the body its act of existing. But only one thing comes naturally from something that is one. Therefore, if the soul as a form were in each part of the body, it would follow that it would give existence uniformly to each part of the body. Praeterea. Magis intime unitur forma materiae quam locatum loco. Sed unum locatum non potest esse in diversis locis simul, etiam si sit substantia spiritualis: non enim conceditur a magistris quod angelus sit in diversis locis simul. Ergo nec anima potest esse in diversis partibus corporis. Obj. 18: Further, a form is united to matter more intimately than a thing in place is united to its place. But a thing existing in one place cannot exist in different places simultaneously, especially if it is a spiritual substance. For the teachers of theology do not admit that an angel exists in different places simultaneously. Therefore, the soul cannot exist in different parts of the body. Sed contra. Augustinus dicit, in VI De Trinitate, quod anima est tota in toto corpore, et tota in qualibet parte eius. On the contrary (1), Augustine says in On the Trinity 6 that the whole soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts. Praeterea. Anima non dat esse corpori nisi secundum quod unitur ei. Sed anima dat esse toti corpori et cuilibet parti eius. Ergo anima est in toto corpore et in qualibet parte eius. Furthermore (2), the soul gives to the body its act of existing only by being united to the body. But the soul confers the act of existing on the whole body and on each of its parts. Therefore, the whole soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts. Praeterea. Anima non operatur nisi ubi est. Sed operationes animae apparent in qualibet parte corporis. Ergo anima est in qualibet parte corporis. Furthermore (3), the soul operates only where it exists. But the operations of the soul are seen to exist in each part of the body. Therefore, the soul exists in each part of the body. Respondeo. Dicendum quod veritas huius quaestionis ex praecedenti dependet. Ostensum est enim quod anima secundum quod est forma corporis non unitur toti corpori mediante aliqua parte, sed toti corpori immediate. Est enim forma et totius corporis et cuiuslibet partis eius. Et hoc necesse est dicere. Cum enim corpus hominis aut cuiuslibet alterius animalis sit quoddam totum naturale, dicetur unum ex eo quod unam formam habeat, qua perficitur non solum secundum aggregationem aut compositionem, ut accidit in domo et in aliis huiusmodi. Unde oportet quod quaelibet pars hominis et animalis recipiat esse et speciem ab anima sicut a propria forma. Unde Philosophus dicit quod, recedente anima, neque oculus neque caro neque aliqua pars remanet nisi aequivoce. I answer that the true solution to this question depends on the preceding one. For it was shown that the soul as the form of the body is not united to the whole body through the medium of any of its parts, but is united directly to the whole body because it is the form of the body as a whole and of each of its parts. And this must be maintained, for, since the body of a man or that of any other animal is a certain natural whole, it will be said to be one because it has one form whereby it is perfected, and not simply because it is an aggregate or a composition, as occurs in the case of a house and other things of this kind. Hence, each part of a man and that of an animal must receive its act of existing and species from the soul as its proper form. Therefore, the Philosopher says that when the soul leaves the body, neither the eye nor the flesh nor any part remains except in an equivocal sense. Non est autem possibile quod aliquid recipiat esse et speciem ab aliquo separato sicut a forma (hoc enim simile esset Platonis positioni, qui posuit huiusmodi sensibilia recipere esse et speciem per participationem formarum separatarum), sed oportet quod forma sit aliquid eius cui dat esse, nam forma et materia sunt principia intrinsecus constituentia essentiam rei. Moreover, it is impossible for a thing to receive its act of existing and species (as it does from a form) from a principle existing in separation from it, because this would be similar to the position of the Platonists, who maintained that such sensible things receive their act of existing and species by participating in forms which exist apart from things themselves. But a form must be an intrinsic principle of the thing whose act of existing it is responsible for, because form and matter are the intrinsic principles constituting the essence of a corporeal thing. Unde oportet quod si anima dat esse et speciem ut forma cuilibet parti corporis secundum sententiam Aristotilis, quod sit in qualibet parte corporis, nam et ea ratione dicimus animam esse in toto, quia est forma totius. Hence, according to the teaching of Aristotle, if the soul as a form gives to each part of the body its act of existing and species, it must be present as a form in each part of the body. And for this reason, the soul is said to exist in the whole body because it is the form of the whole. Unde si est forma cuiuslibet partis, oportet quod sit in qualibet parte, et non in toto tantum, neque in una parte tantum. Et hoc definitio animae ostendit: est enim anima actus corporis organici. Corpus autem organicum est constitutum ex diversis organis. Si ergo anima esset in una parte tantum ut forma, non esset actus corporis organici, sed actus unius organi tantum, puta cordis aut alicuius alterius, et reliquae partes essent perfectae per alias formas. Et sic totum non esset unum quid naturale, sed compositione tantum. Relinquitur igitur quod anima sit in toto corpore et in qualibet parte eius. Therefore, if it is the form of each part of the body, it must exist in each part and not in the whole alone, nor in one part alone. Moreover, this definition of the soul is an appropriate one, for the soul is the act of an organic body. However, an organic body is composed of different organs. Hence, if the soul as a form existed in one part of the body only, it would not be the act of an organic body, but that of one organ alone, for instance, the heart or some other part, and the remaining parts would be perfected by different forms. And thus, the whole would not be one thing by nature but merely by composition. Hence, it follows that the soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts. Sed quia etiam quaeritur an sit tota in toto et in qualibet parte eius, considerandum est qualiter dicitur et hoc. Potest autem attribui totalitas alicui formae tripliciter, secundum quod tribus modis convenit aliquid habere partes. Uno enim modo aliquid habet partes secundum divisionem quantitatis, prout scilicet dividitur numerus aut magnitudo: uni autem formae non competit totalitas numeri nec magnitudinis nisi forte per accidens, puta in formis quae per accidens dividuntur divisione continui, sicut albedo per divisionem superficiei. Alio modo dicitur aliquid totum per comparationem ad partes essentiales speciei, sicut materia et forma dicuntur partes compositi, et genus et differentia quodammodo partes speciei: et hic modus totalitatis attribuitur etiam essentiis simplicibus ratione suae perfectionis, eo quod sicut composita habent perfectam speciem ex coniunctione principiorum essentialium, ita substantiae et formae simplices habent perfectas species per se ipsas. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid totum per comparationem ad partes virtutis seu potestatis, quae quidem partes accipiuntur secundum divisionem operat-ionum. But since it is also asked whether the whole soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts, we must consider how this is to be explained. For totality can be attributed to a form in a threefold manner, according to the three ways in which it is proper for a thing to have parts. For a thing has parts, in one way, resulting from quantitative division, that is, according as a number or a magnitude is divided. However, totality of number or that of magnitude does not apply to a form, except perhaps in an accidental way, for instance, in the case of forms which are divided accidentally by the division of a continuum, as whiteness is divided as a result of dividing a surface. A thing is said to be a totality in another way in relation to the essential parts of its species, as matter and form are said to be parts of a composite, and genus and difference, in a certain respect, parts of a species. This kind of totality is also attributed to simple essences by reason of their perfection, in this way, that as composites have a perfect species from the union of their essential principles, so also do substances and simple forms which have a perfect species in virtue of themselves. A thing is said to be a totality in a third way in relation to its active and passive powers, inasmuch as these are considered to be parts of it which are distinguished from one another because their operations differ. Si qua igitur forma accipiatur quae dividitur per continui divisionem, et quaeratur de ea utrum sit in qualibet parte corporis tota, ut puta utrum albedo sit in qualibet parte superficiei tota, si accipiatur totum per comparationem ad partes quantitativas—quae quidem totalitas pertinet ad albedinem per accidens—, non est tota in qualibet parte, sed tota in toto et pars in parte. Si autem quaeratur de totalitate quae pertinet ad speciem, sic tota est in qualibet parte, nam aeque intensa est albedo in aliqua parte sicut in toto. Sed verum est quod adhuc secundum virtutem non est tota in qualibet parte: non enim tantum potest in disgregando albedo quae est in parte superficiei sicut albedo quae est in tota superficie, sicut neque tantum potest calor qui est in parvo igne ad calefaciendum sicut calor qui est in magno igne. Therefore, if we take a form which is divided as a result of dividing a continuum, and inquire whether the whole form is in each part of the body, for example, whether whiteness exists in its entirety in a part of the surface, and if the form is considered in relation to quantitative parts—which totality, indeed, pertains to whiteness accidentally—, then the whole form does not exist in each part of the body, but the whole form exists in the whole body, and a part of the form in a part of the whole. However, if it is a question of totality so far as the species is concerned, then the whole form exists in each part of the body, for whiteness is as equally intense in any part as it is in the whole. But so far as its power is concerned, it is true that the whole form does not exist in each part, for the whiteness existing in a part of the surface cannot disperse as much light as the whiteness existing in the whole surface, just as the heat in a small fire alone cannot cause warmth like the heat in a large fire. Supposito autem ad praesens quod sit una tantum anima in corpore hominis (de hoc enim postea quaeretur), non dividitur divisione quantitatis quae est numerus. Planum est etiam quod non dividitur divisione continui, praecipue anima animalium perfectorum, quae decisa non vivunt; secus autem forte esset de animabus animalium anulosorum, in quibus est una anima in actu et plures in potentia, ut Philosophus docet. Relinquitur igitur quod in anima hominis et cuiuslibet animalis perfecti non potest accipi totalitas nisi secundum perfectionem speciei, et secundum potentiam seu virtutem. Now if we suppose, for the present, that there is only one soul in the human body—we will explain this later—, we must maintain that it is not divided by dividing that species of quantity which is numerical in nature. It is also obvious that the soul is not divided by dividing a continuum. This is particularly true of the souls of perfect animals which do not live when dissected. However, it would perhaps be different in the case of the souls of ring-worms, in which there is one soul actually and many potentially, as the Philosopher teaches. Therefore, in the case of the soul of man and that of any perfect animal, it follows that totality can be considered only so far as the soul’s species and its passive or active power are concerned. Dicimus ergo quod, cum perfectio speciei pertineat ad animam secundum suam essentiam, anima autem secundum suam essentiam est forma corporis, et prout est forma corporis est in qualibet parte corporis, ut ostensum est, relinquitur quod anima tota sit in qualibet parte corporis secundum totalitatem perfectionis speciei. Hence, we say that the soul by its very essence is the form of the body, and that it exists as such in each part of the body, as has been shown, because the perfection of the species comes from the soul in virtue of its very essence. Consequently, the whole soul exists in each part of the body according to the whole of its specific perfection. Si autem accipiatur totalitas quantum ad virtutem et potestatem, sic non est tota in qualibet parte corporis, nec etiam tota in toto, si loquamur de anima hominis. Ostensum est enim ex superioribus quaestionibus quod anima humana, quia excedit corporis capacitatem, remanet ei virtus ad operandum operationes quasdam sine communicatione corporis, sicut intelligere et velle. Unde intellectus et voluntas non sunt actus alicuius organi corporalis. However, if totality is taken so far as the soul’s active and passive powers are concerned, then the whole soul does not exist in each part of the body. Nor, if we speak of the soul of man, does the whole soul, according to the totality of its powers, exist in the whole body. For it was shown in the preceding articles that the human soul possesses the power of performing certain operations without communicating in any way with the body, that is, the acts of understanding and willing, as it exceeds the capacity of the body. Hence, the intellect and the will are not the acts of any bodily organ. Sed quantum ad alias operationes quas exercet per organa corporalia, tota virtus et potestas eius est in toto corpore, non autem in qualibet parte corporis, quia diversae partes corporis sunt proportionatae ad diversas operationes animae. Unde secundum illam potentiam tantum est in aliqua parte, quae respicit operationem quae per illam partem corporis exercetur. However, with respect to those operations which the soul exercises through bodily organs, the soul’s active and passive powers as a whole exist in the whole body, although not in each part of the body, because different parts of the body are proportioned to different operations of the soul. Consequently, with respect to any one power, the soul exists only in that part of the body which takes care of the operations exercised by that particular part.