Sed contra est quod dicit Philosophus in VIII Metaphysicae, quod forma unitur materiae immediate. Anima autem unitur corpori ut forma. Ergo unitur sibi immediate. On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics that a form is united to its matter directly. Now the soul is united as a form to the body. Therefore, it is united to the body directly. Respondeo. Dicendum quod inter omnia, esse est illud quod immediatius et intimius convenit rebus, ut dicitur in libro De causis. Unde oportet quod, cum materia habeat esse actu per formam, quod forma dans esse materiae ante omnia intelligatur advenire materiae, et immediatius ceteris sibi inesse. Est autem hoc proprium formae substantialis quod det materiae esse simpliciter—ipsa enim est per quam res est hoc ipsum quod est—. Non autem per formas accidentales habet esse simpliciter, sed esse secundum quid, puta esse magnum vel coloratum vel aliquid tale. Si qua igitur forma est quae non det materiae esse simpliciter, sed adveniat materiae iam existenti in actu per aliam formam, non erit forma substantialis. I answer that among all principles the act of existing is that which most immediately and intimately belongs to things, as is pointed out in the Book of Causes. Hence the form which gives matter its act of existing must be understood to come to matter prior to anything else, and to be present in it more immediately than anything else, because matter receives its act of existing from a form. Moreover, it is proper to a substantial form to give matter its act of existing pure and simple, because it is through its form that a thing is the very thing that it is. For a thing is not given an act of existing pure and simple through accidental forms, but only a relative one such as to be large or colored, and so on. Therefore, if there is a form which does not give to matter its act of existing pure and simple, but comes to matter already possessing an act of existing through some form, such a form will not be a substantial one. Ex quo patet quod inter formam substantialem et materiam non potest cadere aliqua forma substantialis media, sicut quidam voluerunt, ponentes quod secundum ordinem generum, quorum unum sub altero ordinatur, est ordo diversarum formarum in materia: ut puta si dicamus quod materia secundum unam formam habet quod sit substantia in actu, et secundum aliam quod sit corpus, et iterum secundum aliam quod sit animatum corpus, et sic deinceps. Sed hac positione facta, sola prima forma, quae faceret esse substantiam actu, esset substantialis; aliae vero omnes accidentales, quia forma substantialis est quae facit hoc aliquid, ut iam dictum est. Oportet igitur dicere quod eadem numero forma sit per quam res habet quod sit substantia, et quod sit in ultima specie specialissima, et in omnibus intermediis generibus. From this it is obvious that an intermediary substantial form cannot intervene between a substantial form and matter, as some wished to maintain. For these men held that there exists in matter an order of diverse forms, one of which is arranged under another in accordance with the order of genera; as if one were to say, for instance, that matter is given the act of existing of a substance through one form; the act of existing of a body through another; the act of existing of a living body through still another; and so on. But if this position is adopted, only the first form which gives a thing its act of existing as a substance would be a substantial one. The other forms, indeed, would all be accidental ones, because it is a thing’s substantial form that makes it be a substance, as we have already shown. Therefore, it is necessary to say that a thing has substantiality, exists in the ultimate species, under which there are no other species, and in all intermediate genera, through one and the same form. Relinquitur igitur dicendum quod, cum formae rerum naturalium sint sicut numeri—in quibus est diversitas speciei addita vel subtracta unitate, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphysicae—, oportet intelligere diversitatem formarum naturalium, secundum quas materia constituitur in diversis speciebus, ex hoc quod una addit perfectionem super aliam. Ut puta quod una forma constituit in esse corporali tantum (hunc enim oportet esse infimum gradum formarum materialium, eo quod materia non est in potentia nisi ad formas corporales; quae enim incorporea sunt, immaterialia sunt, ut in praecedentibus ostensum est); alia autem perfectior forma constituit materiam in esse corporali et ulterius dat ei esse vitale; et ulterius alia forma dat ei esse corporale et esse vitale et super hoc addit esse sensitivum; et sic est in aliis. Now the forms of natural things are like numbers whose species change when a unit is added or subtracted, as is pointed out in the Metaphysics. It follows, therefore, that the diversity of natural forms, in accordance with which matter is constituted in diverse species, is to be understood as resulting from this fact, that one adds a perfection over and above another. For example, one form gives matter corporeal existence only. This must be below the grade of animal forms, because matter is in potency only to corporeal forms. For those things which are incorporeal are immaterial, as was shown in the preceding question. A second more perfect form gives matter vital existence in addition to corporeal existence. Another, still higher, form confers on it sensory existence in addition to vital and corporeal existence; and so on successively. Oportet igitur intelligere quod forma perfectior, secundum quod constituit materiam in perfectione inferioris gradus, simul cum materia composita intelligatur ut materiale respectu ulterioris perfectionis, et sic ulterius procedendo: utpote materia prima, secundum quod iam constituta est in esse corporeo, est materia respectu ulterioris perfectionis quae est vita. Et exinde est quod corpus est genus corporis viventis, et animatum sive vivens, est differentia, nam genus sumitur a materia et differentia a forma. Et sic quodammodo una et eadem forma, secundum quod constituit materiam in actu inferioris gradus, est media inter materiam et se ipsam, secundum quod constituit eam in actu superioris gradus. Therefore a more perfect form, constituting with matter a composite being in the perfection of an inferior grade, must be considered as matter with respect to a higher perfection; and so on up the scale. For instance, prime matter, so far as it now exists in a corporeal mode, is matter with respect to the higher perfection of life. And so body is the genus of living body, and animated or living is the specific difference. For genus is derived from matter, and difference from form. Thus, in a certain way, one and the same form actualizing matter in a lower grade of perfection, is midway between matter and that same form actualizing matter in a superior grade. Materia autem, prout intelligitur constituta in esse substantiali secundum perfectionem inferioris gradus, per consequens intelligi potest ut accidentibus subiecta, nam substantia, secundum illum inferiorem gradum perfectionis, necesse est quod habeat quaedam accidentia propria, quae necesse est ei inesse. Sicut ex hoc quod materia constituitur in esse corporeo per formam, statim consequitur ut sint in ea dimensiones per quas intelligitur materia divisibilis per diversas partes, ut sic secundum diversas sui partes possit esse susceptiva diversarum formarum. Et ulterius, ex quo materia intelligitur constituta in esse quodam substantiali, intelligi potest ut susceptiva accidentium quibus disponitur ad ulteriorem perfectionem, secundum quam materia fit propria ad altiorem perfectionem suscipiendam. Huiusmodi autem dispositiones praeintelliguntur formae ut inductae ab agente in materiam, licet sint quaedam accidentia ita propria formae quod non nisi ex ipsa forma causentur in materia. Unde non praeintelliguntur in materia formae quasi dispositiones, sed magis forma praeintelligitur eis sicut causa effectui. But matter, so far as it is understood to have substantial existence as a perfection of an inferior grade, can, therefore, be regarded as the subject of accidents. For a substance in that inferior grade of perfection must have a proper accident which necessarily inheres in it. Likewise, from the fact that matter has corporeal existence through forms, it immediately follows that there are dimensions in matter whereby it is understood to be divisible into different parts, so that it can receive different forms corresponding to its different parts. Furthermore, from the fact that matter is known to have a certain substantial mode of existing, matter can be understood to receive accidents by which it is disposed to a higher perfection, so far as it is fittingly disposed to receive that higher perfection. Moreover, dispositions of this kind are understood to exist in matter prior to the form, inasmuch as they are given existence in matter by an agent, although there are some improper accidents of the form that are caused in the matter only by the form itself. Hence such accidents are not understood to exist as dispositions in matter prior to the form; rather is the form understood to be prior to the proper accidents as a cause is to its effects. Sic igitur, cum anima sit forma substantialis quia constituit hominem in determinata specie substantiae, non est aliqua alia forma substantialis media inter animam et materiam primam; sed homo ab ipsa anima rationali perficitur secundum diversos gradus perfectionum, ut scilicet sit corpus, et animatum corpus, et animal rationale. Sed oportet quod materia, secundum quod intelligitur ut recipiens ab ipsa anima rationali perfectiones inferioris gradus, puta quod sit corpus et animatum corpus et animal, intelligitur simul cum dispositionibus convenientibus quod sit materia propria ad animam rationalem secundum quod dat ultimam perfectionem. Sic igitur anima, secundum quod est forma dans esse, non habet aliquid aliud medium inter se et materiam primam. Consequently, since the soul is a substantial form, because it places man in a determinate species of substance, no other substantial form intervenes between the soul and prime matter. But man is perfected in different grades of perfection by the rational soul itself, so that he is a body, a living body, and a rational animal. However, matter—being understood to receive from the rational soul itself, perfections of an inferior grade, for instance, that of being a body, a living body, and an animal—, must also be understood to have, at the same time, appropriate dispositions so that it may be a matter befitting a human soul, inasmuch as the soul gives the body its ultimate perfection. So, therefore, the soul inasmuch as it is the form which gives the act of existing absolutely, does not have any intermediary between itself and prime matter. Sed quia eadem forma quae dat esse materiae est etiam operationis principium, eo quod unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu, necesse est quod anima, sicut et quaelibet alia forma, sit etiam operationis principium. Sed considerandum est quod secundum gradum formarum in perfectione essendi est etiam gradus earum in virtute operandi, cum operatio sit existentis in actu. Et ideo quanto aliqua forma est maioris perfectionis in dando esse, tanto etiam est maioris virtutis in operando. Unde formae perfectiores habent plures operationes et magis diversas quam formae minus perfectae. Et inde est quod ad diversitatem operationum in rebus minus perfectis sufficit diversitas accidentium; in rebus autem magis perfectis requiritur ulterius diversitas partium, et tanto magis quanto forma fuerit perfectior. Videmus enim quod igni conveniunt diversae operationes secundum diversa accidentia, ut ferri sursum secundum levitatem, calefacere secundum calorem, et sic de aliis; sed tamen quaelibet harum operationum competit igni secundum quamlibet partem eius. In corporibus vero animatis, quae nobiliores formas habent, diversis operationibus deputantur diversae partes: sicut in plantis alia est operatio radicis, et stipitis et ramorum. Et quanto corpora animata fuerint perfectiora, tanto propter maiorem perfectionem necesse est inveniri maiorem diversitatem in partibus. Unde, cum anima rationalis sit perfectissima formarum materialium, in homine invenitur maxima distinctio partium propter diversas operationes; et anima singulis earum dat esse substantiale secundum illum modum qui competit operationi ipsarum; cuius signum est quod, remota anima, non remanet neque caro neque oculus nisi aequivoce. But because the same form which gives matter its act of existing is also a principle of operation, for a thing acts so far as it is in act; then the soul like any other form must be a principle of operation. But it must be considered that a gradation of forms in the order of operation corresponds to the gradation of forms in the order of existence, for an operation is an act of an agent in act. Therefore, the greater perfection a form possesses with respect to conferring the act of existing, so much the greater is its power of operating. Hence more perfect forms have a greater number of operations and more diverse ones than less perfect forms. And so it is that a diversity of accidents suffices for a diversity of operations in the case of less perfect things. But in the case of more perfect things a diversity of parts is required as well; and the greater the diversity of parts, the more perfect the form will be. For we see that diverse operations are proper to fire because its accidents differ, for example, to rise upward in virtue of its lightness; to heat in virtue of its heat; and so on. However, any one of these operations belongs to any part of fire. But in animate bodies which have nobler forms, different operations are allotted to different parts; for instance, in plants there is one operation performed by the roots, another by the trunk, and still another by the branches. And the more perfect that living bodies are, so much the more diverse must their parts be in view of their greater perfection. Therefore, since the rational soul is the most perfect of natural forms, there is found in man the greatest diversity of parts because of his different operations. Furthermore, the one soul performing these operations confers substantial existence in a manner befitting the operations of the parts themselves. An indication of this fact is that, when the soul ceases to animate the body, neither flesh nor eye remains except in an equivocal sense. Sed cum oporteat ordinem instrumentorum esse secundum ordinem operationum, diversarum autem operationum quae sunt ab anima una naturaliter praecedit aliam, necessarium est quod una pars corporis moveatur per aliam ad suam operationem. Sic igitur inter animam, secundum quod est motor et principium operationum, et totum corpus cadit aliquid medium, quia mediante aliqua prima parte movet alias partes ad suas operationes: sicut mediante corde movet alia membra ad vitales operationes. Sed secundum quod dat esse corpori, immediate dat esse substantiale et specificum omnibus partibus corporis. Et hoc est quod a multis dicitur, quod anima unitur corpori ut forma sine medio, ut motor autem per medium. But since there must be an order of instruments in keeping with the order of operations, and since there is a natural precedence among the different operations which flow from the soul, one part of the body must be moved to perform its operations by another part. Thus a medium intervenes between the whole body and the soul as the mover and principle of its operations. For after a certain primary mediating part of the body has been moved, that part moves the other parts to perform their operations. So it is that the soul, by means of the heart, moves the other members of the body to perform their vital operations. But since the soul gives to the body its act of existing, it immediately gives to all parts of the body their substantial and specific mode of existing. And this is what many assert, namely, that as a form the soul is united to the body without an intermediary, but that as a mover it is united to the body through an intermediary. Et haec opinio procedit secundum sententiam Aristotilis, qui posuit animam esse formam substantialem corporis. Sed quidam ponentes, secundum opinionem Platonis, animam uniri corpori sicut unam substantiam alii, necesse habuerunt ponere media quibus anima uniretur corpori, quia diversae substantiae et distantes non colligantur nisi sit aliquid quod uniat eas. Et sic posuerunt quidam spiritum et humorem esse medium inter animam et corpus, et quidam lucem, et quidam potentias animae vel aliquid huiusmodi. Sed nullum istorum est necessarium si anima est forma corporis, quia unumquodque secundum quod est ens est unum. Unde cum forma secundum se ipsam det esse materiae, secundum se ipsam unitur materiae proprie, et non per aliquod aliud ligamentum. Moreover, this view is in keeping with the position of Aristotle, who maintains that the soul is the substantial form of the body. However, some who, following Plato’s theory, hold that the soul is united to the body as one substance is to another, had to posit media through which the soul is united to the body. For diverse and disparate substances are unified only if something exists to unite them. For this reason, some held that there is a certain spirit and humor existing as a medium between soul and body; other posited light; still others, the powers of the soul, or something else of this sort. But none of these are necessary if the soul is the form of the body, because anything whatever, inasmuch as it is a being, is one. Hence a form is united to prime matter by virtue of itself and not by any other bond, because a form, by its very nature, gives to matter its act of existing. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vires animae sunt qualitates eius quibus operatur. Et ideo cadunt media inter animam et corpus secundum quod anima movet corpus, non autem secundum quod dat ei esse. Tamen sciendum quod liber qui inscribitur De spiritu et anima non est Augustini, et quod auctor illius libri opinatus est quod anima sit suae potentiae. Unde totaliter cessat obiectio. Reply Obj. 1: The powers of the soul are the qualities by which it operates. Therefore, they serve as intermediaries between the soul and the body inasmuch as the soul moves the body, but not inasmuch as it gives to the body its act of existing. Moreover, it must be understood that the work which is called The Spirit and the Soul is not a work of Augustine, and that its author is of the opinion that the soul is its powers. Hence the objection fails completely. Ad secundum dicendum quod licet anima sit forma in quantum est actus et similiter in quantum est motor, et ita secundum idem sit forma et motor, tamen alius est effectus eius secundum quod est forma, et alius secundum quod est motor. Et propter hoc locum habet distinctio. Reply Obj. 2: Although the soul is a form inasmuch as it is an act, and similarly is a mover inasmuch as it is an act, and thus is a form and a mover in one and the same respect, nevertheless the effect which it produces as a form differs from that which it produces as a mover. The distinction is made for this reason. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex motore et mobili non fit unum per se in quantum huiusmodi; sed ex hoc motore qui est anima et hoc mobili quod est corpus fit unum per se, in quantum anima est forma corporis. Reply Obj. 3: One being pure and simple does not result from the union of a mover and a thing moved inasmuch as they are mover and moved, but from the union of this mover which is the soul, inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, and this mobile thing which is the body. Ad quartum dicendum quod, quantum ad illam operationem animae quae est compositi, non cadit aliquod medium inter animam et quamlibet partem corporis; sed est una pars corporis per quam primo exercet anima illam operationem quae cadit media inter animam, secundum quod est principium illius operationis, et omnes alias partes corporis quae participant illam operationem. Reply Obj. 4: Nothing intervenes between the soul and any part of the body with respect to any operation of the soul which is an operation of the composite. However, there is one part of the body through which the soul first exercises its operation, which falls midway between the soul, so far as it is the principle of that operation, and all the other parts of the body which share in that operation. Ad quintum dicendum quod dispositiones accidentales quae faciunt materiam propriam ad aliquam formam non sunt mediae totaliter inter formam et materiam, sed inter formam secundum quod dat ultimam perfectionem, et materiam secundum quod iam est perfecta perfectione inferioris gradus. Materia enim secundum se ipsam est propria respectu infimi gradus perfectionis, quia materia secundum se ipsam est in potentia ad esse substantiale corporeum, nec ad hoc requirit aliquam dispositionem. Sed hac perfectione praesupposita in materia requiruntur dispositiones ad ulteriorem perfectionem. Tamen sciendum est quod potentiae animae sunt accidentia propria animae quae non sunt sine ea. Unde non habent rationem dispositionum ad animam secundum quod sunt eius potentiae, nisi potentiae inferioris partis animae dicantur dispositiones ad superiorem partem, sicut potentia animae vegetabilis ad animam sensibilem, secundum quod ex praemissis intelligi potest. Reply Obj. 5: The accidental dispositions which dispose matter properly for some form are not media absolutely between form and matter, but between form inasmuch as it bestows the highest perfection, and matter inasmuch as it is already perfected by some perfection of an inferior order. For matter by its very nature is first with respect to the lowest grade of perfection, because matter of itself is in potency to substantial corporeal existence. Moreover, it does not require to be disposed in this way. But matter, having this perfection already in existence, requires dispositions to a higher perfection. Moreover it must be recognized that the powers of the soul are its proper accidents and do not exist without the soul. Therefore, inasmuch as they are its powers, they do not have the nature of a disposition in relation to the soul except so far as the powers of the inferior part of the soul are called dispositions in relation to the powers of the superior part, just as the powers of the vegetal soul are dispositions in relation to the sentient soul, as can be seen from the preceding argument. Ad sextum dicendum quod ratio illa concludit quod animal dividatur in duas partes, quarum una sit corpus mobile et alia sit motor; quod quidem verum est. Sed oportet intelligere quod anima movet corpus secundum apprehensionem et appetitum. Apprehensio autem et appetitus in homine duplex est: una quidem quae est animae tantum, non per organum corporale, quae est partis intellectivae; alia quae est coniuncti, et est partis sensitivae. Illa autem quae est partis intellectivae non movet corpus nisi mediante ea quae est partis sensitivae: quia, cum motus sit secundum aliquod singulare, apprehensio universalis, quae est intellectus, non movet nisi mediante particulari, quae est sensus. Sic igitur homo vel animal, cum dividitur in partem moventem et partem motam, non est haec divisio in solam animam et solum corpus, sed in unam partem corporis animati et aliam: nam illa pars corporis animati cuius operatio est apprehendere et appetere movet totum corpus. Sed si supponatur quod pars intellectiva immediate moveat, ita quod pars movens in homine sit anima tantum, adhuc remanebit responsio secundum praehabita: nam anima humana erit movens secundum id quod est supremum in ipsa, scilicet secundum partem intellectivam; motum autem erit non materia prima tantum, sed materia prima secundum quod est constituta in esse corporali et vitali non per aliam formam nisi per eamdem animam. Unde non erit necessarium ponere formam substantialem mediam inter animam et materiam primam. Reply Obj. 6: This argument concludes that the soul or the animal is divided into two parts, one of which is like a mobile thing, the other like a mover. This, indeed, is true, but we must understand that the soul moves the body through knowledge and appetite. Now knowledge and appetite in man are of two kinds. First, that which belongs to the soul alone and which does not depend on a bodily organ. This belongs to the intellective part of the soul. Secondly, that which belongs to the composite. This belongs to the sentient part of the soul. Now whatever belongs to the intellective part moves the body only by means of that which belongs to the sentient part. For when a movement has to do with some particular thing, the universal apprehension which belongs to the intellect causes movement only by means of something particular belonging to sense. Hence when we divide a man or an animal into a part that causes movement and one that is moved, we do not divide them into a soul and a body exclusively, but into a soul and an animated body. For that part of the animated body whose operation it is to apprehend and to desire, moves the whole body. But if it be supposed that the intellective part moves the body directly, so that the part causing movement in man is the soul alone, then the answer will be in accordance with the preceding explanation. For the human soul will be a mover in virtue of what is supreme in itself, namely, its intellective part. Moreover, the moved part will not be prime matter alone, but prime matter inasmuch as it is given a corporeal and vital act of existing. Nor will it be moved by any other form than the soul. Hence it will not be necessary to maintain that a substantial form acts as an intermediary between the soul and prime matter. Sed quia in animali est quidam motus qui non est per apprehensionem et appetitum, scilicet motus cordis et etiam motus augmenti, et motus alimenti diffusi per corpus (quod etiam est commune plantis), quantum ad hos motus dicendum est quod, cum anima animali det non solum id quod est proprium sibi, sed etiam id quod est inferiorum formarum, ut ex dictis patet, sicut inferiores formae sunt principia naturalis motus in corporibus naturalibus, ita etiam anima in corpore animalis. Unde Philosophus dicit, in II De anima, quod anima est natura talis corporis. Et propter hoc operationes animae distinguuntur in animales et naturales: ut illae dicantur animales quae sunt ab anima secundum id quod est proprium sibi, naturales autem quae sunt ab anima secundum quod facit effectum inferiorum formarum naturalium. Secundum hoc ergo dicendum quod sicuti ignis per formam suam naturalem habet naturalem motum quo tendit sursum, ita aliqua pars corporis animati, in qua primo invenitur motus qui non est per apprehensionem, habet hunc motum naturaliter per animam. Sicut enim ignis naturaliter movetur sursum, ita sanguis naturaliter movetur ad loca propria et determinata. Et similiter cor naturaliter movetur motu sibi proprio, licet ad hoc etiam cooperetur resolutio spirituum facta ex sanguine, quibus cor dilatatur et constringitur, ut Aristoteles dicit ubi agit de respiratione et exspiratione. Sic igitur prima pars in qua talis motus invenitur non est movens se ipsam, sed movetur naturaliter sicut ignis; sed ista pars movet aliam; et sic totum animal est movens se ipsum, cum una pars eius sit movens et alia sit mota. However, there is a certain movement in the animal which is not the result of apprehension and desire, that is, the movement of the heart, the movement also of growth and decay, and the movement of nutrition which is diffused throughout the whole body, and which the animal has in common with plants. Now with respect to this kind of movement, we must maintain that, as inferior forms are the principles of movement in natural bodies, so also is the soul the principle of movement in animal bodies. For the animal soul not only bestows what is proper to its nature as such, but also gives those perfections which belong to a lower order of forms, as is evident from what has been said. Hence the Philosopher says in On the Soul that the soul is the nature of this specific type of body. For this reason the operations of the soul are divided into animal operations and natural operations. That is to say, those operations which proceed from the soul in keeping with its proper nature are called animal operations, whereas those which come from the soul inasmuch as it produces the effect of inferior natural forms are called natural operations. According to this, therefore, it must be said that, as fire through its natural form has a natural movement whereby it tends upwards, so also does any part of an animated body in which there is found movement not resulting from apprehension have this movement naturally through its soul. For as fire tends upward by nature, so also is the blood moved naturally to its proper and determinate place. Similarly, the heart is moved naturally by its proper movement, although the dissolution of spirits, made from the blood, by which the heart is expanded and contracted, cooperates in this activity, as Aristotle points out in the place where he treats of exhalation and inhalation. Consequently, the first part of the body in which such movement is found is not a self-mover, but is moved naturally, just as fire is. However, this part moves another part, and thus the whole animal is a self-mover, because one part of it is a mover, and another is moved. Ad septimum dicendum quod corpus physicum organicum comparatur ad animam sicut materia ad formam; non quod sit tale per aliquam aliam formam, sed quia hoc ipsum habet per animam, ut supra ostensum est. Reply Obj. 7: A physical organic body is related to the soul as matter to form, not that it is such a body as a result of some other form, but because it has this nature through the soul, as was shown above. Et similiter dicendum est ad octavum, nam quod in Genesi dicitur: formavit Deus hominem de limo terrae, non praecedit tempore hoc quod sequitur: et inspiravit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, sed ordine naturae tantum. Reply Obj. 8: The eighth argument must be answered similarly. For the statement in Genesis, God formed man out of the slime of the earth, is not prior in time to the following, and breathed into his face the breath of life (Gen 2:7); but is prior in the order of nature only. Ad nonum dicendum quod materia secundum ordinem est in potentia ad formas, non quod recipiat diversas formas substantiales ordinatim, sed quia id quod est proprium perfectioris formae non recipit nisi mediante eo quod est proprium inferioris formae, sicut expositum est. Et per hunc modum intelligitur quod mediantibus formis elementaribus recipiat alias formas. Reply Obj. 9: Matter is in potency to forms with respect to a certain order, not that it receives different substantial forms in a certain order, but because it receives whatever is proper to a superior form only through the medium of what is proper to an inferior form, as was shown. In this way matter is understood to receive other forms by way of the forms of the elements. Ad decimum dicendum quod formae elementares non sunt actu in mixto secundum suam essentiam, licet hoc Avicenna posuerit: non enim possunt esse in una parte materiae. Si autem essent in diversis partibus, non esset mixtio secundum totum, quae est vera mixtio, sed esset mixtio minima, quae est mixtio ad sensum. Dicere etiam quod formae elementorum recipiant magis et minus, ut Averroes dicit, ridiculum est, cum sint formae substantiales, quae magis et minus recipere non possunt. Nec aliquid est medium inter substantiam et accidens, ut ipse fingit. Nec iterum dicendum est quod totaliter corrumpantur, sed quod maneant virtute, ut Aristoteles dicit; et hoc est in quantum manent accidentia propria elementorum secundum aliquem modum, in quibus manet virtus elementorum. Reply Obj. 10: The forms of the elements do not exist according to their very essence in a mixed body, although Avicenna maintained this, for they cannot exist in one and the same part of matter. However, if they were to exist in different parts of matter, there would not be a mixture with respect to the whole, as is the case in a true mixture, but there would be a mixture of the most insignificant kind, that is to say, one which appears to be a mixture to the senses. Again, to say that the forms of the elements may receive more and less, as Averroes does, is ridiculous, because there are substantial forms which cannot receive more and less. Nor is there a medium between a substance and an accident as he imagined. Moreover it must be said that the forms of the elements are not corrupted completely, but that they remain virtually, as Aristotle says. And they are virtually present inasmuch as the proper accidents of the elements, in which the power of the elements is found, remain in some measure. Ad undecimum dicendum quod licet anima sit forma corporis secundum essentiam animae intellectualis, non tamen secundum operationem intellectualem. Reply Obj. 11: The intellective soul is the form of the body according to its very essence, but not according to its intellectual operation. Ad duodecimum dicendum quod proportio quae est inter animam et corpus est in ipsis proportionatis; unde non oportet quod sit aliqua res media inter animam et corpus. Reply Obj. 12: The proportion that exists between the soul and the body is in the things proportioned. Consequently, it does not necessarily have to be an intermediary between soul and body. Ad tertium decimum dicendum quod cor est primum instrumentum per quod anima movet ceteras corporis partes; et ideo eo mediante anima unitur reliquis partibus ut motor, licet ut forma uniatur unicuique parti corporis per se et immediate. Reply Obj. 13: The heart is the first instrument through which the soul moves the other parts of the body. Therefore, as a mover, the soul is united to the other parts of the body through the medium of the heart. However, as a form, the soul is united to every part of the body essentially and directly. Ad quartum decimum dicendum quod licet anima sit forma simplex secundum essentiam, est tamen multiplex virtute secundum quod est principium diversarum operationum. Et quia forma perficit materiam non solum ad esse, sed etiam ad operandum, ideo oportet quod, licet anima sit una forma, partes corporis diversimode perficiantur ab ipsa, et unaquaeque secundum quod competit eius operationi. Et secundum hoc etiam oportet esse ordinem in partibus secundum ordinem operationum, ut dictum est. Sed iste ordo est secundum comparationem corporis ad animam ut est motor. Reply Obj. 14: Although the soul is a form in its entirety so far as its essence is concerned, yet it is many by its powers inasmuch as it is the principle of different operations. Furthermore, because a form perfects a matter not only with respect to its act of existing, but also with respect to its operation, it is necessary that the parts of the body be perfected in different ways by the soul, even though it is a form in its entirety, and that each part be perfected in a way befitting its operation. For this reason there must be an order among the parts of the body in accordance with the order among operations, as was explained. However, this order exists inasmuch as the operation of the body belongs to the soul as the mover of the body. Ad quintum decimum dicendum quod inferiores vires animae possunt intelligi ligare superiores vires corpori quantum ad operationem, prout scilicet superiores vires indigent operationibus inferiorum, quae exercentur per corpus. Et eodem modo corpus per superiores sui partes coniungitur animae secundum operationem et motum. Reply Obj. 15: The inferior powers of the soul, so far as their operations are concerned, can be understood to unite the superior powers to the body inasmuch as the superior powers stand in need of the operations of the inferior powers which are exercised through the body. Similarly the body, so far as operation and movement are concerned, is joined through its superior parts to the soul. Ad sextum decimum dicendum quod sicut forma non advenit materiae nisi sit facta propria per debitas dispositiones, ita cessantibus debitis dispositionibus forma in materia remanere non potest. Et hoc modo unio animae ad corpus solvitur, remoto calore et humiditate naturali et aliis huiusmodi, in quantum his disponitur corpus ad susceptionem animae. Unde huiusmodi cadunt media inter animam et corpus ut dispositiones. Quod quomodo sit, dictum est. Reply Obj. 16: A form accrues to matter only when matter is properly disposed by fitting dispositions, and thus a form cannot remain in matter when the proper dispositions cease to exist. In this way, when the heat, natural humidity, and the like, are removed from the body, the union of soul and body is destroyed, because the body is disposed to receive the soul by means of these things. Hence things of this kind intervene as dispositions between the soul and the body. The explanation of this was given above. Ad septimum decimum dicendum quod dimensiones non possunt intelligi in materia nisi secundum quod materia intelligitur constituta per formam substantialem in esse substantiali corporeo; quod quidem non fit per aliam formam in homine quam per animam, ut dictum est. Unde huiusmodi dimensiones non praeintelliguntur ante animam in materia totaliter, sed quantum ad ulteriores gradus perfectionis, ut supra expositum est. Reply Obj. 17: Dimensions can be considered to exist in matter only so far as matter is given substantial corporeal existence through a substantial form. In man this kind of existence is not bestowed by any other form than the soul, as has been explained. Consequently, these dimensions are not understood actually to precede the existence of the soul in matter absolutely, but relative to the highest grades of perfection, as was explained above. Ad octavum decimum dicendum quod anima et corpus non sunt distantia sicut res diversorum generum vel specierum, cum neutrum eorum sit in genere vel specie, ut in superioribus quaestionibus habitum est, sed solum compositum ex eis. Sed anima est forma corporis per se ipsam dans ei esse. Unde per se et immediate ei unitur. Reply Obj. 18: The soul and the body do not differ from each other as things of different genera and species do, because neither of them exists in a genus or a species, but only the composite of which they are parts, as we have shown in the preceding questions. However, the soul by its very essence is the form of the body giving it its act of existing. Hence it is united to the body essentially and directly. Ad nonum decimum dicendum quod corpus humanum habet aliquam communicationem cum corpore caelesti; non quod aliquid corporis caelestis, ut lux, interveniat medium inter animam et corpus; sed secundum quod est constitutum in quadam aequalitate complexionis, remotum a contrarietate, ut in superioribus expositum est. Reply Obj. 19: The human body has something in common with a celestial body, not inasmuch as something characteristic of a celestial body, such as light, intervenes as a medium between the soul and the body, but inasmuch as the human body is given a certain tempered combination lacking contrariety, as was shown in preceding questions. Quaestio 10 Question 10 Utrum anima sit in toto corpore et in qualibet parte eius Whether the soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts Decimo quaeritur utrum anima sit in toto corpore et in qualibet parte eius. Tenth, it is asked whether the soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts. Et videtur quod non. Anima enim est in corpore sicut perfectio in perfectibili. Sed perfectibile ab anima est corpus organicum: est enim anima actus corporis physici organici, potentia vitam habentis, ut dicitur in II De anima. Ergo anima non est nisi in corpore organico. Sed non quaelibet pars corporis est organicum corpus. Ergo anima non est in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 1: It seems that the soul does not. For the soul exists in the body as a perfection in something perfectible. But the thing capable of being perfected by the soul is an organic body because the soul is the actuality of a physical organic body having life potentially, as is stated in book 2 of On the Soul. Therefore the soul exists only in an organic body. But each part of the body is not an organic body. Therefore the soul does not exist in each part of the body. Praeterea. Forma est proportionata materiae. Sed anima, prout est forma corporis, est quaedam essentia simplex. Ergo non respondet ei materia multiplex. Sed diversae partes corporis, vel hominis vel animalis, sunt sicut materia multiplex, cum habeant magnam diversitatem ad invicem. Non igitur anima est forma cuiuslibet partis corporis; et ita non est anima in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 2: Further, a form is proportioned to a matter. But the soul as the form of the body is a certain simple essence. Therefore a complex matter is not proportioned to the soul. But the diverse parts of the body, either of a man or of an animal, are certainly complex matter, because these parts differ greatly from one another. Therefore the soul is not the form of each part of the body, and so does not exist in each part of the body. Praeterea. Extra totum nihil est sumere. Si igitur anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis, extra illam partem nihil est de anima. Ergo impossibile est quod sit tota in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 3: Further, no part of a whole exists in separation from the whole. Therefore, if the whole soul exists in one part of the body, no part of the soul can exist outside that part of the body. Therefore, it is impossible for the soul to exist in each part of the body.