Item, ad relationem pertinentia in divinis sunt duo in communi, a quo alius, et qui ab alio. Sed a quo alius non distinguitur personaliter per diversum modum originis: nam eadem persona Patris est a qua est Filius per generationem et Spiritus Sanctus per processionem. Ergo nec qui est ab alio per spirationem, scilicet Spiritus Sanctus, distinguitur ab eo qui est ab alio per generationem, scilicet a Filio. Again (7), in God there are two things belonging commonly to relation, one from whom the other is and one who is from the other. Now, he from whom the other is is not personally distinguished through a diverse mode of origin; for the same person of the Father is the one from whom the Son is, by generation, and the Holy Spirit is, by procession. Neither, then, is he who is from another by spiration (that is, the Holy Spirit) distinguished from him who is from another by generation (that is, from the Son). Item, Richardus, assignans differentiam inter duas processiones Filii et Spiritus Sancti, dicit: communio maiestas fuit, ut sic dicam, causa originis unius, scilicet Filii; communio amoris fuit causa originis alterius; scilicet Spiritus Sancti. Non esset autem processio Spiritus Sancti ex communione amoris, nisi Pater et Filius mutuo se amarent, et sic Spiritus Sanctus ab eis procederet. Ergo si Spiritus Sanctus a Filio non procederet, non esset differentia inter processionem Spiritus Sancti et generationem Filii, et sic neque personaliter Spiritus Sanctus esset a Filio distinctus. Again (8), Richard states the difference between the two processions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit in the following terms: communion of majesty, so to speak, was the cause of the one’s origin, namely, the Son’s; communion of love was the cause of the other’s origin, namely, the Holy Spirit’s. Now, the procession of the Holy Spirit would not be caused by communion of love unless the Father and the Son loved each other, and thus the Holy Spirit proceeded from them. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, there would be no difference between the procession of the Holy Spirit and the generation of the Son, and consequently neither would the Holy Spirit be personally distinct from the Son. Respondeo dicendum quod, si quis recte consideret dicta Graecorum, inveniet quod a nobis magis differunt in verbis quam in sensu. Non enim concedunt Spiritum Sanctum a Filio procedere, vel propter ignorantiam vel proterviam seu calumniam, vel propter quamcumque aliam causam; concedunt tamen Spiritum Sanctum esse Spiritum Filii, et esse a Patre per Filium: quod non posset dici, si processio Spiritus Sancti omnino esset a Filio absoluta. Unde datur intelligi quod etiam ipsi Graeci processionem Spiritus Sancti aliquem ordinem ad Filium habere intelligunt. I answer that if we take careful note of the statements of the Greeks, we shall find that they differ from us more in words than in meaning. Thus, they will not grant that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, either through ignorance, obstinacy or sophistry or some other cause, no matter what, and yet they acknowledge that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son and that he is from the Father through the Son, which would not be true if the procession of the Holy Spirit were entirely independent of the Son. Hence, we may infer that even the Greeks themselves understand that the procession of the Holy Spirit has a certain order as regards the Son. Dico autem, quod si Spiritus Sanctus non sit a Filio, nec aliquo modo Filius sit principium processionis Spiritus Sancti, impossibile est quod Spiritus Sanctus a Filio personaliter distinguatur, et etiam impossibile est quod processio Spiritus Sancti differat a Filii generatione. But I say that, if the Holy Spirit is not from the Son, and if the Son is in no way a principle of the Holy Spirit’s procession, then it is impossible that the Holy Spirit is a person distinct from the Son, and further, that it is impossible for the procession of the Holy Spirit to differ from the generation of the Son. Quod quidem manifestum est, si quis consideret ea ex quibus aliqui divinarum personarum distinctionem manifestant. Loquuntur enim quidam de distinctione personarum secundum relationes; alii vero secundum modos originis; quidam autem per comparationem ad essentialia attributa. This will be evident if we consider those things in reference to which various writers explain the distinction between the divine persons. Thus, some refer the distinction of the persons to the relations; others, to the modes of origin; others, to the essential attributes. Si ergo consideremus modum distinguendi personas per relationes, manifeste apparet quod Spiritus Sanctus personaliter a Filio distingui non potest, si ab eo non procedat: If, then, we consider the mode of distinguishing the persons through the relations, it is evident that the Holy Spirit cannot be personally distinguished from the Son if he does not proceed from him. primo quidem, quia distinctio aliquorum ab invicem non proprie potest esse nisi vel propter divisionem materialem seu quantitativam, vel propter divisionem formalem. First, because things cannot be properly distinct from one another otherwise than either on account of a material or quantitative division or on account of a formal division. Distinctio autem secundum materialem et quantitativam divisionem, invenitur in corporalibus rebus, in quibus eiusdem speciei sunt individua plura ex eo quod forma speciei in diversis partibus materiae secundum quantitatem divisionis invenitur: unde et si aliquod est individuum quod constat ex tota materia, in qua possibile est esse formam speciei, impossibile est quod illius speciei sint individua plura, sicut probat Aristoteles de mundo, in principio caeli et mundi. Hunc autem modum distinctionis omnino oportet a divinis removeri, cum in Deo non sit materia nec quantitas corporalis. Distinctio autem aliquorum habentium unam naturam saltem generis, per divisionem formalem esse non potest nisi ratione alicuius oppositionis. Unde invenimus quod cuiuslibet generis differentiae sunt oppositae. Now, distinction according to material and quantitative division is found in corporeal realities, wherein there are several individuals of the same species by reason of the specific form being found in diverse parts of matter according as it is quantity of the division. Wherefore, if there is an individual consisting of all the matter in which the form of the species is capable of existing, it is impossible that there be more than one individual of that species, as Aristotle proves about the world in On the Heavens 1. Now, this mode of distinction is utterly foreign to God, seeing that in him there is neither matter nor corporeal quantity. But a distinction of things that possess one nature, at least in their genus, cannot exist through a formal division except by reason of some opposition. Whence, we find that the differences of any genus are in opposition to one another. Et ideo in natura divina non potest nec esse nec intelligi aliqua distinctio, cum sit una non solum genere sed numero, nisi per aliquam oppositionem. Unde cum personae distinguantur in divinis, oportet quod hoc sit per aliquam oppositionem relativam, quia alia oppositio in divinis esse non potest: et hoc satis manifeste apparet. Nam quantumcumque aliqua dividantur secundum rationem diversam, sicut essentialia attributa, non distinguunt personas quia ad invicem non opponuntur. Sic etiam plures notiones inveniuntur in una persona divina, propter hoc quod oppositionem ad invicem non habent, sicut in Patre: scilicet innascibilitas, paternitas, et spiratio activa. Ibi enim primo invenitur distinctio ubi primo occurrit oppositio relativa, sicut in hoc quod est esse Patrem et Filium. Ubi ergo non est oppositio relativa in divinis, non potest esse realis distinctio, quae est distinctio personalis. And consequently, it is impossible and even inconceivable that there be any distinction save one of opposition in the divine nature, because it is one not only in genus but also in number. Wherefore, since the divine persons are distinguished from one another, this must be on account of a relative opposition, in that no other opposition is possible in God. This is sufficiently evident, since no matter how much certain things may differ according to a diverse account, for instance, the essential attributes, they do not distinguish the persons, since they are not mutually opposed to one another. Thus again, several notions are found in one divine person for the reason that they are not opposed to one another; for instance, in the Father there are innascibility, paternity, and active spiration. For we first find distinction where first there is relative opposition, for instance, in what it is to be Father and Son. Accordingly, in God, wherever there is no relative opposition, there can be no real distinction, which is a distinction of persons. Si autem Spiritus Sanctus non procedit a Filio, non erit oppositio aliqua inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, et ita non distinguetur personaliter Spiritus Sanctus a Filio. Nec potest dici, quod ad talem distinctionem faciendam sufficiat oppositio affirmationis et negationis; quia talis oppositio sequitur distinctionem, non autem distinctionem causat, cum existens ab altero distinguatur per aliquid sibi inhaerens substantialiter vel accidentaliter; quod autem hoc non sit hoc, sequitur ex hoc quod distincta sunt. Similiter etiam patet quod veritas cuiuslibet negativae in existentibus supra veritatem affirmativae fundatur: sicut veritas huius negativae Aethiops non est albus, fundatur supra veritatem huius affirmativae Aethiops est niger. Et ideo oportet omnem differentiam quae est per oppositionem affirmationis et negationis, reduci in differentiam alicuius affirmativae oppositionis. Unde non potest esse prima distinctionis ratio inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum ex hoc quod Filius est genitus, non spiratus; alius spiratus, non genitus nisi praeintelligatur distinctio inter generationem et spirationem, et inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, per aliquam oppositionem duarum affirmationum. Now, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, there will be no opposition between them, and so the Holy Spirit will not be a distinct person from the Son. Nor can it be said that, for this distinction, opposition of affirmation and negation is enough; for this sort of opposition follows distinction and does not cause distinction, since that which already exists is distinguished from another by something inhering in it either substantially or accidentally, whereas that this is not that is a result of their being distinct. Likewise, it is evident that the truth of a negative statement about things in existence is based on the truth of a positive statement; for example, the truth of this negation, “an Ethiopian is not white” is based on the truth of this affirmation, “an Ethiopian is black.” Wherefore, all differences in respect of affirmation and negation must be reducible to a difference of positive opposition. Consequently, the primary reason for the distinction between the Son and Holy Spirit cannot be that the Son is begotten and not spirated, the other spirated and not begotten, unless we presuppose a distinction between begetting and spirating, and between Son and Holy Spirit, by reason of an opposition between two affirmations. Secundo, quia, secundum Augustinum, in divinis quod dicitur absolute, est commune tribus personis. Unde relinquitur quod divinarum personarum distinctio esse non possit nisi secundum id quod ad aliquid dicitur; haec enim duo praedicamenta sunt in divinis. Prima autem distinctio quae in divinis secundum relationem invenitur, est per haec duo, a quo alius, et qui a nullo. Si autem alterum eorum subdistinguendum est, scilicet quod est ab alio, oportet quod subdistinguatur per ea quae sunt eiusdem rationis. Ut enim Philosophus docet, si quis in subdividendo utatur his quae sunt per accidens et non per se, non rectum divisionis ordinem sequitur; sicut si diceretur: animalium aliud est rationale aliud irrationale; irrationalium vero aliud album, aliud nigrum; non esset recta divisio, quia cum ex his quae sunt per accidens, non fiat unum simpliciter, ultima species, ex differentiis multis constituta, non esset unum simpliciter. Second, because according to Augustine, whatever is said of God absolutely is common to the three persons. Whence it follows that distinction between the divine persons can only be in respect of what is said to be toward-something; for these two categories are in the divine. Now, the primary distinction that is found according to relation in God is through these two things: that from which another one is and that which is from no one. But if one of these should be subdivided, namely, that which is from another, it must be subdivided through things that are of the same account. For as the Philosopher teaches, it does not follow the correct order of subdivision to subdivide a thing in reference to that which is accidental to it and does not belong to it through itself; thus, if one were to say that animals are divided into rational and irrational, and irrational animals are divided into white and black, the division would not be correct, because, since things that are accidental do not combine to make that which is simply one, the ultimate species resulting from many differences would not be one thing, simply speaking. Oportet ergo, si in divinis qui est ab alio distinguatur vel subdividatur, quod hoc sit per differentias eiusdem rationis, ut videlicet eorum quae sunt ab alio, unus eorum ab eorum altero sit; et hoc importat differentia processionum, quae significatur cum dicitur quod unus procedit per generationem, alius per spirationem. Unde Richardus hoc modo distinguit procedentem ab alio, quod unus habeat alium de se procedentem, alius vero non. Accordingly, if in God, he who is from another were to be distinguished or subdivided, this must be in reference to differences of the same account, namely, that one of those who is from another is from the other; and this involves a difference of processions, which is indicated when we say that one proceeds by generation, the other by spiration. Hence, Richard of Saint Victor distinguishes one proceeding from another thus: one has another proceeding from him and one does not. Tertio, quia cum in Patre sint duae relationes, scilicet paternitas et activa spiratio, sola paternitas constituit personam Patris: unde dicitur proprietas sive relatio personalis; spiratio vero activa est relatio personae non personalis, quasi personae iam constitutae superveniens. Ex quo patet quod generatio activa, sive paternitas, secundum ordinem intelligendi, praesupponitur ad spirationem. Oportet ergo quod similiter filiatio, quae paternitati per oppositionem respondet, secundum aliquem ordinem praesupponatur ad spirationem passivam, quae est processio Spiritus Sancti. Aut ergo ita quod spiratio passiva intelligatur supervenire filiationi in eadem persona, sicut spiratio activa paternitati: et sic erit in eadem persona spirati et nati, sicut generantis et spirantis; aut oportet quod aliquem alium ordinem habeat filiatio ad spirationem passivam. Non est autem ordo in divinis nisi naturae, secundum quod aliquis est ab aliquo, ut dicit Augustinus. Unde relinquitur quod vel sit una persona Filii et Spiritus Sancti spirati, vel quod Spiritus Sanctus sit a Filio. Third, although in the Father there are two relations, paternity and active spiration, only the paternity constitutes the person of the Father; this is why it is called a “personal property” or “relation,” whereas active spiration is not the person’s personal relation, as though supervening on the already constituted person. Hence, it is plain that the active generation, that is, the paternity, is presupposed, according to the order of understanding, to active spiration. Consequently, in like manner the filiation, which corresponds to paternity as its opposite, must in some order be presupposed by passive spiration, which is the procession of the Holy Spirit. This is, then, either such that passive spiration is understood as supervening on the filiation in the same person, just as active spiration supervenes on the paternity, and thus, the same person will be spirated and born, just as the same person begets and spirates; or there must be some other order between filiation and passive spiration. But there is no order in God other than that of nature, in respect of which one is from another, as Augustine says. It follows, then, that either the Son and the Holy Spirit are one person or the Holy Spirit is from the Son. Si quis autem distinctionem divinarum personarum per ipsam originem consideret, non per relationes originis, idem sequitur; sicut ex his quae dicentur apparebit. Moreover, we shall come to the same conclusion if we consider the distinction of the divine persons in reference to their very origin but not to their relations of origin. This will be evident for the following reasons. Primo quidem, quia si quis proprietatem divinae naturae consideret, impossibile est in Deo esse pluralitatem personarum nisi per hoc quod una ab alia oriatur, nullo autem modo per hoc quod duae oriuntur ab una. First, if we consider what is proper to the divine nature, we shall see it is impossible that there be a plurality of divine persons unless through one originating from another, but in no way through two originating from one. Quod patet, si quis consideret qualiter in diversis rebus distinctio invenitur. In rebus enim materialibus, in quibus possibile est fieri multiplicationem per divisionem materiae et quantitatis, ut dictum est, possibile est duo individua unius speciei ex aequo se habere, sicut et duae partes quantitatis ex aequo se habent; ubi autem invenitur prima differentia secundum formam, ibi impossibile est quod aliquo duo se habeant ex aequo. Ut enim Philosophus dicit, formae rerum sunt sicut numeri, in quibus variantur species per unitatis additionem vel subtractionem: et formales rerum differentiae consistunt in quodam perfectionis ordine. Nam planta specie differt a lapide in hoc quod superaddit vitam; animal vero brutum a planta in hoc quod superaddit sensum: homo vero a bruto in hoc quod superaddit rationem. Et ideo in rebus immaterialibus, in quibus non potest esse multiplicatio secundum divisionem materiae, impossibile est quod sit pluralitas nisi cum ordine quodam. In substantiis quidem immaterialibus creatis est ordo perfectionis, secundum quod unus angelus est perfectioris naturae quam alius. Et quia quidam philosophi crediderunt quod omnis natura imperfecta crearetur a perfectiori, ideo dixerunt quod in substantiis separatis non potest esse multiplicatio nisi per causam et causatum: quod tamen recta fides non tenet, quia credimus, ex ordine divinae sapientiae, differentes ordines substantiarum immaterialium productos esse. This is made plain if we observe how distinction is found in diverse realities. For in the material realities, wherein, as stated above, it is possible for things to be multiplied by a division of matter and quantity, two individuals of the same species can be on an equal footing, just as two parts of a quantity may be equal. But where the primary difference is found to be according to form, it is impossible for two individuals to be on equal footing. For as the Philosopher says, the forms of things are like numbers, in which the species vary by the addition or subtraction of the unit, and the formal differences of things consist in a certain order of perfection. For the species of the plant differs from that of the stone in that it has life in addition, and the species of the brute animal from that of the plant in that it has sensation in addition, and man differs from the brute in that he adds reason. Wherefore, in immaterial realities, which cannot be multiplied by a division of matter, there cannot be plurality without some order. Indeed, in created immaterial substances, there is an order of perfection, insofar as one angel is of a more perfect nature than another. And because some philosophers thought that every imperfect nature is created by a more perfect one, they therefore contended that in separated substances there cannot be multiplication otherwise than by reason of cause and effect. The true faith, however, does not hold this, since we believe that the various orders of immaterial substances were brought into existence from the order of divine wisdom. Cum autem in divinis non possit esse ordo perfectionis, ut Ariani posuerunt—dicentes Patrem Filio esse maiorem, et utrumque Spiritu Sancto—relinquitur quod pluralitas in divinis personis esse non potest nec intelligi nisi secundum ordinem originis solum, ut scilicet Filius sit a Patre, et Spiritus Sanctus a Filio. Si enim Spiritus Sanctus non esset a Filio, ex aequo respiceret Patrem quantum ad originem; unde vel non essent duae personae; vel esset ordo inter eos perfectionis secundum Arianos; vel esset inter eos materialis divisio; quod est impossibile. Et hanc rationem sequens Hilarius dicit, quod ponere in divinis duos ingenitos, id est non ab aliquo existentes, est ponere duos Deos; quia si non sit multiplicatio per originis ordinem, oportet quod sit per ordinem naturarum. Et ideo eadem est ratio, si inter Filium et Spiritum Sanctum originis ordo non ponatur. But since there cannot be order of perfection in God, as the Arians contended, saying that the Father is greater than the Son and each of them greater than the Holy Spirit, we must conclude that plurality in the divine persons cannot even be conceived otherwise than according to the sole order of origin, such that, namely, the Son is from the Father and the Holy Spirit from the Son. For if the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, then he would be related to the Father in an equal way in point of origin. Wherefore, either they would not be two persons, or there would be an order of perfection between them (as the Arians pretended), or there would be a material division between them (which is impossible). Hilary follows this line of argument when he says that to assert that in God there are two who are unbegotten, that is, who are not existing from another, is to posit two Gods; for if multiplication is not by the order of origin, it must be by the order of nature. And the same argument avails if we do not acknowledge an order of origin between the Son and Holy Spirit. Secundo, quia quod procedit ab uno naturaliter, oportet esse unum: natura enim semper ad unum se habet; sed quae procedunt ab aliquo per voluntatem operantem, possunt esse plura, licet sint ab uno: sicut ab uno Deo diversae creaturae processerunt secundum voluntatem ipsius. Constat autem quod Filius procedit a Patre naturaliter et non per voluntatem, ut Ariani dixerunt; et hoc ideo quia Hilarius dicit: quod naturaliter procedit ab aliquo, est tale quale est ipsum a quo procedit; quod autem procedit ab aliquo secundum voluntatem agentem, non est tale quale est illud a quo procedit, sed quale vult esse illud. Filius autem talis est qualis est Pater; creaturae vero sunt tales quales Deus voluit eas esse. Unde Filius est a Patre naturaliter, creaturae autem ab eo per voluntatem. Similiter autem et Spiritus Sanctus talis est qualis est Pater; non enim est creatura, ut Arius et Macedonius dixerunt. Unde oportet quod naturaliter a Patre procedat; propter quod dicitur ab Athanasio et aliis sanctis esse naturalis Spiritus Patris et Filii. Impossibile est ergo quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus procedant a Patre nisi hoc modo quod a solo Patre procedit unus solus, scilicet Filius; et a Patre et Filio, in quantum unum sunt, unus Spiritus Sanctus. Second, because that which proceeds naturally from one thing must itself be one; for nature is always oriented to one effect, whereas things that proceed from something through an acting will can be many even though they proceed from one; for example, from one God a diversity of creatures proceeded according to his will. Now, it is certain that the Son proceeds from the Father naturally and not through his will (as the Arians maintained); and this is because, as Hilary says, that which proceeds from its source naturally is of the same nature as its source, but that which proceeds according to an acting will is not of the same nature as he from whom it proceeds, but such as he wishes it to be. Now, the Son is such as the Father, while creatures are such as God wished them to be. Hence, the Son is from the Father naturally, and creatures are from him according to his will. In like manner, the Holy Spirit is such as the Father, for he is not a creature (as Arius and Macedonius asserted). Wherefore, he must proceed from the Father naturally, for which reason he is said, by Athanasius and other holy men, to be the natural Spirit of the Father and the Son. Consequently, it is impossible that the Son and Holy Spirit proceed from the Father except in such wise that from the Father alone proceeds one alone, namely, the Son, and from the Father and Son, inasmuch as they are one, proceeds one Holy Spirit. Tertio, quia, sicut Richardus probat, impossibile est quod in divinis sit mediata processio. Cum enim quaelibet divina persona sit in alia, oportet quod quaelibet divina persona immediate ad aliam ordinetur. Si autem Filius et Spiritus Sanctus essent a Patre absque hoc quod Spiritus Sanctus esset a Filio, Spiritus Sancti ad Filium non esset immediatus ordo: non enim ordinaretur ad invicem nisi mediante uno a quo existerent, sicut duo fratres ab uno patre geniti. Unde impossibile est quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus hoc modo sint a Patre, sicut duae personae distinctae, quod unus eorum non sit ab alio. Third, because as Richard proves, there cannot be a mediated procession in God. For because each divine person is within the other, each must be ordered immediately to the other. But if the Son and Holy Spirit were from the Father without the Holy Spirit being from the Son, there would not be an immediate order of the Holy Spirit to the Son, since they would not be ordered to each other except through the one from whom they exist, like two brothers begotten of one father. Hence, it is impossible that the Son and the Holy Spirit are from the Father in this way: as two distinct persons, such that one of them is not from the other. Si vero aliquis consideret distinctionem personarum per ordinem ad attributa essentialia, patet etiam quod idem sequitur. Again, if we consider the distinction of the persons through an order to the essential attributes, we shall come to the same conclusion. Primo quidem, quia secundum hoc dicitur, quod Filius procedit per modum naturae, Spiritus autem Sanctus per modum voluntatis. Nam semper processio naturae est principium et origo cuiuslibet alterius processionis; omnia enim quae per artem et voluntatem vel intellectum fiunt, procedunt ab his quae secundum naturam sunt. Et ideo Richardus dicit, quod inter omnes procedendi modos constat primum locum tenere et ceteris principaliorem esse illum modum procedendi qui est Filii a Patre. Nam nisi iste praecesserit, ceterorum nullus existendi locum habebit omnino. First, because in this respect we say that the Son proceeds through the mode of nature and the Holy Spirit through the mode of will. For the procession of nature is always the principle and origin of every other procession; for all things that occur through art and the will or the intellect proceed from things that are according to nature. Hence, Richard says that it is certain that, of all modes of procession, the first and chief place belongs to the mode of proceeding that belongs to the Son from the Father. For unless the Father had preceded, neither of the other persons would have had any foundation for his existence. Secundo manifestum est si dicatur, quod Filius procedit processione intellectuali ut Verbum, Spiritus autem Sanctus processione voluntatis ut Amor. Non enim potest esse nec intelligi quod amor sit alicuius quod non est in intellectu praeconceptum: unde quilibet amor est ab aliquo verbo, loquendo de amore in intellectuali natura. Second, this is evident if we realize that the Son proceeds by an intellectual procession as the Word, and the Holy Spirit by a procession of the will as Love. For it is both impossible and inconceivable that an object can be loved that has not first been understood by the intellect; wherefore, when speaking of love in an intellectual nature, all love proceeds from some word. Tertio idem apparet, si Spiritum Sanctum dicamus esse vivificum quoddam spiramen divinitatis, ut dicit Athanasius. Omnis enim motus et actio vitae ordinatur per intellectum, nisi ex imperfectione naturae contrarium accidat. Third, it is evident, if we say with Athanasius that the Holy Spirit is the life-giving breath of divinity. For every vital movement and action is directed by understanding, unless the contrary occur on account of an imperfection of nature. Unde ex omnibus supradictis datur intelligi, quod nec Spiritus Sanctus esset alius a Filio si ab eo non procederet, nec spiratio esset aliud a generatione. Hence, from all that has been said we infer that the Holy Spirit would not be a person distinct from the Son if he did not proceed from him, nor would spiration be distinct from generation. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod Spiritus Sanctus distinguitur substantialiter a Filio in hoc quod origo unius differt ab origine alterius; sed ipsa differentia originis est per hoc quod Filius est a Patre solo, Spiritus autem Sanctus a Patre et Filio. Quod patet per Richardum de sancto Victore qui in II de Trin. dicit: notandum quod huiusmodi differentia proprietatum in solo constitit numero producentium; nam prima earum habet esse a nulla alia, altera ab una sola, tertia vero a gemina. Reply Obj. 1: The Holy Spirit is substantially distinguished from the Son in that the origin of the one differs from the origin of the other; but this very difference of origin is due to the Son’s being from the Father alone, whereas the Holy Spirit is from both the Father and the Son. Richard of Saint Victor makes this plain in On the Trinity 2, when he says: observe that this difference of properties consists merely in the number of persons producing, for the first has being from no other, the second from one only, the third from two. Ad secundum dicendum, quod id quod dicit Anselmus, quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus per hoc solum ad invicem distinguuntur quod diverso modo procedunt, est omnino verum; sed, sicut ostensum est, diverso modo procedere non possent, nisi Spiritus Sanctus a Filio esset; unde remoto quod Spiritus Sanctus non sit a Filio, omnino distinctio Spiritus Sancti removetur a Filio. Est autem intentio Anselmi prius ponere ea in quibus nos convenimus cum negantibus Spiritum Sanctum a Filio esse, qui tamen Spiritum Sanctum a Filio dicunt distingui. Unde verba praedicta Anselmi inducta sunt magis ut disputativa suppositio quam veritatis definitio. Reply Obj. 2: Anselm is quite correct in saying that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct from each other by this alone: that they proceed in different ways, but as we have already shown, they cannot proceed in different ways unless the Holy Spirit were to proceed from the Son. Wherefore, if it be denied that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, it must likewise be denied that he is distinct from the Son. However, it is Anselm’s intention first to indicate the points in which we agree with those who deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son and yet assert that he is a distinct person from him. Wherefore, the words quoted from Anselm are in the nature of an argumentative hypothesis rather than a statement of the truth. Ad tertium dicendum, quod bene sequitur si sunt duo modi originis in divinis, quod sunt duae personae procedentes; sed duo modi originis esse non possunt nisi per hoc quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Filio, ut ostensum est. Reply Obj. 3: If there are two modes of origin in God, it is right to infer that there are two persons who proceed, but, as we have shown, there cannot be two modes of origin except by reason of the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Son. Et similiter dicendum ad quartum. Reply Obj. 4: The same answer applies to the fourth objection. Ad quintum dicendum, quod non oportet quod tot sint personae subsistentes in divinis, quot sunt relationes: nam in una persona Patris sunt duae relationes, scilicet paternitas, per quam refertur ad Filium, et communis spiratio, per quam refertur ad Spiritum Sanctum: paternitatis enim relatio constituit personam subsistentem; sed relatio communis spirationis non est proprietas personam constituens, sed relatio personae subsistenti inhaerens. Unde non sequitur, si ex generatione et processione consequuntur duae relationes, quod propter hoc sint tantum duae personae subsistentes. Potest etiam responderi, quod non sunt duae processiones nisi unus procedentium sit ab alio, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 5: There need not be as many subsistent persons in God as there are relations, since in the one person of the Father there are two relations, namely, paternity, whereby he is referred to the Son, and common spiration, whereby he is referred to the Holy Spirit. For the relation of paternity constitutes a subsistent person, whereas the relation of common spiration is not a property constituting a person but a relation inherent to a subsistent person. Thus, if two relations result from generation and procession, it does not follow that therefore there are only two subsistent persons. And one might further reply that there are not two processions unless one of the proceeding persons is from the other, as we have already stated. Et per hoc patet solutio ad sextum. Reply Obj. 6: From this may be gathered the reply to the sixth objection. Ad septimum dicendum, quod illud quod procedit per modum amoris, oportet quod procedat ab eo quod procedit per modum naturae, ut ex dictis patet. Reply Obj. 7: As already explained, that which proceeds through the mode of love must proceed from that which proceeds through the mode of nature. Ad octavum dicendum, quod spiratio distinguit Spiritum Sanctum a spirante, sicut generatio generatum a generante; non tamen ex hoc sequitur quod spiratus a generato distinguatur, cum et spirans et generans sint idem. Nec propter hoc quod idem non potest duabus processionibus diversis procedere: sed processiones in divinis non possunt esse diversae, nisi per hoc quod unus procedentium est ab alio, ut ostensum est. Reply Obj. 8: Spiration distinguishes the Holy Spirit from the spirator, just as generation distinguishes the begotten from the begetter; nonetheless it does not follow that the spirated is distinct from the begotten, since both spirator and begetter are the same person. Nor does it follow from the fact that the same thing cannot proceed by two diverse processions; rather, processions in God cannot differ except by reason of one proceeding person being from another, as proved above. Ad nonum dicendum, quod Spiritus Sanctus ita perfecte est a Patre, sicut a Patre et Filio; non tamen propter hoc quod est a Patre, a Filio distinguitur, sed propter hoc quod est a Filio. Reply Obj. 9: The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as perfectly as from the Father and Son; yet he is distinct from the Son not because he proceeds from the Father but because he proceeds from the Son. Ad decimum dicendum, quod Pater est sufficiens principium Spiritus Sancti, nec indiget alio principio ad spirationem Spiritus Sancti; Filius enim non est aliud principium Spiritus Sancti a Patre, sed unum principium cum ipso. Reply Obj. 10: The Father is the sufficient principle of the Holy Spirit, nor does he need another principle for the Holy Spirit’s spiration; for in spirating the Holy Spirit, the Son is not a distinct principle from the Father but is one principle with him. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod licet processio sit prius per intellectum quam communio, sicut commune quam proprium, tamen talis processio—scilicet Spiritus Sancti, qui procedit quasi amor et communio et nexus Patris et Filii—non est prius secundum intellectum quam communio. Unde non oportet quod, remota communione, remaneat processio; sicut animal est prius secundum rationem quam homo, non autem animal rationale. Reply Obj. 11: Although procession is prior in understanding to communion, as the common is prior to the proper, nevertheless in this particular kind of procession—namely, that of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as love, communion, and bond of the Father and the Son—is not prior in understanding to communion. Wherefore, it does not follow that if we remove communion, procession remains. Thus, animal is prior to man in understanding, whereas rational animal is not. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod eaedem secundum rem in divinis sunt proprietates et relationes et notiones; nisi quod proprietates sunt solum tres, scilicet paternitas, filiatio et processio. Relationes autem sunt quatuor, addita praedictis proprietatibus tribus communi spiratione, quae relatio quidem est, non tamen proprietas, quia non uni personae convenit, sed duabus. Notiones vero sunt quinque, addita innascibilitate; quae non est relatio, sed notio, quia per eam Pater innotescit; est etiam proprietas, quia convenit soli Patri; non tamen proprietas personalis, quia non constituit personam Patris. Reply Obj. 12: In God, the properties, relations, and notions are the same according to their reality, except that there are only three properties (namely, paternity, filiation, and procession) whereas there are four relations, common spiration being added to the three aforesaid relations; for it is a relation but not a property, inasmuch as it belongs not to one person but to two. And there are five notions, since they include innascibility, which is not a relation but a notion, inasmuch as by it the Father is made known; it is also a property, since it belongs to the Father alone, but not a personal property, since it does not constitute the person of the Father.