Articulus 14 Article 14 Utrum id quod est a Deo diversum in essentia, possit semper fuisse Whether it is possible for that which differs essentially from God to have existed always Decimoquarto quaeritur utrum id quod est a Deo diversum in essentia, possit semper fuisse. The fourteenth point of inquiry is whether it is possible for that which differs essentially from God to have existed always. Et videtur quod sic. Non enim est minor potestas causae producentis totam rei substantiam super effectum suum, quam causae producentis formam tantum. Sed causa producens formam tantum, potest producere eam ab aeterno, si ab aeterno esset; quia splendor qui gignitur ab igne atque diffunditur coaeternus est illi; et esset coaeternus, si ignis esset aeternus, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo multo fortius Deus, potest producere effectum sibi coaeternum. Obj. 1: And it would seem possible. For the cause that produces the whole substance of a thing has not less power over its effect than the cause that produces the form alone. Now, if the cause that produces the form alone is eternal, it can produce it from eternity; thus, the brilliance produced and diffused by fire is coexistent with it and would be coeternal if the fire were eternal, according to Augustine. Much more reason then is there why God, who produces the whole substance of a thing, should be able to produce a coeternal effect. Sed dices, quod hoc est impossibile; quia sequitur inconveniens, scilicet quod creatura parificetur creatori in duratione. Obj. 2: It will be said perhaps that this is incongruous because it would make a creature equal to the Creator in duration. Sed contra, duratio quae non est tota simul, sed successiva, non potest aequiparari durationi quae est tota simul. Sed si mundus semper fuisset, eius duratio non semper tota simul esset; quia tempore mensuraretur, ut etiam Boetius dicit in fine de Consol. Ergo adhuc Deo non aequipararetur creatura in duratione. On the contrary, a duration that is not wholly simultaneous but successive cannot be equal to one that is wholly simultaneous. Now, if the world had always been, its duration would not have been wholly simultaneous, since it would have been measured by time according to Boethius in The Consolation of Philosophy. Therefore, a creature would not be equal to God in duration. Praeterea, sicut divina persona procedit a Deo sine motu, ita et creatura. Sed divina persona potest esse Deo coaeterna, a quo procedit. Ergo similiter et creatura. Obj. 3: As a divine person proceeds from God without movement, so does a creature. Now, a divine person can be coeternal with God, from whom he proceeds. Therefore, a creature can be likewise. Praeterea, quod semper eodem modo se habet, semper potest idem facere. Sed Deus semper eodem modo se habet ab aeterno. Ergo ab aeterno potest idem facere. Si ergo aliquando produxit creaturam et ab aeterno producere potuit. Obj. 4: That which always is in the same state can always do the same thing. Now, God is in the same state from eternity. Therefore, from eternity he can do the same thing, and consequently, if he has produced a creature at any time, he could do so from eternity. Sed dices, quod ratio ista procedit de agente per naturam, non autem de agente per voluntatem. Obj. 5: You will say that the above argument applies to one acting by nature but not to one acting by will. —Contra, voluntas Dei non dirimit virtutem ipsius. Sed si non ageret per voluntatem, sequeretur quod ab aeterno creaturam produxisset. Ergo posito quod per voluntatem agat, non removetur quia ab aeterno producere potuerit. On the contrary, God’s power is not nullified by his will. Now, if he did not act by his will it would follow that he produced the creature from eternity. Therefore, even given that he works by his will, it does not remove the possibility of his having created from eternity. Praeterea, si Deus in aliquo tempore vel instanti creaturam produxit, et eius potentia non est augmentata; potuit etiam ante illud tempus vel instans creaturam producere; et eadem ratione ante illud, et sic in infinitum. Ergo potuit ab aeterno producere. Obj. 6: If God produced a creature at a certain time or instant, and if his power does not increase, he could also have produced the creature at a previous time or instant, and for the same reason, before that, and so on, to infinity. Therefore, he could have produced it from eternity. Praeterea, plus potest facere Deus quam humanus intellectus possit intelligere; propter quod dicitur Luc. I, 37: non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum. Sed Platonici intellexerunt aliquid esse factum a Deo, quod tamen semper fuit; unde Augustinus dicit: de mundo, et de his quos in mundo deos a Deo factos, scribit Plato, apertissime dicit eos esse coepisse, et habere initium; finem tamen non habituros, sed per conditoris potentissimam voluntatem perhibet in aeternum esse mansuros. Verum id quomodo intelligat, Platonici invenerunt, non esse hoc, videlicet temporis, sed institutionis initium. Sicut enim, inquiunt, si pes ab aeternitate fuisset in pulvere, semper subesset vestigium: quod tamen a calcante factum nemo dubitaret: sic mundus semper fuit semper existente qui fecit; et tamen factus est. Ergo Deus potuit facere aliquid quod semper fuit. Obj. 7: God can do more than the human intellect can understand; therefore, it is said: no word shall be impossible with God (Luke 1:37). Now, the Platonists understood God to have made something that had always existed. Thus, Augustine says: Plato, writing about the world and of the gods made by God in the world, asserts most explicitly that they came into existence and had a beginning; yet they will not have an end, and he states that through the all-powerful will of their maker they will live forever. In explaining, however, what he meant by ‘beginning,’ the Platonists affirm that he meant the beginning not of time but of their formation. For, they say, even as if a foot had pressed on the dust from eternity, there would always have been the footprint underneath, which no one would doubt to have been made by the walker, so the world always existed and he who made it always existed, and yet it was made. Therefore, God could make something that always was. Praeterea, quidquid non est contra rationem creaturae, Deus potest in creatura facere; alias non esset omnipotens. Sed semper fuisse non est contra rationem creaturae in quantum est facta; alias idem esset dicere creaturam semper fuisse et factam non esse; quod patet esse falsum. Nam Augustinus, distinguit duas opiniones; quarum una est quod mundus ita fuerit semper quod non sit a Deo factus; alia est, quod ita mundus sit semper quod tamen a Deo sit factus. Ergo Deus hoc potest facere, quod aliquid ab eo factum, sit semper. Obj. 8: God can do in a creature whatever is not inconsistent with the account of a created thing; otherwise he would not be omnipotent. Now, it is not inconsistent with the account of a created thing, considered as made, that it should always have existed; otherwise, to say that creatures always existed would be the same as to say that they were not made, which is clearly false. For Augustine distinguishes two opinions, one asserting that the world always existed in such wise that it was not made by God, the other stating that the world always was and that nevertheless God made it. Therefore, God can do this such that something made by him should always have been. Praeterea, sicut natura statim potest producere effectum suum, ita et agens voluntarium non impeditum. Sed Deus est agens voluntarium quod impediri non potest. Ergo creaturae quae per eius voluntatem producuntur in esse, ab aeterno produci potuerunt, sicut et Filius qui naturaliter a Patre procedit. Obj. 9: Just as nature can produce its effect immediately, so also can a voluntary agent if unhindered. Now, God is a voluntary agent that cannot be hindered. Therefore, the creatures brought into being by his will could be produced from eternity, as with the Son, who proceeds from the Father naturally. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, quia omnino incommutabilis est illa natura Trinitatis, ob hoc ita est aeterna, ut ei aliquid coaeternum esse non possit. On the contrary (1), Augustine says: seeing that the nature of the Trinity is altogether incommunicable, it is so exclusively eternal that nothing can be coeternal with it. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in I libro: quod ex non ente ad esse deducitur, non est aptum natum esse coaeternum ei quod sine principio et semper est. Sed creatura de non esse ad esse producitur. Ergo non potest fuisse semper. Furthermore (2), Damascene says: that which is brought into being from non-being by its very nature is incapable of being coeternal with one who has no beginning and is eternal. Now, the creature is brought from non-being into being. Therefore, it cannot have always existed. Praeterea, omne aeternum est invariabile. Sed creatura non potest esse invariabilis; quia si sibi relinqueretur, in nihilum decideret. Ergo non potest esse aeterna. Furthermore (3), whatsoever is eternal is unchangeable. But a creature cannot be unchangeable, because were it left to itself, it would fall back into nothingness. Therefore, it cannot be eternal. Praeterea, nihil quod dependet ab alio est necessarium, et per consequens nec aeternum; cum omne aeternum sit necessarium. Sed omne quod est factum, dependet ab alio. Ergo nullum factum potest esse aeternum. Furthermore (4), nothing that depends on another is necessary, nor consequently eternal, since all that is eternal is necessary. Now, that which is made depends on another. Therefore, nothing made can be eternal. Praeterea, si Deus ab aeterno producere potuit creaturam, ab aeterno produxit; quia, secundum Philosophum, in sempiternis non differt esse et posse. Sed ponere creaturam ab aeterno fuisse productam, est contra fidem. Ergo et ponere quod produci potuerit. Furthermore (5), if God could make a creature from eternity, he did produce it from eternity; for according to the Philosopher, in eternal things there is no difference between what can be and what is. Now, it is against faith to say that creatures were made from eternity. Therefore, it is also against faith to say that they could be. Praeterea, voluntas sapientis non differt facere quod intendit, si potest, nisi propter aliquam rationem. Sed non potest reddi ratio quare Deus tunc mundum fecerit et non prius, vel ab aeterno, si ab aeterno fieri potuit. Ergo videtur quod ab aeterno fieri non potuit. Furthermore (6), a wise man’s will does not delay to do what he intends, if he can, unless for some reason. But no reason can be given why God made the world then and not before or from eternity, if it could be made from eternity. Therefore, seemingly it could not. Praeterea, si creatura est facta, aut ex nihilo, aut ex aliquo. Sed non ex aliquo: quia vel ex aliquo quod est divina essentia, quod est impossibile; vel ex aliquo alio: quod si non esset factum, erit aliquid praeter Deum, non ab ipso creatum; quod supra est improbatum: quod si est factum ex alio, aut procedetur in infinitum, quod est impossibile; aut devenietur ad aliquid quod est factum de nihilo. Impossibile autem est, quod fit ex nihilo, semper fuisse. Ergo impossibile est creaturam semper fuisse. Furthermore (7), if creatures were made, they were made either from nothing or from something. They were not made from something, since this would either be part of the divine essence (which is impossible) or it would be something else, and if this were not made, there would be something besides God not made by him, and this has been proved to be false, and if it too were made from something else, we should either go infinity (which is impossible), or we should come to something made from nothing. Now, it is impossible for that which is made from nothing to have always been. Therefore, it is impossible for a creature to have always existed. Praeterea, de ratione aeterni est non habere principium, de ratione vero creaturae est habere principium. Ergo nulla creatura potest esse aeterna. Furthermore (8), it belongs to the account of the eternal not to have a beginning, while it belongs to the account of a creature to have a beginning. Therefore, no creature can be eternal. Praeterea, creatura mensuratur tempore vel aevo. Sed aevum et tempus differunt ab aeternitate. Ergo creatura non potest esse aeterna. Furthermore (9), a creature is measured either by time or by aeviternity. But time and aeviternity differ from eternity. Therefore, a creature cannot be eternal. Praeterea, si aliquid est creatum, oportet dare aliquod instans in quo creatum fuerit. Sed ante id non fuit. Ergo oportet dicere creaturam non semper fuisse. Furthermore (10), if a thing be created, it must be possible to assign an instant wherein it was created. Now, before that instant it did not exist. Therefore, we must conclude that creatures did not always exist. Respondeo dicendum quod secundum Philosophum, possibile dicitur quandoque quidem secundum aliquam potentiam, quandoque, vero secundum nullam potentiam; secundum potentiam quidem vel activam, vel passivam. Secundum activam quidem, ut si dicamus possibile esse aedificatori quod aedificet; secundum passivam vero, ut si dicamus, possibile esse ligno quod comburatur. I answer that according to the Philosopher, a thing is called “possible” sometimes in reference to a power, sometimes in reference to no power. If in reference to a power, this power may be active or passive: in reference to an active power, as when we say that it is possible for a builder to build; in reference to a passive power, as when we say that it is possible for the wood to burn. Dicitur autem et quandoque aliquid possibile, non secundum aliquam potentiam, sed vel metaphorice, sicut in geometricis dicitur aliqua linea potentia rationalis, quod praetermittatur ad praesens; vel absolute, quando scilicet termini enuntiationis nullam ad invicem repugnantiam habent. Sometimes, however, a thing is said to be possible not in reference to a power but either metaphorically, as in geometry a line is said to be potentially rational (which we may pass over for the present), or absolutely, that is, when the terms of a proposition are in no way mutually contradictory, whereas we have the impossible when they exclude each other. E contrario vero impossibile, quando sibi invicem repugnant; ut simul esse affirmationem et negationem impossibile dicitur, non quia sit impossibile alicui agenti vel patienti, sed quia est secundum se impossibile, utpote sibi ipsi repugnans. Thus, the impossible is spoken of in a converse way, when they do exclude each other; for example, simultaneous affirmation and negation is said to be impossible, not in reference to an agent or patient, but because it is impossible in itself, as being repugnant to its very self. Si ergo consideretur hoc enuntiabile, aliquid diversum in substantia existens a Deo fuisse semper, non potest dici impossibile secundum se, quasi sibi ipsi repugnans: hoc enim quod est esse ab alio, non repugnat ei quod est esse semper, ut supra ostensum est; nisi quando aliquid ab alio procedit per motum, quod non intervenit in processu rerum a Deo. Per hoc autem quod additur, diversum in substantia, similiter nulla repugnantia absolute loquendo datur intelligi ad id quod est semper fuisse. If, then, we consider the statement that something substantially distinct from God has always existed, it cannot be described as impossible in itself as though it were repugnant to its very self; for to be from another is not repugnant with always existing, as we have proved above, except when the one proceeds from the other by movement, of which there can be no question in the procession of things from God. And when we add substantially distinct, this again involves no repugnance, absolutely speaking, with having always existed. Si autem accipiamus possibile dictum secundum potentiam activam, tunc in Deo non deest potentia ab aeterno essentiam aliam a se producendi. However, if we take the possible spoken of in reference to an active power, then God does not lack the power to produce from eternity an essence distinct from himself. Si vero hoc ad potentiam passivam referatur, sic, supposita Catholicae fidei veritate, dici non potest, quod aliquid a Deo procedens in essentia diversum, potuerit semper esse. Supponit enim fides Catholica omne id quod est praeter Deum, aliquando non fuisse. Sicut autem impossibile est, quod ponitur aliquando fuisse, nunquam fuisse: ita impossibile est, quod ponitur aliquando non fuisse, semper fuisse. Unde et dicitur a quibusdam quod hoc quidem est possibile ex parte Dei creantis, non autem ex parte essentiae a Deo procedentis, per suppositionem contrarii, quam fides facit. On the other hand, if we refer to a passive power, then given the truth of the Catholic faith, it cannot be said that something essentially distinct from God can proceed from him and yet have always existed. For the Catholic faith supposes that all things other than God at some time did not exist. Now, as it is impossible for a thing never to have existed, if it be granted that at some time it has been, so is it impossible for a thing to have always existed, if it be granted that at some time it did not exist. Therefore, some say that this is possible on the part of God creating, but not on the part of an essence proceeding from God, because our faith teaches the contrary. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio illa procedit ex parte potentiae facientis, non autem ex parte facti, de quo facta sit suppositio aliquando non fuisse. Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers the question from the point of view of the power of the maker, but not from that of the thing made, which is supposed not to have existed at some time. Ad secundum dicendum, quod etiam si creatura semper fuisset, non simpliciter Deo aequipararetur, sed secundum quod eum imitaretur; quod non est inconveniens; unde illa obviatio parum est efficax. Reply Obj. 2: Even if creatures had always existed they would not be equal to God simply speaking, but insofar as they imitate him. There is nothing unreasonable in this, and so the objection has but little force. Ad tertium dicendum, quod in persona divina non est aliquid quod supponatur aliquando non fuisse, sicut est in omni essentia aliena a Deo. Reply Obj. 3: In the divine person, there is nothing that is supposed not to have existed at some time, as there is in every essence other than God. Ad quartum dicendum, quod obiectio procedit ex parte potentiae facientis; quae nec etiam per voluntatem diminuitur, nisi quatenus ex arbitrio voluntatis divinae fuit quod non semper fuerit creatura. Reply Obj. 4: This argument considers the power of the maker, which indeed is not diminished by his will except insofar as it was by the decree of the divine will that creatures did not always exist. Unde patet responsio ad quintum. Reply Obj. 5: This suffices for the reply to the fifth objection. Ad sextum dicendum, quod si ponatur ante quodcumque tempus datum creaturam fuisse, salvatur positio fidei, qua ponitur nihil praeter Deum semper fuisse; non tamen salvatur, si ponatur eam semper fuisse; unde non est simile. Sciendum etiam, quod forma arguendi non valet. Potest enim Deus quamlibet creaturam facere meliorem, non tamen potest facere infinitae bonitatis creaturam; infinita enim bonitas rationi creaturae repugnat, non autem determinata bonitas quantacumque. Reply Obj. 6: If it be stated that creatures existed before any given time, the position of the faith is safeguarded because it is stated that nothing except God existed always, but it is not safeguarded if we say that creatures have always existed; hence, the comparison fails. It must also be noted that the argument is lacking in form. For God is able to make any creature better, yet he cannot make a creature of infinite goodness, because infinite goodness is incompatible with the account of being created, whereas determinate goodness is not, however great it be.