Praeterea, illud quod est semper in principio et in fine sui nunquam incipit nec desinit: quia unaquaeque res est post sui principium et ante sui finem. Sed tempus semper est in sui principio et in sui fine; nihil enim est temporis nisi instans, quod est finis praeteriti et principium futuri. Ergo tempus nunquam incipit nec desinit, sed semper est; et per consequens motus semper, et mobile semper, et totus mundus; tempus enim non est sine motu, nec motus sine mobili, nec mobile sine mundo. Obj. 15: That which exists always in its beginning and always in its end never begins and never ceases, because each thing exists after its own beginning and before its own end. Now, time exists always in its beginning and end; for nothing of time exists except the instant, which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore, time never begins nor ends but exists always; and consequently, movement always exists as well, and the mobile, and even, the whole world, since there is no time without movement, nor movement without the mobile, nor the mobile without a world. Sed dicendum, quod primum instans temporis non est finis praeteriti, nec ultimum principium futuri. Obj. 16: It will be said perhaps that the first instant of time is not the end of a past nor the last beginning of the future. Sed contra, nunc temporis semper consideratur ut fluens, et in hoc differt a nunc aeternitatis. Sed quod fluit, ab alio in aliud fluit. Ergo oportet omne nunc a priori nunc in posterius fluere. Ergo impossibile est esse aliquod primum vel ultimum nunc. On the contrary, the now of time is always considered as flowing, wherein it differs from the now of eternity. But that which flows from one thing to another. Consequently, every now flows from a previous to a later now, and there cannot be a first or last now. Praeterea, motus sequitur mobile, et tempus sequitur motum. Sed primum mobile, cum sit circulare, non habet principium neque finem: quia in circulo non est accipere principium et finem in actu. Ergo neque motus neque tempus habent principium; et sic idem quod prius. Obj. 17: Movement follows the mobile, and time follows movement. Now, the first mobile, since it is circular, has neither beginning nor end, for it is not possible to indicate the actual beginning or end of a circle. Therefore, neither time nor movement has a beginning, and the same conclusion follows as above. Sed dicendum, quod licet ipsum corpus circulare non habeat principium magnitudinis, habet tamen principium durationis. Obj. 18: It will be said that, although a circular body itself has no beginning of its magnitude, it does have a beginning of its duration. Sed contra, duratio motus sequitur mensuram magnitudinis: quia, secundum Philosophum, quanta est magnitudo, tantum est et motus, et tantum tempus. Si ergo in magnitudine corporis circularis non est aliquod principium, nec in magnitudine motus et temporis erit principium, et per consequens nec in eorum duratione, cum eorum duratio, et praecipue temporis, sit eorum magnitudo. On the contrary, duration of movement follows the measure of magnitude because, according to the Philosopher, however great is the magnitude, so great is the motion, and so great is the time. Hence, if there be no beginning of the magnitude of a circular body, neither will there be a beginning of the magnitude of the movement or of the time, and consequently, there will be no beginning of their duration, since their duration, especially that of time, is their magnitude. Praeterea, Deus est causa rerum per scientiam suam. Scientia autem relative dicitur ad scibile. Cum igitur relativa sint simul natura, et scientia Dei sit aeterna, videtur quod res sint ab ipso ab aeterno productae. Obj. 19: God is the cause of realities through his own knowledge, and knowledge is spoken of in relation to the thing knowable. Since, then, relatives are by nature simultaneous, and God’s knowledge is eternal, it would seem that realities that exist were produced by him from eternity. Praeterea, aut Deus praecedit mundum natura tantum, aut duratione. Si natura tantum, sicut causa effectum sibi coaevum, videtur quod cum Deus fuerit ab aeterno, et creaturae fuerint ab aeterno. Si autem praecedit mundum duratione, si ergo est accipere aliquam durationem priorem duratione mundi, quae se habet ad durationem mundi ut prius ad posterius. Sed duratio quae habet prius et posterius est tempus. Ergo ante mundum fuit tempus, et per consequens motus et mobile; et sic idem quod prius. Obj. 20: God precedes the world either in the order of nature only or by duration. If only in the order of nature, as a cause precedes its synchronous effect, it would seem that creatures must have existed, like God, from eternity. And if he preceded the world in duration, there must have been a duration prior to the duration of the world, one that stood to the duration of the world as before stands to after. But a duration that stands as before and after is a time. Therefore, the world was preceded by time, and consequently, by movement and the mobile, and we come to the same conclusion as before. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit: Deum ab aeterno dominum non fuisse dicere nolo. Sed quandocumque fuit dominus, habuit creaturam sibi subiectam. Ergo non est dicendum, quod creatura non fuerit ab aeterno. Obj. 21: Augustine says: I dare not assert that God was not Lord from eternity. Now, so long as he was Lord he had creatures for his subjects. Therefore, we must not assert that creatures are not from eternity. Praeterea, Deus potuit mundum producere antequam produxerit; alias impotens fuisset. Scivit etiam ante producere; alias ignorans esset. Videtur etiam quod voluit, alias invidus fuisset. Ergo videtur quod non inceperit de novo producere creaturas. Obj. 22: God was able to create the world before he created it, else he were lacking in power. Likewise, he knew that he could produce it, else he were ignorant. And it also seems that he willed it, else he were envious. Therefore, it would seem that he did not begin to create creatures anew. Praeterea, omne quod est finitum, est communicabile creaturae. Sed aeternitas est quoddam finitum; alias nihil posset esse ultra aeternitatem: dicitur enim Exod. XV, 18: dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra. Ergo videtur quod creatura fuerit aeternitatis capax; et sic conveniens fuit divinae bonitati quod creaturam ab aeterno produxerit. Obj. 23: Whatsoever is finite can be communicated to a creature. Now, eternity is something finite, otherwise nothing could extend beyond it, and yet it is written: the Lord shall reign for eternity and beyond (Exod 15:18). Therefore, one would infer that a creature is capable of being eternal, and that it was becoming to the divine goodness to produce a creature from eternity. Praeterea, omne quod incipit, habet mensuram suae durationis. Sed tempus non potest habere aliquam mensuram suae durationis: non enim mensuratur aeternitate, quia sic semper fuisset: nec aevo, quia sic in perpetuum duraret; nec tempore, quia nihil est mensura sui ipsius. Ergo tempus non incipit esse, et ita nec mobile nec mundus. Obj. 24: Whatsoever has a beginning has a measure of its duration. Now, time cannot have any measure of its own duration: for it cannot be measured by eternity, since then it would have existed always; nor by aeviternity, since then it would last forever; nor by time, since nothing is its own measure. Therefore, time had no beginning, and consequently, neither had movable things, nor the world. Praeterea, si tempus incepit esse, aut incepit esse in tempore, aut in instanti. Sed non incepit esse in instanti, quia in instanti tempus nondum est; nec iterum in tempore, quia sic nihil temporis ante temporis terminum esset; nihil enim rei est antequam res esse incipiat. Ergo tempus non incepit esse: et sic idem quod prius. Obj. 25: If time had a beginning, this was either in a time or in an instant. It did not begin in an instant, for in an instant there is not yet time; nor did it begin in time, for in that case no time would precede the terminus of time, since nothing belonging to a thing exists before the thing begins to exist. Consequently, time had no beginning and the same conclusion follows as before. Praeterea, Deus ab aeterno fuit causa rerum: alias oporteret dicere, quod prius fuit causa in potentia, et postea in actu; et sic esset aliquid prius quod reduceret ipsum de potentia in actum, quod est impossibile. Nihil autem est causa, nisi causatum habeat. Ergo mundus fuit a Deo ab aeterno creatus. Obj. 26: God from eternity was the cause of things; otherwise, we should have to say that he was at first their cause in potency and afterwards their cause in act, so that there would be something prior that would reduce him from potency to act, and this is impossible. Now, nothing is a cause unless it has an effect. Therefore, the world was created by God from eternity. Praeterea, verum et ens convertuntur. Sed multa sunt vera ab aeterno; sicut hominem non esse asinum, et mundum futurum esse, et multa similia. Ergo videtur quod multa sunt entia ab aeterno; et non solum Deus. Obj. 27: The true and being are convertible, and many truths are eternal, such as that man is not an ass, and that the world was to be, and many similar things. Therefore, it would seem that many beings are from eternity, and not God alone. Sed dicendum, quod omnia ista sunt vera veritate prima, quae Deus est. Obj. 28: But it may be said that all these are true by the first Truth, which is God. Sed contra, alia veritas est huius propositionis, mundum futurum esse, et huius, hominem non esse asinum: quia posito per impossibile quod una sit falsa, adhuc reliqua erit vera. Sed veritas prima non est alia et alia. Ergo non sunt vera veritate prima. On the contrary, the truth of the proposition “the world will exist” differs from the truth of “man is not an ass”; for granted (though it is impossible) that the one is false, the other remains true. But the first Truth cannot alter. Therefore, these propositions are not true by the first Truth. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in praedicamentis, ex eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est. Si igitur multae propositiones verae sint ab aeterno, videtur quod res per eas signatae ab aeterno extiterint. Obj. 29: According to the Philosopher, in the Categories, a statement is true or false insofar as the reality is so or not so. If, then, many propositions are true from eternity, it would seem that the realities signified by them have existed from eternity. Praeterea, Deo idem est dicere quod facere; unde in Ps. 148, 5: dixit, et facta sunt. Sed dicere Dei est aeternum: alias Filius qui est Verbum Patris non esset Patri coaeternus. Ergo et facere Dei est aeternum, et ita mundus est factus ab aeterno. Obj. 30: With God to speak and to make are the same, according to Psalm 148:5, he spoke and they were made. Now, God spoke from eternity; otherwise, the Son who is the Father’s Word would not be coeternal with the Father. Therefore, God’s work is eternal and the world was made from eternity. Sed contra est quod dicitur Proverb. cap. VIII, 24, ex ore divinae sapientiae: nondum erant abissi, et ego iam concepta eram: necdum fontes aquarum eruperant, necdum montes gravi mole constiterant; ante omnes colles ego parturiebar; adhuc terram non fecerat et flumina et cardines orbis terrae. Ergo cardines orbis terrae et flumina et terra non semper fuerunt. On the contrary (1), it is said in the words of divine Wisdom: the depths were not as yet and I was already conceived, neither had the fountains of waters as yet sprung out. The mountains with their huge bulk had not as yet been established, before the hills was I brought forth. He had not yet made the earth, nor the rivers, nor the poles of the world (Prov 8:24). Therefore, the poles of the world, the rivers, and the earth did not always exist. Praeterea, secundum Priscinianum quanto tempore iuniores, tanto intellectu perspicaciores. Sed perspicacitas non est infinita. Ergo nec tempus quo perspicacitas crevit fuit infinitum, et per consequens nec mundus. Furthermore (2), according to Priscian, the younger in time are more perspicacious in intellect. But perspicacity is not infinite; therefore, the time during which perspicacity increases was not infinite, and consequently, neither is the world. Praeterea, Iob XIV, 19: alluvione paulatim terra consumitur. Sed terra non est infinita. Si ergo fuisset tempus infinitum, iam totaliter esset consumpta: quod patet esset falsum. Furthermore (3), it is written: with inundation the ground little by little is washed away (Job 14:19). Now, the earth is not infinite. Therefore, if time were infinite, the earth would by now have been wholly washed away, and this is clearly false. Praeterea, constat Deum naturaliter esse mundo priorem, sicut causam effectu. Sed in Deo idem est duratio et natura. Ergo Deus duratione prior est mundo, et ita mundus non semper fuit. Furthermore (4), it is evident that God naturally preceded the world as a cause precedes its effect. But in God duration and nature are the same; therefore, God preceded the world by duration, and thus, the world did not always exist. Respondeo dicendum quod firmiter tenendum est mundum non semper fuisse, sicut fides Catholica docet. Nec hoc potest aliqua physica demonstratione efficaciter impugnari. I answer that we must not hesitate to hold that, as the Catholic faith teaches, the world has not always existed. Nor can this be adequately disproved by any physical demonstration. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod sicut in quaestione alia est habitum, in operatione Dei non potest accipi aliquod debitum ex parte causae materialis, neque potentiae activae agentis, nec ex parte finis ultimi, sed solum ex parte formae quae est finis operationis, ex cuius praesuppositione requiritur quod talia existant qualia competunt illi formae. In order to make this clear, we must observe that, as we have shown in a previous question, in God’s works we cannot assign a necessity on the part of the material cause, nor on the part of the active power of the agent, nor on the part of the ultimate end, but only on the part of the form that is the end of the activity, since if the form be presupposed, it is requisite that things be such as to be fit for that form. Et ideo aliter dicendum est de productione unius particularis creaturae, et aliter de exitu totius universi a Deo. Cum enim loquimur de productione alicuius singularis creaturae, potest assignari ratio quare talis sit, ex aliqua alia creatura, vel saltem ex ordine universi, ad quem quaelibet creatura ordinatur, sicut pars ad formam totius. Cum autem de toto universo loquimur educendo in esse, non possumus ulterius aliquod creatum invenire ex quo possit sumi ratio quare sit tale vel tale; unde, cum nec etiam ex parte divinae potentiae quae est infinita, nec divinae bonitatis, quae rebus non indiget, ratio determinatae dispositionis universi sumi possit, oportet quod eius ratio sumatur ex simplici voluntate producentis ut si quaeratur, quare quantitas caeli sit tanta et non maior, non potest huius ratio reddi nisi ex voluntate producentis. Consequently, we must speak of the production of one particular creature otherwise than of the emanation of the whole universe from God. For when we speak of the production of an individual creature, it is possible to gather the reason why it is such, either from some other creature or at least from the order of the universe, to which every creature is ordered, as a part to the form of the whole. But when we speak of the whole universe’s coming into being, we cannot find any other creature as being the reason why the universe is such and such. Therefore, since neither on the part of the divine power, which is infinite, nor of the divine goodness, which does not need things, can a reason be assigned for the particular disposition of the universe, this reason must be drawn from the simple will of the Creator, so that if it be asked why the heavens are of such and such a size, no other reason can be given except that their maker willed it so. Et propter hoc etiam, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit, divina Scriptura inducit homines ad considerationem caelestium corporum, per quorum dispositionem maxime ostenditur quod omnia subiacent voluntati et providentiae creatoris. Non enim potest assignari ratio quare talis stella tantum a tali distet, vel aliqua huiusmodi quae in dispositione caeli consideranda occurrunt, nisi ex ordine sapientiae Dei; unde dicitur Is. XL, 26: levate in excelsum oculos vestros; et videte quis creavit haec. For this reason too, as Rabbi Moses says, Holy Scripture exhorts men to consider the heavenly bodies, since we gather from their disposition most of all how all things are subject to the will and providence of a Creator. For no reason can be given for why this star is this far from that one, or for any other dispositions that we observe in the heavens, save the ordinance of divine wisdom; therefore, it is written: lift up your eyes on high and see who has created these things (Isa 40:26). Nec obstat, si dicatur quod talis quantitas consequitur naturam caeli vel caelestium corporum, sicut et omnium natura constantium est aliqua determinata quantitas, quia sicut divina potentia non limitatur ad hanc quantitatem magis quam ad illam, ita non limitatur ad naturam cui debeatur talis quantitas, magis quam ad naturam cui alia quantitas debeatur. Et sic eadem redibit quaestio de natura, quae est de quantitate; quamvis concedamus, quod natura caeli non sit indifferens ad quamlibet quantitatem, nec sit in eo possibilitas ad aliam quantitatem nisi ad istam. Nor does it matter if someone say that the quantity in question results from the nature of the heavens or heavenly bodies, just as some determinate quantity is established for all things by nature; for just as the divine power is not confined to this rather than to that quantity, so is it not confined to a nature that requires one particular quantity rather than to a nature that requires another quantity. Consequently, it makes no difference, whether it be a question of quantity or of nature, although we grant that the nature of the heavens is not indifferent to any quantity in particular, and that there is no inherent possibility of the heavens having any other quantity than that which they have. Non sic autem potest dici de tempore vel temporis duratione. Nam tempus est extrinsecum a re, sicut et locus; unde etiam in caelo, in quo non est possibilitas respectu alterius quantitatis vel accidentis interius inhaerentis, est tamen in eo possibilitas respectu loci et situs, cum localiter moveatur; et etiam respectu temporis, cum semper tempus succedat tempori, sicut est successio in motu et in ubi; unde non potest dici, quod neque tempus neque ubi consequatur naturam eius, sicut de quantitate dicebatur. Unde patet quod ex simplici Dei voluntate dependet quod praefigatur universo determinata quantitas durationis, sicut et determinata quantitas dimensionis. Unde non potest necessario concludi aliquid de universi duratione, ut per hoc ostendi possit demonstrative mundum semper fuisse. But this cannot be said of time or the duration of time. For time, like place, is external to a thing; therefore, although there is no possibility in the heavens with respect to another quantity or accident inhering from within, yet is there a possibility with regard to its place and position, since the heavens have a local movement; and also with regard to time, since time ever succeeds time, just as there is succession in movement and in where. Therefore, it cannot be said that neither the time nor the where result from the heavens’ nature, as was said of its quantity. It is clear, then, that the appointment of a determinate quantity of duration for the universe depends on the simple will of God, just as does the appointment of its determinate quantity of dimension. Consequently, we cannot come to a necessary conclusion about the duration of the universe, such as to prove demonstratively thereby that the world has always existed. Quidam vero non considerantes exitum universi a Deo, coacti sunt circa inceptionem mundi errare. Quidam namque causam agentem praetermittentes, solam materiam a nullo creatam ponentes, quae omnium causa esset, sicut antiquissimi naturales, necessario habuerunt dicere materiam semper fuisse. Cum enim nihil se educat de non esse in esse, oportet causam aliam habere quod incipit esse; et hi posuerunt vel mundum semper fuisse continue, quia non ponebant nisi naturaliter agentia quae determinabantur ad unum, ex quo oportebat quod semper idem effectus sequeretur; vel cum interruptione sicut Democritus; qui ponebat mundum vel mundos potius multoties fuisse compositos et dissolutos casu, propter causalem motum atomorum. Some, however, through failing to observe that the universe came forth from God, were forced into erring about the beginning of the world. For some, like the earliest students of nature, setting aside the agent cause and asserting only a matter created by nothing, and which was the cause of all things, necessarily had to say that matter had always existed. For, seeing that nothing brings itself from non-existence into being, that which begins to exist must be caused by something else. And these asserted: either that the world was always in continual existence, because they recognized none but natural agents, which are determined to one thing, due to which it was necessary that the same effect always follows; or that the world had an interrupted existence, just as Democritus held the world, or rather worlds, to be in a continual state of composition and dissolution due to chance, on account of the chance movements of atoms. Sed quia inconveniens videbatur quod omnes convenientiae et utilitates in rebus naturalibus existentes essent a casu, cum semper vel in pluribus inveniantur; quod tamen necesse erat sequi, si solum materia poneretur, et praecipue cum inveniatur quidam effectus ad quos causalitas materiae non sufficit; ideo alii posuerunt causam agentem, sicut Anaxagoras intellectum, et Empedocles amicitiam et litem. Sed tamen isti non posuerunt huiusmodi causas agentes universi esse, sed ad modum aliorum particularium agentium, quae agunt materiam transmutando de uno in aliud. Unde necesse erat eis dicere quod materia esset aeterna, utpote non habens causam sui esse; sed mundum incepisse: quia omnis effectus causae agentis per motum sequitur suam causam in duratione, eo quod effectus non est nisi in termino motus, ante quem est principium motus, cum quo simul oportet esse agens, a quo est principium motus. Since, however, it seemed incongruous that all the congruities and utilities existing in natural things should be due to chance, whereas they are found to occur either always or for the most part, and seeing that nevertheless this would follow if there were no other cause but matter—and especially since some effects are found for which the causality of matter is insufficient—therefore others posited an agent cause; for example, Anaxagoras posited an intellect and Empedocles posited friendship and strife. Yet, they did not hold these to be the agent causes of the universe, but instead they likened them to other particular agents, whose activity consists in the transformation of matter from one thing into another. Consequently, it was necessary for them to say that matter is eternal, insofar as it does not have a cause of its own existence, but that the world had a beginning; for every effect of a cause which acts by movement follows its cause in duration, since such effect does not exist as at the end of the movement, which end is preceded by the initial movement, coexistent with which is the agent that initiates the movement. Aristoteles vero, considerans quod si ponatur causa constituens mundum agere per motum, sequeretur quod sit abire in infinitum, quia ante quemlibet motum erit motus, posuit mundum semper fuisse. Non enim processit ex consideratione illa qua intelligitur exitus universi esse a Deo, sed ex illa consideratione qua ponitur aliquod agens incipere operari per motum; quod est particularis causae, et non universalis. Et propter hoc ex motu et immobilitate primi motoris, rationes suas sumit ad mundi aeternitatem ostendendam; unde diligenter consideranti, rationes eius apparent quasi rationes disputantis contra positionem; unde et in principio VIII Phys., mota quaestione de aeternitate motus, praemittit opiniones Anaxagorae et Empedoclis, contra quas disputare intendit. Aristotle, in fact, observing that if it be said that the cause establishing the world acted by movement, it would follow that one would have to proceed to infinity, since every movement must be preceded by another movement, maintained that the world has always existed. He argued not from the position that the world comes forth from God, but from the position that an agent begins to act through a movement, which belongs to a particular cause and not a universal cause. Therefore, in order to prove the eternity of the world, he based his own arguments on movement and the immobility of the prime mover; and consequently, if we consider them carefully, his arguments are seen to be like those of one who is arguing against a position; this is also why at the commencement of Physics 8, having introduced the question of the eternity of movement, he begins by citing the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, his object being to argue against them. Sed sequaces Aristotelis considerantes exitum totius universi a Deo per suam voluntatem, et non per motum, conati sunt ostendere mundi aeternitatem per hoc quod voluntas non retardat facere quod intendit, nisi propter aliquam innovationem vel immutationem, saltem quam necesse est imaginari in successione temporis, dum vult facere hoc tunc et non prius. Those who came after Aristotle, however, considering that the whole universe came forth from God through his own will and not by movement, endeavored to prove the eternity of the world from the fact that the will does not wait to do what it intends, except on account of some new occurrence or change, at least one that is necessary to imagine in the succession of time, when one wills to do this now and not sooner. Sed isti etiam in defectum similem inciderunt in quem et praedicti. Consideraverunt enim primum agens ad similitudinem alicuius agentis quod suam actionem exercet in tempore quamvis per voluntatem agat; quod tamen non est causa ipsius temporis, sed tempus praesupponit. Deus autem est causa etiam ipsius temporis. Nam et ipsum tempus in universitate eorum quae a Deo facta sunt continetur; unde cum de exitu universi esse a Deo loquimur, non est considerandum, quod tunc et non prius fecerit. Ista enim consideratio tempus praesupponit ad factionem, non autem subiicit factioni. Yet, these fell into an error like that of the ones mentioned before. For they considered the first agent as like an agent that exercises its activity in time even though it acts through its will. Such an agent is not the cause of time itself but presupposes it, whereas God is the cause even of time itself. For time itself is included in the universe of the things made by God; and therefore, seeing that we are speaking about the being of the universe coming forth from God, one should not think that he made it then and not sooner. For this consideration presupposes a time before the making, one that is not subject to the making. Sed si universitatis creaturae productionem consideramus, inter quas est etiam ipsum tempus, est considerandum quare tali tempori talem mensuram praefixerit, non quare hoc fecit in tali tempore. Praefixio autem mensurae temporis dependet ex simplici voluntate Dei, qui voluit quod mundus non esset semper, sed quandoque esse inciperet, sicut et voluit quod caelum nec esset maius vel minus. But, if we consider the production of the universe of created things, among which even time itself is included, we must consider why such a measure was affixed to such a time, and not why he did this at such a time. However, the fixing of the measure to time depends on the simple will of God, who willed that the world should not have always been, but should have a beginning at some point, just as he also willed the heavens to be neither greater nor smaller than they are. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod bonitatis proprium est producere res in esse mediante voluntate, cuius est obiectum; unde non oportuit quod quandocumque fuit divina bonitas, res producerentur in esse, sed secundum dispositionem voluntatis divinae. Reply Obj. 1: It is proper to divine goodness to bring things into being by means of the will, of which it is the object. Consequently, it does not follow that whenever the divine goodness existed, things would be brought into being, but rather that this would be according to the plan of the divine will.