Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod cum prima successio temporis causetur ex motus successione, ut dicitur in IV Phys., secundum hoc verum est quod omne instans et est principium et finis temporis, secundum quod verum est quod omne momentum est principium et finis motus; unde si supponamus motum non semper fuisse nec semper futurum esse, non oportebit dicere quod quodlibet instans sit principium et finis temporis; sed erit aliquod instans quod est tantum principium, et aliquod quod tantum finis. Unde patet quod ratio ista est circularis, et propter hoc non est demonstratio; sed tamen est efficax secundum intentionem Aristotelis, qui eam inducit contra positionem, ut dictum est, in corp. art. Multae enim rationes sunt efficaces contra positionem propter ea quae ab adversariis ponuntur, quae non sunt efficaces simpliciter. Reply Obj. 15: Since the first succession of time is caused by movement, as is said in Physics 4, it is true that every instant is a beginning and an end of time, insofar as it is true that every moment of motion is a beginning and an end of movement; this is why, if we suppose that movement neither always existed nor will always exist, there will be no need to say that every instant is a beginning and an end of time; rather, there will be a certain instant that will be only a beginning, and a certain instant that will be only an end. Hence, this objection argues in a circle, and consequently is not a demonstration; yet it serves the purpose of Aristotle, who employs it to attack a position, as we have said above in the body of the article. In fact, many arguments serve to rebut an opinion on account of the statements advanced by its holders and yet in themselves are not simply speaking efficacious. Ad decimumsextum dicendum, quod instans semper consideratur ut fluens, sed non semper ut fluens ab aliquo in aliquid, sed quandoque ut fluens ab aliquo tantum, sicut ultimum instans temporis; quandoque ut fluens in aliquid tantum, sicut primum instans. Reply Obj. 16: The instant is indeed always considered as flowing, yet not always as flowing from one thing to another, but sometimes as only flowing from something (for example, the last instant of time), sometimes as flowing only towards something (as the first instant). Ad decimumseptimum dicendum, quod illa ratio non probat quod motus semper fuerit, sed quod motus circularis possit esse semper, quia ex mathematicis non potest aliquid efficaciter de motu concludi; unde Aristoteles, non probat ex circulatione motus, eius aeternitatem; sed supposito quod sit aeternus, ostendit quod est circularis; quia nullus alius motus potest esse aeternus. Reply Obj. 17: This argument does not prove that movement has always existed, but that a circular movement can always exist, because from mathematics we cannot efficaciously conclude anything about movement; therefore, Aristotle does not prove the eternity of movement from its being circular; rather, from the fact that a movement is eternal, he shows that it must be circular, because no other movement can be eternal. Et per hoc patet responsio ad decimumoctavum. Reply Obj. 18: This suffices for the reply to the eighteenth objection. Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod sicut se habet scibile ad scientiam nostram, ita se habet scientia Dei ad creaturas. Nam scientia Dei est causa creaturarum, sicut et scibile est causa scientiae nostrae; unde sicut scibile potest esse, scientia nostra non existente, ut dicitur in praedicamentis, ita Dei scientia esse potest, scibili non existente. Reply Obj. 19: As the knowable is related to our knowledge, so is God’s knowledge is to creatures. For God’s knowledge is the cause of creatures just as the knowable is also the cause of our knowledge. Therefore, just as a thing can be knowable even without our knowledge existing, as is said in the Categories, so God’s knowledge can exist without the knowable thing having existence. Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod Deus praecedit mundum duratione, non quidem temporis, sed aeternitatis, quia esse Dei non mensuratur tempore. Nec ante mundum fuit tempus reale, sed solum imaginarium, prout scilicet nunc possumus imaginari infinita temporum spatia, aeternitate existente, potuisse revolvi ante temporis inceptionem. Reply Obj. 20: God does indeed precede the world by duration, not one of time but of eternity, since God’s existence is not measured by time. Nor was there a real time before the world, but only an imaginary one, inasmuch as now we can imagine an infinite space of time existing alongside eternity and to have been able to have revolved before the beginning of time. Ad vicesimumprimum dicendum, quod si relatio dominii intelligatur consequi actionem qua Deus actualiter creaturas gubernat, sic non est ab aeterno dominus. Si autem intelligatur consequi ipsam potestatem gubernandi, sic competit ei ab aeterno. Nec tamen oportet creaturas ab aeterno ponere, nisi in potentia. Reply Obj. 21: If the relation of lordship be understood as consequent to the action whereby God actually governs creatures, then God was not Lord from eternity. But if it be understood as consequent on the very power of governing, then it belongs to God from eternity. Nor does it follow that creatures must have existed from eternity, except in potency. Ad vicesimumsecundum dicendum, quod ratione illa utitur Augustinus, ad probandum coaeternitatem et coaequalitatem Filii ad Patrem; quae tamen ratio non est efficax de mundo; quia cum natura Filii sit eadem cum Patre, requirit aeternitatem et aequalitatem Patris; quae si sibi subtraheretur, invidiae esset. Non autem hoc requirit natura creaturae; et ideo non est simile. Reply Obj. 22: This is Augustine’s argument to prove that the Son is coeternal and coequal with the Father. But this argument is not applicable to the world. For, since the Son’s nature is the same as the Father’s, it requires an eternity and equality with the Father; otherwise, were this denied him, it would savor of envy. The nature of the creature, however, does not require this, and consequently, the comparison fails. Ad vicesimumtertium dicendum, quod secundum Graecos dicitur: dominus regnabit in saeculum saeculi, et adhuc; quod exponens Origenes in Glossa, dicit, quod saeculum intelligitur spatium unius generationis, cuius finis notus est nobis: per saeculum saeculi immensum spatium temporis, quod finem habet, tamen nobis ignotum; sed adhuc ultra illud, regnum Dei extenditur. Et sic aeternum exponitur pro tempore diuturno. Anselmus autem in Proslog., exponit aeternum pro aevo, quod nunquam finem habet; et tamen ultra illud Deus esse dicitur propter hoc: primo, quia aeviterna possunt intelligi non esse. Secundo, quia non essent, nisi a Deo continerentur; et sic de se non sunt. Tertio, quia non habent totum esse suum simul, cum in eis sit aliqua mutationis successio. Reply Obj. 23: The Greek text reads: the Lord shall reign for age upon age and beyond; and Origen, as quoted by a Gloss, says that by age we are to understand the space of one generation, the limits of which are known to us; by age upon age we are to understand an immense space of time, which has an end, yet it is unknown to us; and that God’s reign will extend even beyond this. Hence, eternity here means the duration of time. Anselm in the Proslogion, however, takes eternity to mean aeviternity, which has no end; and yet, God is said to reign beyond it because, in the first place, aeviternal things can be thought of as non-existent; second, because they would not exist if God ceased to uphold them, and in this sense, of themselves they do not exist; third, because they do not possess their whole existence at once, but in them there is a certain succession of change. Ad vicesimumquartum dicendum, quod pro tanto oportet illud quod incipit, habere mensuram durationis, quia incipit per motum. Sic autem tempus non incipit per creationem, unde ratio non sequitur; et tamen potest dici, quod omnis mensura in suo genere seipsa mensuratur, sicut linea per lineam, et similiter tempus per tempus. Reply Obj. 24: That which has a beginning must have a measure of its duration because it begins through movement. But time does not begin thus by creation; therefore, the argument does not follow. However, it may be said that every measure is measured by itself within its own genus; thus, a line is measured by a line, and time by a time. Ad vicesimumquintum dicendum, quod tempus non se habet sicut permanentia, quorum substantia est tota simul; unde non oportet quod totum tempus sit quando incipit esse; et sic nihil prohibet dicere, quod tempus incipit in instanti esse. Reply Obj. 25: Time is not like permanent things, which have their whole substance at once, so that there is no need for the whole of time to exist as soon as it begins to exist. Consequently, nothing prevents saying that time begins in an instant. Ad vicesimumsextum dicendum, quod actio Dei est aeterna, sed effectus non est aeternus, ut supra dictum est; unde licet Deus non semper fuerit causa, cum non semper fuerit effectus, non tamen sequitur quod non fuerit causa in potentia, quia actio eius semper fuit, nisi potentia ad effectum referatur. Reply Obj. 26: God’s action is eternal, but its effect is not, as we have stated above; hence, though God was not always a cause, since his effect did not always exist, still it does not follow that he was not the cause potentially, since his action always existed, unless we refer the potency to the effect. Ad vicesimumseptimum dicendum, quod secundum Philosophum, verum est in mente, non in rebus; est enim adaequatio intellectus ad res. Unde omnia quae fuerunt ab aeterno, fuerunt vera per veritatem intellectus divini, quae est aeterna. Reply Obj. 27: According to the Philosopher, the true is in the mind, not in things, for it is the intellect’s becoming equal to the things. Therefore, whatsoever has existed from eternity has been true by the Truth of the divine intellect, which is eternal. Ad vicesimumoctavum dicendum, quod omnia illa quae ab aeterno dicuntur esse vera, non sunt alia et alia veritate vera, sed una et eadem divini intellectus veritate, ad diversas tamen res in proprio esse futuras relata; et sic ex diversa relatione potest aliqua distinctio in illa veritate designari. Reply Obj. 28: Whatsoever things are said to be true from eternity do not vary in their truth, but are true by the one same Truth of the divine intellect, yet with reference to the various things that are going to be in their own proper being; and thus there can be a certain distinction in that truth resulting from their various relations. Ad vicesimumnonum dicendum, quod verbum etiam Philosophi intelligitur de oratione existente in nostro intellectu vel in nostra pronuntiatione; veritas enim nostri intellectus vel verbi, ab existentia rei causatur. Sed e converso veritas divini intellectus est causa rerum. Reply Obj. 29: The saying of the Philosopher refers to the speech existing in our intellect, or in our oral statements, since the truth of our intellect or word is caused by the existence of the reality; but conversely, the truth of the divine intellect is the cause of the realities. Ad tricesimum dicendum, quod ex parte ipsius Dei facere non importat aliquid quod sit aliud quam suum dicere; non enim actio Dei est accidens, sed eius substantia; sed facere importat effectum actualiter existentem in propria natura, quod per dicere non importatur. Reply Obj. 30: On the part of God, there is no difference between “to make” and “to speak,” for God’s action is not an accident but his substance; nevertheless, “to make” connotes the effect existing in its own proper nature, whereas “to speak” does not. Argumenta vero quae obiiciuntur in contrarium, licet verum concludant, non tamen necessario, praeter primum, quod ex auctoritate procedit. Argumentum enim perspicacitatis secundum temporis cursum, non ostendit tempus quandoque incepisse. Potuit enim esse quod scientiarum studia pluries fuerint intermissa, et postmodum post longa tempora quasi de novo incepta, ut Philosophus etiam dicit. Terra etiam non ita per illuvionem ex una parte consumitur, quin etiam per mutuam elementorum conversionem ex parte alia augmentetur; duratio etiam Dei, licet sit idem quod eius natura secundum rem, tamen differt ratione; unde non oportet quod sit prior duratione, si est prior natura. Reply Sed Contra: The arguments on the contrary side, although they prove what is true, are not demonstrative, except the first, which is based on authority. For the argument taken from the growth of perspicacity in the course of time does not prove that time must have had a beginning. For it was possible that the study of the sciences may have been frequently interrupted and subsequently taken up anew after a long interval, as the Philosopher also says. Again, the soil is not so consumed by erosion on one part of the earth’s surface without a corresponding increase taking place elsewhere through the combination of the elements. And God’s duration, although it is the same as the divine nature in reality, differs therefrom in account; whence it does not follow that he is before the world in duration because he is before it in nature. Articulus 18 Article 18 Utrum angeli sint creati ante mundum visibilem Whether the angels were created before the visible world Decimoctavo quaeritur utrum angeli sint creati ante mundum visibilem. The eighteenth point of inquiry is whether the angels were created before the visible world. Et videtur quod sic. Quia ut Damascenus refert in II libro, Gregorius Nazianzenus dicit, quod Deus primum excogitavit angelicas virtutes et caelestes; et excogitatio fuit opus eius. Ergo prius fecit angelos quam mundum visibilem conderet. Obj. 1: And it would seem that they were. For Damascene quotes Gregory Nazianzen as saying that at first God devised the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making thereof. Therefore, he created the angels before making the visible world. Sed dicendum, quod ly primum dicit ordinem naturae, non durationis. Obj. 2: It may be said that first here denotes an order of nature, not of duration. Sed contra, Damascenus ibidem ponit super hoc duas opiniones: quarum una ponit, angelos primum fuisse creatos, alia vero dicit contrarium. Sed nulla unquam opinio posuit, quin angeli natura priores essent visibilibus creaturis. Ergo oportet quod intelligatur de ordine durationis. On the contrary, Damascene cites two opinions on this point: one of which states that the angels were created first, while the other holds the contrary. Now, no one ever denied that the angels were by nature prior to visible creatures. Therefore, we must take it to refer to the order of duration. Praeterea, Basilius dicit in principio Hexameron: erat quaedam natura ante hunc mundum intellectui nostro contemplabilis; quod postmodum exponit de angelis; ergo videtur quod ante hunc mundum angeli sint creati. Obj. 3: Basil says, in the beginning of The Hexameron: prior to this world there existed a nature that is intelligible to our understanding, and subsequently, he states that this is the angelic nature. Therefore, it would seem that the angels were created before this world. Praeterea, ea quae cum mundo visibili facta sunt, Scriptura in principio Genesis prosequitur. Sed del angelis nullam facit mentionem. Ergo videtur quod angeli non fuerunt creati cum mundo, sed ante mundum. Obj. 4: The Scriptures, in the beginning of Genesis, treats those things that were created with the visible world; but it makes no mention of the angels. Therefore, it would seem that the angels were not created with the visible world but before it. Praeterea, illud quod ordinatur ad perfectionem alicuius sicut ad finem, est eo posterius. Sed mundus visibilis ordinatur ad perfectionem intellectualis naturae: quia, ut Ambrosius dicit, Deus, qui natura invisibilis est, opus visibile fecit, per quod cognosci posset. Et non nisi a rationali creatura. Ergo rationalis creatura facta est ante mundum visibilem. Obj. 5: That which is ordered to the perfection of another as its end is posterior to it. Now, the visible world is ordered to the perfection of the intellectual nature since, according to Ambrose, God, who by nature is invisible, produced a visible work in order to make himself known thereby. But he could only be made known to a rational creature. Therefore, the rational creature was made before the visible world. Praeterea, quidquid est ante tempus, est ante mundum visibilem: quia tempus cum mundo visibili incepit. Sed angeli creati sunt ante tempus: non enim fuit tempus ante diem; angeli autem creati sunt ante diem, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo angeli creati sunt ante mundum visibilem. Obj. 6: Whatsoever precedes time precedes the visible world, since time began with the visible world. Now, angels were created before time, since there was no time before the day, but the angels were created before the day, as Augustine says. Therefore, the angels were created before the visible world. Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit super epistolam ad Titum, cap. I: sex millia necdum nostri temporis implentur annorum; et quantas prius aeternitates, quanta tempora fuisse arbitrandum est, in quibus angeli Deo servierunt, et eo iubente substiterunt? Sed mundus visibilis cum nostro tempore incepit. Ergo angeli ante mundum visibilem fuerunt. Obj. 7: Jerome says, on Titus 1, that six thousand years of our time have not yet elapsed, before which for how many ages, for how long think you the angels served God and to his command owed their existence? Now, the visible world began with our time. Therefore, the angels were in existence before the visible world. Praeterea, sapientis est ordinate suum effectum producere. Sed angeli praecedunt nobilitatem creaturarum visibilium. Ergo a sapientissimo artifice Deo, primo debuerunt produci in esse. Obj. 8: A wise man produces his effects in due order. Now, the angels precede visible creatures in point of nobility. Therefore, they should have been brought into being first by God who is the supremely wise master-craftsman. Praeterea, Deus, in quantum bonus est, suae bonitatis alios participes facit. Sed huius dignitatis capaces erant angeli, quod creaturam visibilem duratione praecederent. Ergo videtur hoc eis per summam Dei bonitatem collatum. Obj. 9: God, inasmuch as he is good, makes others share in his goodness. Now, angels were capable of being dignified by preceding the visible creature in point of duration. Therefore, seemingly this was bestowed upon them by God’s sovereign goodness. Praeterea, homo dicitur minor mundus, quia maioris mundi similitudinem gerit. Sed in homine pars eius nobilior ante alias partes formatur, scilicet cor, ut Philosophus dicit. Ergo videtur quod angeli, qui sunt nobilior pars maioris mundi, ante visibiles creaturas sint conditi. Obj. 10: Man is called a “microcosm” by reason of his likeness to the macrocosm. Now, man’s more noble part, namely, his heart, is formed before the other parts, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, seemingly the angels, who are the more noble part of the macrocosm, were created before visible creatures. Praeterea, ut Augustinus dicit, in opere secundae diei et deinceps tripliciter Scriptura rerum factionem commemorat. Dicit enim primo: dixit Deus, fiat firmamentum. Secundo: et factum est ita. Tertio vero: fecit Deus firmamentum. Quorum primum refertur ad esse rerum in Verbo; secundum ad esse rerum in cognitione angelica, prout angeli accipiunt cognitionem creaturae fiendae; tertium vero ad esse creaturae in propria natura. Sed quando creatura visibilis erat fienda, nondum erat. Ergo angeli fuerunt et habuerunt cognitionem naturae visibilis antequam esset. Obj. 11: According to Augustine, Scripture in the work of the second and following days divided the formation of things into three stages: for first it states that God said: let there be a firmament made; second: and it was so done; and, third: God made the firmament. The first of these refers to the existence of things in the Word; the second refers to the existence, in the angelic mind, of creatures to be made; the third to the creature’s existence in its own proper nature. Now, when creatures were yet to be made they did not exist. Therefore, angels existed and had knowledge of the visible nature before the latter existed. Sed dicendum, quod hic intelligitur de factione creaturae quantum ad eius formationem, non quantum ad primam creationem. Obj. 12: It might be said, however, that it is a question of the making of creatures as to their formation and not as to their first creation. Sed contra, secundum opinionem Augustini, creatio naturae visibilis non praecedit tempore eiusdem formationem. Si ergo angelus fuit ante formationem creaturae visibilis, fuit et ante eius creationem. On the contrary, in the opinion of Augustine, the creation of visible nature did not precede its formation in point of time. Therefore, if angels existed before the formation of visible creatures, they also existed before its creation. Praeterea, dicere Dei est causa creaturae fiendae; quod non videtur posse intelligi de aeterna Verbi genitura quia illa ab aeterno fuit, nec per vices temporum repetitur; cum tamen in singulis diebus Scriptura repetat Deum aliquid dixisse. Nec etiam potest intelligi de locutione corporali; tum quia nondum erat homo, qui vocem Dei loquentis audiret; tum etiam quia oportuisset ante lucis formationem aliquod aliud corporeum formatum fuisse, cum vox corporalis non fiat nisi per alicuius corporis formationem. Ergo videtur quod intelligatur de spirituali locutione qua Deus ad angelos loquitur; et sic videtur quod angelorum cognitio praesupponatur ut causa ad creaturarum visibilium productionem. Obj. 13: God’s speaking was the cause of creatures coming to be. Now, it seems that this cannot refer to the eternal birth of the Word, since this was from eternity and not repeated in course of time, and yet Scripture tells of God speaking on each day. Nor can it refer to audible speech, both because there was as yet no man to hear the voice of God speaking, and because before the formation of light it would have been necessary for some other body to be formed, since an audible voice is not produced except by means of a body. It would seem, then, that it refers to spiritual speech, whereby God spoke to the angels; and consequently, that the angels’ knowledge is presupposed as a cause for the production of visible creatures. Praeterea, ut supra dictum est, sacra Scriptura tripliciter actionem rerum commemorat: quorum primum pertinet ad esse rerum in Verbo; secundum ad esse rerum in cognitione angelica; tertium in propria natura. Sed primum horum praecedit secundum et duratione et causa. Ergo similiter secundum praecedit tertium duratione et causa, scilicet cognitio angelica existentiam visibilis creaturae. Obj. 14: As observed above, Holy Scripture employs three expressions in relating the creation: the first pertains to the existence of things in the Word; the second to their existence in the angelic knowledge; the third to their existence in their own nature. Now, the first of these precedes the second in point both of duration and of causality. Therefore, likewise the second, namely, the angelic knowledge, precedes the third, namely, the existence of the visible creature, both in duration and causality.