Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum creatio sit mutatio Whether creation is a change Secundo quaeritur utrum creatio sit mutatio. The second point of inquiry is whether creation is a change. Et videtur quod sic. Mutatio enim secundum nomen suum designat hoc esse post hoc, ut patet V Phys. Sed hoc habet creatio: nam fit esse post non esse. Ergo creatio est mutatio. Obj. 1: And it seems that it is. For change denotes the succession of one being after another, as stated in Physics 5, and this is true of creation, for being comes to be after non-being. Therefore, creation is a change. Praeterea, omne quod fit, fit aliquo modo ex non ente; quia quod est, non fit. Sicut ergo se habet generatio, secundum quam fit res secundum partem substantiae suae, ad privationem formae, quae est non esse secundum quid; ita se habet creatio, per quam fit secundum totam substantiam suam, ad non esse simpliciter. Sed privatio proprie loquendo, est terminus generationis. Ergo et non esse simpliciter, proprie loquendo, est terminus creationis; et sic creatio, proprie loquendo, est mutatio. Obj. 2: Everything that comes to be, comes to be in some way from non-being; for what exists does not come to be. Consequently, just as generation (according to which a thing comes to be as to a part of its own substance) is to the privation of the form (which privation is non-being in a certain respect), so too is creation (whereby a thing comes to be as to its entire substance) to non-being simply speaking. But properly speaking, privation is a terminus of generation. Therefore, properly speaking, non-being simply speaking is a terminus of creation; and thus, creation, properly speaking, is a change. Praeterea, quanto est maior distantia inter terminos, tanto maior est mutatio. Maior enim est mutatio de albo in nigrum quam de albo in pallidum. Sed plus distat non ens simpliciter ab ente quam contrarium a contrario, vel non ens secundum quid ab ente. Ergo cum transitus de contrario in contrarium, vel de non ente secundum quid in ens, fit mutatio, multo magis transitus de non ente simpliciter in ens, quod est creatio, erit mutatio. Obj. 3: The greater the distance between the termini, the greater the change. For a change from white to black is greater than a change from white to pale. Now, non-being simply speaking is more distant from being than one contrary from another or than relative non-being from being. Therefore, since the transition from contrary to contrary, or from relative non-being to being, is a change, much more is creation a change, since it is the transition from non-being simply speaking into being. Praeterea, quod non similiter habet se nunc et prius, mutatur vel movetur. Sed quod creatur non similiter se habet nunc et prius: quia prius erat simpliciter non ens, et postea fiet ens. Ergo quod creatur, movetur vel mutatur. Obj. 4: That which is now in a condition different from before is changed or moved. But what is created is now in a different condition than before, since formerly it was simply non-being and afterwards became a being. Therefore, that which is created is changed or moved. Praeterea, illud quod exit de potentia in actum, mutatur. Sed quod creatur, exit de potentia in actum; quia ante creationem erat tantum in potentia facientis, postea autem est in actu. Ergo quod creatur, movetur vel mutatur: ergo creatio est mutatio. Obj. 5: That which goes from potency to act changes. Now, the creature goes from potency to act; for before creation it was only in the potency of the maker, whereas afterward it actually exists. Hence, that which is created moves or changes, and consequently, creation is a change. Sed contra, species motus vel mutationis sunt sex, secundum Philosophum in praedicamentis. Nulla autem earum est creatio ut patet per singula inducenti. Ergo creatio non est mutatio. On the contrary, according to the Philosopher in the Categories, there are six species of movement or change. But none of them is creation, as one may see by taking them one by one. Therefore, creation is not a change. Respondeo dicendum quod in mutatione qualibet requiritur quod sit aliquid idem commune utrique mutationis termino. Si enim termini mutationis oppositi in nullo eodem convenirent, non posset vocari transitus ex uno in alterum. In nomine enim mutationis et transitus designatur aliquid idem, aliter se habere nunc et prius; et etiam ipsi mutationis termini non sunt incontingentes, quod requiritur ad hoc ut sint mutationis termini, nisi in quantum referuntur ad idem. Nam duo contraria si ad diversa subiecta referantur, contingit simul esse. I answer that in every change there needs to be something common to both termini of the change. For if the opposite termini of a change had nothing in common, one could not name a “transition” from the one to the other. For in “change” and “transition” is designated the same thing now being otherwise than before. Moreover, the very termini of a change are not incompatible (which is required for their being termini of a change) except insofar as they refer to one and the same thing. For two contraries, if referred to different subjects, can exist simultaneously. Quandoque ergo contingit quod utrique mutationis termino est unum commune subiectum actu existens; et tunc proprie est motus; sicut accidit in alteratione et augmento et diminutione et loci mutatione. Nam in omnibus his motibus subiectum unum et idem actu existens, de opposito in oppositum mutatur. Accordingly, there is sometimes one actually existent common subject of both termini of a change, and then we have movement properly speaking, as occurs in alteration, increase and decrease, and local movement. For in all such movements, the one subject, while actually remaining the same, changes from one opposite to another. Quandoque vero est idem commune subiectum utrique termino, non quidem ens actu, sed ens in potentia tantum, sicut accidit in generatione et corruptione simpliciter. Formae enim substantialis et privationis subiectum est materia prima, quae non est ens actu: unde nec generatio nec corruptio proprie dicuntur motus, sed mutationes quaedam. But sometimes the same subject common to each terminus is not a being in act but only a being in potency, as happens in generation and corruption simply speaking. For the subject of the substantial form and of its privation is prime matter, which is not an actual being. Therefore, neither generation nor corruption are “movements,” properly so called, but certain changes. Quandoque vero non est aliquod subiectum commune neque actu neque potentia existens; sed est idem tempus continuum, in cuius prima parte est unum oppositum et in secunda aliud, ut cum dicimus hoc fieri ex hoc, id est post hoc, sicut ex mane fit meridies. Sed haec non proprie vocatur mutatio, sed per similitudinem, prout ipsum tempus imaginamur quasi subiectum eorum quae in tempore aguntur. And sometimes, there is no common subject existing either in act or in potency; rather, there is the one continuous time in the first part of which there is the one opposite and in the second part the other; as when we say that this thing comes to be from that—that is, after that, as when we say, “from the morning comes noon.” But this is a change not properly but according to a likeness, insofar as we imagine time itself as though it were the subject of those things that take place in time. In creatione autem non est aliquid commune aliquo praedictorum modorum. Neque enim est aliquod commune subiectum actu existens, neque potentia. Tempus etiam non est idem, si loquamur de creatione universi; nam ante mundum tempus non erat. Invenitur tamen aliquod commune subiectum esse secundum imaginationem tantum, prout scilicet imaginamur unum tempus commune dum mundus non erat, et postquam mundus in esse productus est. Sicut enim extra universum non est aliqua realis magnitudo, possumus tamen eam imaginari; ita et ante principium mundi non fuit aliquod tempus, quamvis sit possibile ipsum imaginari: et quantum ad hoc creatio secundum veritatem, proprie loquendo, non habet rationem mutationis, sed solum secundum imaginationem quamdam; non proprie, sed similitudinarie. Now, in creation, there is not something common in any of the ways mentioned, for there is no common subject existing either actually or potentially. The time, also, is not the same, if we are speaking of the creation of the universe, since there was no time before the world. Yet we may find a common but purely imaginary subject, insofar as we imagine one common time when there was no world and afterwards when the world had been brought into being. For just as outside the universe there is no real magnitude, and yet we can picture one, so too before the beginning of the world there was no time, and yet it is possible to imagine one. Accordingly, properly speaking, creation does not hold the account of a change according to truth, but only one according to a certain imagination, and not properly but as a likeness. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod mutatio secundum suum nomen designat hoc esse post hoc circa aliquid idem, ut praedictum est, in corp. art. Hoc autem in creatione non est. Reply Obj. 1: As stated in the body of the article, the word “change” denotes the existence of one thing after another in reference to some same thing. But this is not the case in creation. Ad secundum dicendum, quod in generatione, secundum quam fit aliquid secundum partem substantiae suae, est aliquid commune subiectum privationi et formae, et non est in actu existens: et ideo sicut proprie ibi accipitur terminus, sic etiam et proprie accipitur ibi transitus; quod in creatione non est. Reply Obj. 2: In generation, whereby a thing comes to be in respect of part of its substance, there is some common subject of privation and form that is not actually existent. Therefore, just as in generation we find a terminus, properly speaking, so also do we find transition, properly speaking; but it is not so with creation. Ad tertium dicendum, quod ubi est maior distantia terminorum, est maior mutatio, supposita identitate subiecti. Reply Obj. 3: It is true that the greater the distance of the termini, the greater the change, provided that the subject is identical. Ad quartum dicendum, quod id quod non similiter se habet nunc et prius, mutatur, supposita consistentia subiecti: alias non ens simpliciter mutaretur; quia non ens simpliciter, non similiter se habet nunc et prius, neque dissimiliter. Oportet autem ad hoc quod sit mutatio, quod sit aliquid idem dissimiliter se habens nunc et prius. Reply Obj. 4: That which is otherwise now than it was before changes, provided the subject remains; otherwise, non-being simply speaking would change, for non-being simply is neither the way it was before nor is it otherwise than it was before. But in order that there be a change, one thing must be otherwise than it was before. Ad quintum dicendum, quod potentia passiva est subiectum mutationis, non autem activa; et ideo quod exit de potentia passiva in actum, mutatur, non autem quod de potentia activa exit: et ideo non valet obiectio. Reply Obj. 5: A passive potency is the subject of change, not an active potency. Hence, that which goes from passive potency to act changes, but that which goes from active power to act does not, and so the objection proves nothing. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum creatio sit aliquid realiter in creatura Whether creation is something real in the creature Tertio quaeritur utrum creatio sit aliquid realiter in creatura, et si est, quid sit. The third point of inquiry is whether creation is something real in the creature, and if so, what is it? Et videtur quod non sit aliquid reale in creatura. Ut enim dicitur in libro de causis, omne quod recipitur in aliquo, est in eo per modum recipientis. Sed actio Dei creantis recipitur simpliciter in non ente: quia Deus creando ex nihilo aliquid facit. Ergo creatio nihil reale ponit in creatura. Obj. 1: And it seems that it is not anything real in the creature. For as stated in The Book of Causes, whatever is received into a thing is in it according to the mode of the recipient. Now, the creative action of God is received simply speaking in non-being, since God makes something from nothing by creating it. Therefore, creation places nothing real in the creature. Praeterea, omne quod est in rerum natura, aut est creator aut creatura. Sed creatio non est creator, quia sic esset ab aeterno; nec etiam creatura, quia aliqua creatione crearetur; quae etiam creatio, aliqua creatione indigeret creari, et sic in infinitum. Ergo creatio non est aliquid in rerum natura. Obj. 2: All that is in the nature of things is either the Creator or a creature. But creation is not the Creator, since then it would be eternal. Nor is it a creature, since then it would be created by another creation, and this creation again would need to be created by yet another creation, and so on to infinity. Therefore, creation is not something in the nature of things. Praeterea, omne quod est, vel est substantia vel accidens. Sed creatio non est substantia, cum non sit nec materia neque forma neque compositum, ut de facili patere potest: nec etiam accidens, quia accidens sequitur suum subiectum; creatio autem est naturaliter prior creato, quod nullum sibi supponit subiectum. Ergo creatio non est aliquid in rerum natura. Obj. 3: Everything that exists is either substance or accident. But creation is not a substance, for it is neither matter, nor form, nor composite, as can easily be shown. Nor is it an accident, for an accident is subsequent to its subject, while creation is naturally prior to the thing created, since it presupposes no subject. Therefore, creation is nothing in the nature of things. Praeterea, sicut se habet generatio ad rem generatam, ita se habet creatio ad rem creatam. Sed generationis subiectum non est res generata, sed magis terminus; subiectum vero eius est materia prima, ut dicitur in de Generat. et Corrupt. Ergo nec subiectum creationis est res creata. Nec potest dici quod subiectum eius sit aliqua materia, cum res creata non creetur ex aliqua materia. Ergo creatio non habet subiectum aliquod, et ita non est accidens. Constat autem quod non est substantia. Ergo non est aliquid in rerum natura. Obj. 4: As generation is to the thing generated, so is creation to the thing created. But the thing generated is not the subject of generation but rather its terminus; its subject is prime matter, as is said in On Generation and Corruption. Neither, therefore, is the thing created the subject of the creation. Nor can it be said that its subject is some matter, since the thing created is not created from any matter. Therefore, creation has no subject, and hence it is not an accident. And it is certain that it is not a substance. Therefore, it is nothing within the nature of things. Praeterea, si creatio est aliquid in rerum natura, cum non sit mutatio, ut supra dictum est, maxime videtur esse relatio. Sed non est relatio, cum in nulla relationis specie contineri possit. Simpliciter enim non enti, ex quo est relatio, ens simpliciter neque supponitur neque aequatur. Ergo creatio non est aliquid in rerum natura. Obj. 5: If creation is something within the nature of things, since it is not a change (as was said above), it would seem most likely that it is a relation. But it is not a relation, since it cannot be contained within any species of relation. For being simply speaking is neither the subject of nor equal to non-being simply speaking, from which a relation arises. Therefore, creation is something in the nature of things. Praeterea, si creatio importet relationem entis creati ad Deum a quo esse habet; cum ista relatio semper maneat in creatura, non solum quando incipit esse, sed quamdiu res est; continue aliquid crearetur: quod videtur absurdum. Ergo creatio non est relatio: et sic idem quod prius. Obj. 6: If creation brings in a relation of the created being to God, from whom it has existence, because such relation would always remain in the creature—not only when the latter begins to be but as long as it exists—something would be continuously created. This seems absurd. Hence, creation is not a relation, and the same conclusion follows as before. Praeterea, omnis relatio realiter in rebus existens, acquiritur ex aliquo quod est diversum ab ipsa relatione, sicut aequalitas a quantitate, et similitudo a qualitate. Si ergo creatio sit aliqua relatio in creatura realiter existens, oportet quod differat ab eo ex quo acquiritur relatio. Hoc autem est quod per creationem accipitur. Sequitur ergo quod ipsa creatio non sit per creationem accepta; et ita sequitur quod sit aliquid increatum: quod est impossibile. Obj. 7: Every relation that really exists in things derives from something different than that relation itself: for instance, equality from quantity and likeness from quality. If, then, creation be a relation really existing in the creature, it must differ from that from which the relation derives. Yet this is what is received through creation. Therefore it follows that creation itself is not received through creation, and consequently that it is something uncreated, which is impossible. Praeterea, omnis mutatio reducitur ad illud genus ad quod terminatur, sicut alteratio ad qualitatem, et augmentum ad quantitatem; et propter hoc dicitur, in III Phys., quod quot sunt species entis, tot sunt species motus. Sed creatio terminatur ad substantiam; nec tamen potest dici quod sit in genere substantiae, ut supra, argum. 3, dictum est. Ergo non videtur quod sit aliquid secundum rem. Obj. 8: Every change is traced back to the genus in which it terminates. For instance, alteration is to quality, increase to quantity. For this reason it is stated in Physics 3 that there are as many species of movement as there are species of being. But creation terminates in substance, and yet it cannot be said that it is in the genus of substance, as was proved above. Therefore, it seems that it is nothing real. Sed contra, si creatio non est aliqua res, ergo nec aliquid realiter creatur. Hoc autem apparet esse falsum. Ergo creatio aliquid est in rerum natura. On the contrary (1), if creation is not something real, nothing is really created. Now, this is clearly false. Therefore, creation is something in the nature of things. Praeterea, ex hoc Deus est dominus creaturae, quia eam creando in esse produxit. Sed dominium est quaedam relatio realiter in creatura existens. Ergo multo fortius creatio. Furthermore (2), God is Lord of the creature because he brought it into being by creating it. Now, lordship is a relation really existing in the creature. Much more, therefore, is creation. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam dixerunt creationem aliquid esse in rerum natura medium inter creatorem et creaturam. Et quia medium neutrum extremorum est, ideo sequebatur quod creatio neque esset creator neque creatura. Sed hoc a magistris erroneum est iudicatum, cum omnis res quocumque modo existens non habeat esse nisi a Deo, et sic est creatura. I answer that some have said that creation is something in the nature of things between the Creator and the creature. And since a mean is neither of the extremes, it followed that creation would be neither the Creator nor the creature. But the masters judged this to be erroneous, since every reality that in any way exists has its existence only from God and in this way is a creature. Et ideo alii dixerunt, quod ipsa creatio non ponit aliquid realiter ex parte creaturae. Sed hoc etiam videtur inconveniens. Nam in omnibus quae secundum respectum ad invicem referuntur, quorum unum ab altero dependet, et non e converso, in eo quod ab altero dependet, relatio realiter invenitur, in altero vero secundum rationem tantum; sicut patet in scientia et scibili, ut dicit Philosophus. Creatura autem secundum nomen refertur ad creatorem. Dependet autem creatura a creatore, et non e converso. Unde oportet quod relatio qua creatura ad creatorem refertur, sit realis; sed in Deo est relatio secundum rationem tantum. Et hoc expresse dicit Magister in I Sent. distinct. 30. Therefore, others have said that creation itself does not posit anything real on the part of the creature. But this would also seem incongruous. For in all those things that are referred the one to the other in some respect, of which the one depends on the other but not vice versa, one finds a real relation in the one that is dependent, but in the other there is only a relation according to reason; this is clear in knowledge and the thing known, as the Philosopher says. Now, the creature by its very name is referred to the Creator; moreover, the creature depends on the Creator, and not vice versa. Therefore, the relation by which the creature is referred to the Creator must be real; but in God there is only a relation according to reason. The Master says this expressly in Sentences I. Et ideo dicendum est, quod creatio potest sumi active et passive. Si sumatur active, sic designat Dei actionem, quae est eius essentia, cum relatione ad creaturam; quae non est realis relatio, sed secundum rationem tantum. Si autem passive accipiatur, cum creatio, sicut iam supra dictum est, proprie loquendo non sit mutatio, non potest dici quod sit aliquid in genere passionis, sed est in genere relationis. We must, accordingly, say that “creation” may be taken actively or passively. Taken actively, it denotes God’s action, which is his essence, together with a relation to the creature; this is not a real relation but only a relation according to reason. But taken passively, since creation is not properly speaking a change (as we have already said), it must be said to be something not in the genus of passion but rather in the genus of relation. Quod sic patet. In omni vera mutatione et motu invenitur duplex processus. Unus ab uno termino motus in alium, sicut ab albedine in nigredinem; alius ab agente in patiens, sicut a faciente in factum. Sed hi processus non similiter se habent in ipso moveri, et in termino motus. Nam ipso moveri, id quod movetur recedit ab uno termino motus et accedit ad alterum; quod non est in termino motus; ut patet in eo quod movetur de albedine in nigredinem: quia in ipso termino motus iam non accedit in nigredinem, sed incipit esse nigrum. This is clear as follows. In every true change and movement, one finds two processes. One is from one terminus of movement to the other (for instance, from whiteness to blackness); the other is from the agent to the patient (for instance, from the maker to the thing made). These processes, however, do not stand in the same way in the movement itself and in the terminus of the movement. For in the movement itself, the thing moved is receding from one terminus of the movement and approaching the other, which does not apply when the terminus has been reached; this is clear in something moved from whiteness to blackness, for at the very terminus of the movement it no longer approaches to blackness, but begins to be black.