Articulus 9 Article 9 Utrum anima rationalis educatur in esse per creationem, vel per seminis traductionem Whether the rational soul is brought into being by creation or by the transmission of seed Nono quaeritur utrum anima rationalis educatur in esse per creationem, vel per seminis traductionem. The ninth point of inquiry is whether the rational soul is brought into being by creation or by the transmission of seed. Et videtur quod propagetur cum semine. Dicitur enim Gen. XLVI, 26: cunctae animae quae ingressae sunt cum Iacob in Aegyptum, et egressae sunt de femore illius, absque uxoribus filiorum eius, sexaginta sex. Sed nihil egreditur de femore patris, nisi per seminis traductionem. Ergo anima rationalis traducitur cum semine. Obj. 1: And it would seem that it is propagated with the seed. For it is written: all the souls that went with Jacob into Egypt and that came out of his thigh, besides his sons’ wives, sixty-six (Gen 46:26). Now, nothing comes from a father’s thigh except through the transmission of seed. Therefore, the rational soul is transmitted with the seed. Sed diceretur, quod ponitur pars pro toto, id est anima pro homine. Obj. 2: It may be replied that the part is being given for the whole, namely, the soul for the man. Sed contra, homo est quid compositum ex anima et corpore. Si ergo totus homo ex femore patris egreditur, non solum corpus, sed etiam anima cum semine traducetur, ut prius. On the contrary, a man is composed of soul and body. Therefore, if the whole man comes forth from his father’s thigh, it follows (as above) that not the body only but also the soul is transmitted with the seed. Praeterea, accidens traduci non potest nisi subiectum traducatur, eo quod accidens de subiecto in subiectum non transeat. Sed anima rationalis est subiectum peccati originalis. Cum ergo peccatum originale traducatur a parente in prolem, videtur etiam quod anima rationalis filii a parente traducatur. Obj. 3: An accident cannot be transmitted unless its subject be transmitted, since an accident does not pass from one subject to another. Now, the rational soul is the subject of original sin. Therefore, seeing that original sin is transmitted from parent to child, it would seem that the child’s rational soul is transmitted from its parent. Sed diceretur, quod peccatum originale, licet sit in anima sicut in subiecto, est tamen in carne sicut in causa; unde per carnis traductionem traducitur. Obj. 4: It may be said that although original sin is in the soul as in its subject, it is in the flesh as in its cause, and consequently is transmitted by the transmission of the flesh. Sed contra, Rom. V, 12, dicitur: peccatum per unum hominem in mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors: et ita mors in omnes pertransit, in quo omnes peccaverunt. Glossa autem exponit: in quo homine peccatore, vel in quo peccato. Non autem in illo peccato omnes peccassent, nisi illud unum peccatum in omnes traductum fuisset. Illud ergo unum peccatum quod in Adam fuit, in omnes traducitur; et sic anima illius, quae peccati subiectum erat, traducitur in omnes. On the contrary, it is written: by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned (Rom 5:12). The words in whom are expounded by a gloss as meaning, in which sinner or in which sin. Now, all would not have sinned in that sin unless that same sin had been transmitted to all. Therefore, the same sin that was in Adam is transmitted to all men; consequently, so is the soul that was the subject of that sin. Praeterea, omne agens agit sibi simile. Sed omne agens agit per virtutem formae. Ergo illud quod agit agens, est forma. Sed generans agens est. Ergo forma generati est per actionem generantis. Cum ergo homo generet hominem, et anima rationali sit forma hominis; videtur quod anima rationalis sit per generationem, et non per creationem. Obj. 5: Every agent produces its like. But every agent acts through the power of its form. Therefore, that which an agent makes is a form. But the begetter is an agent. Therefore, the form of the begetter is produced by the action of the begetter. Since, then, a man begets a man, and the rational soul is the form of a man, it would seem that the rational soul is produced by generation and not by creation. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in II Phys., causa efficiens in suo effectu incidit in idem specie. Sed homo sortitur speciem per animam rationalem. Ergo videtur quod id quod facit generans in genito, sit anima rationalis. Obj. 6: According to the Philosopher in Physics 2, an efficient cause falls into the same species in its effect. Now, man takes his species through his rational soul. Therefore, it seems that the rational soul is caused by the begetter in the begotten. Praeterea, filii similantur parentibus propter hoc quod a parentibus propagantur. Similantur autem parentibus filii, non solum quantum ad dispositiones corporales, sed etiam quantum ad dispositiones animae. Ergo sicut corpora a corporibus, ita animae ab animabus traducuntur. Obj. 7: Children are like their parents because they are begotten by their parents. But they are like their parents not only in dispositions of the body, but also in those of the soul. Therefore, as bodies derive from bodies, so do souls derive from souls. Praeterea, Moyses dicit, Levit. XVII, 11: anima carnis in sanguine est. Sed sanguis cum semine traducitur: praecipue cum sperma non sit nisi sanguis decoctus. Ergo et anima cum semine traducitur. Obj. 8: Moses says: the soul of all flesh is in the blood (Lev 17:11). Now, blood is transmitted with the seed, especially as the male seed is merely boiled blood. Therefore, the soul is transmitted with the seed. Praeterea, embrio antequam anima rationali perficiatur, habet aliquam operationem animae; quia augetur et nutritur et sentit. Sed operatio animae non est sine vita. Ergo vivit. Vitae vero corporis principium est anima. Ergo habet animam. Sed non potest dici quod adveniat ei alia anima; quia tunc in uno corpore essent duae animae. Ergo ipsa anima quae prius erat in semine propagata, est anima rationalis. Obj. 9: Moreover, the embryo, before it is perfected with the rational soul, has a certain action of the soul, for it grows, self-nourishes, and senses. But where there is the soul’s action, there is life. Consequently, it is alive. Now, the soul is the principle of life in a body, so it has a soul. But it cannot be said that it receives yet another soul, because then there would be two souls in one body. Therefore, the very soul that was from the beginning transmitted in the seed is the rational soul. Praeterea, diversae animae secundum speciem, constituunt diversas animas secundum speciem. Si ergo in semine ante ipsam animam rationalem erat anima quae non erat rationalis, erat ibi animal secundum speciem diversum ab homine; et sic ex illo non poterit homo fieri; quia diversae species animalis non transeunt in invicem. Obj. 10: Souls differing in species constitute animals of different species. If, then, before the rational soul itself, there was in the seed a soul that was not rational, there was an animal of a different species from man, which consequently could not become a man, since diverse species of animals do not turn into each other. Sed dices, quod huiusmodi operationes animae non conveniunt embrioni per animam, sed per aliquam virtutem animae, quae dicitur virtus formativa. Obj. 11: You will say that these actions belong to the embryo not through the soul, but by some power of the soul known as the “formative power.” Sed contra, virtus supra substantiam radicatur; unde ponitur media inter substantiam et operationem, ut habetur a Dionysio. Si ergo est ibi virtus animae, erit ibi animae substantia. On the contrary, power is rooted in substance; hence, it occupies a place between substance and activity, according to Dionysius. Consequently, if the soul’s power is there, its substance is there also. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit in XVI de animalibus, quod embrio prius vivit quam animal, et prius animal quam homo. Sed omne animal habet animam. Ergo prius est ibi aliqua anima quam sit ibi anima rationalis per quam homo est homo. Obj. 12: The Philosopher says, On Animals 16, that the embryo is alive before it is an animal, and an animal before it is a human being. Now, every animal has a soul. Therefore, it has a soul before it has a rational soul, by which it is a human being. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, anima est actus viventis corporis in quantum huiusmodi. Sed si embrio vivit, et operationem vitae exercet per huiusmodi virtutem formativam, ipsa virtus erit actus eius in quantum est vivens. Ergo erit anima. Obj. 13: According to the Philosopher, a soul is the act of a living body as such. Now, if the embryo is alive and exercises life’s activity by means of this formative power, this very power will be its act insofar as it is a living thing. Therefore, it will be a soul. Praeterea, ut dicitur in I de anima, vivere inest omnibus viventibus per animam vegetabilem. Sed manifestum est embrionem vivere ante infusionem animae rationalis, cum in eo operationes vitae inveniantur. Ergo est ibi anima vegetabilis antequam sit anima rationalis. Obj. 14: According to On the Soul 1, living is present in all living things through the vegetative soul. Now, it is clear that the embryo lives before the infusion of the rational soul, since life’s activities are found in it. Therefore, the vegetative soul is in it before the rational soul. Praeterea, in II de anima, improbat Philosophus quod augeri est actus ignis sicut principalis agentis, sed magis animae vegetabilis. Sed embrio ante adventum animae rationalis augetur. Ergo habet animam vegetabilem. Obj. 15: In On the Soul 2, the Philosopher disproves the assertion that growth is the effect of fire as principal agent, rather than of the vegetative soul. Now, the embryo grows before the advent of the rational soul. Therefore, it has a vegetative soul. Praeterea, si non est ibi anima vegetabilis ante adventum animae rationalis, sed virtus formativa; adveniente anima, illa virtus suam operationem non habebit; cum operatio quam illa virtus faciebat in embrione, sufficienter postmodum fiat in animali per animam. Ergo erit ibi otiosa; quod videtur esse inconveniens, cum nihil sit otiosum in natura. Obj. 16: If, before the advent of the rational soul, there is not a vegetative soul but a formative power, this power will not have its own activity at the advent of the soul, since the activity the power exercised in the embryo will subsequently be sufficiently fulfilled in the animal through the soul. Consequently, it would remain superfluous, and this would seem to be incongruous, since nothing is superfluous in nature. Sed dices, quod illa virtus destruitur adveniente anima rationali. Obj. 17: You will say that this power is destroyed at the advent of the rational soul. Sed contra, dispositiones non destruuntur adveniente forma, sed manent, et quodammodo tenent formam in materia. Sed illa virtus erat quaedam dispositio ad animam. Ergo adveniente anima, illa virtus non destruitur. On the contrary, dispositions are not destroyed at the advent of the form; rather, they remain and in a certain way hold on to their form in the matter. Now, this power was a certain disposition for the soul. Therefore, at the advent of the latter, that power is not destroyed. Praeterea, ex actione illius virtutis pervenitur ad introductionem animae. Si ergo anima adveniente illa virtus destruitur, videtur quod aliquid agat ad sui destructionem; quod est impossibile. Obj. 18: By its action, this power conduces to the introduction of the soul. If, then, at the soul’s advent this power is destroyed, it seems to do for its own destruction. This is impossible. Praeterea, homo est homo per animam rationalem. Si ergo anima non exit in esse per generationem, nec erit verum dicere quod homo generetur; quod patet esse falsum. Obj. 19: A man is a human being by his rational soul. Therefore, if the soul does not go into being by generation, it will not be true to say that a man is generated, which is clearly false. Praeterea, corpus hominis exit in esse per actionem generantis. Si ergo anima non exit in esse a generante, erit in homine duplex esse; unum corporis, quod facit generans; et aliud animae, quod non facit; et sic ex anima et corpore non fit unum simpliciter, cum secundum esse differant. Obj. 20: Further, the human body goes into being by the action of its begetter. If, then, the soul does not go into being by its begetter, there will be two sorts of being in man: one of the body (which the begetter makes), and another of the soul (which he does not make). And consequently, soul and body will not become one being simply, since they differ in being. Praeterea, impossibile est quod actio unius agentis terminetur ad materiam, et alterius ad formam; alias ex forma et materia non esset unum simpliciter, cum unum factum sit per unam actionem. Sed actio naturae generantis terminatur ad corpus. Ergo et terminatur ad animam, quae est forma eius. Obj. 21: Moreover, it is impossible that the matter be the terminus of action of one agent, and the form the terminus of action of another agent. Otherwise, form and matter would not together make one thing simply, for one thing is made by one action. Now, the action of the nature of the begetter terminates in the body. Therefore, it terminates in the soul also, which is the form of the body. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in libro XVI de animalibus, principia quorum actiones non sunt sine corpore, cum corpore producuntur. Sed actio animae rationalis non est sine corpore; maxime enim intelligere esset sine corpore, quod patet esse falsum; non enim est intelligere sine phantasmate, ut dicitur in I et III de anima; phantasma autem non est sine corpore. Ergo anima rationalis cum corpore traducitur. Obj. 22: Moreover, according to the Philosopher in On Animals 16, principles whose actions are not performed independently of the body are produced together with the body. Now, the action of the rational soul is not independent of the body, since understanding would most of all be independent of the body, and this is clearly not the case. For we cannot understand without images, as is said in On the Soul 1 and 3, and there cannot be images without a body. Therefore, the rational soul is transmitted with the body. Sed dicebat, quod anima rationalis indiget phantasmate intelligendo quantum ad acquisitionem specierum intelligibilium, non autem postquam eas iam acquisivit. Obj. 23: To this it may be replied that in its understanding, the rational soul requires images for the acquisition of intelligible species, but not after it has acquired them. Sed contra, homo postquam acquisivit scientiam, impeditur in actione intellectus laeso organo phantasiae. Hoc autem non esset, si intellectus post acquisitionem scientiae, phantasmatibus non indigeret. Indiget ergo eis non solum in acquirendo scientiam, sed in utendo scientia acquisita. On the contrary, after a man has acquired knowledge, his intellect is hindered from acting if the organ of imagination is injured. And this would not be the case if the intellect, after acquiring knowledge, were no longer in need of images. Consequently, it needs them not only in acquiring knowledge but also in using the knowledge it has acquired. Sed dices, quod impedimentum operationis intellectualis ex laesione organi phantasiae provenit non ex hoc quod intellectus indigeat phantasmatibus in utendo scientia acquisita, sed ex hoc quod imaginatio et intellectus sunt in una essentia animae: unde per accidens, imaginatione impedita, impeditur et intellectus. Obj. 24: But you may reply that the impediment to intellectual activity due to an injury to the organ of imagination arises not because the intellect needs images in using the knowledge it has acquired, but from the fact that imagination and intellect are in the one essence of the soul; whence when the imagination is impeded, the intellect is also impeded accidentally. Sed contra est quod coniunctio potentiarum in una essentia animae est causa quare quando una potentiarum intenditur in suo actu, alterius actus remittitur; sicut quando aliquis attente videt, minus attente audit; et est etiam causa quare una potentiarum cessante a suo actu, alia in suo actu roboratur; unde caeci plerumque acutius audiunt. Non ergo propter huiusmodi coniunctionem contingeret quod propter impedimentum potentiae imaginativae impediretur actio intellectus, sed magis roboraretur. On the contrary, the conjunction of powers in the one essence of the soul is the reason why, if the act of one power be intense, the act of the other is diminished; for example, when someone is intent on seeing, he is less intent on hearing. It is also the reason why one power acts with greater strength when another ceases its act; whence, the blind are often sharp of hearing. Therefore, this conjunction of powers is not a reason for the action of the intellect being hindered through an impediment to the imagination; in fact, it should rather be strengthened. Praeterea, quicumque dat ultimum complementum operationi alicui, ille maxime operanti cooperatur. Sed si omnes animae humanae creantur a Deo, et ab ipso corporibus infunduntur, ipse dat ultimum complementum generationi quae est ex adulterio. Ergo ipse cooperabitur adulteris; quod videtur absurdum. Obj. 25: He who gives the work its final complement is the worker’s chief cooperator. Now, if all human souls are created by God and by him they are infused into bodies, he himself gives the final complement to a generation that comes of adultery. Therefore, he cooperates in adultery, which seems absurd. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum, perfectum unumquodque est quod potest sibi simile facere. Quanto ergo aliquid est perfectius, tanto magis potest sibi simile facere. Sed animae rationales sunt perfectiores materialibus formis elementorum, quae sibi similes formas producunt. Ergo virtute animae rationalis poterit anima rationalis produci per viam generationis. Obj. 26: According to the Philosopher, a perfect thing is one that can make its like; consequently, the more perfect a thing is, the more is it able to make its like. Now, the rational soul is more perfect than the material forms of the elements, which produce other forms like themselves. Therefore, the rational soul has the power by way of generation to produce another rational soul. Praeterea, anima rationalis constituta est inter Deum et res corporales media; unde in libro de causis dicitur, quod est creata in horizonte aeternitatis et temporis. Sed in Deo generatio invenitur, similiter in rebus corporalibus. Ergo et anima, quae est media, per generationem producitur. Obj. 27: The rational soul is situated between God and corporeal things; therefore, it is asserted, in The Book of Causes, that it is created on the horizon between eternity and time. Now, there is generation both in God and in corporeal things. Therefore, the soul, which is situated between them, is also produced by generation.