Ad secundum dicendum, quod appetitus formae non est aliqua actio materiae, sed quaedam habitudo materiae ad formam, secundum quod est in potentia ad ipsam, sicut Commentator exponit in primo Physic. Reply Sed Contra 2: The desire for form is not any action of matter, but a certain orientation of matter to form, insofar as matter is in potency to it, as the Commentator explains regarding Physics 1. Ad tertium dicendum, quod si Deus faceret ens in potentia tantum, minus faceret quam natura, quae facit ens in actu. Actionis enim perfectio magis attenditur secundum terminum ad quem, quam secundum terminum a quo; et tamen hoc ipsum quod dicitur, contradictionem implicat, ut scilicet aliquid fiat quod sit in potentia tantum: quia quod factum est, oporteret esse cum est, ut probatur in VI Phys. Quod autem est tantum in potentia, non simpliciter est. Reply Sed Contra 3: Were God to make a being only in potency, he would do less than nature, which makes a being in act. For the perfection of an action is viewed in reference to the terminus to which it tends more than to the terminus from which it originates. Moreover, the very argument involves a contradiction: namely, that anything might come to be that exists only in potency; for what has been made must exist when it exists, as is proved in Physics 6, whereas what exists only in potency does not exist, simply speaking. Ad quartum dicendum, quod hoc quod Scriptura dicit: terra erat inanis et vacua, si accipiatur de materia omnino informi, secundum Augustinum, non est intelligendum quod sic erat aliquando in actu, sed quia talis erat natura sua, si absque formis inhaerentibus consideretur. Reply Sed Contra 4: If, as Augustine holds, the words of Scripture the earth was void and empty are taken as being about matter utterly devoid of form, we are not to suppose that there was a time when it was actually so, but that its nature was such, if we consider it apart from inherent forms. Ad quintum dicendum, quod formatio spiritualis creaturae dupliciter potest intelligi: una per gratiae infusionem, et alia per gloriae consummationem. Reply Sed Contra 5: The formation of a spiritual creature may be understood in two ways: first, by the infusion of grace; second, by the consummation of glory. Prima quidem formatio, secundum sententiam Augustini, statim creaturae spirituali affuit in sui creationis principio; et tunc per tenebras, a quibus lux distinguitur, non intelligitur peccatum malorum angelorum; sed informitas naturae, quae nondum erat formata, sed erat consequentibus operibus formanda, ut dicitur in I super Genes. ad litteram, vel, sicut dicitur quarto eiusdem libri, per diem significatur Dei cognitio, per noctem vero cognitio creaturae, quae quidem tenebra est respectu divinae cognitionis. Vel si per tenebras intelligamus angelos peccantes, ista divisio non ad praesens peccatum refertur, sed ad futurum, quod erat in Dei praescientia: unde dicit in libro ad Orosium: quia ex angelis quosdam per superbiam praesciebat casuros, per incommutabilem praescientiae suae ordinem divisit inter bonos et malos, malos tenebras appellans, et bonos lucem. The first, according to Augustine’s opinion, was bestowed on the spiritual creature from the first moment of its creation; and in that case, the darkness from which the light was divided does not signify the sin of the wicked angels, but rather the formlessness of the nature, which was not formed as yet but remained to be formed by subsequent works, as is said in The Literal Interpretation of Genesis. Or, as he says in the fourth book of the same work, the day signifies God’s knowledge, and the night the creature’s knowledge, which is indeed darkness in comparison with God’s. Or, if the darkness does signify the sinful angels, then this distinction refers to their sin not as present but as to come, because it was within God’s foreknowledge; therefore, he says in his work addressed to Orosius: foreseeing that some of the angels would fall through pride, by the ordinance of his unfailing foreknowledge he divided the good from the bad, calling the bad “darkness” and the good “light.” Secunda vero formatio non pertinet ad principium institutionis rerum, sed magis ad rerum decursum, quo per divinam providentiam gubernantur. Hoc enim ultimum verum est, secundum Augustinum, de omnibus in quibus operatio naturae requiritur, quod in hac formatione necesse est provenisse; quia per motum liberi arbitrii aliqui sunt conversi ut starent; aliqui aversi ut caderent. The second formation does not pertain to the creation of things at the beginning, but rather to the course of things whereby they are governed by divine providence. For this last, according to Augustine, is true of all those things in which an activity of nature is required; this needed to have occurred in this formation because, by the movement of their free decision, some were converted such that they remained standing; others turned away such that they fell. Ad sextum dicendum, quod mundus dicitur factus ex invisa materia, non quia informis materia tempore praecesserit, sed ordine naturae. Et similiter privatio non fuit aliquo tempore in materia ante omnem formam, sed quia materia absque forma intellecta cum privatione etiam intelligitur. Reply Sed Contra 6: The world is said to have been made of invisible matter because formless matter preceded the world not in time but by the order of nature. Likewise, privation was not at any time in matter before the advent of all form, but matter understood without form is understood as with privation. Ad septimum dicendum, quod hoc est ex imperfectione naturae operantis per motum quod ex imperfecto ad perfectum procedit; motus enim est actus imperfecti. Sed Deus propter suae virtutis perfectionem potuit statim res perfectas in esse producere; et ideo non est simile. Reply Sed Contra 7: It is owing to the imperfection of nature that acts through movement that it proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect; for movement is the act of the imperfect. God, however, by reason of the perfection of his own power, was able at once to give being to perfect things; hence, the comparison fails. Ad octavum dicendum, quod verba Augustini non sunt intelligenda sic quod materia aliquo tempore fuerit in potentia ad formas elementares nullam earum habens; sed quia in sua essentia considerata, nullam formam actu includit ad omnes in potentia existens. Reply Sed Contra 8: The words of Augustine should not be understood such that matter was at a certain time in such potency to the elemental forms that it had none of them, but that considered in its own essence it includes no form actually, being in potency to them all. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum materiae formatio tota simul fuerit, an successive Whether the formation of matter occurred all at once or by degrees Secundo quaeritur utrum materiae formatio tota simul fuerit, an successive. The second point of inquiry is whether the formation of matter occurred all at once or by degrees. Et videtur quod successive. Dicitur enim Iudith, IX, 4: tu fecisti priora, et illa post illa cogitasti. Excogitatio autem Dei est eius operatio, ut Damascenus dicit; unde et in praedicta auctoritate subditur: et hoc factum est quod ipse voluisti. Ergo res quodam ordine, et non simul, sunt factae. Obj. 1: And it seems that it was formed by degrees. For it is written: you have done the things of old and have devised one thing after another (Jdt 9:5). Now, with God to devise is to act, according to Damascene; hence the text quoted continues: and what you have designed has been done. Therefore, things were made in a certain order and not all at once. Praeterea, plures partes temporis non possunt esse simul: quia totum tempus sub quadam successione agitur. Sed rerum formatio in diversis partibus temporis facta commemoratur Genes. I. Ergo videtur quod rerum formatio facta sit successive, et non tota simul. Obj. 2: Several parts of time cannot be together at once, because the whole of time comes about under a certain succession. Now, according to Genesis 1, things were formed at diverse parts of time. Therefore, seemingly things were formed by degrees, and not all at once. Sed dicendum, quod per illos sex dies, secundum sententiam Augustini, non intelliguntur dies consueti nobis qui sunt temporis partes, sed secundum cognitionem angelicam sexies rebus cognoscendis praesentatam, secundum rerum sex genera. Obj. 3: It will be said, perhaps, that according to the opinion of Augustine, those six days are not the days or divisions of time to which we are accustomed, but a six-fold manifestation of things to the angelic mind corresponding to the six genera of things. Sed contra, dies ex praesentia lucis causatur; unde dicitur Genes. I, 5, quod Deus vocavit lucem diem. Sed lux non proprie in spiritualibus invenitur, sed solum metaphorice. Ergo nec dies proprie potest intelligi angelorum cognitio. Non videtur ergo esse litteralis expositio, quod per diem angelorum cognitio intelligatur. Probatio mediae. Nullum per se sensibile potest in spiritualibus proprie accipi: ea enim quae sensibilibus et spiritualibus sunt communia, non sunt sensibilia nisi per accidens; sicut substantia, potentia, virtus et huiusmodi. Lux autem est per se sensibilis visu. Ergo proprie non potest in spiritualibus accipi. On the contrary, day is caused by the presence of light, whereupon it is written that God called the light “day” (Gen 1:5). And light, properly speaking, is not found in spiritual creatures, but only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore, neither can the angels’ knowledge be called “day,” properly speaking. Consequently, it would seem not to be a literal exposition of the text to take “day” as signifying the angelic knowledge. The middle premise is proved thus: nothing that is sensible through itself is properly applicable to spiritual things, for things that are common to the sensible and the spiritual are not sensible except accidentally, for instance, substance, power, virtue, and the like. Now, light through itself is sensible to sight. Hence, it cannot be applied properly speaking to spiritual things. Praeterea, cum angelus dupliciter res cognoscat, scilicet in Verbo et in propria natura; oportet quod per alteram istarum cognitionum dies intelligatur. Non autem potest intelligi de cognitione qua cognoscit rem in Verbo, quia haec cognitio est una tantum de omnibus; simul enim in verbo cognoscit angelus quaecumque cognoscit, et una cognitione, quia scilicet Verbum videt. Non ergo esset nisi una dies. Si autem intelligitur de cognitione qua cognoscit res in propria natura, sequitur quod sint multo plures quam sex dies, cum sint plura genera et species creaturarum. Non ergo videtur quod dierum senarius ad cognitionem angelicam referri possit. Obj. 4: An angel has two ways of knowing things, in the Word and in their own proper natures; consequently, “day” must refer to the one or the other. It cannot signify his knowledge whereby he knows a thing within the Word, since this knowledge is only one for all those things; for whatsoever things an angel knows in the Word, he knows simultaneously and by one knowledge, because he sees the Word. Thus, there would be but one day. On the other hand, if it refers to his knowledge of things in their own proper natures, it would follow that there were many more than six days, since there are many genera and species of creatures. Hence, it would seem that the six days cannot refer to the angelic knowledge. Praeterea, Exod. XX, 9, dicitur: sex diebus operaberis, septimo autem die sabbatum domini Dei tui est: non facies omne opus; et postea subditur ratio: sex enim diebus fecit Deus caelum et terram, mare, et omnia quae in eis sunt, et requievit in die septimo. Sed lex ad litteram de diebus materialibus loquitur in quorum sex permittit operari, in septimo prohibet. Ergo et hoc quod dicitur de Dei operatione ad dies materiales referendum est. Obj. 5: It is written: six days shall you labor, but on the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord your God; you shall do no work on it (Exod 20:9–10), and afterwards, the reason is given: for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth and the sea and all things that are in them, and he rested on the seventh day (Exod 20:11). Now, in permitting work on six days and forbidding it on the seventh, the Law speaks literally of material days. Therefore, the days ascribed to God’s works are to be taken in the material sense. Praeterea, si per diem cognitio angeli intelligitur; facere ergo aliquid in die non est aliud quam facere in angelica cognitione. Per hoc autem quod aliquid fit in angelica cognitione non sequitur quod in sua natura existat, sed solum quod ab angelo cognoscatur. Ergo per hoc non ostenderetur rerum in propriis naturis institutio; quod est contra Scripturam. Obj. 6: If “day” signifies the angels’ knowledge, it follows that to make a thing in a day is nothing else but to produce it in the angelic knowledge. But it does not follow that if a thing is produced in the angelic knowledge, it therefore exists in its own nature, but only that it is known by the angels. Consequently, the creation of things in their respective natures would not be manifested by this, which is contrary to Scripture. Praeterea, cuiuslibet angeli cognitio differt ab alterius cognitione. Si ergo per diem cognitio angeli intelligitur, oportet tot dies ponere quot sunt angeli, et non solum sex ut Scriptura tradit. Obj. 7: The knowledge of any single angel differs from that of any other. If, then, “day” signifies an angel’s knowledge, there should be as many days as there are angels, and not only six, as Scripture tells us. Praeterea, Augustinus, II super Genes. ad litteram, dicit, quod per hoc quod dicitur: dixit Deus, fiat, intelligitur quod res fiendae praeextiterunt in Verbo, per hoc quod dicitur: est ita factum, intelligimus factam rei cognitionem in creatura intellectuali: per hoc quod dicitur: fecit Deus, intelligitur in suo genere fieri creatura. Si ergo per diem cognitio angeli intelligitur, postquam dixerat de aliquo opere: et factum est ita, in quo cognitio angelica intelligitur, superflue adderetur: factum est vespere et mane dies unus vel dies secundus. Obj. 8: Augustine says, in The Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2, by the words God said: let it be made, we are to understand that the thing to be made pre-existed in the Word; that by the words it was so, we understand that knowledge of the thing was produced in the intellectual creature; and by the words God made, we understand that the creature came to be in its own genus. If, then, day signifies the angels’ knowledge, then having said of this or that work, and it was so, in reference to the angelic knowledge, it was superfluous to add the evening and morning were the first or the second day. Sed dicendum, quod hoc additur ad ostendendum duplicem modum cognitionis rerum in creatura spirituali. Unus est quo cognoscit res in Verbo; et secundum hoc dicitur mane, vel cognitio matutina: alius quo cognoscit res in propria natura; et secundum hoc dicitur vespere, vel cognitio vespertina. Obj. 9: But it will be said that these words are added to indicate the spiritual creature’s twofold manner of knowing things. One is his knowledge of things in the Word, and this is called morning, or “morning knowledge”; the other is his knowledge of things in their respective natures, and this is called evening, or “evening knowledge.” Sed contra, licet angelus posset simul plura considerare in Verbo, non tamen potest simul plura intelligere in propria natura, cum per diversas species diversa in suis naturis intelligat. Si ergo quilibet sex dierum non solum habet mane, sed etiam vespere; oportebit in sex diebus aliquam successionem considerare; et sic rerum formatio non tota simul fuit facta. On the contrary, though an angel can at the same time consider several things in the Word, he cannot at the same time consider several things in his own nature, since he understands different things in their respective natures by means of different species. If, then, each of the six days has both morning and evening, there must have been some succession in the six days, and consequently, the formation of things did not take place all at once. Praeterea, ab una potentia non possunt esse simul plures operationes, sicut nec una linea recta terminatur ex una parte nisi ad unum punctum: per operationem enim potentia terminatur. Sed considerare rem in Verbo et in propria natura, non est una operatio, sed plures. Ergo non simul est matutina et vespertina cognitio; et sic adhuc sequitur quod in illis sex diebus sit successio. Obj. 10: Several actions cannot proceed from one power at the same time, any more than one straight line can terminate at one end in more than one point; for a power is determined in an action. Now, the consideration of a thing in the Word and in its proper nature is not one but several actions. Therefore, morning and evening knowledge are not simultaneous, and thus again it follows that there was succession in those six days. Praeterea, sicut supra dictum est, art. praeced., distinctio lucis a tenebris exponitur ab Augustino distinctio creaturae formatae, alia ab informitate materiae quae adhuc restabat formanda. Una ergo ex parte materiae formata, altera adhuc remanebat formanda: non ergo tota materia est simul formata. Obj. 11: As stated in the previous article, Augustine explains the division of light from darkness as that of the formed creature from the formlessness of matter that had yet to be formed. Therefore, the one was formed on the side of the matter, the other still remained to be formed; and consequently, matter was not formed all at once. Praeterea, cognitio matutina secundum Augustinum, intelligitur cognitio Verbi in quo angelus accipit cognitionem creaturae fiendae. Hoc autem non esset si creaturae, quarum formatio diebus sequentibus deputatur, simul cum angelo formatae essent. Ergo non omnes res sunt simul creatae. Obj. 12: According to Augustine, the angels’ morning knowledge signifies their knowledge of the Word in whom they knew the creatures yet to be made. But this would not be the case if the creatures whose formation is assigned to the following days were formed at the same time as the angels. Therefore, not all things were created at the same time. Praeterea, dies in spiritualibus dicuntur ad similitudinem sensibilium dierum. Sed in sensibilibus diebus mane praecedit vespere. Ergo in istis non debet vespere praeponi ad mane, cum dicitur: factum est vespere et mane dies unus. Obj. 13: In spiritual matters, “day” is spoken of through a likeness with sensible days. Now, in sensible days morning precedes evening. Therefore, in these days, evening should not have been mentioned before the morning: evening and morning were the first day. Praeterea, inter vespere et mane est nox, et inter mane et vespere est meridies. Ergo sicut fecit Scriptura de vespere et mane mentionem, ita debuit facere de meridie. Obj. 14: Between evening and morning is night, and between morning and evening is midday. Hence, as Scripture mentions evening and morning, it should have mentioned midday also. Praeterea, omnes dies sensibiles habent et vespere et mane. Hoc autem non invenitur in istis septem diebus; nam primus dies non habet mane, septimus non habet vespere. Ergo non convenienter dicuntur dies ad similitudinem horum dierum. Obj. 15: Every sensible day has both evening and morning. But this is not the case with these seven days, for the first has no morning, and the seventh has no evening. Therefore, it is unreasonable to speak of these days according to a likeness with ours. Sed dicendum, quod ideo primus dies non habet mane, quia per mane intelligitur cognitio creaturae fiendae, quam accepit angelus in Verbo: ipsa autem spiritualis creatura sui ipsius fiendae non potuit cognitionem in Verbo accipere antequam esset. Obj. 16: It might be said that the first day has no morning because “morning” signified that knowledge of the creature yet to be made, which the angel received in the Word; but before being made, the spiritual creature itself could not receive in the Word any knowledge of its own future coming to be. Sed contra, secundum hoc habetur quod angelus aliquando fuit, et aliae creaturae nondum erant factae, sed fiendae. Non ergo omnia sunt simul formata. On the contrary, from this it follows that the angel at one time existed, whereas other creatures were not yet made but were still to be made. Therefore, not all things were made at the same time. Praeterea, creatura spiritualis non accipit rerum inferiorum cognitionem a rebus ipsis. Ergo non indiget rerum praesentia ad hoc quod eas cognoscat. Potuit ergo eas ut fiendas cognoscere in propria natura antequam fierent, et non solum in Verbo; et sic cognitio rei fiendae videtur pertinere ad vespertinam cognitionem, sicut ad matutinam; et sic secundum rationem praedictam secundus dies nec mane nec vespere debuit habere. Obj. 17: The spiritual creature does not acquire knowledge of lower realities from those realities themselves; and thus, he does not need their presence in order to know them. Consequently, before those things were made, he could know them as things to be made in their respective natures and not only in the Word; thus, knowledge of a thing to be made would seem to belong to the evening as well as the morning knowledge; and thus, according to the foregoing exposition, the second day should have had neither morning nor evening. Praeterea, angelo sunt prius nota ea quae sunt priora simpliciter; quod enim ea quae sunt posteriora sint nobis prius nota, provenit ex hoc quod cognitionem a sensu accipimus. Sed rationes rerum in Verbo priores sunt simpliciter ipsis rebus. Ergo per prius cognoscit angelos res in Verbo quam in propria natura; et sic mane deberet praeordinari ad vespere, cuius contrarium in Scriptura apparet. Obj. 18: Those things that are first simply speaking are better known to an angel, since the fact that things that are posterior are better known to us is due to our acquiring knowledge from sensation. Now, the accounts of things in the Word are simply speaking prior to the things themselves. Therefore, the angels’ knowledge of things in the Word precedes his knowledge of things in their respective natures, and consequently, the morning should have been ordered before the evening, which is contrary to the text of Scripture. Praeterea, ea quae non sunt unius rationis non possunt aliquod unum constituere. Sed cognitio rerum in Verbo et in propria natura est alterius et alterius rationis, cum medium cognoscendi sit omnino diversum. Ergo ex mane et vespere, secundum praedictam expositionem, non posset unus dies perfici. Obj. 19: Things that are not of one account cannot constitute something one. Now, knowledge of things in the Word and in their proper natures belong to different accounts, since their medium of knowing is entirely different. Consequently, according to the foregoing exposition, morning and evening could not complete one day. Praeterea, I ad Corinth. XIII, 8, dicit apostolus, quod in patria scientia destruetur: quod non potest intelligi nisi de scientia rerum in propriis naturis, quae est vespertina. In patria autem erimus similes angelis, ut dicitur Matth. cap. XXII, 30. Ergo in angelis non est cognitio vespertina. Obj. 20: The Apostle says that knowledge will be destroyed in the heavenly fatherland (1 Cor 13:8), and this only refers to the knowledge of things in their respective natures, which is the evening knowledge. Now, in the heavenly fatherland we shall be as the angels (Matt 12:30). Therefore, evening knowledge is not in the angels. Praeterea, cognitio rerum in Verbo plus excedit cognitionem rerum in propriis naturis quam claritas solis excedat lumen candelae. Sed lux solis offuscat lumen candelae. Ergo multo magis matutina cognitio vespertinam. Obj. 21: Knowledge of things in the Word surpasses knowledge of them in their respective natures more than the sun’s brightness surpasses candlelight. But sunlight renders useless the light of a candle. Therefore, much more does the morning knowledge render evening knowledge useless.