Praeterea, motus caeli est naturalis caelo, sicut et motus gravium et levium est eis naturalis, ut patet in I caeli et Mun. Hoc autem differt, quod corpora elementaria non moventur naturaliter nisi cum sunt extra suum ubi, caelum autem movetur etiam in suo ubi existens; ex quibus accidi potest quod sicut se habet corpus elementare ad motum suum naturalem, cum est extra suum ubi, ita se habet caelum ad motum suum naturalem, cum est in suo ubi. Corpus enim elementare, cum est extra suum ubi, non quiescit nisi per violentiam. Ergo et caelum non potest quiescere nisi quies sit violenta; quod quidem est inconveniens. Cum enim nullum violentum possit esse perpetuum, sequeretur quod illa quies caeli non esset perpetua; sed quandoque iterum caelum moveri inciperet; quod est fabulosum. Ergo non est dicendum, quod motus caeli aliquando quiescat. Obj. 12: The celestial movement is natural to the heavens, as the movement of heavy and light bodies is natural to them, as is clear in On the Heavens 1. There is this difference, however, that elemental bodies move naturally only when they are outside their proper place, while the heaven is moved even while it is in its proper place. Therefore, we may infer that the relation of an elemental body to its natural movement when it is outside its own place is like the relation of the heaven to its natural movement when it is in its own place. For an elemental body, when it is outside its proper place, does not rest there unless the rest is forced. Therefore, the heavenly body also cannot rest unless the rest is forced. But this is incongruous. For, since nothing violent can endure forever, it would follow that this heavenly rest does not last forever, and that at length the heaven would begin again to be moved, which is ridiculous. Therefore, we must not say that the heavenly movement will cease at some time. Praeterea, eorum quae sibi succedunt, oportet esse aliquem ordinem et proportionem. Finiti autem ad infinitum non est aliqua proportio. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur, quod caelum finito tempore sit motum, et postmodum infinito tempore quiescat: quod tamen oportet dicere, si motus caeli incepit et finietur, et nunquam reincipiat. Obj. 13: Things that succeed one another should have a certain order and proportion. But there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite. Therefore, it is incongruously asserted that the heaven moved for a finite time and later rests for an infinite time, and yet, this must be said if the movement of the heaven began and will end and will never begin again. Praeterea, quanto aliquid Deo assimilatur secundum nobiliorem actum, tanto nobilior est assimilatio; sicut nobilior est assimilatio hominis ad Deum quae est secundum animam rationalem, quam animalis bruti, quae est secundum animam sensibilem. Actus autem secundus nobilior est quam actus primus, sicut consideratio quam scientia. Ergo assimilatio qua caelum assimilatur Deo secundum actum secundum, qui est causare inferiora, est nobilior quam assimilatio secundum claritatem, quae est actus primus. Si ergo in mundi consummatione partes principales mundi meliorabuntur, videtur quod caelum non desinet moveri, aliqua maiori claritate repletum. Obj. 14: To the degree that something becomes like God according to a nobler act, so to that degree assimilation is nobler; for example, man’s likeness to God, by reason of his rational soul, is nobler than that of a beast, which occurs by reason of its sensitive soul. Now, the second act is more excellent than the first, just as the consideration is better than the knowledge. Therefore, the heaven’s likeness to God in respect of its second act, which is to cause lower things, is nobler than its likeness in respect of brightness, which is its first act. If, then, in the consummation of the world, the principal parts of the world will be made better, it seems that the heaven will not cease to be moved when it is filled with a greater brightness. Praeterea, magnitudo et motus et tempus se consequuntur quantum ad divisionem et finitatem vel infinitatem, ut probatur in VI Phys. Sed in magnitudine circulari non est principium neque finis. Ergo nec in motu circulari poterit esse aliquis finis; et sic, cum motus caeli sit circularis, videtur quod nunquam finietur. Obj. 15: Magnitude, movement, and time are in sequence to one another in respect of division and finitude or infinitude. Now, there is neither beginning nor end in a circular magnitude. Therefore, neither is there any end in a circular movement, so that the heavenly movement being circular, it would seem that it will never have an end. Sed dicebat, quod licet motus circularis nunquam secundum suam naturam finiatur, tamen divina voluntate finietur. Obj. 16: It might be replied to the last objection that, although a circular movement may have no end, according to its own nature, it will have an end by the will of God. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit: cum de mundi institutione agitur, non quaeritur quid Deus possit facere, sed quod rerum natura patiatur ut fiat. Consummatio autem mundi, eius institutioni respondet, sicut finis principio. Ergo nec in his quae pertinent ad finem mundi, recurrendum est ad Dei voluntatem, sed ad rerum naturam. On the contrary, Augustine says: in discussing the origin of the world, we do not ask what God can do, but what the nature of things allows of being done. Now, the consummation of the world corresponds to its origin, as the end corresponds to the beginning. Therefore, in discussing things pertaining to the end of the world, we must not have recourse to the divine will, but to the nature of things. Praeterea, sol per suam praesentiam lumen et diem in istis inferioribus causat, per absentiam vero tenebras et noctem. Sed non potest esse sol praesens utrique hemisphaerio, nisi per motum. Ergo si motus caeli quiescat, semper sua praesentia in una parte mundi causabit diem, et in alia noctem, cui sol semper erit absens; et sic illa pars non erit meliorata, sed deteriorata, in mundi consummatione. Obj. 17: The sun by its presence causes light and day in these lower things, and by its absence produces darkness and night. Now, the sun cannot be present in both hemispheres except through movement. Therefore, if the heavenly movement cease, the sun by its presence will cause day in one part of the world and night in the other, by being always absent; thus, the latter part will not be made better, but rather worse, in the consummation of the world. Praeterea, illud quod aequaliter se habet ad duo, aut utrique adhaeret aut neutri. Sed sol aequaliter se habet quantum est de sua natura ad quodlibet ubi caeli. Ergo vel erit in quolibet, aut in nullo. Sed non potest esse in nullo, quia omne corpus sensibile alicubi est. Ergo oportet quod sit in quolibet. Sed hoc non potest esse, nisi per motus successionem. Ergo semper movebitur. Obj. 18: That which is equally open to two things will either cling to both or to neither. Now, the sun, so far as its own nature is concerned, is open to any particular position in the heavens. Therefore, it will either occupy every one of them or none of them. But it cannot occupy none, since every sensible body is somewhere. Therefore, it must occupy them all. But this is impossible except by successive movement. Therefore, it will always be in movement. Praeterea, in mundi consummatione a nullo tolletur sua perfectio quod tunc remanebit, quia res quae remanebunt in illo statu non deteriorabuntur, sed meliorabuntur. Motus autem est perfectio ipsius caeli; quod patet ex hoc quia motus est entelechia mobilis in quantum huiusmodi, ut dicitur in II Phys.: et iterum, ut dicitur in II caeli et mundi, caelum per motum perfectam bonitatem consequitur. Ergo in mundi consummatione caelum motu non carebit. Obj. 19: At the consummation of the world, none of the things that will remain will lose their perfection, because the things that will remain will not be made worse in that state; rather, they will become better. Now, movement is a perfection of the heavens themselves; this is clear from the fact that motion is an entelechy of the mobile as such, as is said in Physics 2; and again, as is said in On the Heavens 2, by movement the heavens acquire perfect goodness. Therefore, at the consummation of the world, the heavens will not lack movement. Praeterea, corpus aliquod nunquam attinget ad gradum naturae spiritualis. Hoc autem ad naturam spiritualem pertinet quod bonitatem perfectam sine motu habeat, ut patet in II caeli et mundi. Nunquam ergo caelum, si moveri desinat, perfectam bonitatem habebit; quod est contra rationem consummationis mundi. Obj. 20: No body ever attains to the degree of a spiritual nature. Now, it belongs to a spiritual nature to have perfect goodness without movement, as is clear in On the Heavens 2. Therefore, the heaven will never have perfect goodness if its movement ceases, and this is contrary to the account of the world’s consummation. Praeterea, nihil tollitur nisi per suum contrarium. Motui autem caeli nihil est contrarium, ut probatur in I caeli et mundi. Ergo motus caeli nunquam quiescet. Obj. 21: Nothing is removed except by its contrary. Now, there is nothing contrary to the heavenly movement, as is shown in On the Heavens 1. Therefore, the heavenly movement will never cease. Sed contra est quod dicitur Apoc. X, vers. 5: angelus quem vidi stantem super mare et super terram, levavit manum suam et iuravit per viventem in saecula saeculorum . . . quia tempus amplius non erit. Tempus autem erit quamdiu motus caeli erit. Ergo motus caeli aliquando esse desinet. On the contrary (1), it is written: the angel whom I saw standing upon the sea and upon the earth lifted up his hand to heaven, and he swore by him that lives forever and ever . . . that time shall be no longer (Rev 10:5). Now, time will endure as long as the heavens are moved. Therefore, at some time the heavens will cease to be moved. Praeterea, dicitur Iob XIV, 12: homo, cum dormierit, non resurget, donec atteratur caelum; non evigilabit, nec consurget de somno suo. Caelum autem non potest intelligi quod atteratur secundum substantiam, quia semper remanebit, ut prius probatum est. Ergo quando resurrectio mortuorum erit, caelum atteretur quantum ad motum, qui cessabit. Furthermore (2), it is written: man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not rise again till the heavens be broken; he shall not awake nor rise up out of his sleep (Job 14:12). Now, we must not understand that the heavens will be broken in their substance, because this will always remain, as proved above. Therefore, when the dead shall rise again, the heavens will be broken in the sense that their movement will cease. Praeterea, Rom. VIII, 22, super illud: omnis creatura ingemiscit, et parturit usque adhuc, dicit Glossa Ambrosii: omnia elementa cum labore sua explent officia, sicut sol et luna non sine labore statuta sibi implent spatia; quod est causa nostri: unde quiescent nobis assumptis. Ergo in resurrectione sanctorum motus corporum caelestium quiescent. Furthermore (3), commenting on Romans 8:22, every creature groans and travails even until now, a Gloss of Ambrose says: all the elements labor to fulfill their various duties; thus, the sun and moon, not without toil, run their appointed courses. This they do for our benefit: whence, when we are removed, they will rest. Therefore, at the resurrection of the saints, the movements of the heavenly bodies will cease. Praeterea, Isidorus dicit: post iudicium sol laboris sui mercedem recipiet, et non veniet ad occasum nec sol nec luna; quod non potest esse, si caelum moveatur, ergo tunc caelum non movebitur. Furthermore (4), Isidore writes: after the judgment, the sun will receive the reward of his labor, and thenceforward neither sun nor moon shall set, which is impossible as long as the heavens are in motion. Therefore, the heavens will then cease to be moved. Respondeo dicendum quod secundum documenta sanctorum ponimus motum caeli quandoque cessaturum; quamvis hoc magis fide teneatur quam ratione demonstrari possit. Ut autem manifestum esse possit in quo huius quaestionis pendeat difficultas, attendendum est quod motus caeli non hoc modo est naturalis caelesti corpori sicut motus elementaris corporis est sibi naturalis; habet enim huiusmodi motus in mobili principium, non solum materiale et receptivum, sed etiam formale et activum. Formam enim ipsius elementaris corporis sequitur talis motus, sicut et aliae naturales proprietates ex essentialibus principiis consequuntur; unde in eis generans dicitur esse movens in quantum dat formam quam consequitur motus. I answer that, following the teaching of holy men, we hold that at some time the celestial movement will cease, although this is more held by faith than capable of demonstration by reason. In order to make clear wherein this question offers difficulty, it must be observed that the heavenly movement is not natural to the heavenly body in the same way as the elemental body’s movement is natural to the elemental body. For the latter movement has a principle within the mobile thing, not only a material and receptive principle but also a formal and active one. For such a movement follows the form of the elemental body just as other natural properties also result from the essential principles; therefore, in these things, the generator is said to be the mover inasmuch as it gives the form that the movement follows on. Sic autem in corpore caelesti dici non potest. Cum enim natura semper in unum tendat determinate, non se habens ad multa, impossibile est quod aliqua natura inclinet ad motum secundum se ipsum, eo quod in quolibet motu difformitas quaedam est, in quantum non eodem modo se habet quod movetur; uniformitas vero mobilis est contra motus rationem. But this cannot be said with the heavenly body. For, because nature always tends determinately to one thing, not being open to many, it is impossible that any nature tend to movement as such, in that within every movement there is a certain diversity of form, inasmuch as the thing that moves does not stand in the same way, whereas unity of form of the mobile is contrary to the account of movement. Unde natura nunquam inclinat ad motum propter movere, sed propter aliquid determinatum quod ex motu consequitur; sicut natura gravis inclinat ad quietem in medio, et per consequens inclinat ad motum qui est deorsum, secundum quod tali motu in talem locum pervenitur. Caelum autem non pervenit suo motu in aliquod ubi, ad quod per suam naturam inclinetur, quia quodlibet ubi est principium et finis motus; unde non potest esse suus motus naturalis quasi sequens aliquam inclinationem naturalis virtutis inhaerentis, sicut sursum ferri est motus naturalis ignis. In consequence, nature never inclines to movement for the sake of movement, but for the sake of something definite that follows from the movement; for example, a heavy body inclines by nature to rest in the center, and consequently inclines to a downward motion insofar as it attains that place by that motion. However, the heaven, by its movement, does not attain some where to which it is inclined by its nature, because every where is the beginning and end of a movement; whence its movement cannot be natural as though following the inclination of a natural inherent power, in the way that to be carried upward is the natural movement of fire. Dicitur autem motus circularis esse naturalis caelo, in quantum in sua natura habet aptitudinem ad talem motum; et sic in seipso habet principium talis motus passivum; activum autem principium motus est aliqua substantia separata, ut Deus vel intelligentia vel anima, ut quidam ponunt; quantum enim ad praesentem quaestionem nihil differt. Now, circular movement is said to be natural to the heaven insofar as it has within its nature an aptitude for such a movement; and in this way it has within itself a passive principle for such movement, whereas the active principle of this movement is some separated substance, such as God, or an intelligence, or a soul (as some assert); which does not matter to the question at issue. Ratio ergo permanentiae motus non potest sumi ex natura aliqua caelestis corporis, ex qua tantum est aptitudo ad motum; sed oportet eam sumere ex principio activo separato. Et quia agens omne propter finem agit, oportet considerare quis est finis motus caeli; si namque fini eius congruat quod motus aliquando terminetur, caelum quandoque quiescet; si autem fini eius non competat quies, motus eius erit sempiternus; non enim potest esse quod motus deficiat ex mutatione causae moventis, cum voluntas Dei sit immutabilis sicut etiam natura; et per eam immobilitatem consequantur, si quae sunt causae mediae moventes. Accordingly, no argument for the permanence of this movement can be taken from any nature of the heavenly body, wherein there is only an aptitude for movement, but one must take that from the separated active principle. And seeing that every agent acts for the sake of an end, we must consider what is the end of the heavens’ movement; for if the termination of this motion at some time is congruent with its end, the heavens will at some time rest, whereas if rest is not compatible with its end, its motion will last forever. For it cannot be that it will cease through a change in its moving cause, since God’s will, like his nature, is unchangeable, and through it, whatever intermediate causes produce the heavenly movement may become unchangeable likewise. In hac autem consideratione tria oportet vitare: Now, in making this observation, three things must be avoided. quorum primum est, ne dicamus caelum moveri propter ipsum motum; sicut dicebatur caelum esse propter ipsum esse, in quo Deo assimilatur. Motus enim, ex ipsa sui ratione, repugnat ne possit poni finis, eo quod motus est in aliud tendens; unde non habet rationem finis, sed magis eius quod est ad finem. Cui etiam attestatur quod est actus imperfectus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Finis autem est ultima perfectio. In the first place, we must not say that the heaven is moved for the sake of the movement itself, as we have said that it exists for the sake of its very existence, wherein it becomes like God. For movement by its very account cannot be regarded as an end, since motion is a tendency to something else, so that it does not hold the account of an end, but more of something that is for an end. This is confirmed by the fact that movement is the act of the imperfect, as is said in On the Soul 3, whereas an end is an ultimate perfection. Secundum est, ut non ponatur motus caeli esse propter aliquid vilius; nam cum finis sit unde ratio sumitur, oportet finem praeeminere his quae sunt ad finem. Potest autem contingere quod vilior sit terminus operationis rei nobilioris; non autem ut sit finis intentionis: sicut securitas rustici est terminus quidam, ad quem operatio regis gubernantis terminatur; non tamen regimen regis est ordinatum ad huius rustici securitatem sicut in finem sed in aliquid melius, scilicet in bonum commune. Unde non potest dici, quod generatio istorum inferiorum sit finis motus caeli, etsi sit effectus vel terminus, quia et caelum his inferioribus praeeminet, et motus eius motibus et mutationibus horum. Second, we must not say that the heavenly movement is for the sake of something more base; for, since the end is that whence the account is taken, the end must be more worthy than the things that are for the end. Now, the terminus of the activity of a nobler thing can happen to be more base, but not such that it be the intention’s end; for example, the safety of a peasant is the terminus at which the activity of the king’s government ends, yet the king’s regime is not ordered to the peasant’s safety as its end but to something better, namely, the common good. Consequently, it cannot be admitted that the generation of these lower things is the end of the heavenly movement, although it is its effect or terminus, because both the heaven itself is more excellent than these lower things and its movement than the movements and changes that take place here below. Tertium est, ut non ponatur finis motus caeli aliquid infinitum, quia, ut dicitur in II Metaphys., qui ponit infinitum in causa finali destruit finem et naturam boni. Pertingere enim quod infinitum est, impossibile est. Nihil autem movetur ad id quod impossibile est ipsum consequi, ut dicitur in I Caeli et mundi. Unde non potest dici, quod finis motus caeli sit ut consequatur in actu ubi ad quod est in potentia, licet hoc Avicenna dicere videatur. Hoc enim impossibile est consequi, cum infinitum sit; quia dum in uno ubi fit in actu, erit in potentia ad aliud ubi, in quo prius actu existebat. Third, we must not suppose the end of the heaven’s movement to be something infinite, since to place infinity in a final cause is to destroy the end and the nature of the good, as is said in Metaphysics 2. For it is impossible to reach what is infinite, and nothing moves to what is impossible to attain, as is said in On the Heavens 1. Therefore, it cannot be said that the end of the celestial movement is to attain in act a where to which it is in potency, although Avicenna would seem to say so. For this it cannot possibly obtain, since it is infinite; for while it comes to be actually in one where, it is in potency to another where, in which it was in act before. Oportet ergo finem motus caeli ponere aliquid quod caelum per motum consequi possit, quod sit aliud a motu, et eo nobilius. Therefore, we must assign as the end of the heavenly movement something that the heaven can obtain by its movement, something that is distinct from its movement and nobler than it. Hoc autem dupliciter potest poni. Now, this admits of a twofold solution. Uno modo ut ponatur finis motus caeli aliquid in ipso caelo, quod simul cum motu existit; et secundum hoc a quibusdam philosophis ponitur, quod similitudo ad Deum in causando est finis motus caeli; quod quidem fit ipso motu durante; unde secundum hoc non convenit quod motus caeli deficiat, quia deficiente motu, finis ex motu proveniens cessaret. The first is that we assign as the end of the heavenly movement something in the heavens themselves and coexistent with movement. With this in view, some philosophers held that the end of the heavenly movement is its likeness to God in causing, which takes place during the movement itself. In this view, it is not fitting for this movement to cease, since were it to cease, the end resulting from the movement would cease also. Alio modo potest poni finis motus caeli aliquid extra caelum, ad quod pervenitur per motum caeli; quo cessante illud potest remanere: et haec est nostra positio. The second solution is that we assign as the end of the heavenly movement something outside the heaven that is obtained by that movement, and which can remain when that movement ceases, and this is the view that we adopt. Ponimus enim quod motus caeli est propter implendum numerum electorum. Anima namque rationalis quolibet corpore nobilior est, et ipso caelo. Unde nullum est inconveniens, si ponatur finis motus caeli multiplicatio rationalium animarum: non autem in infinitum, quia hoc per motum caeli provenire non posset; et sic moveretur ad aliquid quod consequi non potest; unde relinquitur quod determinata multitudo animarum rationalium sit finis motus caeli. Unde ea habita motus caeli cessabit. For we hold that the movement of the heavens is for the completion of the number of the elect. For the rational soul is nobler than any body whatsoever, even than the heavens itself. Therefore, there is nothing incongruous in supposing that the end of the heavenly movement is the multiplication of rational souls—not, of course, into infinity, since this could not result from the movement of the heavens, and in this way it could move to something that it could not obtain. Therefore, it is a definite multitude of rational souls that is the end of the heavenly movement. Whence, when this is reached, the movement of the heavens will cease. Licet autem utraque positionum praedictarum possit rationabiliter sustineri, tamen secunda, quae fidei est, videtur esse probabilior propter tres rationes. Now, though either of these views can be rationally sustained, still the second, which belongs to faith, seems the more probable for three reasons. Primo quidem, quia nihil differt dicere finem alicuius esse assimilationem ad Deum secundum aliquid, et illud secundum quod assimilatio attenditur; sicut supra dictum est, quod finis rerum posset dici vel ipsa assimilatio divinae bonitatis, vel esse rerum, secundum quod res Deo assimilantur. Idem ergo est dictu, finem motus caeli esse assimilari Deo in causando et causare. Causare autem non potest esse finis, cum sit operatio habens operatum et tendens in aliud: huiusmodi enim operationibus meliora sunt operata, ut dicitur in principio Ethic.; unde huiusmodi factiones non possunt esse fines agentium, cum non sint perfectiones facientium, sed magis factorum; unde et ipsa facta sunt magis fines, ut patet IX Metaph., et in I Ethic. Ipsa autem operata non sunt fines, cum sint viliora caelo, ut supra dictum est. Unde relinquitur non convenienter dici, quod finis motus caeli sit assimilari ad Deum in causando. First, because it does not matter whether we say that a certain thing’s end is its likeness to God in some particular respect, or that thing itself insofar as this likeness is attended to, just as we have said above that the end of things may be said to be either their very likening to God’s goodness, or the being of the things as becoming like God. Therefore, to say that the end of the heavenly motion is to be like God in causing is the same as to say that it is to cause. Now, to cause cannot be an end, since it is an activity that implies an effect and tends to something else; for in such activities, the effect is better than the activity, as is said in the Ethics 1; whence such actions cannot be the ends of their agents, for they do not perfect the makers but rather the things made; whence also the very things made are more the ends, as is clear in Metaphysics 9 and Ethics 1. Now, the very things that are brought about are not the ends, since they are more base than the heavens, as stated above. Therefore, it is incongruous to hold that the end of the heavenly movement is likeness to God in causing. Secundo vero, quia cum caelum moveatur in ipso existente sola aptitudine ad motum, principio vero activo existente extra, ut dictum est; movetur et agit sicut instrumentum; haec est enim dispositio instrumenti, ut patet in artificialibus, nam in securi est sola aptitudo ad talem motum; principium autem motus in artifice est. Unde et secundum philosophos, quod movet motum, movet ut instrumentum. In actione autem quae est per instrumentum, non potest esse finis aliquis in ipso instrumento nisi per accidens, in quantum instrumentum accipitur ut artificiatum et non ut instrumentum; unde non est probabile quod finis motus caeli sit aliqua perfectio ipsius, sed magis aliquid extra ipsum. Second, since the heavens are moved by an external active principle, while the heavens themselves have merely the aptitude for that movement, as stated above, it follows that the heavens are moved and act as an instrument; for such is the disposition of an instrument, as may be seen in the productions of art, for an axe has nothing more than the aptitude for its particular movement, while the principle of this movement is in the craftsman. Hence, as philosophers say, that which moves through being itself moved, moves as an instrument. Now, in an action that occurs through an instrument, there cannot be any end in the instrument, save accidentally insofar as the instrument is considered as a thing made and not as an instrument. Consequently, it is not probable that the end of the heavenly movement is some perfection of the heavens; rather, it is something outside the heavens. Tertio, quia si similitudo ad Deum in causando est finis motus caeli, praecipue attenditur haec similitudo secundum causalitatem eius quod a Deo immediate causatur, scilicet animae rationalis, ad cuius causalitatem concurrit caelum et per motum suum materiam disponendo. Et ideo probabilius est quod finis motus caeli sit numerus electorum quam assimilatio ad Deum in causalitate generationis et corruptionis, secundum quod philosophi ponunt. Et ideo concedimus quod motus caeli completo numero electorum finietur. Third, if likeness to God in causing is the end of the heavenly movement, this likeness will be found chiefly in the causality of that which is caused by God immediately, namely, that of the rational soul, to the causality of which the heavenly movement conduces also by disposing its matter. And therefore it is more probable that the end of the heavenly movement is the number of the elect than that it is its becoming like God in causing generation and corruption, as the philosophers say. For this reason, we grant that the heavens’ motion will end when the number of the elect is complete. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod loquitur de duratione terrae secundum quod est transmutationi subiecta; sic enim in ea seminatur et metitur. Tali autem statu terrae durante motus caeli non cessabit. Reply Obj. 1: The text refers to the duration of the earth as subject to change, for it is thus that it receives the seed and gives the harvest. So long as the earth is in that state, the heavens will not cease to be in motion. Ad secundum dicendum, quod auctoritas illa non est intelligenda de Israel carnali, sed de Israel spirituali; non tamen secundum quod est in patria coram Deo, contemplando ipsum per speciem, sed secundum quod est in via coram Deo per fidem; ut sic idem sit quod dicitur hic, et quod dominus discipulis loquens ait, Matth. XXVIII, 20: ecce ego vobiscum sum usque ad consummationem saeculi. Reply Obj. 2: The text quoted refers not to the carnal Israel, but to the spiritual Israel, yet not as in God’s presence by contemplating him through his species in the heavenly fatherland, but as a wayfarer in the presence of God by faith. Therefore, the words of the text resemble those of our Lord to his disciples: behold I am with you . . . until the consummation of the world (Matt 28:20). Ad tertium dicendum, quod haec praepositio “propter” denotat causam; unde quandoque denotat causam finalem, quae est posterior in esse; quandoque autem materialem vel efficientem, quae sunt prior. Cum autem dicitur in rebus incorruptibilibus, actus sunt propter agentia, ly “propter” non denotat causam finalem, sed causam efficientem, ex qua est necessitas ibi, et non ex fine. Motus ergo caeli si comparetur ad ipsum mobile, non habet ex eo necessitatem sicut ex causa efficiente, ut ostensum est; habet autem hanc necessitatem ex movente. Quod, quia est voluntarie movens, secundum hoc necessitatem in motu inducit secundum quod determinatum est per ordinem sapientiae divinae, et non ad moveri semper. Reply Obj. 3: The preposition propter (“for the sake of”) indicates a cause: whence sometimes it indicates a final cause, which is posterior in being, and sometimes it indicates a material or efficient cause, which are prior. Now, when it is stated that, in incorruptible things, acts are for the sake of the agents, “for the sake of” indicates not the final cause, but the efficient cause, due to which necessity is present, and not due to the end. Accordingly, the celestial movement, if we refer it to the mobile itself, does not have its necessity from it as from its efficient cause, as we have proved; however, it does have this necessity from a mover, which, being a voluntary mover, does induce this necessity in the motion to the degree that it has been determined by the order of divine wisdom, and not so as to move forever.