Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum relationes dictae de Deo ab aeterno, quae importantur his nominibus Pater et Filius, sint relationes reales, vel rationis tantum Whether the relations said of God from eternity that are indicated by the names “Father” and “Son” are real or only relations of account or reason Primo quaeritur utrum relationes dictae de Deo ab aeterno, quae importantur his nominibus Pater et Filius, sint relationes reales, vel rationis tantum. The first point of inquiry is whether the relations said of God from eternity that are indicated by the names “Father” and “Son” are real or only relations of account or reason. Et videtur quod non sint reales. Quia, ut dicit Damascenus, in substantiali Trinitate commune quidem et unum re consideratur, cognitione vero et intellectu est quod diversum vel distinctum est. Sed distinctio personarum fit per relationes. Ergo relationes in divinis sunt rationis tantum. Obj. 1: It would seem that they are not real. For according to Damascene, in the substantial Trinity one contemplates a common and single reality that is distinguished or diverse by our knowledge and understanding. Now, the persons are distinct by their relations. Therefore, in God, the relations are merely ones of reason. Praeterea, Boetius dicit: similis est relatio Patris ad Filium in Trinitate, et utriusque ad Spiritum Sanctum, ut eius quod est idem ad id quod idem est. Sed relatio identitatis est rationis tantum. Ergo et relatio paternitatis et filiationis. Obj. 2: Boethius says: relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son and of both to the Holy Spirit is like the relation of the same to the same. Now, a relation of identity is purely one of reason. Therefore, such are the relations of paternity and filiation. Praeterea, in Deo ad creaturam non est relatio realis, propter hoc quod Deus sine sui mutatione creaturas producit, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed multo magis sine mutatione producit Pater Filium, et Filius procedit a Patre. Ergo non est aliqua realis relatio Patris ad Filium in divinis, vel e contrario. Obj. 3: In God there is no real relation to the creature, because he produced creatures without any change in himself, as Augustine says. Now, much more true is it that the Father produced the Son and the Son proceeded from the Father without any change. Therefore, in God there is no real relation in the Father to the Son, or vice versa. Praeterea, ea quae non sunt perfecta, Deo non attribuuntur, sicut privatio, materia et motus. Sed relatio inter omnia entia habet debilius esse intantum quod eam quidam aestimaverunt de secundis intellectis, ut patet per Commentatorem. Ergo in Deo esse non potest. Obj. 4: Things that are not perfect, such as privation, matter, and movement, are not attributed to God. Now, of all things relation has the weakest being, so much so that some have reckoned it among the secondary things understood, according to the Commentator. Therefore, there can be no relation in God. Praeterea, omnis relatio in creaturis compositionem facit cum eo cuius est relatio: non enim potest una res alteri inesse sine compositione. Sed in Deo nulla compositio esse potest. Ergo in eo non potest esse realis relatio. Obj. 5: In creatures, there is always composition of the relation and its subject, for one thing cannot inhere to another without composition. Now, there can be no composition in God. Therefore, there cannot be real relation in him. Praeterea, simplicissima seipsis differunt. Sed divinae personae sunt simplicissimae. Ergo seipsis differunt, et non per relationes aliquas; ergo non oportet relationes in Deo ponere, cum ad nihil aliud ponantur nisi ad distinguendas personas. Obj. 6: Things that are most simple differ from one another by themselves. Now, the divine persons are most simple. Therefore, they differ by themselves and not by any relations; and consequently, there is no need of putting relations in God, since the only reason for doing so is to distinguish the persons. Praeterea, sicut relationes sunt proprietates personarum divinarum, ita attributa absoluta sunt proprietates essentiae. Sed attributa absoluta sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum. Ergo relationes sunt in Deo secundum rationem et non reales. Obj. 7: Just as the relations are properties of the divine persons, so are the absolute attributes properties of the essence. Now, the absolute attributes are in God only according to reason. Therefore, the relations in God are merely according to reason and not real. Praeterea, perfectum est cui nihil deest, ut dicitur III Phys. Sed substantia divina est perfectissima. Ergo nihil quod ad perfectionem pertineat, ei deest. Superfluum est ergo ponere relationes in Deo. Obj. 8: A perfect thing lacks nothing, as is said in Physics 3. Now, the divine substance is most perfect and consequently lacks nothing that pertains to perfection. Therefore, there is no need to place relations in God. Praeterea, cum Deus sit summum rerum principium et ultimus finis, ea quae oportet in alia priora reduci, in Deo esse non possunt, sed solum ea ad quae alia reducuntur: sicut esse mobile reducitur ad immobile, et per accidens ad per se; et propter hoc Deus non movetur, nec est in eo aliquod accidens. Sed omne quod dicitur ad aliud, reducitur ad absolutum quod ad se est. Ergo nihil est in Deo ad aliud, sed solum ad se tantum dictum. Obj. 9: Seeing that God is the highest beginning and last end of realities, anything that is reducible to something previous cannot be in God but only those things to which others are reduced. For example, the movable is reducible to the immovable and the accidental to the essential; thus, God is not moved and nothing in him is accidental. Now, everything that denotes “to-another” being is reducible to absolute, what is “to-itself.” Therefore, in God, nothing is to-another, but all is spoken of as to-itself only. Praeterea, Deum esse per se necesse est. Sed omne quod est per se necesse esse, est absolutum: relativum enim non potest esse sine correlativo. Quod autem est per se necesse esse, etiam alio remoto esse potest. Ergo in Deo non est aliqua relatio realis. Obj. 10: Through himself God exists of necessity. Now, everything that through itself exists of necessity is absolute, for the relative cannot exist without its correlative. But that which through itself exists of necessity does not cease to exist when something else is removed. Therefore, no real relation is in God. Praeterea, omnis relatio realis, ut in praecedenti quaestione, est habitum, consequitur aliquam quantitatem vel actionem vel passionem. Sed quantitas in Deo non est: dicimus enim Deum sine quantitate magnum, ut Augustinus dicit. Numerus etiam in eo non est, ut dicit Boetius, quem relatio consequi posset, etsi ponatur numerus quem relatio facit. Oportet ergo, si est relatio realis in Deo, quod competat Deo secundum aliquam eius actionem. Non autem potest secundum actionem qua creaturas producit, quia in quaestione praecedenti, est habitum quod in Deo non est realis relatio ad creaturam. Nec iterum secundum actionem personalem quae ponitur in divinis, sicut est generare: nam cum generare in divinis non sit nisi suppositi distincti, distinctionem autem sola relatio facit in divinis, oportet praeintelligere relationem tali actioni; et sic relatio talem actionem consequi non potest. Restat ergo, si aliquam actionem consequatur relatio realiter in Deo existens quod consequatur actionem eius aeternam vel essentialem quae est intelligere et velle. Sed etiam hoc esse non potest: huiusmodi enim actionem consequitur relatio intelligentis ad intellectum, quae in Deo reales non sunt, — alias oporteret quod intelligens et intellectum realiter in divinis distinguerentur, — quod patet esse falsum, quia utrumque de singulis personis praedicatur: non solum enim Pater est intelligens, sed et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus; similiter et quilibet eorum est in intellectu. Nulla ergo relatio realis in Deo esse potest, ut videtur. Obj. 11: As stated in the preceding question, every real relation arises from some quantity or action or passion. But there is no quantity in God, for in the words of Augustine, God is great without quantity. Nor is there number in him, as Boethius says, from which relations could arise (although there is a number resulting from relations). Hence, if there be real relations in God, they must be attributed to him in respect of some action of his. This cannot be, however, in respect of the action by which he brings creatures into being, since in the preceding question it was proved that there is no real relation in God to creatures. Nor again in respect of a personal action ascribed to God, such as generation, for seeing that in God to beget belongs to a distinct hypostasis, and distinction arises only from relation, it will be necessary for the relation to precede such an action; and thus, it cannot result from it. Accordingly, we must conclude that if any real relation in God arises from his action, it must be consequent upon his eternal or essential action of understanding or willing. But even this is impossible, since such an action results in the relation between the one who understands and the thing understood, and such a relation in God cannot be real, or else in God he who understands and what he understands would be really distinct—which is clearly false, since each is predicated of each person, for not only does the Father understand but so do the Son and the Holy Spirit; and likewise, each of them is understood. Therefore, it seems that no real relation is in God. Praeterea, ratio naturalis humana potest pervenire ad cognitionem divini intellectus; probatum est enim demonstrative a philosophis quod Deus est intelligentia. Si ergo actionem intellectus consequantur relationes reales, quae in divinis personas distinguere dicuntur, videtur quod per rationem humanam Trinitas personarum inveniri posset, et sic non esset articulus fidei: nam fides est sperandarum substantia rerum, argumentum non apparentium. Obj. 12: Man’s natural reason can attain to the knowledge of the divine mind, for it has been demonstrated by philosophers that God is an intelligence. If, then, real relations, which in God are said to distinguish the persons, arise from the action of the intellect, it would seem possible for human reason to discover the Trinity of persons, and this would no longer be an article of faith. For faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not (Heb 11:1). Praeterea, relativa opposita contra alia opposita dividuntur. In Deo autem alia genera oppositionis poni non possunt. Ergo nec relatio. Obj. 13: Relative opposition is divided against other kinds of opposition, and the latter cannot be ascribed to God. Neither, therefore, can relative opposition. Sed contra, Boetius dicit, quod sola relatio multiplicat Trinitatem. Haec autem multiplicatio non est secundum rationem tantum, sed secundum rem, ut patet per Augustinum, qui dicit, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt tres res. Ergo oportet quod relatio sit in divinis non solum rationis, sed etiam rei. On the contrary (1), Boethius says that relation alone multiplies the Trinity. Now, this multiplication is not merely according to reason but is according to reality, for as Augustine says, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three realities. Therefore, the relations in God are not merely relations of reason but relations of reality. Praeterea, nulla res constituitur nisi per rem. Sed relationes in divinis sunt proprietates constituentes personas; persona autem est nomen rei. Ergo oportet et relationes in divinis res esse. Furthermore (2), that which is real is constituted by something real. Now, the relations in God are properties which constitute the persons; and “person” signifies something real. Therefore, the divine relations also must be real. Praeterea, perfectior est generatio in divinis quam in creaturis. Sed ad generationem in creaturis sequitur relatio realis, scilicet patris et filii. Ergo multo fortius in divinis sunt relationes reales. Furthermore (3), generation is more perfect in God than in creatures. Now, in creatures generation produces a real relation, namely, that of father and son. Therefore, a fortiori relations in God are real. Respondeo dicendum quod, sententiam fidei Catholicae sequentes, oportet dicere in divinis relationes reales esse. Ponit enim fides Catholica tres personas in Deo unius essentiae. Numerus autem omnis aliquam distinctionem consequitur: unde oportet quod in Deo sit aliqua distinctio non solum respectu creaturarum, quae a Deo per essentiam differunt, sed etiam respectu alicuius in divina essentia subsistentis. I answer that those who follow the teaching of the Catholic faith must hold that the relations in God are real. For the Catholic faith teaches that there are in God three persons of one essence. Now, every number results from some kind of distinction; therefore, in God there must be some distinction not only in respect of creatures, who differ from him in nature, but also in respect of someone subsisting in the divine nature. Haec autem distinctio non potest esse secundum aliquod absolutum: quia quidquid absolute in divinis praedicatur, Dei essentiam significat; unde sequeretur quod personae divinae per essentiam distinguerentur, quod est haeresis Arii. Relinquitur ergo quod per sola relativa distinctio in divinis personis attenditur. But this distinction cannot regard anything absolute, since whatsoever is predicated of God absolutely denotes the divine essence; whence it would follow that the divine persons differ essentially, which is the heresy of Arius. It follows, then, that the divine persons are distinct only by their relations. Haec tamen distinctio non potest esse rationis tantum: quia ea quae sunt sola ratione distincta, nihil prohibet de se invicem praedicari, sicut dicimus principium esse finem, quia punctum unum secundum rem est principium et finis, licet ratione differat; et ita sequeretur quod Pater est Filius et Filius Pater, quia, cum nomina imponantur ad significandum rationes nominum, sequeretur quod personae in divinis non distinguerentur nisi secundum nomina: quod est haeresis Sabelliana. Now, this distinction cannot be merely one of reason, because things that are only distinct by reason or account can be predicated of one another; thus, we say that the beginning is the end because one point in reality is both beginning and end [of a line], although they differ in account. Hence, it would follow that the Father is the Son and the Son the Father, because seeing that names are given in order to signify the accounts of names, it would follow that the divine persons differ only in name, which is the heresy of Sabellius. Relinquitur ergo quod oportet dicere, relationes in Deo quasdam res esse: quod qualiter sit, sequendo sanctorum dicta, investigari oportet, licet ad plenum ad hoc ratio pervenire non possit. It remains thus to be said that the relations in God are something real: how this may be, we must endeavor to discover by following the statements of holy men, although reason is unable to reach this fully. Sciendum est ergo, quod cum realis relatio intelligi non possit, nisi consequens quantitatem vel actionem seu passionem, oportet quod aliquo istorum modorum ponamus in Deo relationem esse. We must observe, then, that since a real relation cannot be conceived unless it arise from quantity or from action or passion, it follows that we must posit relation in God according to one of these modes. In Deo autem quantitas esse non potest, neque continua neque discreta, nec aliquid cum quantitate similitudinem habens, nisi multitudo quam relatio facit, cui oportet relationem praeintelligere, et unitas quae essentiae competit, ad quam relatio consequens non est realis, sed rationis tantum; sicut relatio quam importat hoc nomen idem, ut supra dictum est. Now, in God there cannot be quantity, either continuous or discrete, nor anything bearing a likeness to quantity—except the multitude that relation makes, which presupposes relation, and the unity that belongs to the essence, the consequent relation of which is not real but merely a relation of reason, like the relation implied in the word “same,” as we have stated in the preceding question. Relinquitur ergo quod oportet in eo ponere relationem actionem consequentem. Actionem dico non quae in aliquod patiens transeat: quia in Deo nihil potest esse patiens, cum non sit ibi materia; ad id autem quod est extra Deum, non est in Deo realis relatio, ut ostensum est. It follows, then, that we ascribe to God the relation that arises from action—not indeed the action that passes into something passive, since nothing is passive in God, in whom there is no matter, and there is no relation in God to what is outside him, as we have proved. Relinquitur ergo quod consequatur relatio realis in Deo actionem manentem in agente: cuiusmodi actiones sunt intelligere et velle in Deo. Sentire enim, cum organo corporeo compleatur, Deo non potest competere, qui est omnino incorporeus. Et propter hoc dicit Dionysius, quod in Deo est paternitas perfecta, idest non corporaliter nec materialiter, sed intelligibiliter. Intelligens autem in intelligendo ad quatuor potest habere ordinem: scilicet ad rem quae intelligitur, ad speciem intelligibilem, qua fit intellectus in actu, ad suum intelligere, et ad conceptionem intellectus. Consequently, real relation in God must follow the action that remains in the agent, and in God these are understanding and willing. For sensing, through being accomplished through of a corporeal organ, cannot be attributed to God, who is wholly incorporeal. For this reason, Dionysius says that in God, fatherhood is perfected, that is, not corporeally or materially but intelligibly. Now, the one who understands may have an order to four things in understanding: namely, to the reality understood, to the intelligible species by which his intelligence is made actual, to his act of understanding, and to his intellectual conception. Quae quidem conceptio a tribus praedictis differt. This conception in fact differs from the other three things. A re quidem intellecta, quia res intellecta est interdum extra intellectum, conceptio autem intellectus non est nisi in intellectu; et iterum conceptio intellectus ordinatur ad rem intellectam sicut ad finem: propter hoc enim intellectus conceptionem rei in se format ut rem intellectam cognoscat. It differs from the reality understood because the latter is sometimes outside the intellect whereas the intellectual conception is only within the intellect. Moreover, the intellectual conception is ordered to the reality understood as to its end, inasmuch as the intellect forms its conception of the reality that it may know the reality understood. Differt autem a specie intelligibili: nam species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis intellectus, cum omne agens agat secundum quod est in actu; actu autem fit per aliquam formam, quam oportet esse actionis principium. It differs from the intelligible species because the latter, which makes the intellect actual, is considered as the principle of the intellect’s action, since every agent acts insofar as it is in act, and it becomes actual by a form, which is necessary as a principle of action. Differt autem ab actione intellectus: quia praedicta conceptio consideratur ut terminus actionis, et quasi quoddam per ipsam constitutum. Intellectus enim sua actione format rei definitionem, vel etiam propositionem affirmativam seu negativam. And it differs from the act of the intellect because it is considered as the terminus of the action and, as it were, something effected thereby. For the intellect by its action forms a definition of the reality, or even an affirmative or negative proposition. Haec autem conceptio intellectus in nobis proprie verbum dicitur: hoc enim est quod verbo exteriori significatur: vox enim exterior neque significat ipsum intellectum, neque speciem intelligibilem, neque actum intellectus, sed intellectus conceptionem qua mediante refertur ad rem. Now, this intellectual conception in us is called properly a “word,” because this is what is signified by the exterior word. For the external vocal sound signifies neither the intellect itself, nor the intelligible species, nor the act of the intellect, but rather the conception of the intellect by means of which it is carried to the reality. Huiusmodi ergo conceptio, sive verbum, qua intellectus noster intelligit rem aliam a se, ab alio exoritur, et aliud repraesentat. Oritur quidem ab intellectu per suum actum; est vero similitudo rei intellectae. Cum vero intellectus seipsum intelligit, verbum praedictum, sive conceptio, eiusdem est propago et similitudo, scilicet intellectus seipsum intelligentis. Et hoc ideo contingit, quia effectus similatur causae secundum suam formam: forma autem intellectus est res intellecta. Et ideo verbum quod oritur ab intellectu, est similitudo rei intellectae, sive sit idem quod intellectus, sive aliud. Accordingly, this conception or word, by which our intellect understands a reality distinct from itself, originates from another and represents another. It originates from the intellect through the intellect’s own act, and it is the likeness of the reality understood. Now, when the intellect understands itself, this same word or conception is a progeny and likeness of itself, that is of the intellect understanding its very self. And this happens because the effect is like its cause in respect of its form, and the form of the intellect is the reality understood. Therefore, the word that originates from the intellect is the likeness of the reality understood, whether this be the intellect itself or something else. Huiusmodi autem verbum nostri intellectus, est quidem extrinsecum ab esse ipsius intellectus (non enim est de essentia, sed est quasi passio ipsius), non tamen est extrinsecum ab ipso intelligere intellectus, cum ipsum intelligere compleri non possit sine verbo praedicto. And this word of our intellect is extrinsic to the existence of the intellect itself (for it is not of its essence but, as it were, a passion of it), yet it is not extrinsic to the intellect’s very act of intelligence, since the understanding cannot itself be completed without the aforesaid word. Si ergo aliquis intellectus sit cuius intelligere sit suum esse, oportebit quod illud verbum non sit extrinsecum ab esse ipsius intellectus, sicut nec ab intelligere. Huiusmodi autem est intellectus divinus: in Deo enim idem est esse et intelligere. Oportet ergo quod eius verbum non sit extra essentiam eius, sed ei coessentiale. If, then, there is an intellect whose act of understanding is its own existence, it follows that this word is not extrinsic to the existence of that intellect, even as it is not extrinsic to its act of understanding. Such is the divine intellect, since in God to be and to understand are the same thing. Therefore, his word is not outside his essence, but is coessential with it. Sic ergo in Deo potest inveniri origo alicuius ex aliquo, scilicet verbi et proferentis verbum, unitate essentiae servata. Ubicumque enim est origo alicuius ab aliquo, ibi oportet ponere realem relationem vel tantum ex parte eius quod oritur, quando non accipit eamdem naturam quam habet suum principium, sicut patet in exortu creaturae a Deo; vel ex parte utriusque, quando scilicet oriens attingit ad naturam sui principii, sicut patet in hominum generatione, ubi relatio realis est et in patre et in filio. Verbum autem in divinis est coessentiale suo principio, ut ostensum est. Relinquitur ergo quod in divinis sit realis relatio et ex parte Verbi et ex parte proferentis Verbum. Accordingly, in God we find the origin of someone from someone else, namely, a word and one sending forth the word, with the unity of essence preserved. For whenever one thing is the origin of another, there must be a real relation—either only on the part of that which originates, when it does not receive the same nature that its principle has (as is apparent in the creature’s origination from God), or on the part of both, namely, when that which originates attains the nature of its own principle (as is apparent in the generation of human beings, where a real relation is in both the father and the son). Now, in the divine, the Word is coessential with its principle, as we have shown. It follows, then, that in God there is a real relation both on the part of the Word and on the part of the one bringing forth the Word.