Praeterea, natura est tantum in rebus mobilibus: est enim principium motus, ut dicitur in II Phys. Sed essentia est tam in rebus mobilibus quam in immobilibus. Ergo convenientius fuit in definitione personae ponere essentiam quam naturam, cum etiam persona inveniatur tam in rebus mobilibus quam in immobilibus: est enim in hominibus, in angelis et in Deo. Obj. 11: Nature is only in movable things, since it is the principle of movement, as is said in Physics 2. Now, essence is in things both movable and immovable. Therefore, it were better in defining person to include essence rather than nature, seeing that person is found both in movable and immovable things, since person is found in men, angels, and God. Praeterea, definitio debet converti cum definito. Non autem omne quod est rationalis naturae individua substantia, est persona. Essentia enim divina, secundum quod est essentia, non est persona, alioquin esset in Deo una persona, sicut est una essentia. Ergo inconvenienter definitur persona definitione praedicta. Obj. 12: The definition should be convertible with the thing defined. Now, not every individual substance of rational nature is a person. For the divine essence as an essence is not a person, or else in God there would be one person just as there is one essence. Therefore, the aforesaid definition of person is unsuitable. Praeterea, humana natura in Christo est rationalis naturae individua substantia: neque enim est accidens, neque universalis substantia, neque irrationalis naturae; non tamen humana natura in Christo est persona: sequeretur enim quod persona divina quae assumpsit humanam naturam, assumpsisset humanam personam; et sic essent in Christo duae personae, scilicet divina assumens, et humana assumpta; quod est haeresis Nestorianae. Non ergo omnis individua substantia rationalis naturae est persona. Obj. 13: The human nature in Christ is an individual substance of rational nature, for it is neither an accident nor a universal substance nor is it of irrational nature; and yet in Christ it is not a person, since it would follow that the divine person in assuming human nature assumed a human person. Thus, there would be two persons in Christ, the divine person assuming and the human person assumed, which is the heresy of Nestorius. Therefore, not every individual substance of rational nature is a person. Praeterea, anima separata a corpore per mortem, non dicitur esse persona; et tamen est rationalis naturae individua substantia. Non ergo haec est conveniens definitio personae. Obj. 14: The soul separated by death from the body is not said to be a person, yet it is an individual substance of rational nature. Therefore, this is not a suitable definition of person. Respondeo dicendum quod rationabiliter, individuum in genere substantiae speciale nomen sortitur: quia substantia ex propriis principiis individuatur,—et non ex alio extraneo,—sicut accidens ex subiecto. Inter individua etiam substantiarum rationabiliter individuum in rationali natura, speciali nomine nominatur, quia ipsius est proprie et vere per se agere, sicut supra dictum est. I answer that, as explained above, it is reasonable that the individual in the genus of substance should have a special name, because a substance is individualized by its proper principles and not by something extraneous, as an accident is by its subject. Again, it is reasonable that among individual substances also the individual of rational nature should have a special name, because (as stated above) it belongs to it properly and truly to act through itself. Sicut ergo hoc nomen hypostasis, secundum Graecos, vel substantia prima secundum Latinos, est speciale nomen individui in genere substantiae; ita hoc nomen persona, est speciale nomen individui rationalis naturae. Utraque ergo specialitas sub nomine personae continetur. Therefore, just as the word “hypostasis” according to the Greeks or “first substance” according to the Latins is the special name of an individual in the genus of substance, even so the word “person” is the special name of an individual of rational nature, so that person is a special name under both these heads. Et ideo ad ostendendum quod est specialiter individuum in genere substantiae, dicitur quod est substantia individua; ad ostendendum vero quod est specialiter in rationali natura, additur rationalis naturae. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur substantia, excluduntur a ratione personae accidentia quorum nullum potest dici persona. Per hoc vero quod dicitur individua, excluduntur genera et species in genere substantiae quae etiam personae dici non possunt; per hoc vero quod additur rationalis naturae, excluduntur inanimata corpora, plantae et bruta quae personae non sunt. Hence, to indicate that it is in a special manner an individual in the genus of substance, it is stated that it is “an individual substance”; and to indicate that it is in a special manner an individual of rational nature, it is added, “of rational nature.” Accordingly, by describing it as a substance, we exclude accidents from the account of person, for no accident can be a person, and by adding “individual,” we exclude genera and species in the genus of substance, since they cannot be called persons; and by adding “of rational nature,” we exclude inanimate bodies, plants, and beasts, which are not persons. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod in substantia particulari, est tria considerare: quorum unum est natura generis et speciei in singularibus existens; secundum est modus existendi talis naturae, quia in singulari substantia existit natura generis et speciei, ut propria huic individuo, et non ut multis communis; tertium est principium ex quo causatur talis modus existendi. Sicut autem natura in se considerata communis est, ita et modus existendi naturae; non enim invenitur natura hominis existens in rebus nisi aliquo singulari individuata: non enim est homo qui non sit aliquis homo, nisi secundum opinionem Platonis, qui ponebat universalia separata. Sed principium talis modi existendi quod est principium individuationis, non est commune; sed aliud est in isto, et aliud in illo; hoc enim singulare individuatur per hanc materiam, et illud per illam. Sicut ergo nomen quod significat naturam, est commune et definibile,—ut homo vel animal,—ita nomen quod significat naturam cum tali modo existendi, ut hypostasis vel persona. Illud vero nomen quod in sua significatione includit determinatum individuationis principium, non est commune nec definibile, ut Socrates et Plato. Reply Obj. 1: Three points are to be noted in an individual substance; first, the generic and specific nature existing in the individual; second, such a nature’s mode of existence, inasmuch as the generic and specific nature in the individual substance exists as proper to that individual and not as common to many; third, the principle whence is caused this mode of existence. Now, just as a nature considered in itself is common, so too is that nature’s mode of existence, for we do not find human nature existing in things except as individualized in this or that man; for there is no man that is not a particular man, except in the opinion of Plato, who posited separate universals. But the principle of that mode of existence, namely, the principle of individuation, is not common but differs in each individual, for this particular thing is individualized by this matter and that one by that matter. Accordingly, just as the term denoting the nature is common and definable, like man or animal, so too is the term denoting the nature together with such a mode of existence, for example, hypostasis or person. On the other hand, the term that includes in its signification a determinate principle of individuation is neither common nor definable, like Socrates or Plato. Ad secundum dicendum, quod non solum intentio singularitatis est communis omnibus individuis substantiis, sed etiam natura generis cum tali modo existendi; et hoc modo significat hoc nomen hypostasis naturam generis substantiae ut individuatam; hoc autem nomen persona solum naturam rationalem sub tali modo existendi. Et propter hoc neque hypostasis neque persona est nomen intentionis, sicut singulare vel individuum, sed nomen rei tantum; non autem rei et intentionis simul. Reply Obj. 2: Not only is the intention of singularity common to all individual substances, but also the generic nature together with that particular mode of existence. In this way, the term “hypostasis” denotes a nature of the genus of substance as individuated, while the term “person” denotes only a rational nature with that particular mode of existence. For this reason neither “hypostasis” nor “person” is a term of intention, like “singular” and “individual,” but denotes a real thing only, and not a real thing together with an intention. Unde patet solutio ad tertium et quartum. Reply to Obj. 3–4: This suffices for the replies to the third and fourth objections. Ad quintum dicendum quod, quia essentiales rerum differentiae sunt ignotae frequenter et innominatae, oportet interdum uti accidentalibus differentiis ad substantiales differentias designandas, sicut docet Philosophus, et hoc modo individuum ponitur in definitione personae, ad designandum individualem modum essendi. Reply Obj. 5: While the essential differences of things are often unknown and unnamed, we are sometimes under the necessity of employing accidental differences to denote substantial distinctions, as the Philosopher teaches. Thus it is that “individual” is included in the definition of person, in order to indicate an individual mode of existence. Ad sextum dicendum quod, cum dividitur substantia in primam et secundam, non est divisio generis in species,—cum nihil contineatur sub secunda substantia quod non sit in prima,—sed est divisio generis secundum diversos modos essendi. Nam secunda substantia significat naturam generis secundum se absolutam; prima vero substantia significat eam ut individualiter subsistentem. Unde magis est divisio analogi quam generis. Sic ergo persona continetur quidem in genere substantiae, licet non ut species, sed ut specialem modum existendi determinans. Reply Obj. 6: The division of “substance” into first and second is not a division into genus and species, since second substance covers nothing that is not covered by first substance; rather, it is a division of a genus according to different modes of existence. Thus, “second substance” denotes the generic nature in itself absolutely, while “first substance” signifies that nature as individually subsistent; therefore, the division is analogous rather than specific. Accordingly, person is contained in the genus substance, although not as a species, but as defining a specific mode of existence. Ad septimum dicendum, quod quidam dicunt, quod substantia ponitur in definitione personae prout significat hypostasim, sed cum de ratione hypostasis sit individuum, secundum quod opponitur communitati universalis vel parti,—quia nullum universale, nec aliqua pars, ut manus vel pes, potest dici hypostasis,—ulterius de ratione personae est individuum, secundum quod opponitur communitati assumptibilis. Dicunt enim, quod humana natura in Christo est hypostasis, sed non persona. Et ideo ad excludendum assumptibilitatem additur individuum in definitione personae. Reply Obj. 7: Some hold that substance is included in the definition of person inasmuch as substance signifies a hypostasis; but since the account of hypostasis includes “individual” insofar as it is opposed to the community of a universal or to a part—for no universal nor any part of a thing, such as a hand or a foot, can be called a “hypostasis”—they say that “individual” is added in the definition of person inasmuch as “individual” excludes a community of assumability. For they hold that the human nature in Christ is a hypostasis but not a person. Therefore, they say to exclude assumability, “individual” is added in the definition of person. Sed hoc videtur esse contra intentionem Boetii, qui in Lib. de duabus naturis, per hoc quod dicitur individuum, excludit universalia a ratione personae. Et ideo melius est ut dicatur, quod substantia non ponitur in definitione personae pro hypostasi, sed pro eo quod est commune ad substantiam primam, quae est hypostasis, et substantiam secundam, et dividitur in utraque. Et sic illud commune, per hoc quod additur individuum, contrahitur ad hypostasim, ut idem sit dicere: substantia individua rationalis naturae, ac si diceretur hypostasis rationalis naturae. This, however, would seem contrary to the intention of Boethius in On the Two Natures, who by the term “individual” excludes universals from the account of person. Hence, it is better to say that, in the definition of person, “substance” does not stand for “hypostasis” but for that which is common to first substance (that is, hypostasis) and second substance, and is divided into both. Thus, this common substance, by the addition of “individual,” is narrowed down to the hypostasis, and thus to say “individual substance of rational nature” is the same as to say “hypostasis of rational nature.” Ad octavum dicendum quod, secundum praedicta, ratio non procedit: quia substantia accipitur non pro hypostasi, sed pro eo quod est commune ad omnem substantiae acceptionem. Si tamen acciperetur substantia pro hypostasi, adhuc ratio non sequeretur: substantia enim quae est hypostasis, propinquius se habet ad personam quam subsistentia; cum tamen persona dicat aliquid subiectum, sicut substantia prima, et non solum sicut subsistens ut subsistentia. Sed quia nomen substantiae refertur etiam apud Latinos ad significationem essentiae, ideo ad vitandum errorem non dicimus tres substantias, sicut tres subsistentias. Graeci vero apud quos est distinctum nomen hypostasis a nomine ousias indubitanter in Deo tres hypostases confitentur. Reply Obj. 8: In view of what we have just said, this argument does not prove. “Substance” does not stand for “hypostasis” but for that which is common to all substance in whatever sense it be taken. If, however, “substance” were to stand for “hypostasis,” the objection would remain inconclusive, because the substance that is a hypostasis is more akin to a person than is subsistence, since nonetheless “person” signifies some subject, as first substance does, and not merely as subsisting, as a subsistence. But seeing that the term “substance” is employed even by the Latins to denote the essence, therefore in order to avoid error, we do not speak of three substances, as we do of three subsistences. The Greeks, however, who have the word hypostasis as distinct from ousia (οὐσία), do not hesitate to acknowledge three hypostases in God. Ad nonum dicendum quod, sicut dicimus in Deo tres personas, ita possumus dicere tres substantias individuas; unam tamen substantiam quae est essentia. Reply Obj. 9: Just as we speak of three persons in God, so may we speak of three individual substances, yet of only one substance that is the essence. Ad decimum dicendum, quod rationale est differentia animalis, secundum quod ratio, a qua sumitur, significat cognitionem discursivam, qualis est in hominibus, non autem in angelis nec in Deo. Boetius autem sumit rationale communiter pro intellectuali, quod dicimus convenire Deo et angelis et hominibus. Reply Obj. 10: Rational is the difference of animal, inasmuch as “reason,” whence it is taken, denotes discursive knowledge, the sort that is found in man but not in angels nor in God. But Boethius takes “rational” in a broad sense for “intellectual,” and this is common to man, angels, and God. Ad undecimum dicendum quod natura in definitione personae non accipitur prout est principium motus, sicut definitur a Philosopho, sed sicut definitur a Boetio: quod natura est unumquodque informans specifica differentia. Et quia differentia complet definitionem et determinat definitum ad speciem, ideo nomen naturae magis competit in definitione personae—quae specialiter in quibusdam substantiis invenitur—quam nomen essentiae, quod est communissimum. Reply Obj. 11: In the definition of person, “nature” is not to be taken as the principle of movement, in which sense it is defined by the Philosopher, but as defined by Boethius as the specific difference giving each thing its form. And since the difference completes the definition and confines the thing defined to its species, it follows that the term “nature” is more suitable in the definition of person, which is specific to certain substances, than is the term “essence,” which is most common. Ad duodecimum dicendum quod individuum, in definitione personae, sumitur pro eo quod non praedicatur de pluribus; et secundum hoc essentia divina non est individua substantia secundum praedicationem—cum praedicetur de pluribus personis—licet sit individua secundum rem. Richardus tamen de sancto Victore, corrigens definitionem Boetii, secundum quod persona in divinis accipitur, dixit: quod persona est divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia, ut per hoc quod dicitur incommunicabilis, essentia divina, persona non esse, ostenderetur. Reply Obj. 12: In the definition of person, “individual” signifies that which is not predicated of several; and in this sense, the divine essence is not an individual substance by predication, inasmuch as it is predicated of several persons, although it is individual in itself. However, Richard of St. Victor amends the definition of Boethius as applied to the divine persons and says that a person is an incommunicable existence of divine nature, so as to indicate by the term “incommunicable” that the divine essence is not a person. Ad decimumtertium dicendum quod cum substantia individua sit quoddam completum per se existens, humana natura in Christo, cum sit assumpta in personam divinam, non potest dici substantia individua—quae est hypostasis—sicut nec manus nec pes nec aliquid eorum quae non subsistunt per se ab aliis separata; et propter hoc non sequitur quod sit persona. Reply Obj. 13: Seeing that an individual substance is something complete existing through itself, the human nature in Christ, inasmuch as it was assumed into the divine person, cannot be called an individual substance, which is a hypostasis, any more than can a hand, a foot, or anything that does not subsist by itself apart from anything else; and for this reason, it does not follow that it is a person. Ad decimumquartum dicendum quod anima separata est pars rationalis naturae, scilicet humanae, et non tota natura rationalis humana, et ideo non est persona. Reply Obj. 14: The separated soul is a part of rational nature and not a whole rational human nature; wherefore, it is not a person. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum in Deo possit esse persona Whether there can be a person in God Tertio quaeritur utrum in Deo possit esse persona. The third point of inquiry is whether there can be a person in God. Et videtur quod non. Sicut enim dicit Boetius nomen personae sumitur a personando, quia homines larvati personae dicebantur, quia in comoediis vel tragoediis aliquid personabant. Sed esse larvatum non competit Deo, nisi forte metaphorice. Ergo nomen personae non potest dici de Deo, nisi forte metaphorice. Obj. 1: And it seems that there cannot be. For according to Boethius, the word “person” is taken from “personating,” for those wearing masks in comedies and tragedies were called “persons” because they personated something. But it is unbecoming for God to wear a mask, except perhaps metaphorically speaking. Therefore, the term “person” should not be applied to God, except perhaps metaphorically. Praeterea, sicut dicit Damascenus, de nullo eorum quae dicuntur de Deo, possumus scire quid est, prout ei conveniunt. Sed de persona scimus quid est, per definitionem praemissam. Ergo persona non competit Deo, ad minus secundum definitionem praedictam. Obj. 2: As Damascene says, it is impossible for us to know what any of the things are which we ascribe to God insofar as they belong to him. Yet we do know what a person is, by the above-given definition. Therefore, “person” is not applicable to God, at least in the sense of the aforesaid definition. Praeterea, Deus non est in aliquo genere; cum enim sit infinitus, sub nullius generis terminis comprehendi potest. Persona autem significat aliquid quod est in genere substantiae. Ergo persona Deo non convenit. Obj. 3: God is not in a genus, because, since he is infinite, he cannot be confined within the limits of any genus. Now, “person” signifies something in the genus of substance. Therefore, “person” is not to be applied to God. Praeterea, in Deo nulla est compositio. Sed persona significat aliquid compositum; singulare enim humanae naturae, quod est persona, est maximae compositionis; partes etiam definitionis personae demonstrant personam esse compositam. Non est ergo in Deo persona. Obj. 4: There is no composition in God. But “person” signifies something composite, for an individual of human nature, which is a person, is most composite; also, the parts of the definition of person show that person is a composite thing. Therefore, there is no person in God. Praeterea, in Deo nulla est materia. Principium autem individuationis materia est. Cum ergo persona sit substantia individua, non potest Deo convenire. Obj. 5: There is no matter in God. But matter is the principle of individuation. Since, then, a person is an individual substance, the term cannot be applied to God. Praeterea, omnis persona est subsistentia. Sed Deus non potest dici subsistentia, quia non existit sub aliquo. Ergo non est persona. Obj. 6: Every person is a subsistence. But God cannot be called a subsistence, for he is not subject to anything. Therefore, he is not a person. Praeterea, persona sub hypostasi continetur. Sed in Deo non potest esse hypostasis, quia non est in eo aliquod accidens, cum hypostasis dicat subiectum accidentis, ut supra dictum est. Ergo in Deo non est persona. Obj. 7: Person is contained under hypostasis. Now, there cannot be a hypostasis in God, since there are no accidents in him, and hypostasis denotes the subject of an accident, as stated above. Therefore, there is no person in God. Sed contrarium apparet per Athanasium in symbolo quicumque vult, etc., et per Augustinum in VII de Trinit., et per communem Ecclesiae usum, quae a Spiritu Sancto edocta non potest errare. The contrary is plain from the authority of Athanasius in the Creed, quicumque vult, etc., and of Augustine in On the Trinity 7, and from the general usage of the Church, which, being taught by the Holy Spirit, cannot err. Respondeo dicendum quod persona, sicut dictum est, significat quamdam naturam cum quodam modo existendi. Natura autem, quam persona in sua significatione includit, est omnium naturarum dignissima, scilicet natura intellectualis secundum genus suum. Similiter etiam modus existendi quem importat persona est dignissimus, ut scilicet aliquid sit per se existens. I answer that, as stated above, “person” denotes a certain nature with a certain mode of existence. Now, the nature which “person” includes in its signification is of all natures the most dignified, namely, that nature which is intellectual in regard to its genus. Likewise, the mode of existence signified by the word “person” is most dignified, namely, that something exists through itself. Cum ergo omne quod est dignissimum in creaturis, Deo sit attribuendum, convenienter nomen personae Deo attribui potest, sicut et alia nomina quae proprie dicuntur de Deo. Since, then, whatsoever is most dignified in created things should be attributed to God, it is becoming that the word “person” should be attributed to God, like the other terms that are said of God properly. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in nomine aliquo est duo considerare: scilicet, illud ad quod significandum nomen imponitur, et illud a quo imponitur ad significandum. Frequenter enim imponitur nomen aliquod ad significandum rem aliquam, ab aliquo accidente aut actu aut effectu illius rei; quae tamen non sunt principaliter significata per illud nomen, sed potius ipsa rei substantia, vel natura sicut hoc nomen lapis sumitur a laesione pedis, quam tamen non significat, sed potius corpus quoddam in quo tale accidens frequenter invenitur. Unde laesio pedis magis pertinet ad etymologiam huius nominis lapis, quam ad eius significationem. Reply Obj. 1: Two things must be considered in a name: that which it is intended to signify and that from which it is taken for the purpose of signification. For a name is often given to signify a certain reality based on some accident or action or effect of that reality; and yet these are not what are principally signified by the name, but rather the very substance of the reality. Thus, the word lapis (“stone”) is taken from laesio pedis (“hurting of the foot”), yet it does not signify this but rather a body wherein such an accident is frequently found, so that laesio pedis belongs to the etymology of the word lapis rather than to its signification. Quando ergo illud ad quod significandum nomen imponitur, Deo non competit —sed aliqua proprietas eius secundum similitudinem quamdam—tunc illud nomen de Deo metaphorice dicitur: sicut Deus nominatur leo, non quia natura illius animalis Deo conveniat, sed propter fortitudinem quae in leone invenitur. Quando vero res significata per nomen Deo convenit, tunc illud nomen proprie de Deo dicitur, sicut bonum, sapiens et huiusmodi; licet etiam quandoque illud a quo tale nomen imponitur, non conveniat Deo. Sic ergo licet personare ad modum larvati hominis a quo impositum fuit nomen personae, Deo non conveniat, tamen illud quod significatur per nomen, scilicet subsistens in natura intellectuali, competit Deo; et propter hoc nomen personae proprie sumitur in divinis. Accordingly, when it is not the intended signification of a term that is appropriate to God but some property by way of likeness, then such a term is applied to God metaphorically. Thus, God is called a “lion” not because the nature of that animal belongs to God but on account of the strength that is found in a lion. When, however, that which the term signifies does belong to God, it is applied to God in its proper sense, for instance, good, wise, and the like—even though sometimes that based on which such terms are taken does not belong to God. Thus, although to personate—the way one wearing a mask does, on which is based the term “person”—does not belong to God, yet that which the word signifies, namely, that which subsists in an intellectual nature, does belong to God; and for this reason, the term “person” is ascribed to God in its proper sense.