Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis Whether the whole soul is in every part of the body Quarto quaeritur utrum tota anima sit in qualibet parte corporis. Fourth, it is asked whether the whole soul is in every part of the body. Et videtur quod non. Dicit enim Aristoteles in libro De causa motus animalium: nihil opus est in unoquoque corporis esse animam, set in quodam corporis principio existere; in natura autem nihil est frustra; non est ergo anima in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 1: And it would seem that it is not. For Aristotle says in his book On the Motion of Animals that there is no need for the soul to be in any one part of the body, but there is need for it to exist in some principle of the body. Now, in nature nothing is in vain. Therefore, the soul is not in every part of the body. Praeterea. Ex corpore et anima constituitur animal; si igitur in qualibet parte corporis esset anima, quaelibet pars animalis esset animal. Quod est inconveniens. Obj. 2: Furthermore, an animal is made up of body and soul. If, then, the soul were in every part of the body, every part of an animal would be an animal, which is incongruous. Praeterea. In quocumque est subiectum, et proprietas subiecti; sed omnes potentiae animae sunt in essentia animae sicut et proprietates in subiecto; ergo si anima esset in qualibet parte corporis, sequeretur quod in qualibet parte corporis essent omnes potentiae animae: et sic auditus erit in oculo et visus in aure. Quod est inconveniens. Obj. 3: Furthermore, in anything in which a subject is, the property of the subject also is. But all the powers of the soul are in the essence of the soul, just as properties are in a subject. Therefore, if the soul were in every part of the body, it would follow that all the powers of the soul were in every part of the body, and thus hearing will be in the eye and sight in the ear, which is incongruous. Praeterea. Nulla forma quae requirit dissimilitudinem partium invenitur in qualibet parte, ut patet de forma domus, quae non est in qualibet parte domus sed in tota domo. Formae vero quae non requirunt dissimilitudinem partium sunt in singulis partibus, ut forma aeris et ignis; anima autem est forma requirens dissimilitudinem partium, ut patet in omnibus animatis; ergo anima non est in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 4: Furthermore, no form which demands a dissimilarity of parts is found in every part, as is clear regarding the form “house,” which is not in every part of a house but in the house as a whole. But forms which do not demand a dissimilarity of parts are in the individual parts, as, for instance, the form “fire” and the form “air.” Now, the soul is a form that demands a dissimilarity of parts, as is clear in the case of all animate things. Therefore, the soul is not in every part of the body. Praeterea. Nulla forma quae extenditur secundum extensionem materiae est tota in qualibet parte suae materiae. Sed anima extenditur secundum extensionem materiae; dicitur enim in libro De quantitate animae: tantam extimo esse animam quantam eam spatia corporis esse patiuntur. Ergo anima non est tota in qualibet corporis parte. Obj. 5: Furthermore, no form which is extended in correspondence with the extension of matter is entirely in every part of its matter. But the soul is extended in correspondence with the extension of matter. For it is said in the book On the Magnitude of the Soul, I judge the soul to be as large as the extent of the body allows it to be. Therefore, the soul is not entirely in every part of the body. Praeterea. Quod anima sit in qualibet corporis parte praecipue videtur ex hoc quod in qualibet corporis parte agit. Sed anima operatur ubi non est, quia ut Augustinus dicit Ad Volusianum: anima sentit et videt in caelo, ubi non est; non est ergo necessarium animam esse in qualibet corporis parte. Obj. 6: Furthermore, that the soul is in every part of the body seems particularly apparent from the fact that it acts in every part of the body. But the soul acts where it is not; for Augustine says in his Letter to Volusianus, the soul feels and sees in the heavens, where it is not. It is not, therefore, necessary for the soul to be in every part of the body. Praeterea. Secundum Philosophum moventibus nobis moventur ea quae in nobis sunt. Contingit autem unam partem corporis moveri alia quiescente; si ergo anima est in qualibet parte corporis, sequitur quod simul moveatur et quiescat. Quod videtur impossibile. Obj. 7: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, when we move ourselves, those things which are within us are moved. Now, it may be the case that one part of the body is moved while another is at rest. If, therefore, the soul is in every part of the body, it follows that it is both in motion and at rest at the same time, which seems incongruous. Praeterea. Si anima est in qualibet parte corporis, unaquaeque pars corporis immediatum ordinem habebit ad animam; et sic non dependent aliae partes a corde, quod est contra Hieronymum Super Matthaeo, qui dicit quod principale hominis non est in cerebro secundum Platonem, sed in corde secundum Christum. Obj. 8: Furthermore, if the soul is in every part of the body, each part of the body will have an immediate relation to the soul, and, thus, the other parts will not depend on the heart. This is contrary to Jerome in his Commentary on Matthew, who says that the most important thing in man is not in the brain, as Plato says, but in the heart, as Christ says. Praeterea. Nulla forma quae requirit determinatam figuram potest esse ubi non est illa figura. Sed anima est in corpore secundum determinatam figuram; dicit enim Commentator in 1 De anima quod quodlibet corpus animalis habet figuram propriam, et hoc manifestatur in speciebus: membra enim leonis non differunt a membris cervi nisi propter diversitatem animae. Ergo, cum in parte non inveniatur figura totius, anima non erit in parte. Et hoc est quod idem Commentator dicit in eodem libro quod, si cor habet naturam recipiendi animam quia habet talem figuram, manifestum est quod pars eius non recipit illam animam quia non habet talem figuram. Obj. 9: Furthermore, no form which demands a definite shape can be where that shape is not. But the soul is in the body in connection with a definite shape; for the Commentator says in On the Soul 1 that every animal’s body has its own proper shape, and this fact is evident in the case of the species, for the lion’s members do not differ from the stag’s members except because of the difference of their souls. Therefore, since the shape of the whole is not found in a part, the soul will not be in a part. And this is what the same Commentator says on the same book, that if the heart has a natural capacity for receiving a soul because it has a particular kind of shape, it is obvious that a part of it does not receive that soul, because a part does not have that particular shape. Praeterea. Quanto aliquid est magis abstractum, tanto minus determinatur ad aliquid corporale. Sed angelus est magis abstractus quam anima; determinatur autem angelus ad aliquam partem mobilis quod movet, et non est in qualibet parte eius, ut patet per philosophum in 4 Physic., ubi dicit quod motor caeli non est in centro sed in quadam parte circumferentiae. Multo minus igitur anima est in qualibet parte sui corporis. Obj. 10: Furthermore, the more abstract a thing is, so much the less is it limited to something corporeal. But an angel is more abstract than a soul. Now an angel is limited to some part of the movable object which it moves and is not in every part of it, as the Philosopher makes clear in the Physics, where he says that the mover of the heavens is not in the center, but in a certain part of the circumference. Much less then is a soul in every part of its body. Praeterea. Si in quacumque parte corporis est operatio animae, ibi est ipsa anima; pari ratione in quacumque parte corporis est operatio visivae potentiae, ibi est visiva potentia. Sed operatio visivae potentiae esset in pede, si ibi esset organum visivae potentiae: unde quod desit operatio visiva, erit propter defectum organi tantum; erit igitur ibi potentia visiva, si ibi sit anima. Obj. 11: Furthermore, if the soul’s activity is in any particular part of the body, the soul itself is there. And by a parallel argument, in whatever part of the body there is the activity of the power of sight, there is the power of sight. But the activity of the power of sight would be in the foot, if the organ of the power of sight were there; hence, the fact that the activity of sight is not there will be due merely to the absence of the organ. Accordingly, the power of sight will be there if the soul is there. Praeterea. Si anima est in qualibet parte corporis, oportet quod ubicumque sit aliqua pars corporis ibi sit anima; sed pueri crescentis partes incipiunt esse per augmentum ubi prius non erant; ergo et anima eius incipit esse ubi prius non erat. Sed hoc videtur impossibile. Tribus enim modis aliquid incipit esse ubi prius non erat: aut per hoc quod de novo fit, sicut cum anima creatur et infunditur corpori, aut per propriam transmutationem, sicut cum corpus transfertur de loco ad locum, aut per proprium transmutationem alterius in ipsum, sicut cum corpus Christi incipit esse in altari; quorum nullum hic dici potest. Ergo anima non est in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 12: Furthermore, if the soul is in every part of the body, it must be the case that wherever a given part of the body is, there is the soul. But in the case of a growing child, parts begin to exist through growth, where they previously were not; therefore, his soul too begins to exist where it previously was not. But this seems impossible. For there are three ways in which a thing begins to exist where it previously was not: either through the fact that something quite new comes into being, as when the soul is created and is infused into the body; or through a changing over of the thing itself, as when the body is changed from place to place; or through the change of another thing into the thing itself, as when Christ’s body begins to exist on the altar. None of these can be said to happen in this case. Therefore, the soul is not in every part of the body. Praeterea. Anima non est nisi in corpore cuius est actus; est autem actus corporis organici, ut dicitur 2 De anima. Cum igitur non quaelibet pars corporis sit corpus organicum, non erit anima in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 13: Furthermore, the soul is only in the body whose act it is. Now it is the act of an organic body, as On the Soul 2 says. Since, then, not every part of the body is an organic body, it will not be in every part of the body. Praeterea. Plus differunt caro et os unius hominis quam duae carnes duorum hominum; sed anima una non potest esse in duobus corporibus diversorum; ergo non potest esse in omnibus partibus unius hominis. Obj. 14: Furthermore, there is a greater difference between the flesh and the bone of any one man than between the flesh of one man and the flesh of another. But one soul cannot be in two bodies of different men. Therefore, it cannot be in all the parts of any one man. Praeterea. Si anima est in qualibet parte corporis, oportet quod ablata quacumque parte corporis vel auferatur anima, quod patet esse falsum, cum remaneat homo vivens, vel transferatur de illa parte ad alias, quod est impossibile, cum anima sit simplex, et per consequens immobilis. Non ergo est in qualibet parte corporis. Obj. 15: Furthermore, if the soul is in every part of the body, it must be the case that if any part of the body is taken away, either the soul must be taken away, which is clearly false, since a man remains alive; or else it must be transferred from that part to other parts, which is impossible, since the soul is simple and consequently immovable. Therefore, it is not in every part of the body. Praeterea. Nullum indivisibile potest esse nisi in indivisibili, cum locum oporteat aequari locato; in corpore autem contingit significare infinita indivisibilia; si igitur anima sit in qualibet parte corporis, sequetur quod sit in infinitis. Quod esse non potest, cum sit finitae virtutis. Obj. 16: Furthermore, nothing that is indivisible can be in anything but an indivisible object, since a place has to be commensurate with what is in that place. Now in the body it is possible to specify an indefinite number of indivisibles. If, then, the soul is in every part of the body, it will follow that it is in an indefinite number of places. This cannot be, since it is of finite power. Praeterea. Cum anima sit simplex et absque quantitate dimensiva, nulla totalitas videtur ei posse attribui nisi virtutis; sed non est in qualibet parte corporis secundum suas potentias, in quibus consideratur totalitas virtutis eius; non ergo in qualibet parte corporis est tota anima. Obj. 17: Furthermore, since the soul is simple and without dimensional quantity, it seems that no wholeness can possibly be attributed to it save that of power. But it is not in every part of the body as regards its powers, in which the wholeness of its power is considered to be. Therefore, the whole soul is not in every part of the body. Praeterea. Quod aliquid possit esse totum in toto cum omnibus partibus videtur provenire ex eius simplicitate: in corporibus enim hoc videmus non posse accidere. Sed anima non est simplex sed composita ex materia et forma; ergo non est in qualibet parte corporis. Probatio mediae: Philosophus in 2 Metaphysicae reprehendit ponentes materiam corporalem primum principium, quia ponebant solum elementa corporum, non corporum autem non. Est igitur etiam incorporeorum aliquod elementum; sed elementum est materiale principium; ergo etiam substantiae incorporeae ut angelus et anima habent materiale principium. Obj. 18: Furthermore, that a thing can be wholly in a whole and in all parts seems to be due to its simplicity. For in the case of bodies we see that this cannot happen. But the soul is not simple, but is composed of matter and form. Therefore, it is not in every part of the body. Proof of the minor premise: in the Metaphysics, the Philosopher censures those who assert that corporeal matter is the first principle, because they asserted only the elements of bodies, but not of things that do not have bodies. There is accordingly some incorporeal element too. But an element is a material principle. Therefore, incorporeal substances also, such as an angel and a soul, have a principle too. Praeterea. Quaedam animalia decisa vivunt. Non est autem dicere quod altera pars vivat per totam animam; ergo nec ante decisionem tota anima erat in illa parte sed pars animae. Obj. 19: Furthermore, certain animals live, even when cut in two. For it cannot be said that either of the two parts lives through the whole soul. Therefore, even before the cutting, the whole soul was not in that part, but part of the soul was. Praeterea. Totum et perfectum idem, ut dicitur in 3 Physicorum. Perfectum autem est quod attingit propriam virtutem, ut dicitur in 3 Physicorum; propria autem virtus animae humanae secundum intellectum non est actus alicuius partis corporis. Non ergo est anima tota in qualibet corporis. Obj. 20: Furthermore, “whole” and “perfect” are identical, as is said in Physics 3. A thing is perfect which attains its proper excellence, as is said in Physics 3. Now, the proper excellence of the human soul, as regards the intellect, is not an act of any part of the body. Therefore, the soul is not entirely in every part of the body. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in 3 De Trinitate quod anima in toto tota est et in qualibet parte eius tota. On the contrary (1), there is what Augustine says in On the Trinity 3, that the soul is wholly in the whole being and wholly in every part of it. Praeterea. Damascenus dicit quod angelus ibi est ubi operatur. Pari ergo ratione et anima; sed anima operatur in qualibet parte corporis, quia quaelibet pars corporis nutritur, augetur et sentit; ergo anima est in qualibet parte corporis. Furthermore (2), Damascene says that an angel is where it acts; by a parallel argument, therefore, so too the soul. But the soul acts in every part of the body, because every part of the body is nourished, grows, and is sensitive. Therefore, the soul is in every part of the body. Praeterea. Anima est maioris virtutis quam formae materiales; sed formae materiales ut ignis aut aeris sunt in qualibet parte; multo igitur magis anima. Furthermore (3), the soul is of greater power than material forms. But material forms, such as fire or air, are in every part; much more so, therefore, is the soul. Praeterea. In libro De spiritu et anima dicitur quod anima praesentia sua corpus vivificat; sed quaelibet pars corporis vivificatur ab anima; ergo anima est cuilibet parti corporis praesens. Furthermore (4), it is said in the book The Spirit and the Soul that the soul by its presence vivifies the body. But every part of the body is vivified by the soul. Therefore, the soul is present in every part of the body. Respondeo. Dicendum quod veritas huius quaestionis ex praecedentibus dependet. Ostensum est enim prius quod anima unitur corpori, non solum ut motor, sed ut forma. Posterius vero ostensum est quod anima non praesupponit alias formas substantiales in materia, quae dent esse substantiale corpori aut partibus eius; sed et totum corpus et omnes eius partes habent esse substantiale et specificum per animam, qua recedente, sicut non manet homo aut animal aut vivum, ita non manet manus aut oculus aut caro aut os nisi aequivoce, sicut depicta aut lapidea. Sic igitur, cum omnis actus sit in eo cuius est actus, oportet animam, quae est actus totius corporis et omnium partium, esse in toto corpore et in qualibet eius parte. I answer that the truth of this question depends on the preceding ones. For it has previously been pointed out that the soul is united to the body not only as a mover, but as a form. And later on it was shown that a soul does not presuppose in matter other substantial forms, which would give substantial actual being to a body or to its parts, but that both the whole body and all its parts have actual substantial and specific being through the soul, and, when the soul departs, just as “man” or “animal” or “living body” does not remain, so neither “eye” nor “flesh” nor “bone” remain, except in an equivocal sense, like things painted or made of stone. Thus, then, since every act is in that of which it is the act, it must be that the soul, which is the act of the whole body and of all the parts, is in the whole body and in every one of its parts. Sed tamen aliter se habet totum ad animam et aliter partes eius: anima enim totius quidem corporis actus est primo et per se, partium vero in ordine ad totum. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod, cum materia sit propter formam, talem oportet esse materiam ut competit formae. In istis rebus corruptibilibus formae imperfectiores, quae sunt debilioris virtutis, habent paucas operationes, ad quas non requiritur partium dissimilitudo, sicut patet in omnibus inanimatis corporibus; anima vero, cum sit forma altioris et maioris virtutis, potest esse principium diversarum operationum, ad quarum executionem requirantur dissimiles partes corporis. Et ideo omnis anima requirit diversitatem organorum in partibus corporis cuius est actus, et tanto maiorem diversitatem quanto anima fuerit perfectior; sic igitur formae infimae uniformiter perficiunt suam materiam, sed anima difformiter, ut ex dissimilibus partibus constituatur integritas corporis, cuius primo et per se anima est actus. Yet the whole body is related in one way to the soul and in another to its parts. For the soul is indeed the act of the whole body primarily and essentially, but of the parts in their relation to the whole. To make this clear, we must consider that, since matter is for the sake of form, the matter must be such as suits the form. In those things which are subject to corruption, the more imperfect forms, which are of weaker power, have few activities, for which dissimilarity of parts is not required, as is clear in the case of all inanimate bodies. But the soul, since it is a form of higher and greater power, can be the principle of different activities, for the carrying out of which dissimilar parts of the body are required. And, consequently, every soul requires a diversity of organs in parts of the body of which it is the act; and all the greater diversity in proportion as the soul is more perfect. Thus, then, the lowest forms perfect their matter in a uniform way, but the soul does this in a non-uniform way, with the result that the entirety of the body of which the soul is primarily and essentially the act is made up of dissimilar parts. Sed restat inquirendum quod dicitur totam animam esse in toto et totam in singulis partibus. Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod totalitas invenitur prima quidem est manifestior secundum quantitatem, prout totum quantum dicitur quod natum est dividi in partes quantitatis: et haec totalitas non potest attribui formis nisi per accidens, in quantum scilicet per accidens dividuntur divisione quantitatis, sicut albedo divisione superficiei. Sed haec est illarum tantum formarum quae coextenduntur quantitati; quod ex hoc competit aliquibus formis quia habent materiam similem aut fere similem in toto et in parte: unde formae quae requirunt magnam dissimilitudinem in partibus non habent huiusmodi extensionem et totalitatem, sicuti animae praecipue animalium perfectorum. But we still have to inquire into the statement that the soul is wholly in the whole and wholly in each individual part. To make this clear, we must consider that wholeness is primarily and more obviously something based on quantity, inasmuch as a whole is called a “quantum,” which is naturally susceptible of division into quantitative parts. This sort of wholeness cannot be ascribed to forms except in an accidental sense, namely, insofar as they are accidentally divided by the division of a quantity, as whiteness is divided by the division of a surface. But this is characteristic of those forms only which are extended along with quantity. The reason why this latter property belongs to some forms is that they have similar, or almost similar, matter in their whole and in a part. Hence, forms which require great dissimilarity in the parts do not have this sort of extension and wholeness, as, for instance, souls, especially those of perfect animals. Secunda autem totalitas attenditur secundum perfectionem essentiae, cui totalitati etiam respondent partes essentiae, physice quidem in compositis materia et forma, logice vero genus et differentia; quae quidem perfectio in formis accidentalibus recipit magis et minus, non autem in substantialibus. Tertia autem totalitas est secundum virtutem. Si igitur loqueremur de aliqua forma habente extensionem in materia, puta de albedine, possemus dicere quod est tota in qualibet parte totalitate essentiae et virtutis, non autem totalitate prima, quae est ei per accidens: sicut tota ratio speciei albedinis invenitur in qualibet parte superficiei, non autem tota quantitas quam habet per accidens, sed pars in parte. Now, the second kind of wholeness is considered on the basis of the perfection of an essence, and is a wholeness to which essential parts correspond: the physical parts, matter and form, in the case of composites, and the logical parts, genus and difference. This perfection is susceptible of degrees in the case of accidental forms, but not in the case of substantial forms. The third sort of wholeness is on a basis of powers. If, then, we were to speak of a given form which has extension in matter, such as “whiteness,” we might say that the whiteness is wholly in every part by a wholeness of essence and of power, but not by the first sort of wholeness, which belongs to it accidentally. Thus, the whole account of the species “whiteness” is found in every part of the surface; the total quantity which it accidentally possesses, however, is not, but part of this is in a part. Anima autem, et praecipue humana, non habet extensionem in materia: unde in ea prima totalitas locum non habet. Relinquitur ergo quod secundum totalitatem essentiae simpliciter enuntiari possit esse tota in qualibet corporis parte, non autem secundum totalitatem virtutis, quia partes difformiter perficiuntur ab ipsa ad diversas operationes, et aliqua operatio est eius, scilicet intelligere, quam per nullam partem corporis exequetur. Unde sic accepta totalitate animae secundum virtutem non solum non est tota in qualibet parte, sed nec tota in toto, quia virtus animae capacitatem corporis excedit, ut supra dictum est. Now, the soul, and especially the human soul, does not have extension in matter. Hence, the first sort of wholeness does not take place in it. The remaining alternative, therefore, is that from the viewpoint of wholeness of essence, it may be stated absolutely that it is wholly in every part of the body; not, however, from the viewpoint of wholeness of power, because the parts are perfected in different ways by the soul itself for different activities, and a definite activity belongs to it, namely, understanding, which it will not perform through any part of the body. Hence, if the soul’s wholeness is taken in the sense of wholeness of power, not only is the soul not wholly in every part, but neither is it wholly in the whole body. For the power of the soul exceeds the body’s capacity, as has been said above. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Philosophus ibi loquitur de anima quantum ad potentiam motivam, quae primo fundatur in corde. Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher in that passage is speaking of the soul with reference to its power of moving, which is primarily seated in the heart. Ad secundum dicendum quod anima non est in qualibet parte corporis primo et per se sed in ordine ad totum, ut dictum est; et ideo non quaelibet pars animalis est animal. Reply Obj. 2: The soul is not in every part of the body primarily and essentially, but in relation to the whole, as has been said, and consequently not every part of an animal is an animal. Ad tertium dicendum quod secundum Philosophum in libro De somno et vigilia: cuius est potentia eius est actio. Unde potentiae illae quarum operationes non sunt solius animae sed coniuncti, sunt in organo sicut in subiecto, in anima autem sicut in radice; solum autem illae potentiae sunt in anima sicut in subiecto, quarum operationes anima non per organum corporis exequitur, quae tamen sunt animae secundum quod excedit corpus. Unde non sequitur quod in qualibet parte corporis sint omnes potentiae animae. Reply Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher in his book On Sleep and Sleeplessness, an action belongs to that which has the potency for that action. Hence, those powers whose activities do not belong to the soul alone but to the composite are in an organ as in a subject, but in the soul as in their root. Now, only those powers are in the soul as in a subject whose activities the soul does not carry out through an organ of the body, and yet these powers belong to the soul inasmuch as it is superior to the body. Hence, it does not follow that all the powers of the soul are in every part of the body. Ad quartum dicendum quod forma domus, cum sit accidentalis, non dat esse specificum singulis partibus domus sicut dat anima singulis partibus corporis. Et ideo non est simile. Reply Obj. 4: The form “house,” since it is an accidental form, does not give specific actual being to the individual parts of the house, as the soul gives it to the individual parts of the body. Consequently, there is no comparison.