Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum omnes angeli differant specie ab invicem Whether all angels differ in species from one another Octavo quaeritur utrum omnes angeli differant specie ab invicem. Eighth, it is asked whether all angels differ in species from one another. Et videtur quod non. Dicit Augustinus in Enchiridion: creatura rationalis quae in hominibus erat, quantum peccatis atque suppliciis tota perierat, ex parte reparari meruit. Ex quo sic arguitur. Si omnes angeli ad invicem differrent secundum naturam speciei, pluribus angelis irreparabiliter cadentibus, plures naturae irreparabiliter periissent; sed hoc non patitur divina providentia, ut aliqua natura rationalis ex toto pereat, ut patet ex auctoritate inducta; ergo non omnes angeli differunt ab invicem secundum naturam speciei. Obj. 1: And it would seem that they do not. Augustine says in his Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Charity, the rational creaturehood which was in men, since by reason of sins and penalties . . . it had wholly perished deserved in part to be renewed. From this, it is argued as follows. If all angels were different from one another in their specific nature, then, since many angels fell irreparably, many natures would have irreparably perished. But divine providence does not allow any rational nature to perish entirely, as is clear from the passage quoted. Therefore, not all angels differ from one another in specific nature. Praeterea. Quanto sunt aliqua propinquiora Deo, in quo nulla est diversitas, tanto minus sunt diversa; angeli autem secundum ordinem naturae propinquiores sunt Deo quam homines. Magis vero diversa sunt ab invicem quae differunt numero et specie quam quae differunt numero et conveniunt in specie; cum igitur homines non differant specie sed numero solum, videtur quod nec angeli specie differant. Obj. 2: Furthermore, the closer some things are to God, in whom there is no diversity, the less different they are. Now, according to the order of nature, angels are closer to God than men are. But beings which differ in number and in species are more different from one another than are those which differ in number and agree in species. Since, therefore, men do not differ in species, but only in number, it would seem that angels too do not differ in species. Praeterea. Convenientia aliquorum in formali principio facit aliqua idem esse specie, differentia vero in principio materiali facit differre numero solum; in angelis autem ipsum esse se habet ut formale ad essentiam angeli, ut supra dictum est. Cum igitur omnes angeli conveniant in esse, differant vero secundum essentiam, videtur quod angeli non differant specie sed numero solo. Obj. 3: Furthermore, an agreement of things in their formal principle causes them to be the same in species, but a difference in their material principle makes them differ only in number. Now in angels their very existence serves as the formal element with regard to the angel’s essence, as has been said above. Since then all angels agree in existence but differ in essence, it would seem that angels differ, not in species, but only in number. Praeterea. Omnis substantia subsistens creata est individuum contentum sub aliqua natura communi speciei, ita quod si individuum sit compositum, natura speciei praedicabitur de eo secundum rationem compositi; si vero individuum fuerit simplex, natura speciei praedicabitur de eo secundum simplices rationes. Angelus autem est substantia creata subsistens; sive igitur sit compositus ex materia et forma sive simplex, oportet quod contineatur sub aliqua natura speciei. Sed naturae speciei non derogat quod possit habere plura supposita; similiter etiam nec individuo sub ea existenti derogat si habeat aliquod secum compar in eadem specie. Ergo videtur quod possibile sit esse plures angelos unius speciei; in perpetuis autem non differunt esse et posse, ut dicitur in 3 Physicorum; ergo in angelis sunt plura individua unius speciei. Obj. 4: Furthermore, every subsisting created substance is an individual, included under some nature common to a species in such a way that if the individual be a composite, the specific nature will be predicated of it according to its account as a composite, but if the individual is simple, the specific nature will be predicated of it in consideration of its simple accounts. Now, an angel is a subsisting created substance. Whether, then, it be composed of matter and form or whether it be simple, it must be included under some specific nature. But the fact that it can have many supposits does not detract from a specific nature; so too, the fact of having something like itself in the same species does not detract from an individual existing under such a nature. Therefore, it would seem to be possible that there are many angels belonging to one species. But in the case of eternal beings, there is no difference between “actual” and “possible,” as is said in Physics 3. Therefore, among the angels there are many individuals of a single species. Praeterea. In angelis est perfecta dilectio; nihil igitur eis subtrahendum est quod ad perfectionem dilectionis pertineat. Sed quod sint plures unius speciei pertinet ad perfectionem dilectionis, quia omnia animalia unius speciei naturaliter se invicem diligunt secundum illud Eccli. 14: omne animal diligit simile sibi. Ergo in angelis sunt plures unius speciei. Obj. 5: Furthermore, among the angels there is perfect love; accordingly, nothing which pertains to the perfection of love must be taken away from them. But the fact that there are many belonging to one species pertains to the perfection of love, because all living beings of one species naturally love one another, according to Ecclesiasticus: every creature loves its like (Sir 13:15). Therefore, in the case of angels, there are many belonging to one species. Praeterea. Cum sola species definiatur secundum Boetium, quaecumque in definitione conveniunt videntur in specie convenire; sed omnes angeli conveniunt in illa definitione quam Damascenus ponit in 3 libro: angelus est substantia intellectualis, semper mobilis, arbitrio libera, incorporea, Deo ministrans, secundum gratiam, non natura, immortalitatem suscipiens; ergo omnes angeli sunt unius speciei. Obj. 6: Furthermore, since a species alone has a definition, according to Boethius, all things which agree in their definition would seem to agree in their species. But all angels agree in that definition which Damascene lays down: an angel is an intellectual substance, always mobile, free in its will, incorporeal, serving God, receiving immortality in consequence of grace, not by nature. Therefore, all angels belong to one species. Praeterea. Angeli secundum ordinem naturae sunt propinquiores Deo quam homines; sed in Deo sunt tres personae unius naturae secundum numerum; cum igitur in hominibus sint plures personae unius naturae secundum speciem, videtur quod multo fortius in angelis sint plures personae in una natura speciei convenientes. Obj. 7: Furthermore, according to the order of nature, angels are closer to God than men are. But in God there are three persons of a nature one in number. Since then there are, among men, many persons of a nature one in species, it would seem that, for all the greater reason, among the angels there are many persons agreeing in a nature one in species. Praeterea. Gregorius dicit quod in illa caelesti patria, ubi plenitudo boni est, si quaedam data sunt excellenter, nihil tamen possidetur singulariter: omnia enim in omnibus sunt, non quidem aequaliter, quia aliqui aliis sublimius possident quae tamen omnes habent. Non est ergo differentia in angelis nisi secundum magis et minus; sed magis et minus non diversificant speciem; ergo angeli non differunt specie. Obj. 8: Furthermore, Gregory says that in that heavenly country where there is a fullness of good, although certain attributes have been bestowed in an outstanding degree, yet none of these is possessed in an individual way; for all attributes are in all, not indeed equally, since some angels possess them in a more sublime degree than others, and yet all have them. There is, therefore, no difference in angels except one of “more and less.” But “more and less” do not constitute a specific difference. Therefore, angels do not differ in species. Praeterea. Quaecumque conveniunt in nobilissimo conveniunt in specie, quia nobilius est quod ponit sub specie quam quod ponit sub genere: est enim differentia specifica formalis respectu generis; sed omnes angeli conveniunt in nobilissimo quod in eis est, scilicet in natura intellectuali; ergo omnes angeli conveniunt in specie. Obj. 9: Furthermore, things which agree in what is most noble agree in species, because that which puts something in a species is more noble than that which puts a thing in a genus; for a specific difference is something formal in relation to a genus. But all angels agree in the most noble thing that is in them, namely, in intellectual nature. Therefore, all angels agree in species. Praeterea. Si aliquod genus dividatur per duas differentias quarum una altera sit imperfectior, differentia imperfectior magis est multiplicabilis quam perfectior, sicut irrationale per plures species multiplicatur quam rationale. Substantia autem spiritualis dividitur per unibile et non unibile; unibile autem corpori est imperfectius in spiritualibus substantiis. Cum igitur substantia spiritualis unibilis corpori, scilicet anima humana, non distinguatur in multas species, multo fortius substantia spiritualis non unibilis, scilicet angelus, non multiplicatur per multas species. Obj. 10: Furthermore, if a given genus is divided by two differences, one of which is more imperfect than the other, the more imperfect difference is more capable of multiplication than is the more perfect; thus, for instance, “irrational” is multiplied in more species than is “rational.” Now, spiritual substance is divided by “capable of union” and “not capable of union”; but “capable of union with a body” is something more imperfect, in the case of spiritual substances. Since, then, a spiritual substance capable of union with a body, namely, the human soul, is not divided into many species, for all the greater reason a spiritual substance which is not capable of union, namely, an angel, is not multiplied in many species. Praeterea. Bonifatius Papa dicit quod ministrationes in ecclesia militanti sunt ad exemplum caelestis militiae, in qua angeli differunt in ordine et potestate; sed in ecclesia militante differentia ordinis et potestatis non facit homines differre secundum speciem; ergo nec in caelesti militia angelorum angeli specie differunt, etiam qui sunt diversorum ordinum vel hierarchiarum. Obj. 11: Furthermore, Pope Boniface says that ministerial functions in the church militant are modelled after the heavenly host, wherein angels differ in orders and in power. But in the church militant, a difference in orders and in power does not make men differ in species. Therefore, neither in the heavenly host of angels do angels differ in species, even those who are of different orders or hierarchies. Praeterea. Sicut inferiora elementa sunt ornata plantis et animalibus et caelum sidereum stellis et sole et luna, ita etiam caelum empyreum ornatum est angelis. Sed in plantis et animalibus inveniuntur multa eiusdem speciei; similiter etiam videtur quod omnes stellae sint unius speciei, quia communicant in una forma nobilissima, quae est lux. Ergo videtur pari ratione quod vel omnes angeli vel aliqui conveniant in una specie. Obj. 12: Furthermore, just as the lower elements are adorned with plants and animals, and the sidereal heaven with stars, sun, and moon, so too the empyrean heaven is adorned with angels. But among plants and animals many of the same species are found; likewise also, it would seem that all the stars belong to the same species, because they share in one most noble form, which is light. Therefore, it would seem by a parallel argument that either all angels or some angels agree in one species. Praeterea. Si plures angeli non ponantur convenire in una specie, hoc non est nisi quia in eis non est materia. Sed remotio materiae non solum tollit pluralitatem individuorum sed etiam unitatem, quia individuum non ponitur sub specie nisi per materiam, quia materia est individuationis principium; si ergo necesse est poni angelos esse individua quaedam, pari etiam ratione poni poterit quod sint plures in una specie. Obj. 13: Furthermore, if many angels are not asserted to agree in one species, this is only because there is no matter in them. But the removal of matter not only takes away plurality of individuals, but also their unity. For an individual is not put into a species except through matter, because matter is the principle of individuation. If, therefore, it must be asserted that angels are individuals in some sense, by a parallel argument it can also be asserted that there are many in one species. Praeterea. In his quae sunt separata a materia idem est intelligens et intellectum secundum Philosophum: si igitur angeli essent sine materia, idem esset angelus intelligens et angelus intellectus. Sed quilibet angelus intelligit alium quemlibet; ergo sequeretur quod non esset nisi unus angelus, quod est falsum. Non est ergo ponendum quod angeli sint sine materia, et ita neque ponendum est quod omnes angeli differant specie. Obj. 14: Furthermore, in those things which are separated from matter, the being which understands and that which is understood are the same, according to the Philosopher. If, then, angels were without matter, the angel which understands and the angel which is understood would be the same. But every angel understands every other angel. Therefore, it would follow that there is but one angel, which is false. One must not, therefore, assert that angels are without matter, and so neither must it be asserted that all the angels differ in species. Praeterea. Numerus est species quantitatis, quae non est sine materia; si igitur in angelis non esset materia, non esset in eis numerus, quod est falsum. Ergo idem quod prius. Obj. 15: Furthermore, number is a species of quantity, which is not apart from matter. If, then, there were no matter in the angels, there would be no number in them, which is false. Therefore, we reach the same conclusion as before. Praeterea. In his quae sunt sine materia non est multiplicatio nisi secundum causam et causatum, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit; si igitur angeli sunt sine materia, aut non est in eis multitudo aut unum est causa alterius, quorum utrumque est falsum. Ergo idem quod prius. Obj. 16: Furthermore, in those things which are without matter there is no multiplication except on a basis of cause and effect, as Rabbi Moses says. If, then, angels are without matter, either there is no manyness among them, or one is the cause of another; and both these alternatives are false. Therefore, we reach the same conclusion as before. Praeterea. Creaturae a Deo sunt conditae ut in eis divina bonitas repraesentetur; sed in una specie angeli repraesentatur divina bonitas perfectius quam in una specie hominis; non ergo oportet ponere plures species angelorum. Obj. 17: Furthermore, creatures have been created by God in order that the divine goodness may be represented in them. But in a single species of “angel” the divine goodness is more perfectly represented than in the single species of “man.” Therefore, one should not posit many species of angels. Praeterea. Diversae species secundum differentiam specificam differunt, quae ex opposito dividuntur; non possunt autem designari tot differentiae specificae oppositae quanta ponitur multitudo angelorum; non ergo omnes angeli differunt specie. Obj. 18: Furthermore, different species which are divided as a result of being opposites differ by a specific difference. Now, it is impossible to indicate a number of opposite specific differences as great as the multitude of the angels is asserted to be. Therefore, not all angels differ in species. Sed contra. Si aliqui angeli specie conveniant, maxime hoc videtur de illis qui sunt unius ordinis; sed illi qui sunt unius ordinis non conveniunt in specie, cum in eodem ordine sint primi, medii et ultimi, ut Dionysius dicit 10 cap. Angelicae hierarchiae. Species autem non praedicatur de suis individuis secundum prius et posterius, ut dicitur in 3 Metaphysicae. Non ergo sunt plures angeli unius speciei. On the contrary (1), if some angels agree in species, this would seem to be particularly the case with those who are of one order. But those who are of one order do not agree in species, since there are in the same order, the first, the intermediate, and the last, as Dionysius says in the tenth chapter of Celestial Hierarchy. A species, however, is not predicated of its own individuals in an order of sequence, as is said in Metaphysics 3. There are not, therefore, many angels of one species. Praeterea. Illa sola videntur multiplicari secundum numerum in una specie quae sunt corruptibilia, ut natura speciei, quae non potest conservari in uno, conservetur in pluribus; sed angeli sunt incorruptibiles; ergo non sunt plures angeli unius speciei. Furthermore (2), only those things which are corruptible would seem to be multiplied in number in one species, in order that the specific nature, which cannot be preserved in one, may be preserved in many. But the angels are incorruptible. Therefore, there are not many angels of one species. Praeterea. Multiplicatio individuorum in una specie est per divisionem materiae; sed angeli sunt immateriales quia, ut Augustinus dicit 13 Confessionem, materia est prope nihil, angeli autem prope Deum; ergo in angelis non est multiplicatio individuorum in eadem specie. Furthermore (3), the multiplication of individuals in one species takes place through a division of matter. But the angels are immaterial, because, as Augustine says in Confessions 12, matter is next to nothing, whereas the angels are next to God. Therefore, in angels there is no multiplication of individuals in the same species. Respondeo. Dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem diversimode aliqui sunt locuti: quidam enim dixerunt quod omnes spirituales substantiae sunt unius speciei, alii vero quod omnes angeli unius hierarchiae aut etiam unius ordinis, alii autem quod omnes angeli ab invicem specie differunt. Quod et mihi videtur propter tres rationes. I answer that some have expressed themselves in different ways concerning this question. For some have said that all spiritual substances belong to one species, but others, that all the angels of one hierarchy, or again, of one order, do. But others have said that all the angels differ from one another in species, and this seems to me also to be true, for three reasons. Prima sumitur ex conditione substantiae eorum. Necesse est enim dicere quod vel sint formae simplices subsistentes absque materia, ut supra habitum est, vel sint formae compositae ex materia et forma. Si autem angelus est forma simplex abstracta a materia, impossibile est etiam fingere plures angelos unius speciei, quia quaecumque forma quantumcumque materialis et infima, si ponatur abstracta vel secundum esse vel secundum intellectum, non remanet nisi una in specie una. Intelligatur enim albedo absque omni subiecto subsistens, et non erit possibile ponere plures albedines, cum videamus quod haec albedo non differt ab illa nisi per hoc quod est in hoc vel in illo subiecto; et similiter si esset humanitas abstracta, non esset nisi una tantum. Si vero angelus sit substantia ex materia et forma composita, necesse est dicere quod materiae diversorum angelorum sint aliquo modo distinctae. Distinctio autem materiae a materia non invenitur nisi duplex: una secundum propriam rationem materiae, et hoc est secundum habitudinem ad diversos actus. Cum enim materia secundum propriam rationem sit in potentia, potentia autem ad actum dicatur, necesse est quod secundum ordinem actuum attendatur distinctio in potentiis et materiis. The first reason is derived from the makeup of their substance. For it is necessary to say, either that they are simple forms subsisting apart from matter, as was held above, or that they are forms that are composed of matter and form. Now, if an angel is a simple form set apart from matter, it is impossible even to conceive several angels of one species; because any form whatever, however material and low, if it be set down as abstract either in actual being or in the intellect, remains but one form in one species. For, let “whiteness” be understood as something subsisting apart from every subject, and it will not be possible to posit many whitenesses, since we see that “this whiteness” does not differ from “that whiteness” save through the fact that it is in this or in that subject. In similar fashion, if there were an abstract “human nature,” there would be but one only. But if an angel is a substance that is composed of matter and form, it is necessary to say that the matters of different angels are somehow distinct. Now, the distinction of matter from matter is found to be one of only two kinds: one, according to the proper account of matter, and this is according to its relationship to different acts; for, since matter according to its proper account is in potency, whereas potency is spoken of in relation to act, a distinction among potencies and matters is made from the standpoint of the order of acts. Et hoc modo materia inferiorum corporum, quae est potentia ad esse, differt a materia caelestium corporum, quae est potentia ad ubi. Secunda autem distinctio materiae est secundum divisionem quantitatis, prout materia existens sub his dimensionibus distinguitur ab ea quae est sub aliis dimensionibus. Et prima quidem materiae distinctio facit diversitatem secundum genus, quia secundum Philosophum in 5 Metaphysicae genere differunt secundum materiam diversa; secunda autem distinctio materiae facit diversitatem individuorum in eadem specie. Haec autem secunda distinctio materiae non potest esse in diversis angelis, cum angeli sint incorporei et omnino absque dimensionibus quantitativis; relinquitur ergo quod, si sint plures angeli compositi ex materia et forma, quod sit in eis distinctio materiarum secundum primum modum, et ita sequitur quod non solum specie sed etiam genere differunt. And in this way, the matter of lower bodies, which is a potency to actual being, differs from the matter of the heavenly bodies, which is a potency to place. The second distinction of matter, however, is based on quantitative division, inasmuch as matter which exists under these particular dimensions is distinguished from that which is under other dimensions. And the first distinction of matter causes a generic diversity because, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 5, different things are different in genus on a basis of matter. The second distinction of matter, however, causes a diversity of individuals within the same species. Now, this second distinction of matter cannot exist among different angels, since angels are incorporeal and entirely without quantitative dimensions. The only remaining alternative, therefore, is that, if there be many angels that are composed of matter and form, there is a distinction of matters among them according to the first mode, and thus it follows that they differ not only in species but also in genus. Secunda ratio sumitur ex ordine universi. Manifestum est enim quod duplex est bonum universi: quoddam separatum, scilicet Deus, qui est sicut dux in exercitu, et quoddam in ipsis rebus: et hoc est ordo partium universi, sicut ordo partium exercitus est bonum exercitus; unde Apostolus dicit Rom. 13: que a Deo sunt ordinata sunt. The second reason is derived from the order of the universe. For it is obvious that the good of the universe is of two kinds: something that is separate, namely, God, who is, as it were, the leader in an army; and a certain something in things themselves, and this is the order of the parts of the universe, just as the order of the parts of the army is the good of the army. Hence, the Apostle says there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God (Rom 13:1). Oportet autem quod superiores universi partes magis de bono universi participent, quod est ordo; perfectius autem participant ordinem ea in quibus est ordo per se quam ea in quibus est ordo per accidens tantum. Now, the higher parts of the universe must have a greater share in the good of the universe, which is order. But those things in which there is order of themselves have a more perfect share in order than do those in which there is order only accidentally. Manifestum est autem quod in omnibus individuis unius speciei non est ordo nisi secundum accidens: conveniunt enim in natura speciei et differunt secundum principia individuantia et diversa accidentia, quae per accidens se habent ad naturam speciei. Quae autem specie differunt ordinem habent per se secundum essentialia principia: invenitur enim in speciebus rerum una abundare super aliam, sicut et in speciebus numerorum, ut dicitur in 4 Metaphysicae. In istis autem inferioribus, quae sunt generabilia et corruptibilia et infima pars universi, et minus participant de ordine, inveniuntur non omnia diversa habere ordinem per se, sed quaedam habent ordinem per accidens tantum, sicut individua unius speciei. In superiori autem parte universi, scilicet in corporibus caelestibus, non invenitur ordo per accidens sed solum per se, cum omnia corpora caelestia ab invicem specie differant, nec sint in eis plura individua unius speciei, sed unus tantum sol et una luna, et sic de aliis. Now, it is obvious that, among all the individuals of one species, there is no order except accidentally. For they agree in the nature of the species and differ according to individuating principles and different accidents, which are related in an accidental way to the nature of the species. But things which differ in species have order of themselves and on a basis of their essential principles. For among the species of things, one is found to be greater than another, as is also the case in the species of numbers, as is said in Metaphysics 8. However, in the case of those lower things which are subject to generation and corruption, which make up the lowest part of the universe and have a lesser share in order, not all different things are found to have order of themselves, but certain ones have order only accidentally as, for example, the individuals of one species. But in the higher part of the universe, namely, among the heavenly bodies, order is not found accidentally but only essentially, since all heavenly bodies differ from one another in species, and there are not among them several individuals of one species, but one sun only, and one moon, and so of the others. Multo igitur magis in suprema parte universi non invenitur aliqua ordinata per accidens et non per se. Et sic relinquitur quod omnes angeli ab invicem specie differant secundum maiorem et minorem perfectionem formarum simplicium ex maiori vel minori propinquitate ad Deum, qui est actus purus et infinitae perfectionis. Much more so, therefore, in the highest part of the universe there are not to be found any beings that are ordered accidentally and not essentially. And so, the only remaining alternative is that all angels differ from one another in species, according to a greater and a lesser perfection of simple forms, as a result of a greater or a lesser nearness to God, who is pure act and of infinite perfection. Tertia vero ratio sumitur ex perfectione naturae angelicae. Perfectum enim dicitur unumquodque quando nihil deest ei eorum quae ad ipsum pertinent; et huius quidem perfectionis gradus ex extremis rerum perpendi potest. Deo enim, qui est in supremo perfectionis, nihil deest eorum quae pertinent ad rationem totius esse: praehabet enim in se omnes rerum perfectiones simpliciter et excellenter, ut Dionysius dicit. But the third reason is derived from the perfection of the angelic nature. For each individual thing is said to be perfect when it lacks none of those things which pertain to it. And in fact, the degree of this perfection can be calculated from the extremes of things. For to God, who is at the apex of perfection, none of the things which belong to the account of actual being as a whole is lacking; for he has beforehand in himself absolutely and in the highest degree all the perfections of things, as Dionysius says. Individuum autem aliquod in infima parte rerum, quae continet generabilia et corruptibilia, perfectum invenitur ex eo quod habet quidquid ad se pertinet secundum rationem individuationis suae, non autem quidquid pertinet ad naturam suae speciei, cum natura suae speciei etiam in aliis individuis inveniatur. Quod manifeste ad imperfectionem pertinere apparet, non solum in animalibus generabilibus, in quibus unum indiget alio suae speciei ad convictum, sed etiam in omnibus animalibus ex semine qualitercumque generatis, in quibus mas indiget femina suae speciei ad generandum, et ulterius in omnibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus, in quibus necessaria est multitudo individuorum unius speciei, ut natura speciei, quae non potest perpetuo conservari in uno individuo propter eius corruptibilitatem, conservetur in pluribus. But an individual in the lowest part of the world which contains beings that are subject to generation and corruption is found to be perfect from the fact that it has whatever pertains to itself, according to its own individual account, but not whatever pertains to its own specific nature, since its own specific nature is also found in other individual beings. And this quite obviously pertains to imperfection, not only in the case of animals that are subject to generation, among which one animal needs another of its own species for common life, but also in the case of all animals that are generated in any way whatever from semen, in which the male needs the female of its own species in order to generate; and, further, in the case of all beings that are subject to generation and corruption, wherein a group of individuals of one species is necessary in order that the specific nature, which cannot be perpetually conserved in one individual being because of its corruptibility, may be conserved in many. In parte autem superiori universi invenitur altior gradus perfectionis, in quibus unum individuum, ut sol, sic est perfectum ut nihil ei desit eorum quae ad propriam speciem pertinent: unde et tota materia speciei concluditur sub uno individuo. Et similiter est de aliis corporibus caelestibus; multo igitur magis in suprema parte rerum creatarum, quae est Deo propinquissima, scilicet in angelis, haec perfectio invenitur ut uni individuo nihil desit eorum quae ad totam speciem pertinent, et sic non sunt plura individua in una specie. Deus vero, qui est in summo perfectionis, cum nullo alio convenit, non solum in specie sed nec in genere nec in alio praedicato univoco. But in the higher part of the universe, a higher degree of perfection is found, wherein one individual being, such as the sun, is so perfect that it lacks none of the things that pertain to its own species, and hence also the whole matter of the species is contained in one individual being. The same is true of the other heavenly bodies. Much more so, therefore, is this perfection found in the highest part of created things which is nearest to God, namely, among the angels; for that one individual lacks none of the things which pertain to a whole species, and thus there are not several individuals in one species. But God, who is at the summit of perfection, does not agree with any other being, not only in species but not even in genus, nor in any other univocal predicate. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur ibi de natura angelica et humana, non secundum quod considerantur in esse naturali, sed secundum quod ordinantur ad beatitudinem: sic enim aliqui in natura angelica et humana perierunt. Quantum autem ad ordinem beatitudinis natura humana dividitur contra totam angelicam: quia tota natura angelica uno modo nata est pervenire in beatitudinem vel ab ea deficere irreparabiliter, scilicet statim ad primam electionem, natura vero humana per decursum temporis. Et ideo loquitur ibi Augustinus de omnibus angelis sicut de una natura propter unum modum ordinis ad beatitudinem, licet differant secundum speciem naturae. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is there speaking of angelic and human nature, not according as they are considered in their natural actual being, but according as they are ordered toward beatitude. For in this sense some in the angelic and in the human nature have perished. As for the order of beatitude, human nature is contrasted with the whole angelic nature, because the whole angelic nature is naturally such as has been produced to attain to beatitude or to fall short of it in one single way, irreparably, namely, right at the first choice, but human nature, in the course of time. Consequently, Augustine is speaking there of all angels as of one nature, by reason of the single mode of their relation to beatitude, although they are different in the species of that nature. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum inquiritur de differentia vel convenientia speciei, est consideratio de rebus secundum naturas ipsarum; et secundum hoc non est loquendum de omnibus angelis sicut de natura una Deo propinquissima, sed solus primus angelus erat secundum hoc natura Deo propinquissima, in qua quidem natura est minima diversitas quia nec secundum speciem nec secundum numerum. Reply Obj. 2: Whenever one inquires into a difference or similarity of species, things are being studied from the standpoint of their natures. On this basis, one must not speak of all angels as of one nature that is closest to God, but only the first angel was, from this point of view, the nature closest to God. And in this nature, there is the least possible diversity, because there is neither diversity of species nor of number.