Quaestio Disputata de Unione Verbi Incarnati Disputed Question on the Union of the Incarnate Word Prooemium Prologue Et primo enim quaeritur, utrum haec unio facta sit in persona, vel in natura. 1. Whether this union was brought about in the person or in the nature? Secundo utrum in Christo sit una tantum hypostasis. 2. Whether there is only one hypostasis in Christ or two? Tertio utrum Christus sit unum neutraliter, vel duo. 3. Whether Christ is one or two in the neuter? Quarto utrum in Christo sit unum tantum esse. 4. Whether there is only one being in Christ? Quinto utrum in Christo sit una tantum operatio. 5. Whether in Christ there is only one activity? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum haec unio facta sit in persona, vel in natura Whether this union was brought about in the person or in the nature Et primo quaeritur utrum haec unio facta sit in persona, vel in natura. Videtur autem quod in natura. First, it is asked whether this union was brought about in the person or in the nature. It seems that it was in the nature. Dicit enim Athanasius quod sicut anima rationalis et caro unus est homo; ita Deus et homo unus est Christus. Sed anima rationalis et caro uniuntur in unam naturam humanam. Ergo Deus et homo uniuntur in unam naturam Christi. Obj. 1: For Athanasius says that just as the rational soul and the body are one man, so God and man are one Christ. But the rational soul and the body are united into one human nature. Therefore, God and man are united into the one nature of Christ. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit in III libro: hoc facit haereticis errorem, quia dicunt idem naturam et hypostasim. Sed hoc non videtur falsum esse: quia in quolibet simplici, et praecipue in Deo, idem est suppositum et natura. Ergo non est falsum quod haeretici dicunt, quod si unio facta sit in persona, sit facta in natura. Obj. 2: Besides, Damascene says in the third book of Concerning the Orthodox Faith, this produces the error of the heretics, because they say the nature and the hypostasis are the same. But this does not seem to be false, because in anything simple, and especially in God, suppositum and nature are the same. Therefore, what the heretics say, that if the union of the Word was brought about in the person, it was brought about in the nature, is not false. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit in III libro, quod inconvertibiliter et inalterabiliter unitae sunt ad invicem duae naturae. Sed unio naturarum videtur importare unionem naturalem. Ergo unio facta est in natura. Obj. 3: Besides, Damascene says in the third book that the two natures were mutually united unchangeably and inalterably. But the union of natures seems to imply a natural union. Therefore, the union was brought about in the nature. Praeterea, in omnibus illis in quibus suppositum aliquid habet praeter naturam speciei, vel accidens vel naturam individualem necesse est quod differat suppositum a natura, ut patet per Philosophum in VII Metaph. Sed si unio humanae naturae ad Verbum non est facta in natura humana, non pertinebit ad naturam speciei ipsius Verbi. Ergo sequetur quod suppositum Verbi sit aliud a natura divina; quod est impossibile. Videtur ergo quod unio facta sit in natura. Obj. 4: Besides, in all those things in which the suppositum possesses something beyond the nature of the species, either an accident or individual matter, it is necessary that the suppositum differ from the nature, as is clear from the Philosopher in book 7 of the Metaphysics. But if the union of human nature to the Word did not occur in the human nature, it will not belong to the nature of the species of the Word itself. Therefore, it would follow that the suppositum of the Word would be different from the divine nature, which is impossible. Therefore, it seems that the union was brought about in the nature. Praeterea, omnis unio terminatur ad aliquod unum, quod est posterius ipsa unione. Sed unitas personae Verbi, cum sit aeterna, non est posterior unione quae facta est in plenitudine temporis. Ergo unio non est facta in persona. Obj. 5: Besides, every union is terminated in something one, which is posterior to the union itself. But the unity of the person of the Word, since it is eternal, is not posterior to the union which was brought about in the fullness of time. Therefore, the union was not brought about in the person. Praeterea, unio importat additamentum quoddam. Unde non potest fieri unio in aliquo quod est summae simplicitatis. Sed persona Verbi, cum sit vere Deus, est summae simplicitatis. Ergo in persona Verbi non potest fieri unio. Obj. 6: Besides, a union entails a certain addition. Hence, a union cannot be brought about in something which is of highest simplicity. But, the person of the Word, since he is true God, is of the highest simplicity. Therefore, a union cannot be brought about in the person of the Word. Praeterea, duo quae non sunt unius generis, non possunt in aliquo uniri: ex linea enim et albedine non fit unum. Sed humana natura multo plus differt a divina quam ea quae differunt genere. Ergo non potest simul humanae et divinae naturae unio fieri in persona una. Obj. 7: Besides, two things which are not of one genus cannot be united in something, for one thing does not arise from a line and whiteness. But human nature differs much more from the divine nature than those things which differ in a genus. Therefore, the union of human and divine natures cannot be brought about in one person at the same time. Praeterea, persona et natura Verbi differunt solum secundum modum intelligendi, in quantum in persona Verbi importatur relatio originis, non autem in natura. Sed per relationem originis Verbum non refertur ad humanam naturam, sed ad Patrem. Ergo eodem modo se habent ad naturam assumptam persona Verbi, et natura eius. Si ergo est facta unio in persona, erit facta unio in natura. Obj. 8: Besides, the person and the nature of the Word differ only according to the mode of understanding, insofar as a relation of origin is entailed in the person of the Word, but not in the nature. Yet the Word is not related to human nature through the relation of origin, but to the Father. Therefore, the Word and the Word’s nature are related to the assumed nature in the same way. If, therefore, the union was brought about in the person, it would have been brought about in the nature. Praeterea, Incarnatio excitat nos ad Deum incarnatum diligendum. Sed non debemus plus diligere unam personam divinam quam aliam; quia quorum est eadem bonitas, debet esse eadem dilectio. Ergo unio Incarnationis facta est in natura communi tribus personis. Obj. 9: Besides, the Incarnation stimulates us to love God incarnate. But we should not love one divine person more than another; for since their goodness is the same, the love ought to be the same. Therefore, the union of the Incarnation occurred in the nature common to the three persons. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in II De anima, vivere viventibus est esse. Sed in Christo est duplex vita, scilicet humana et divina. Ergo est illi duplex esse, et per consequens duplex persona: esse enim est suppositi vel personae. Non ergo facta est unio in persona. Obj. 10: Besides, according to the Philosopher in book 2 of On the Soul, in living things living is being. But in Christ, life is two-fold, namely, human and divine. Therefore, being is two-fold for him and, consequently, there is a two-fold person, for being is of the suppositum or the person. Therefore, the union was not brought about in the person. Praeterea, sicut forma partis comparatur ad materiam, ita forma totius ad suppositum. Sed forma partis non potest esse nisi in materia propria. Ergo forma totius, quae est natura, non potest esse nisi in proprio supposito, quod est persona humana. Et eadem ratione natura divina est etiam in persona divina. Ergo, si sint ibi duae naturae, oportet quod sint ibi duae personae. Obj. 11: Besides, just as the form of a part is compared to matter, so the form of a whole is compared to a suppositum. But the form of a part cannot exist except in its own matter. Therefore, the form of the whole, which is the nature, cannot exist except in its own suppositum, which is a human person. And by the same reason the divine nature also exists in the divine person. Therefore, if there were two natures there, it would be necessary that there be two persons there. Praeterea, omne quod vere praedicatur de aliquo, potest supponere pro ipso. Sed natura divina vere praedicatur de persona Verbi. Ergo potest supponere pro ipsa. Si ergo facta est unio in persona, vere potest dici quod facta sit unio in natura. Obj. 12: Besides, everything which is truly predicated of something, is able to supposit for it. But the divine nature is truly predicated of the person of the Word. Therefore, it is able to supposit for the person of the Word. If, therefore, the union was brought about in the person, it can be truly said that it was brought about in the nature. Praeterea, omne quod unitur alicui, aut unitur ei essentialiter aut accidentaliter. Sed humana natura non unitur Verbo accidentaliter, quia sic retineret suam personalitatem, et essent duae personae. Omnis enim substantia alteri adveniens retinet suam singularitatem; sicut vestis induta, et equus equitantis. Ergo advenit ei essentialiter quasi pertinens ad essentiam vel naturam Verbi. Est ergo unio facta in natura. Obj. 13: Besides, everything that is united to something is united either accidentally or essentially. But human nature is not united to the Word accidentally, because it would thus retain its own personality and there would be two persons. For every substance added to another retains its own singularity, as the garment which has been put on or the horse which is being ridden. Therefore, human nature comes to the Word essentially as though pertaining to the essence or nature of the Word. Therefore, the union occurred in the nature. Praeterea, nihil quod comprehenditur sub alio, extendit se ad aliquid extrinsecum; sicut quod comprehenditur loco non est in exteriori loco. Sed suppositum cuiuslibet naturae comprehenditur sub natura illa, unde et dicitur res naturae. Sic enim comprehenditur individuum sub specie, sicut species sub genere. Cum ergo Verbum sit suppositum divinae naturae, non potest se extendere ad aliam naturam ut sit eius suppositum, nisi efficiatur natura una. Obj. 14: Besides, nothing that is included in another stretches out to something outside, just as what is found in a place is not also outside the place. But the suppositum of any nature is found in that nature, hence it is called a thing of nature. In this way, the individual is included under a species, just as the species is included under a genus. So, since the Word is the suppositum of the divine nature, it is not able to stretch out to another nature so as to be its suppositum, unless one nature is brought about. Praeterea, natura se habet ad suppositum per modum formalioris, et simplicioris et constituentis. Hoc autem modo non potest se habere natura humana ad personam Verbi. Ergo persona Verbi non potest esse persona humanae naturae. Obj. 15: Besides, nature is related to suppositum through a more formal and more simple mode, and the nature constitutes it. Yet human nature cannot be related to the person of the Word in this way. Therefore, the person of the Word cannot be a person of human nature. Praeterea, actio attribuitur supposito vel personae: quia actiones singularium sunt, secundum Philosophum. Sed in Christo sunt duae actiones, ut Damascenus probat in libro III. Ergo sunt ibi duae personae. Non ergo facta est unio in persona. Obj. 16: Besides, action is attributed to the suppositum or person, since actions belong to particular things, according to the Philosopher. But there are two actions in Christ as Damascene proves in book 3. Therefore, there are two persons there. Therefore, the union is not brought about in the person. Praeterea, persona definitur esse natura proprietate distincta. Si ergo facta est unio in persona, sequitur quod facta sit unio in natura. Obj. 17: Besides, person is properly defined as a nature made distinct as a property. If, therefore, the union occurred in the person, it follows that it occurred in the nature. Sed contra. Est quod Augustinus dicit in libro De fide ad Petrum: duarum naturarum veritas manet in Christo secundum unam personam. On the contrary, there is what Augustine says in the book Concerning the Faith to Peter, the truth of the two natures remain in Christ according to one person. Praeterea, Ad Orosium dicit: duas naturas cognoscimus in una persona Filii. Furthermore, in To Orosius, he also says, we know two natures in the one person of the Son. Respondeo. Dicendum quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis, primo, oportet considerare quid est natura, secundo, quid est persona; tertio, quomodo unio Verbi incarnati facta est in persona, non in natura. I answer that, for a clear understanding of this question, first it is necessary to consider what a nature is, second what a person is, and third how the union of the Word incarnate occurred in the person, not in the nature. Sciendum est ergo, quod nomen naturae a nascendo sumitur. Unde primo est dicta natura, quasi nascitura, ipsa nativitas viventium, scilicet animalium et plantarum. Deinde tractum est nomen naturae ad principium praedictae nativitatis. Et quia huiusmodi nativitatis principium intrinsecum est, ulterius derivatum est nomen naturae ad significandum interius principium motus, secundum quod dicitur in II Physic., quia natura est principium motus in quo est, per se, non secundum accidens. Et quia motus naturalis praecipue in generatione terminatur ad essentiam speciei, ulterius essentia speciei, quam significat definitio, natura vocatur. Unde et Boetius dicit in libro De duabus naturis, quod natura est unumquodque informans specifica differentia. Et hoc modo hic natura accipitur. Therefore, it should be known that the name “nature” is taken from being born. Hence, nature, or “about to be born,” was first said of the actual birth of living things, namely, of plants and animals. Next, the name nature was transferred to the principle of the aforementioned nativity. And since the principle of this kind of nativity is interior, the name “nature” was further extended to signifying a more interior principle of motion, according to what is said in book 2 of the Physics, that nature is a principle of motion in which motion is essential, not accidental. Since natural motion especially in generation is terminated at the essence of a species, we may say further, the essence of a species, which a definition signifies, is called a nature. Hence, Boethius also says in Concerning the Two Natures that nature is the specific difference informing each and every thing. And it is in this way that nature is taken here. Ad intelligendum autem quid sit persona, considerandum est quod si aliqua res est in qua non sit aliud quam essentia speciei, ipsa essentia speciei erit per se individualiter subsistens. Et sic in huiusmodi re idem esset realiter suppositum et natura, sola ratione differens; in quantum scilicet natura dicitur prout est essentia speciei, suppositum vero in quantum per se subsistit. However, in order to understand what a person is, it must be considered that if there is some thing in which there is nothing other than the essence of the species, the essence of the species itself will be subsisting individually through itself. Thus, in a thing of this kind, nature and suppositum would be really the same, differing only in account; that is, the thing is called a nature insofar as it is the essence of the species, but it is called a suppositum insofar as it subsists through itself. Si vero aliqua res sit intra quam praeter essentiam speciei, quam significat definitio, sit aliquid aliud, vel accidens vel materia individualis; tunc suppositum non erit omnino idem quod natura, sed habebit se per additionem ad naturam. Sicut apparet praecipue in his quae sunt ex materia et forma composita. Et quod dictum est de supposito, intelligendum est de persona in rationali natura: cum persona nihil aliud sit quam suppositum rationalis naturae, secundum quod Boetius dicit in libro De duabus naturis, quod persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia. If there were anything within a thing beyond the essence of the species, which the definition signifies, it would be something other, either an accident or the matter of an individual. The suppositum will then not be entirely the same as that nature, but it will be constituted by an addition to the nature, as is most evident in those things which are composed of matter and form. And what was said concerning the suppositum must be understood concerning the person in a rational nature, since a person is nothing other than a suppositum of a rational nature according to what Boethius says in the book Concerning the Two Natures, that person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Sic ergo patet quod nihil prohibet aliqua uniri in persona quae non sunt unita in natura; potest enim individua substantia rationalis naturae habere aliquid quod non pertinet ad naturam speciei, et hoc unitur ei personaliter, non naturaliter. Hoc igitur modo accipiendum est quod natura humana unita est Verbo Dei in persona, non in natura: quia si non pertinet ad naturam divinam, pertinet autem ad personam ipsius, in quantum persona Verbi assumendo, adiunxit sibi humanam naturam. Sed de modo huiusmodi coniunctionis dubitatio et discordia accidit. Videmus enim in creaturis quod dupliciter aliquid alicui advenit; scilicet accidentaliter, et essentialiter. Hence, it is obvious that nothing prevents some things being united in a person which are not united in the nature. For an individual substance of a rational nature can have something which does not pertain to the nature of a species, and this is united to it personally, not naturally. Therefore, in this manner it must be understood that the human nature was united to the Word of God in the person, not in the nature. For if it does not pertain to the divine nature, nevertheless it pertains to his person, insofar as the person of the Word joined human nature to himself by assuming it. But concerning the manner of this kind of conjunction doubt and discord occurs. For we see in creatures that something comes to another in two ways, namely, accidentally and essentially. Nestorius igitur, et ante ipsum Theodorus Mopsuestenus, posuerunt naturam humanam coniunctam esse Verbo accidentaliter; scilicet secundum gratiae inhabitationem: ponentes quod Verbum Dei unitum erat homini Christo sicut habitans in ipso ut in templo suo. Videmus autem quod omnis substantia coniuncta alteri accidentaliter, retinet seorsum suam propriam singularitatem, sicut vestis adveniens homini aut domus continens habitatorem: unde sequitur quod homo ille habuerit propriam singularitatem quae est personalitas eius. Sequebatur ergo secundum Nestorium, quod in Christo persona hominis esset distincta persona a persona Verbi; et quod esset alius filius hominis, et alius Filius Dei. Unde Beatam Virginem non confitebatur matrem Dei, sed matrem hominis.- Sed hoc est omnino absurdum. Therefore, Nestorius, and Theodorus of Mopsuestia before him, posited that the human nature was conjoined to the Word accidentally, namely, according to the indwelling of grace, positing that the Word of God had been united to the man Christ as if by dwelling in him as in his temple. But we see that every substance accidentally conjoined to another retains its own proper singularity separately, as when clothes are put on by man or a house contains an inhabitant. Hence, it follows that man will have a proper singularity which is his personality. Therefore, according to Nestorius it followed that the person of man in Christ was a distinct person from the person of the Word, and that one was the son of man and the other the Son of God. Hence, the Blessed Virgin was not acknowledged as the mother of God, but the mother of a man. But this is entirely absurd. Primo quidem, quia Sacra Scriptura aliter loquitur de hominibus in quibus Verbum Dei habitavit per gratiam, et aliter de Christo. Nam de aliis dicit quod factum est Verbum Domini ad talem prophetam, sed de Christo dicit: Verbum caro factum est, id est homo; quasi ipsum Verbum personaliter sit homo. First, indeed, this is because Sacred Scripture speaks in one way concerning men, in whom the Word of God dwelled through grace, and in another way concerning Christ. For concerning other men, it says that the Word of the Lord was brought to a given prophet, but concerning Christ it says, the Word was made flesh (John 1:14), that is, a man, as if the Word itself were personally a man.