Articulus 1 Article 1 Quid est veritas What is truth Quaestio est de veritate. Et primo quaeritur quid est veritas? The problem under discussion is truth, and in the first article we ask: what is truth? Videtur autem quod verum sit omnino idem quod ens: Augustinus in libro Soliloquiorum dicit quod verum est id quod est; sed id quod est nihil est nisi ens; ergo verum significat omnino idem quod ens. Obj. 1: It seems that the true is exactly the same as being, for Augustine says: the true is that which is. But that which is, is simply being. The true, therefore, means exactly the same as being. Respondens dicebat quod sunt idem secundum supposita, sed ratione differunt. —Contra, ratio cuiuslibet rei est id quod significatur per suam diffinitionem; sed id quod est assignatur ab Augustino ut diffinitio veri, quibusdam aliis diffinitionibus reprobatis; cum ergo secundum id quod est conveniant verum et ens, videtur quod sint idem ratione. Obj. 2: It was said in reply that the true and being are the same materially but differ formally. On the contrary, the nature of a thing is signified by its definition; and the definition of the true, according to Augustine, is that which is. He rejects all other definitions. Now, since the true and being are materially the same, it seems that they are also formally the same. Praeterea, quaecumque differunt ratione ita se habent quod unum illorum potest intelligi sine altero: unde Boetius in libro De hebdomadibus dicit quod potest intelligi Deus esse si separetur per intellectum paulisper bonitas eius; ens autem nullo modo potest intelligi si separetur verum quia per hoc intelligitur quod verum est; ergo verum et ens non differunt ratione. Obj. 3: Things which differ conceptually are so related to each other that one of them can be understood without the other. For this reason, Boethius says that the existence of God can be understood if for a moment we mentally separate his goodness from his existence. Being, however can in no way be understood apart from the true, for being is known only in so far as it is true. Therefore, the true and being do not differ conceptually. Praeterea, si verum non est idem quod ens oportet quod sit entis dispositio; sed non potest esse entis dispositio: non enim est dispositio totaliter corrumpens, alias sequeretur "est verum, ergo est non ens," sicut sequitur "est homo mortuus, ergo non est homo"; similiter non est dispositio diminuens, alias non sequeretur "est verum, ergo est," sicut non sequitur, "est albus dentes, ergo est albus"; similiter non est dispositio contrahens vel specificans, quia sic non converteretur cum ente. Ergo verum et ens omnino sunt idem. Obj. 4: If the true is not the same as being, it must be a state of being. But it cannot be a state of being. It is not a state that entirely corrupts—otherwise, this would follow: “it is true. Therefore, it is non-being”—as it follows when we say: “this man is dead. Therefore, this is not a man.” Similarly, the true is not a state that limits. If it were, one could not say: “it is true. Therefore it is.” For one cannot say that "a thing is white simply because it has white teeth." Finally, the true is not a state which contracts or specifies being, for it is convertible with being. It follows, therefore, that the true and being are entirely the same. Praeterea, illa quorum est una dispositio sunt eadem; sed veri et entis est eadem dispositio; ergo sunt eadem. Dicitur enim in II Metaphysicae dispositio rei in esse est sicut sua dispositio in veritate; ergo verum et ens sunt omnino idem. Obj. 5: Things in the same state are the same. But the true and being are in the same state. Therefore, they are the same. For Aristotle writes: the state of a thing in its act of existence is the same as its state in truth. Therefore, the true and being are entirely the same. Praeterea, quaecumque non sunt idem aliquo modo differunt; sed verum et ens nullo modo differunt, quia non differunt per essentiam cum omne ens per essentiam suam sit verum, nec differunt per aliquas differentias quia oporteret quod in aliquo communi genere convenirent; ergo sunt omnino idem. Obj. 6: Things not the same differ in some respect. But the true and being differ in no respect. They do not differ essentially, for every being is true by its very essence. And they do not differ in any other ways, for they must belong to some common genus. Therefore, they are entirely the same. Item, si non sunt omnino idem oportet quod verum aliquid super ens addat; sed nihil addit verum super ens cum sit etiam in plus quam ens. Quod patet per Philosophum IV Metaphysicae, ubi dicit quod verum diffinientes dicimus, quod dicimus esse quod est aut non esse quod non est, et sic verum includit ens et non ens; ergo verum non addit aliquid super ens, et sic videtur omnino idem esse verum quod ens. Obj. 7: If they were not entirely the same, the true would add something to being. But the true adds nothing to being, even though it has greater extension than being. This is borne out by the statement of the Philosopher that we define the true as that which affirms the existence of what is, and denies the existence of what is not. Consequently, the true includes both being and non-being; since it does not add anything to being, it seems to be entirely the same as being. Sed contra, nugatio est eiusdem inutilis repetitio; si ergo verum esset idem quod ens, esset nugatio dum dicitur ens verum, quod falsum est; ergo non sunt idem. On the contrary (1): Useless repetition of the same thing is meaningless; so, if the true were the same as being, it would be meaningless to say: “being is true.” This, however, is hardly correct. Therefore, they are not the same. Item, ens et bonum convertuntur; sed verum non convertitur cum bono: aliquod est enim verum quod non est bonum, sicut aliquem fornicari; ergo nec verum cum ente convertitur, et ita non sunt idem. Again (2): Being and the good are convertible. The true and the good, however, are not interchangeable, for some things, such as fornication, are true but not good. The true, therefore, and being are not interchangeable. And so they are not the same. Praeterea, secundum Boetium in libro De hebdomadibus in omnibus creaturis diversum est esse et quod est; sed verum significat esse rei; ergo verum est diversum a quod est in creatis. Sed quod est est idem quod ens; ergo verum in creaturis est diversum ab ente. Furthermore (3): In all creatures, as Boethius has pointed out, to be is other than that which is. Now, the true signifies the existence of things. Consequently, in creatures it is different from that which is. But that which is, is the same as being. Therefore, in creatures the true is different from being. Praeterea, quaecumque se habent ut prius et posterius oportet esse diversa; sed verum et ens modo praedicto se habent quia, ut in libro De causis dicitur, prima rerum creatarum est esse, et commentator in eodem libro dicit quod omnia alia dicuntur per informationem de ente, et sic ente posteriora sunt; ergo verum et ens sunt diversa. Furthermore (4): Things related as before and after must differ. But the true and being are related in the aforesaid manner; for, as is said in the book Of Causes: the first of all created things is the act of existence. In a study of this work, a commentator writes as follows: everything else is predicated as a specification of being. Consequently, everything else comes after being. Therefore, the true and being are not the same. Praeterea, quae communiter dicuntur de causa et causatis, magis sunt unum in causa quam in causatis et praecipue in Deo quam in creaturis. Sed in Deo ista quatuor ens, unum, verum et bonum hoc modo appropriantur ut ens ad essentiam pertineat, unum ad personam Patris, verum ad personam Filii, bonum ad personam Spiritus Sancti; personae autem divinae non solum ratione sed etiam re distinguuntur, unde de invicem non praedicantur; ergo multo fortius in creaturis praedicta quatuor debent amplius quam ratione differre. Furthermore (5): What are predicated of a cause and of the effects of the cause are more united in the cause than in its effects—and more so in God than in creatures. But in God four predicates—being, the one, the true, and the good—are appropriated as follows: being, to the essence; the one, to the Father; the true, to the Son; and the good, to the Holy Spirit. Since the divine persons are really and not merely conceptually distinct, these notions cannot be predicated of each other; if really distinct when verified of the divine persons, the four notions in question are much more so when verified of creatures. Responsio. Dicendum quod sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota ita investigando quid est unumquodque, alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum; I answer that when investigating the nature of anything, one should make the same kind of analysis as he makes when he reduces a proposition to certain self-evident principles. Otherwise, both types of knowledge will become involved in an infinite regress, and science and our knowledge of things will perish. illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae Metaphysicae; unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum quo differentia additur generi vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens, unde probat etiam Philosophus in III Metaphysicae quod ens non potest esse genus; sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere super ens in quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non exprimitur, quod dupliciter contingit. Now, as Avicenna says, that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most evident, and to which it reduces all its concepts, is being. Consequently, all the other conceptions of the intellect are had by additions to being. But nothing can be added to being as though it were something not included in being—in the way that a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a subject—for every reality is essentially a being. The Philosopher has shown this by proving that being cannot be a genus. Yet, in this sense, some predicates may be said to add to being inasmuch as they express a mode of being not expressed by the term "being." This happens in two ways. Uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis; sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera: substantia enim non addit super ens aliquam differentiam quae designet aliquam naturam superadditam enti sed nomine substantiae exprimitur specialis quidam modus essendi, scilicet per se ens, et ita est in aliis generibus. First, the mode expressed is a certain special manner of being; for there are different grades of being according to which we speak when we speak of different levels of existence, and according to these grades different things are classified. Consequently, "substance" does not add a difference to being by signifying some reality added to it, but "substance" simply expresses a special manner of existing, namely, as a being in itself. The same is true of the other classes of existents. Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens, et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in se, alio modo secundum quod consequitur unum ens in ordine ad aliud. Si primo modo, hoc est dupliciter quia vel exprimitur in ente aliquid affirmative vel negative; non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente nisi essentia eius secundum quam esse dicitur, et sic imponitur hoc nomen res, quod in hoc differt ab ente, secundum Avicennam in principio Metaphysicae, quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi sed nomen rei exprimit quiditatem vel essentiam entis; negatio autem consequens omne ens absolute est indivisio, et hanc exprimit hoc nomen unum: nihil aliud enim est unum quam ens indivisum. Second, some are said to add to being because the mode they express is one that is common, and consequent upon every being. This mode can be taken in two ways: first, in so far as it follows upon every being considered absolutely; second, in so far as it follows upon every being considered in relation to another. In the first, the term is used in two ways, because it expresses something in the being either affirmatively or negatively. We can, however, find nothing that can be predicated of every being affirmatively and, at the same time, absolutely, with the exception of its essence by which the being is said to be. To express this, the term "thing" is used; for, according to Avicenna, thing differs from being because being gets its name from to-be, but thing expresses the quiddity or essence of the being. There is, however, a negation consequent upon every being considered absolutely: its undividedness, and this is expressed by "one." For the "one" is simply undivided being. Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo modo, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero et hoc exprimit hoc nomen aliquid: dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid, unde sicut ens dicitur unum in quantum est indivisum in se ita dicitur aliquid in quantum est ab aliis divisum. Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud, et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente; hoc autem est anima, quae quodam modo est omnia, ut dicitur in III De anima: in anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva; convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum, unde in principio Ethicorum dicitur quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt, convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum. Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis, sicut visus per hoc quod disponitur secundum speciem coloris cognoscit colorem: If the mode of being is taken in the second way—according to the relation of one being to another—we find a twofold use. The first is based on the distinction of one being from another, and this distinctness is expressed by the word "something," which implies, as it were, "some other thing." For, just as a being is said to be "one" in so far as it is without division in itself, so it is said to be "something" in so far as it is divided from others. The second division is based on the correspondence one being has with another. This is possible only if there is something which is such that it agrees with every being. Such a being is the soul, which, as is said in On the Soul, in some way is all things. The soul, however, has both knowing and appetitive powers. "Good" expresses the correspondence of being to the appetitive power, for, and so we note in the Ethics, the good is that which all desire. "True" expresses the correspondence of being to the knowing power, for all knowing is produced by an assimilation of the knower to the thing known, so that assimilation is said to be the cause of knowledge. Similarly, the sense of sight knows a color by being informed with a species of the color. prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui concordet, quae quidem concordia adaequatio intellectus et rei dicitur, et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit verum super ens, scilicet conformitatem sive adaequationem rei et intellectus, ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei: sic ergo entitas rei praecedit rationem veritatis sed cognitio est quidam veritatis effectus. Secundum hoc ergo veritas sive verum tripliciter invenitur diffiniri. The first reference of being to the intellect, therefore, consists in its agreement with the intellect. This agreement is called “the conformity of thing and intellect.” In this conformity is fulfilled the formal constituent of the true, and this is what "the true" adds to being, namely, the conformity or equation of thing and intellect. As we said, the knowledge of a thing is a consequence of this conformity; therefore, it is an effect of truth, even though the fact that the thing is a being is prior to its truth. Consequently, truth or the true has been defined in three ways. Uno modo secundum illud quod praecedit rationem veritatis et in quo verum fundatur, et sic Augustinus diffinit in libro Soliloquiorum verum est id quod est, et Avicenna in sua Metaphysica veritas cuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei, et quidam sic verum est indivisio esse et quod est. First of all, it is defined according to that which precedes truth and is the basis of truth. This is why Augustine writes: the true is that which is; and Avicenna: the truth of each thing is a property of the act of being which has been established for it. Still others say: the true is the undividedness of the act of existence from that which is. Alio modo diffinitur secundum id in quo formaliter ratio veri perficitur, et sic dicit Isaac quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus, et Anselmus in libro De veritate veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis—rectitudo enim ista secundum adaequationem quandam dicitur—; et Philosophus dicit 4 Metaphysicae quod diffinientes verum dicimus cum dicitur esse quod est, aut non esse quod non est. Truth is also defined in another way—according to that in which its intelligible determination is formally completed. Thus, Isaac writes: truth is the conformity of thing and intellect; and Anselm: truth is a rectitude perceptible only by the mind. This rectitude, of course, is said to be based on some conformity. The Philosopher says that in defining truth we say that truth is had when one affirms that to be which is, and that not to be which is not. Tertio modo diffinitur verum secundum effectum consequentem, et sic dicit Hilarius quod verum est declarativum et manifestativum esse, et Augustinus in libro De vera religione veritas est qua ostenditur id quod est, et in eodem libro veritas est secundum quam de inferioribus iudicamus. The third way of defining truth is according to the effect following upon it. Thus, Hilary says that the true is that which manifests and proclaims existence. And Augustine says: truth is that by which that which is, is shown; and also: truth is that according to which we judge about inferior things. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod diffinitio illa Augustini datur de veritate secundum quod habet fundamentum in re et non secundum id quod ratio veri completur in adaequatione rei ad intellectum.—Vel dicendum quod cum dicitur verum est id quod est, li est non accipitur ibi secundum quod significat actum essendi sed secundum quod est nota intellectus componentis, prout scilicet affirmationem propositionis significat, ut sit sensus: verum est id quod est, id est cum dicitur esse de aliquo quod est, ut sic in idem redeat diffinitio Augustini cum diffinitione Philosophi supra inducta. Reply Obj. 1: That definition of Augustine is given for the true as it has its foundation in reality and not as its formal nature is given complete expression by conformity of thing and intellect. An alternative answer would be that in the statement, “the true is that which is,” the word "is" is not here understood as referring to the act of existing, but rather as the mark of the intellectual act of judging, signifying, that is, the affirmation of a proposition. The meaning would then be this: “the true is that which is—it is had when the existence of what is, is affirmed.” If this is its meaning, then Augustine’s definition agrees with that of the Philosopher mentioned above. Ad secundum patet solutio ex dictis. Reply Obj. 2: The answer is clear from what has been said. Ad tertium dicendum quod aliquid intelligi sine altero potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo quod intelligatur aliquid altero non intellecto, et sic ea quae ratione differunt ita se habent quod unum sine altero intelligi potest. Alio modo potest accipi aliquid intelligi sine altero, quod intelligitur eo non existente, et sic ens non potest intelligi sine vero, quia ens non potest intelligi sine hoc quod concordet vel adaequetur intellectui; sed non tamen oportet ut quicumque intelligit rationem entis intelligat veri rationem, sicut nec quicumque intelligit ens intelligit intellectum agentem, et tamen sine intellectu agente nihil intelligi potest. Reply Obj. 3: “Something can be understood without another” can be taken in two ways. It can mean that something can be known while another remains unknown. Taken in this way, it is true that things which differ conceptually are such that one can be understood without the other. But there is another way that a thing can be understood without another: when it is known even though the other does not exist. Taken in this sense, being cannot be known without the true, for it cannot be known unless it agrees with or conforms to intellect, It is not necessary, however, that everyone who understands the formal notion of being should also understand the formal notion of the true—just as not everyone who understands being understands the agent intellect, even though nothing can be known without the agent intellect. Ad quartum dicendum quod verum est dispositio entis non quasi addens aliquam naturam nec quasi exprimens aliquem specialem modum entis sed aliquid quod generaliter invenitur in omni ente, quod tamen nomine entis non exprimitur; unde non oportet quod sit dispositio vel corrumpens vel diminuens vel in partem contrahens. Reply Obj. 4: The true is a state of being even though it does not add any reality to being or express any special mode of existence. It is rather something that is generally found in every being, although it is not expressed by the word "being." Consequently, it is not a state that corrupts, limits, or contracts. Ad quintum dicendum quod dispositio non accipitur ibi secundum quod est in genere qualitatis sed secundum quod importat quendam ordinem: cum enim illa quae sunt causa aliorum essendi sint maxime entia et illa quae sunt causa veritatis sint maxime vera, concludit Philosophus quod idem est ordo alicui rei in esse et veritate, ita scilicet quod ubi invenitur quod est maxime ens, est maxime verum. Unde nec hoc ideo est quia ens et verum ratione sunt idem sed quia secundum hoc quod aliquid habet de entitate secundum hoc est natum adaequari intellectui, et sic ratio veri sequitur rationem entis. Reply Obj. 5: In this objection, "condition" should not be understood as belonging to the genus of quality. It implies, rather, a certain order; for those which are the cause of the existence of other things are themselves beings most completely, and those which are the cause of the truth of other things are themselves true most completely. It is for this reason that the Philosopher concludes that the rank of a thing in its existence corresponds to its rank in truth, so that when one finds that which is most fully being, he finds there also that which is most fully true. But this does not mean that being and the true are the same in concept. It means simply that in the degree in which a thing has being, in that degree it is capable of being proportioned to intellect. Consequently, the true is dependent upon the formal character of being. Ad sextum dicendum quod verum et ens differunt ratione per hoc quod aliquid est in ratione veri quod non est in ratione entis, non autem ita quod aliquid sit in ratione entis quod non sit in ratione veri; unde nec per essentiam differunt nec differentiis oppositis ab invicem distinguuntur. Reply Obj. 6: There is a conceptual difference between the true and being since there is something in the notion of the true that is not in the concept of the existing—not in such a way, however, that there is something in the concept of being which is not in the concept of the true. They do not differ essentially nor are they distinguished from one another by opposing differences. Ad septimum dicendum quod verum non est in plus quam ens: ens enim aliquo modo acceptum dicitur de non ente secundum quod non ens est apprehensum ab intellectu, unde in IV Metaphysicae dicit Philosophus quod negatio vel privatio entis uno modo dicitur ens, unde Avicenna etiam dicit in principio suae Metaphysicae quod non potest formari enuntiatio nisi de ente quia oportet illud de quo propositio formatur esse apprehensum ab intellectu. Ex quo patet quod omne verum est aliquo modo ens. Reply Obj. 7: The true does not have a wider extension than being. Being is, in some way, predicated of non-being in so far as non-being is apprehended by the intellect. For, as the Philosopher says, the negation or the privation of being may, in a sense, be called being. Avicenna supports this by pointing out that one can form propositions only of beings, for that about which a proposition is formed must be apprehended by the intellect. Consequently, it is clear that everything true is being in some way. Ad primum vero eorum quae contra obiciuntur dicendum quod ideo non est nugatio cum dicitur ens verum quia aliquid exprimitur nomine veri quod non exprimitur nomine entis, non propter hoc quod re differant. Reply Sed Contra 1: It must be said that the reason why it is not tautological to call a being true is that something is expressed by the word "true" that is not expressed by the word "being," and not that the two differ in reality. Ad secundum dicendum quod quamvis istum fornicari sit malum, tamen secundum quod aliquid habet de entitate natum est hoc conformari intellectui et secundum hoc consequitur ibi ratio veri, et ita patet quod nec verum excedit nec exceditur ab ente. Reply Sed Contra 2: Although fornication is evil, it possesses some being and can conform to intellect. Accordingly, the formal character of the true is found here. So it is clear that "true" is coextensive with "being." Ad tertium dicendum quod cum dicitur diversum est esse et quod est distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui ille actus convenit; nomen autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi, et ideo ratio non sequitur. Reply Sed Contra 3: In the statement, to be is other than that which is, the act of being is distinguished from that to which that act belongs. But the name of being is taken from the act of existence, not from that whose act it is. Hence, the argument does not follow. Ad quartum dicendum quod secundum hoc verum est posterius ente quod ratio veri differt ab entis ratione modo praedicto. Reply Sed Contra 4: The true comes after being in this respect, that the notion of the true differs from that of being in the manner we have described. Ad quintum dicendum quod ratio illa deficit in tribus: Reply Sed Contra 5: This argument has three flaws.