Articulus 9 Article 9 Utrum veritas sit in sensu Whether truth is in sense Nono quaeritur utrum veritas sit in sensu. Ninth, it is asked whether truth is in sense? Et videtur quod non: Anselmus enim dicit quod veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis; sed sensus non est de natura mentis; ergo veritas non est in sensu. Obj. 1: It seems that it is not, for Anselm says: truth is a correctness perceivable only by the mind. But sense does not have the same nature as the mind. Hence, truth is not in sense. Praeterea, Augustinus probat in libro 83 quaestionum quod veritas corporeis sensibus non cognoscitur, et rationes eius supra positae sunt; ergo veritas non est in sensu. Obj. 2: Augustine proves that truth is not known by the bodily senses, and his reasons were set down above. Hence, truth is not in sense. Sed contra, Augustinus in libro De vera religione dicit quod veritas est qua ostenditur id quod est; sed id quod est ostenditur non tantum intellectui sed etiam sensui; ergo veritas non solum est in intellectu sed etiam in sensu. On the contrary, Augustine says: truth manifests that which is. But that which is, is manifested not only to the intellect, but also to sense. Therefore. Responsio. Dicendum quod veritas est in intellectu et in sensu, sed non eodem modo. In intellectu enim est sicut consequens actum intellectus et sicut cognita per intellectum: consequitur namque intellectus operationem secundum quod iudicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est; cognoscitur autem ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus reflectitur super actum suum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem eius ad rem, quae quidem cognosci non potest nisi cognita natura ipsius actus, quae cognosci non potest nisi natura principii activi cognoscatur, quod est ipse intellectus, in cuius natura est ut rebus conformetur: unde secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra se ipsum reflectitur. Sed veritas est in sensu sicut consequens actum eius, dum scilicet iudicium sensus est de re secundum quod est, sed tamen non est in sensu sicut cognita a sensu: etsi enim sensus vere iudicat de rebus, non tamen cognoscit veritatem qua vere iudicat; quamvis enim sensus cognoscat se sentire, non tamen cognoscit naturam suam et per consequens nec naturam sui actus nec proportionem eius ad res, et ita nec veritatem eius. I answer that truth is both in intellect and in sense, but not in the same way. It is in intellect as a consequence of the act of the intellect and as known by the intellect. Truth follows the operation of the intellect inasmuch as it belongs to the intellect to judge about a thing as it is. And truth is known by the intellect in view of the fact that the intellect reflects upon its own act—not merely as knowing its own act, but as knowing the proportion of its act to the thing. Now, this proportion cannot be known without knowing the nature of the act; and the nature of the act cannot be known without knowing the nature of the active principle, that is, the intellect itself, to whose nature it belongs to be conformed to things. Consequently, it is because the intellect reflects upon itself that it knows truth. Truth is in sense also as a consequence of its act, for sense judges of things as they are. Truth is not in sense, however, as something known by sense; for, although sense judges truly about things, it does not know the truth by which it truly judges. Although sense knows that it senses, it does not know its own nature; consequently, it knows neither the nature of its act nor the proportion of this act to things. As a result, it does not know its truth. Cuius ratio est quia illa quae sunt perfectissima in entibus, ut substantiae intellectuales, redeunt ad essentiam suam reditione completa: in hoc enim quod cognoscunt aliquid extra se positum, quodam modo extra se procedunt; secundum vero quod cognoscunt se cognoscere, iam ad se redire incipiunt quia actus cognitionis est medius inter cognoscentem et cognitum; sed reditus iste completur secundum quod cognoscunt essentias proprias, unde dicitur in libro De causis quod omnis sciens essentiam suam est rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa. Sensus autem, qui inter cetera est propinquior intellectuali substantiae, redire quidem incipit ad essentiam suam quia non solum cognoscit sensibile sed etiam cognoscit se sentire; non tamen completur eius reditio quia sensus non cognoscit essentiam suam: cuius hanc rationem Avicenna assignat quia sensus nihil cognoscit nisi per organum corporale, non est autem possibile ut organum corporale medium cadat inter potentiam sensitivam et se ipsam. Sed potentiae insensibiles nullo modo redeunt super se ipsas quia non cognoscunt se agere, sicut ignis non cognoscit se calefacere. The reason for this is that the most perfect beings, such as, for example, intellectual substances, return to their essence with a complete return: knowing something external to themselves, in a certain sense they go outside of themselves; but by knowing that they know, they are already beginning to return to themselves, because the act of cognition mediates between the knower and the thing known. That return is completed inasmuch as they know their own essences. Hence, it is said in On the Causes: a being which is such as to know its own essence returns to it by a complete return. Since sense is closer to an intellectual substance than other things are, it begins to return to its essence; it not only knows the sensible, but it also knows that it senses. Its return, however, is not complete, since it does not know its own essence. Avicenna has given the reason for this by pointing out that the sense knows nothing except through a bodily organ, and a bodily organ cannot be a medium between a sensing power and itself. But powers without any ability to sense cannot return to themselves in any way, for they do not know that they are acting. For example, fire does not know that it is heating. Et ex his patet solutio ad obiecta. From this the solutions to the difficulties are clear. Articulus 10 Article 10 Utrum aliqua res sit falsa Whether there is any false thing Decimo quaeritur utrum aliqua res sit falsa. Tenth, it is asked whether there is any false thing? Et videtur quod non: Augustinus enim dicit in libro Soliloquiorum verum est id quod est; ergo falsum est id quod non est; sed quod non est non est res aliqua; ergo nulla res est falsa. Obj. 1: It seems not, for according to Augustine: the true is that which is. Hence, the false is that which is not. Now, what is not is not a thing. Therefore, no thing is false. Sed dicebat quod verum est differentia entis: et ita, sicut verum est quod est, ita et falsum. Obj. 2: It was said that the true is a differentia of being; consequently, the false, like the true, is that which is. Sed contra, nulla differentia divisiva convertitur cum eo cuius est differentia; sed verum convertitur cum ente ut supra dictum est; ergo verum non est differentia divisiva entis ut res aliqua falsa dici possit. On the contrary, no dividing differentia is interchangeable with that whose differentia it is. Now, as was said, the true is interchangeable with being. Consequently, the true is not a dividing differentia of being, for this would make it possible to call some thing false. Praeterea, veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus; sed omnis res est adaequata intellectui divino quia nihil potest esse in se aliter quam intellectus divinus cognoscit; ergo omnis res est vera; ergo nulla res est falsa. Obj. 3: Truth is a conformity of thing and intellect. Now, an things are conformed to the divine intellect, since in itself nothing can be other than it is known to be by the divine intellect. Hence, all things are true, and nothing is false. Praeterea, omnis res habet veritatem a forma sua: ex hoc enim homo dicitur verus quod habet veram hominis formam; sed nulla est res quae non habeat aliquam formam, quia omne esse est a forma; ergo quaelibet res est vera; ergo nulla res est falsa. Obj. 4: All things possess truth from their forms. For example, one is said to be a true man if he has the true form of a man. But there is nothing which does not have some form, for every act of existing comes from form. Hence, everything is true, and there is no thing which is false. Praeterea, sicut se habet bonum et malum, ita se habet verum et falsum; sed, quia malum invenitur in rebus, malum non substantificatur nisi in bono ut Dionysius et Augustinus dicunt; ergo, si falsitas invenitur in rebus, falsitas non substantificabitur nisi in vero: quod non videtur esse possibile quia sic idem esset verum et falsum, —quod est impossibile—, sicut idem est homo et album propter hoc quod albedo substantificatur in homine. Obj. 5: Good and evil are related as true and false are related. Now, since evil is found in things, it has concrete reality only in something good, as Dionysius and Augustine say. Therefore, if falseness is found in things, it can have reality only in what is true. But this does not seem possible, for then the same thing would be both true and false; but this is impossible. This would mean, for example, that man and white are the same because whiteness is made real in a man. Praeterea, Augustinus in libro Soliloquiorum sic obicit. Si aliqua res nominatur falsa, aut hoc est ex eo quod est simile aut ex eo quod est dissimile: si ex eo quod est dissimile, nihil est quod falsum dici non possit: nihil enim est quod alicui dissimile non sit; si ex eo quod simile, omnia reclamant quae ex eo vera sunt quo similia. Ergo nullo modo falsitas in rebus inveniri potest. Obj. 6: Augustine proposes the following difficulty. If a thing is called false, it is either because it is similar or because it is dissimilar. If because it is dissimilar, there is nothing that cannot be called false, for there is nothing that is not unlike something else. If because it is similar, all things loudly protest, for they are true because they are similar. Therefore, falsity cannot be found in things in any way. Sed contra. Augustinus ita diffinit falsum: falsum est quod ad similitudinem alicuius accomodatum est et non pertingit ad illud cuius similitudinem gerit; sed omnis creatura gerit similitudinem Dei; ergo, cum nulla creatura pertingat ad ipsum Deum per modum identitatis, videtur quod omnis creatura sit falsa. On the contrary (1), Augustine defines the false as follows: the false is that which approaches the likeness of something else without being that whose likeness it bears. But every creature bears the likeness of God. Therefore, since no creature is identical with God himself, it seems that every creature is false. Praeterea, Augustinus in libro De vera religione: omne corpus est verum corpus et falsa unitas; sed hoc pro tanto dicitur quia imitatur unitatem et tamen non est unitas; cum ergo quaelibet creatura secundum quamlibet sui perfectionem divinam perfectionem imitetur et ab eo nihilominus in infinitum distet, videtur quod quaelibet creatura sit falsa. Furthermore (2), Augustine says that: every body is a true body and a false unity. Now, a body is said to be false because it imitates unity, yet is not a unity. Therefore, since every creature, in so far as it is perfect, imitates the divine perfection, and, nevertheless, in any perfection which it has, remains infinitely distant from it, it seems that every creature is false. Praeterea, sicut verum convertitur cum ente, ita et bonum; sed ex hoc quod bonum convertitur cum ente non prohibetur quin aliqua res inveniatur mala; ergo nec ex hoc quod verum convertitur cum ente prohibebitur quin aliqua res inveniatur falsa. Furthermore (3), the good, like the true, is interchangeable with being. But the interchangeability of the good and being does not stand in the way of a thing’s being evil. Therefore, the fact that the true is interchangeable with being does not stand in the way of a thing’s being false. Praeterea, Anselmus dicit in libro De veritate quod duplex est propositionis veritas: una quia significat quod accepit significare, sicut haec propositio Socrates sedet significat Socratem sedere sive Socrates sedeat sive non sedeat; alia quando significat illud ad quod facta est,—est enim ad hoc facta ut significet esse quando est—, et secundum hoc proprie dicitur enuntiatio vera. Ergo eadem ratione quaelibet res dicetur vera quando implet hoc ad quod est, falsa autem quando non implet; sed omnis res quae deficit a fine suo non implet illud propter quod est; cum ergo multae res sint tales, videtur quod multae sint falsae. Furthermore (4), Anselm says that there are two kinds of truth in propositions. The first type occurs when the proposition has the meaning which was given to it. For example, this proposition, “Socrates sits,” means that Socrates is sitting, whether he is actually sitting or not. The second type of truth occurs when the proposition signifies that for which it was formed—and it has been formed to signify that something is when it is. In this respect, a proposition is properly said to be true. In the same way, a thing may be called true when it fulfills its purpose, and false when it does not do so. But everything which falls short of its end does not fulfill its purpose; and, since there are many things of this sort, it seems that many things are false. Responsio. Dicendum quod, sicut veritas consistit in adaequatione rei et intellectus, ita falsitas consistit in eorum inaequalitate: res autem comparatur ad intellectum divinum et humanum ut supra dictum est. Intellectui autem divino comparatur uno modo sicut mensuratum mensurae, quantum ad ea quae in rebus positive dicuntur vel inveniuntur, quia omnia huiusmodi ab arte divini intellectus proveniunt; alio modo sicut cognitum ad cognoscens, et sic etiam negationes et defectus divino intellectui adaequantur quia omnia huiusmodi Deus cognoscit quamvis ea non causet; patet ergo quod res qualitercumque se habeat, sub quacumque forma existat vel privatione aut defectu, intellectui divino adaequatur, et sic patet quod res quaelibet in comparatione ad intellectum divinum vera est: unde Anselmus dicit in libro De veritate est igitur veritas in omnium quae sunt essentia, quia hoc sunt quod in summa veritate sunt. Unde per comparationem ad intellectum divinum nulla res potest dici falsa. I answer that just as truth consists in an equation of thing and intellect, so falsity consists in an inequality between them. Now, as was said, a thing is related to divine and human intellects. In regard to everything that is positively predicated of things or found in them, it is related to the divine in one way as the measured to its measure; for all such things come from the divine intellect’s art. A thing is related in another way to the divine intellect: as a thing known is related to the knower. In this way even negations and defects are equated to the divine intellect, since God knows all these even though he does not cause them. It is clear, then, that a thing is conformed to the divine intellect in whatever way it exists, under any for in whatsoever or even under a privation or a defect. Consequently, it is clear that everything is true in its relation to the divine intellect. Hence, Anselm says: there is, then, truth in the essence of all things which are, for they are what they are in the highest truth. Therefore, in its relation to the divine intellect, nothing can be false. Sed secundum comparationem ad intellectum humanum invenitur interdum inaequalitas rei ad intellectum quae quodam modo ex ipsa re causatur. Res enim notitiam sui facit in anima per ea quae de ipsa exterius apparent, quia cognitio nostra a sensu initium sumit cui per se obiectum sunt sensibiles qualitates: unde et in 1 De anima dicitur quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est; et ideo, quando in aliqua re apparent sensibiles qualitates demonstrantes naturam quae eis non subest, dicitur res illa esse falsa: unde Philosophus dicit 6 Metaphysicae quod illa dicuntur falsa quae nata sunt videri aut qualia non sunt aut quae non sunt, sicut dicitur aurum falsum in quo exterius apparet color auri et alia huiusmodi accidentia cum tamen interius natura auri non subsit. Nec tamen res est hoc modo causa falsitatis in anima quod necessario falsitatem causet, quia veritas et falsitas praecipue in iudicio animae existunt, anima vero in quantum de rebus iudicat non patitur a rebus sed magis quodam modo agit: unde res non dicitur falsa quia semper de se faciat falsam apprehensionem, sed quia nata est facere per ea quae de ipsa apparent. In its relation to a human intellect, however, an inequality of thing with intellect, caused in some way by the thing, is occasionally found; for a thing makes itself known in the soul by its exterior appearance, since our cognition takes its beginning from sense, whose direct object is sensible qualities. For this reason it is said in On the Soul: accidents greatly contribute to our knowledge of the quiddity. Consequently, when there are manifested in any object sensible qualities indicating a nature which does not actually underlie them, that thing is said to be false. Hence, the Philosopher says that those things are called false which are such as to seem to be what they are not, or of a kind which they are not. For example, that is called “false” gold which has in its external appearance the color and other accidents of genuine gold, whereas the nature of gold does not interiorly underlie them. But a thing is not to be the cause of falsity in the soul in the sense that it necessarily causes falsity; for truth and falsity exist principally in the soul’s judgment; and the soul, inasmuch as it judges about things, is not acted upon by things, but rather, in a sense, acts upon them. Hence, a thing is not said to be false because it always of itself causes a false apprehension, but rather because its natural appearance is likely to cause a false apprehension. Sed, quia, ut dictum est, comparatio rei ad intellectum divinum est ei essentialis et secundum eam per se dicitur vera, sed comparatio ad intellectum humanum est ei accidentalis, secundum quam non dicitur absolute vera sed quasi secundum quid et in potentia, ideo simpliciter loquendo omnis res est vera et nulla res est falsa, sed secundum quid, scilicet in ordine ad intellectum nostrum, aliquae res dicuntur falsae. Et ita oportet rationibus utriusque partis respondere. As was pointed out previously, however, the relation to the divine intellect is essential to a thing; and in this respect a thing is said to be true in itself. Its relation to the human intellect is accidental to it; and in this respect a thing is not true, absolutely speaking but, as it were, in some respect and in potency. Therefore, all things are true absolutely speaking, and nothing is false. But in a certain respect, that is, with reference to our intellect, some things are said to be false. Hence, it is necessary to answer the arguments of both sides. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ista diffinitio “verum est id quod est” non perfecte exprimit rationem veritatis sed quasi materialiter tantum, nisi secundum quod li esse significat affirmationem propositionis, ut scilicet dicatur id esse verum quod sic esse dicitur vel intelligitur ut in rebus est; et sic etiam falsum dicatur quod non est, id est quod non est ut dicitur vel intelligitur: et hoc in rebus inveniri potest. Reply Obj. 1: The definition, “the true is that which is,” does not perfectly express the intelligible character of truth. It expresses it, as it were, only materially, unless is here signifies the affirmation of a proposition, and means that a thing is said to be true when it is said to be or to be understood as it is in reality. Taken in this sense, the false may be said to be that which does not exist; it is not as it is said or understood to be. And this type of falsity can be found in things. Ad secundum dicendum quod verum proprie loquendo non potest esse differentia entis: ens enim non habet aliquam differentiam ut probatur in 3 Metaphysicae; sed aliquo modo verum se habet ad ens per modum differentiae sicut et bonum, in quantum videlicet exprimunt aliquid circa ens quod nomine entis non exprimitur: et secundum hoc intentio entis est indeterminata respectu intentionis veri, et sic intentio veri comparatur ad intentionem entis quodam modo ut differentia ad genus. Reply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, the true cannot be a differentia of being, for being does not have any differentia, as is proved in the Metaphysics. But in some sense the true, as well as the good, is related to being in the manner of a differentia, since it expresses something about being which is not expressed by the noun being; and in this sense the meaning of being is indeterminate with respect to the meaning of the true. Consequently, the meaning of the true is compared to the notion of being somewhat as a differentia is compared to its genus. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa concedenda est: procedit enim de re in ordine ad intellectum divinum. Reply Obj. 3: That argument must be conceded, since it treats a thing in its relation to the divine intellect. Ad quartum dicendum quod, quamvis quaelibet res habeat aliquam formam, non tamen omnis res habet illam formam cuius indicia exterius ostenduntur per sensibiles qualitates: et secundum haec falsa dicitur in quantum de se falsam aestimationem facere apta nata est. Reply Obj. 4: All things have some form, yet not everything has that form whose characteristics are externally manifested by sensible qualities; and it is in regard to these that a thing is said to be false if it is naturally apt to produce a false estimation about itself. Ad quintum dicendum quod aliquid existens extra animam pro tanto dicitur falsum, ut ex dictis patet, quia natum est de se facere falsam aestimationem; quod autem nihil est non est natum de se facere aliquam aestimationem quia non movet virtutem cognitivam; unde oportet quod illud quod falsum dicitur aliquod ens sit; unde, cum omne ens in quantum huiusmodi sit verum, oportet falsitatem in rebus existentem supra aliquam veritatem fundari: unde dicit Augustinus in libro Soliloquiorum quod tragoedus qui repraesentat alienas personas in theatris non esset falsus (Hector) nisi esset verus tragoedus; similiter equus pictus non esset falsus equus nisi esset pura pictura. Nec tamen sequitur contradictoria esse vera, quia affirmatio et negatio secundum quas dicitur verum et falsum non referuntur ad idem. Reply Obj. 5: As is clear from what has been said, something outside the soul is said to be false if it is naturally such as to give a false impression of itself. But what is nothing is not capable of making any impression, since it does not move a knowing power. What is said to be false, therefore, must be a being; and since every being, in so far as it is a being, is true, falsity must exist in things and be based upon some truth. For this reason Augustine says, that a tragedian representing true persons in dramas would not be false without being a true tragedian. Similarly, a painting of a horse would not be a false horse were it not a true picture. It does not follow, however, that contradictories are true, because the affirmation and the negation in expressing the true and the false do not refer to the same reality. Ad sextum dicendum quod res falsa dicitur secundum quod nata est fallere; cum autem fallere dico, significo actionem quamdam defectum inducentem; nihil autem natum est agere nisi secundum quod est ens, omnis autem defectus est non ens; unumquodque autem secundum quod est ens habet similitudinem veri, secundum autem quod non est recedit ab eius similitudine; et ideo hoc quod dico fallere, quantum ad id quod importat de actione originem habet ex similitudine, sed quantum ad id quod importat defectum, in quo formaliter ratio falsitatis consistit, ex dissimilitudine surgit: et ideo dicit Augustinus in libro De vera religione quod ex dissimilitudine falsitas oritur. Reply Obj. 6: A thing is said to be false in so far as, by its nature, it is likely to deceive. When I say deceive, however, I mean an action that brings on some defect; for nothing can act except to the extent that it is being, and every defect is non-being. Moreover, everything has some likeness to the true to the extent that it is a being; and in so far as it does not exist it departs from this likeness. Consequently, this deceiving as implying action arises from likeness; but the defect it implies, and in which the intelligible character of falsity formally consists, arises from unlikeness. Hence, Augustine says that falsity arises from unlikeness. Ad primum vero eorum quae contra obiciuntur, dicendum quod non ex qualibet similitudine nata est anima decipi, sed ex magna similitudine in qua dissimilitudo de facili inveniri non potest: et ideo ex similitudine maiori vel minori decipitur anima secundum maiorem vel minorem perspicacitatem ad dissimilitudinem inveniendum; nec tamen simpliciter debet enuntiari aliqua res falsa ex eo quod quemcumque in errorem inducit, sed ex eo quod plures vel sapientes nata est fallere. Creaturae autem quamvis aliquam Dei similitudinem gerant in se ipsis, tamen maxima dissimilitudo subest ut nonnisi ex magna insipientia contingat quod ex tali similitudine mens decipiatur. Unde ex praedicta similitudine et dissimilitudine creaturarum ad Deum non sequitur quod omnes creaturae debeant dici falsae. Reply Sed Contra 1: The soul is not so constituted as to be deceived by any likeness whatsoever, but only by a considerable resemblance which makes it difficult to discover the unlikeness. Hence, the soul is deceived by similarities, more or less great, according to the varying degrees of its acuteness in discovering unlikenesses. A thing, however, should not be said to be absolutely false because it leads into error, however much it may do that, but only because it is such as to deceive many or highly intelligent men. Now, although creatures bear some resemblance to God in themselves, so great is the dissimilarity between the two that only because of great stupidity could it happen that a mind would be deceived by such similarity. Hence, from the similarity and dissimilarity between creatures and God, it does not follow that all creatures should be called false. Ad secundum dicendum quod quidam aestimaverunt Deum esse corpus, et, cum Deus sit unitas qua omnia sunt unum, aestimaverunt per consequens corpus esse unitatem ipsam propter ipsam similitudinem unitatis: secundum hoc ergo corpus falsa unitas dicitur in quantum aliquos in errorem induxit vel inducere potuit ut unitas crederetur. Reply Sed Contra 2: Some have thought that God is a body; and, since he is the unity by which all things are one, they consequently thought that body was unity itself, because of its likeness to unity. Therefore, a body is called a false unity for this reason, that it has led or could lead some into the error of believing it to be unity. Ad tertium dicendum quod duplex est perfectio, scilicet prima et secunda: prima perfectio est forma uniuscuiusque per quam habet esse, unde ab ea nulla res destituitur dum manet; secunda perfectio est operatio, quae est finis rei vel id per quod ad finem devenitur, et hac perfectione interdum res destituitur. Ex prima autem perfectione resultat ratio veri in rebus: ex hoc enim quod res formam habet artem divini intellectus imitatur et sui notitiam in anima gignit; sed ex perfectione secunda consequitur in ipsa ratio bonitatis, quae consurgit ex fine. Et ideo malum simpliciter invenitur in rebus, non autem falsum. Reply Sed Contra 3: There are two kinds of perfection, first and second. First perfection is the form of each thing, and that by which it has its act of existing. Nothing is without it while it continues in existence. Second perfection is operation, which is the end of a thing or the means by which a thing reaches its end; and a thing is sometimes deprived of this perfection. The note of truth in things results from first perfection; for it is because a thing has a form that it imitates the art of the divine intellect and produces knowledge of itself in the soul. But the note of goodness in things results from its second perfection, for this goodness arises from the end. Consequently, evil, but not falsity, is found in things absolutely. Ad quartum dicendum quod secundum Philosophum in 6 Ethicorum ipsum verum est bonum intellectus: secundum hoc enim intellectus operatio est perfecta quod sua conceptio est vera, et, quia enuntiatio est signum intellectus, ideo veritas eius est finis ipsius. Non autem ita est in rebus aliis, et propter hoc non est simile. Reply Sed Contra 4: According to the Philosopher, the true itself is the good of the intellect, for an operation of intellect is perfect because its concept is true. And since a proposition is a sign of what is understood, truth is its end. But this is not the case with other things, and so there is no similarity.