Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum in mente sit memoria Whether there is memory in the mind Secundo quaeritur utrum in mente sit memoria. Secondly, it is asked whether there is memory in the mind? Et videtur quod non quia, secundum Augustinum 13 De Trinitate, illud quod est commune nobis et brutis non pertinet ad mentem; memoria autem nobis et brutis communis est, ut patet per Augustinum 10 Confessionum; ergo memoria non est in mente. Obj. 1: It seems that there is not, for according to. Augustine, that which we share with brute animals does not belong to the mind. But memory is common to us and to brute animals, as is also clear from Augustine. Therefore, memory is not in the mind. Praeterea, Philosophus in cap. De memoria et reminiscentia dicit quod memoria non est intellectivi sed primi sensitivi; cum ergo mens sit idem quod intellectus, ut ex dictis patet, videtur quod memoria non sit in mente. Obj. 2: The Philosopher says that memory does not belong to the intellective but to the primary sensitive faculty. Therefore, since mind is the same as understanding, as is clear from what has been said above, memory does not seem to be part of the mind. Praeterea, intellectus et omnia quae ad intellectum pertinent abstrahunt ab hic et nunc; memoria vero non abstrahit, concernit namque determinatum tempus, scilicet praeteritum: memoria namque praeteritorum est, ut dicit Tullius; ergo memoria non pertinet ad mentem vel intellectum. Obj. 3: Understanding and all that belong to understanding abstract from space and time. Memory, however, does not so abstract, for it deals with a definite time, the past. For memory concerns things past, as Cicero says. Therefore, memory does not pertain to mind or understanding. Praeterea, cum in memoria conserventur aliqua quae non actu apprehenduntur, ubicumque ponitur memoria oportet quod ibi differat apprehendere et retinere; in intellectu autem non differunt sed solum in sensu: propter hoc enim in sensu differre possunt quia sensus organo corporali utitur, non autem omne quod tenetur in corpore apprehenditur; intellectus autem non utitur organo corporali, unde nihil in eo retinetur nisi intelligibiliter, et sic oportet quod actu intelligatur; ergo memoria non est in intellectu sive in mente. Obj. 4: Since in memory we retain things that are not being actually apprehended, it follows that, wherever there is memory, there must be a difference between apprehension and retention. But it is in sense only, and not in understanding, that we find this difference. The two can differ in sense because sense makes use of a bodily organ. But not everything that is retained in the body is apprehended. But understanding does not make use of a bodily organ, and so retains things only according to the mode of understanding. So, these things have to be actually understood. Therefore, memory is not part of understanding or mind. Praeterea, anima non memoratur antequam aliquid apud se retineat; sed antequam aliquas species recipiat a sensibus, a quibus omnis cognitio nostra oritur, quas retinere possit, est ad imaginem; cum ergo memoria sit pars imaginis, non videtur quod memoria possit esse in mente. Obj. 5: The soul does not remember until it has retained something. But before it receives from the senses, which are the source of all our knowledge, any species which it can retain, it already has the character of image [of the Trinity]. Since memory is part of that image, it does not seem possible for memory to be in the mind. Praeterea, mens secundum quod est ad imaginem Dei, fertur in Deum; sed memoria non fertur in Deum: est enim memoria eorum quae cadunt sub tempore, Deus autem est omnino supra tempus; ergo memoria non est in mente. Obj. 6: In so far as mind has the character of image of God, it is directed toward God. But memory is not directed toward God, since it deals with things that belong to time. But God is entirely beyond time. Therefore, memory is not in the mind. Praeterea, si memoria esset pars mentis, species intelligibiles in ipsa mente reservarentur sicut conservantur in mente angeli; sed angelus convertendo se ad species quas penes se habet, potest intelligere; ergo et mens convertendo se ad species retentas, et ita posset intelligere sine hoc quod ad phantasmata converteretur, quod manifeste apparet esse falsum: quantumcumque enim aliquis scientiam in habitu habeat, laeso tamen organo imaginativae virtutis vel memorativae, in actum exire non potest, quod non esset si mens in actu intelligere posset non convertendo se ad potentias quae organis utuntur; ergo memoria non est in mente. Obj. 7: If memory were part of the mind, the intelligible species would be maintained in the mind as they are in the angelic mind. But the angels can understand by turning their attention to the species which they have within them. Therefore, the human mind should be able to understand by turning its attention to the species it retains, without referring to phantasms. But this is obviously false. For, no matter to what degree one has scientific knowledge as a habit, if the organ of the power of imagination or memory is injured, this knowledge cannot be made actual. This would not result if the mind could actually understand without referring to powers which use organs. So, memory is not part of the mind. Sed contra, Philosophus dicit in 3 De anima quod anima est locus specierum praeter quod non tota sed intellectiva; loci autem est conservare contenta in eo; cum igitur conservare species ad memoriam pertineat, videtur quod in intellectu sit memoria. On the contrary (1), the Philosopher says that the intellective soul, not the whole soul, is the place of the species. But it belongs to place to preserve what is kept in it. Therefore, since the preservation of the species belongs to memory, memory seems to be part of understanding. Praeterea, illud quod se habet aequaliter ad omne tempus non concernit aliquod tempus particulare; sed memoria etiam proprie accepta se habet aequaliter ad omne tempus, ut dicit Augustinus 14 De Trinitate, et probat per dicta Virgilii qui proprie nomine memoriae et oblivionis usus est; ergo memoria non concernit aliquod tempus particulare sed omne; ergo ad intellectum pertinet. Furthermore (2), that which has a uniform relation to all time is not concerned with any particular time. But memory, even in its proper acceptation, has a uniform relation to all time, as Augustine says and proves with the words of Virgil, who used the names memory and forgetfulness in their proper sense. Therefore, memory is not concerned with any particular time, but with all time. So it belongs to understanding. Praeterea, memoria proprie accipiendo est praeteritorum; sed intellectus non solum est praesentium sed etiam praeteritorum: intellectus enim compositionem format secundum quodlibet tempus intelligens hominem fuisse, futurum esse et esse, ut patet in 3 De anima; ergo memoria proprie loquendo ad intellectum potest pertinere. Furthermore (3), strictly speaking, memory refers to things past. But understanding deals not only with what is present, but also with what is past. For the understanding judges about any time, understanding man to have existed, to exist in the future, and to exist now, as is clear from On the Soul. Therefore, memory, properly speaking, can belong to understanding. Praeterea, sicut memoria est praeteritorum, ita providentia est futurorum secundum Tullium; sed providentia est in parte intellectiva proprie accipiendo; ergo eadem ratione et memoria. Furthermore (4), as memory concerns what is past, so foresight concerns what is in the future, according to Cicero. But foresight, properly speaking, belongs to the intellectual part. For the same reason memory does, too. Responsio. Dicendum quod memoria secundum communem usum loquentium pro notitia praeteritorum accipitur. Cognoscere autem praeteritum ut est praeteritum, est illius cuius est cognoscere nunc ut nunc; hoc autem est sensus. Sicuti enim intellectus non cognoscit singulare ut est hoc sed secundum aliquam communem rationem, ut in quantum est homo vel albus vel etiam particularis, non autem in quantum est hic homo vel particulare hoc, ita etiam intellectus cognoscit praesens et praeteritum, non in quantum est hoc nunc et hoc praeteritum. Unde cum memoria secundum propriam sui acceptionem respiciat ad id quod est praeteritum respectu huius nunc, constat quod memoria proprie loquendo non est in parte intellectiva sed sensitiva tantum, ut Philosophus probat. I answer that according to the common usage, memory means a knowledge of things past. But to know the past as past belongs to that which has the power of knowing the now as now. Sense is this power. For understanding does not know the singular as singular, but according to some common character, as it is man or white or even particular, but not in so far as it is this man or this particular thing. In a similar way, understanding does not know a present and a past thing as this present and this past thing. Since memory, taken strictly, looks to what is past with reference to the present, it is clear that memory, properly speaking, does not belong to the intellectual part, but only to the sensitive, as the Philosopher shows. Sed quia intellectus non solum intelligit intelligibile sed etiam intelligit se intelligere tale intelligibile, ideo nomen memoriae potest extendi ad notitiam qua, etsi non cognoscatur obiectum ut in praeteritione modo praedicto, cognoscitur tamen obiectum de quo etiam prius est notitia habita in quantum aliquis scit se eam prius habuisse; et sic omnis notitia non de novo accepta potest dici memoria. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter: uno modo quando consideratio secundum notitiam habitam non est intercisa sed continua; alio vero modo quando est intercisa, et sic habet plus de ratione praeteriti, unde et magis proprie ad rationem memoriae attingit, ut scilicet dicamur illius habere memoriam quod prius habitualiter cognoscebamus non autem in actu. Et sic memoria est in parte intellectiva nostrae animae; et hoc modo videtur Augustinus memoriam accipere ponens eam partem imaginis: vult enim omne illud quod habitualiter in mente tenetur ut in actum non prodeat, ad memoriam pertinere. But, since intellect not only understands the intelligible thing, but also understands that it understands such an intelligible thing, the term memory can be broadened to include the knowledge by which one knows the object previously known in so far as he knows he knew it earlier, although he does not know the object as in the past in the manner earlier explained. In this way all knowledge not received for the first time can be called memory. This can take place in two ways, either when there is continuous study based on acquired knowledge without interruption, or when the study is interrupted. The latter has more of the character of past, and so it more properly participates in the nature of memory. We have an example of this when we say that we remember a thing which previously we knew habitually but not actually. Thus, memory belongs to the intellective part of our soul. It is in this sense that Augustine seems to understand memory, when he makes it part of the image of the Trinity. For he intends to assign to memory everything in the mind which is stored there habitually without passing into act. Quomodo autem hoc possit contingere diversimode a diversis ponitur. Avicenna enim in 6 De naturalibus ponit quod hoc non contingit—quod anima habitualiter notitiam teneat alicuius rei quam actu non considerat—ex hoc quod aliquae species actu conserventur in parte intellectiva, sed vult quod species actualiter non consideratae non possunt conservari nisi in parte sensitiva, vel quantum ad imaginationem quae est thesaurus formarum a sensu acceptarum, vel quantum ad memoriam quantum ad intentiones particulares non acceptas a sensibus. In intellectu vero non permanet species nisi quando actu consideratur, post considerationem vero in eo esse desinit; unde quando iterum actu vult considerare aliquid, oportet quod species intelligibiles de novo fluant in intellectum possibilem ab intelligentia agente; nec tamen sequitur secundum ipsum quod, quandocumque aliquis de novo debet considerare quae prius scivit, oporteat eum iterum addiscere vel invenire sicut a principio quia relicta est in eo quaedam habilitas per quam facilius se convertit ad intellectum agentem ut ab eo species effluentes recipiat quam prius; et haec habilitas est habitus scientiae in nobis. Et secundum hanc opinionem memoria non esset in mente secundum retentionem aliquarum specierum sed secundum habilitatem ad accipiendum de novo. Sed ista opinio non videtur rationabilis: primo quia, cum intellectus possibilis sit stabilioris naturae quam sensus, oportet quod species in eo recepta stabilius recipiatur; unde magis possunt in eo conservari species quam in parte sensitiva. Secundo quia intelligentia agens aequaliter se habet ad influendum species convenientes omnibus scientiis; unde si in intellectu possibili non conservarentur aliquae species sed sola habilitas ad convertendum se ad intellectum agentem, aequaliter remaneret homo habilis ad quodcumque intelligibile, et ita ex hoc quod homo addisceret unam scientiam, non magis sciret illam quam alias. Et praeterea hoc videtur expresse contrarium sententiae Philosophi in 3 De anima qui commendat antiquos de hoc quod posuerunt animam esse locum specierum quantum ad intellectivam partem. There are various explanations of the manner in which this can take place. Avicenna holds that the fact that the soul has habitual knowledge of anything which it does not actually consider does not come from this, that certain species are retained in the intellectual part. Rather, he understands that it is impossible for the species not actually considered to be kept anywhere except in the sensitive part, either in the imagination, which is the storehouse of forms received by the senses, or in the memory, for particular apprehensions not received from the senses. The species stays in the understanding only when it is actually being considered. But, after the consideration, it ceases to be there. Thus, when one wants actually to consider something again, it is necessary for new intelligible species to flow from the agent intelligence into the potential intellect. However, it does not follow, according to Avicenna, that the new consideration of what was known previously necessarily entails learning or discovering all over again, for one retains a certain aptitude through which he turns more easily to the agent intellect to receive the species flowing from it than he did before. In us, this aptitude is the habit of scientific knowledge. According to this opinion, memory is not part of the mind because it preserves certain species, but because it has an aptitude for receiving them anew. But this does not seem to be a reasonable explanation. In the first place, since the potential intellect has a more stable nature than sense, it must receive its species more securely. Thus, the species can be better preserved in it than in the sensitive part. In the second place, the agent intelligence is equally disposed to communicate species suitable for all the sciences. As a consequence, if some species were not conserved in the potential intellect, but there were in it only the aptitude of turning to the agent intellect, man would have an equal aptitude for any intelligible thing. Therefore, from the fact that a man had learned one science he would not know it better than other sciences. Besides, this seems openly opposed to the opinion of the Philosopher, who commends the ancients for holding that the intellective part of the soul is the place of the species. Et ideo alii dicunt quod species intelligibiles in intellectu possibili remanent post actualem considerationem, et harum ordinatio est habitus scientiae; et secundum hoc vis qua mens nostra retinere potest huiusmodi intelligibiles species post actualem considerationem, memoria dicitur. Et hoc magis accedit ad propriam significationem memoriae. Therefore, others say that the intelligible species remain in the potential intellect after actual consideration, and that the ordered arrangement of these is the habit of knowledge. In this classification the power by which our minds retain these intelligible species after actual consideration will be called memory. This comes closer to the proper meaning of memory. Ad primum igitur dicendum quod memoria quae communis est nobis et brutis, est illa in qua conservantur particulares intentiones; et haec non est in mente, sed illa tantum in qua conservantur species intelligibiles. Reply Obj. 1: The memory which we have in common with brute animals is that in which particular intentions are preserved. This is not in the mind; only the memory in which intelligible species are kept is there. Ad secundum dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur de memoria quae est praeteriti prout est relatum ad hoc nunc in quantum est hoc, et sic non est in mente. Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking of the memory which deals with the past as related to a particular present in so far as particular. This is not in the mind. Unde patet responsio ad tertium. Reply Obj. 3: The answer to the third difficulty is clear from what has just been said. Ad quartum dicendum quod in intellectu possibili differt actu apprehendere et retinere, non ex eo quod species sit in eo aliquo modo corporaliter, sed intelligibiliter tantum. Nec tamen sequitur quod semper intelligatur secundum illam speciem, sed solum quando intellectus possibilis perfecte fit in actu illius speciei; quandoque vero est imperfecte in actu eius, scilicet quodam modo medio inter puram potentiam et purum actum, et hoc est habitualiter cognoscere, et de hoc modo cognitionis reducitur in actum perfectum per voluntatem quae, secundum Anselmum, est motor omnium virium. Reply Obj. 4: Actual apprehension and retention differ in the potential intellect, not because the species are there somehow in a bodily manner, but only in an intelligible way. However, it does not follow that one understands according to that species all the time, but only when the potential intellect becomes that species perfectly in act. Sometimes it has the act of this species incompletely, that is, in some way between pure potency and pure act. This is habitual knowledge. The reduction from this to complete act takes place through the will, which, according to Anselm, is the mover of all the powers. Ad quintum dicendum quod mens est ad imaginem praecipue secundum quod fertur in Deum et in se ipsam; ipsa autem est sibi praesens et similiter Deus antequam aliquae species a sensibilibus accipiantur. Et praeterea mens non dicitur habere vim memorativam ex hoc quod aliquid actu teneat sed ex hoc quod est potens tenere. Reply Obj. 5: Mind has the character of image [of the Trinity] especially in so far as it is directed to God and to itself. It is present to itself and God is present to it before any species are received from sensible things. Furthermore, mind is not said to have the power of memory because it actually preserves something, but because it has the power to preserve something. Ad sextum patet responsio ex dictis. Reply Obj. 6: The answer to the sixth difficulty is clear from what has been said. Ad septimum dicendum quod nulla potentia potest aliquid cognoscere nisi convertendo se ad obiectum suum, sicut visus nihil cognoscit nisi convertendo (se) ad colorem; unde cum phantasma hoc modo se habeat ad intellectum possibilem sicut sensibilia ad sensum, ut patet per Philosophum in 3 De anima, quantumcumque aliquam speciem intelligibilem apud se intellectus habeat, numquam tamen actu aliquid considerat secundum illam speciem nisi convertendo se ad phantasma. Et ideo sicut intellectus noster secundum statum viae indiget phantasmatibus ad actu considerandum antequam accipiat habitum, ita et postquam acceperit; secus autem est de angelis quorum intellectus obiectum non est phantasma. Reply Obj. 7: No power can know anything without turning to its object, as sight knows nothing unless it turns to color. Now, since phantasms are related to the potential intellect in the way that sensible things are related to sense, as the Philosopher points out, no matter to what extent an intelligible species is present to the understanding, understanding does not actually consider anything according to that species without referring to a phantasm. Therefore, just as our understanding in its present state needs phantasms actually to consider anything before it acquires a habit, so it needs them, too, after it has acquired a habit. The situation is different with angels, for phantasms are not the object of their understanding. Ad primum vero eorum quae in contrarium obiciuntur dicendum quod ex auctoritate illa haberi non potest quod in mente sit memoria nisi secundum modum praedictum, non autem quod proprie. Reply Sed Contra 1: The authority cited can prove only that memory is in the mind in the way we have mentioned, not that it is there properly. Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum Augustini est intelligendum quod memoria potest esse de praesentibus obiectis; numquam tamen potest dici memoria nisi consideretur aliquid praeteritum ad minus ex parte ipsius cognitionis; et secundum hoc etiam dicitur aliquis sui oblivisci vel memorari in quantum de se ipso, qui est praesens sibi, non conservat vel conservat praeteritam cognitionem. Reply Sed Contra 2: We must understand Augustine’s statement to mean that memory can deal with present objects. However, it can never be called memory unless something past is considered, at least past with reference to cognition itself. It is in this way that we say someone, who is present to himself, forgets or remembers himself because he retains or does not retain the past knowledge about himself. Ad tertium dicendum quod, in quantum intellectus cognoscit differentias temporum secundum communes rationes, sic formare potest compositiones secundum quamlibet temporis differentiam. Reply Sed Contra 3: In so far as understanding knows temporal differences through common characters, it can thus make judgments according to any difference of time. Ad quartum dicendum quod providentia non est in intellectu nisi secundum generales rationes futuri, sed ad particularia applicatur mediante ratione particulari quam oportet mediam intercidere inter rationem universalem moventem et motum qui in particularibus consequitur, ut patet per Philosophum in 3 De anima. Reply Sed Contra 4: Foresight is in the understanding only according to general considerations about the future. It is applied to particular things through the mediation of particular reason which must act as the medium between general reason, which is the source of movement, and the movement which follows in particular things, as is clear from what the Philosopher says. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum memoria distinguatur ab intelligentia sicut potentia a potentia Whether memory is distinguished from understanding as one power from another Tertio quaeritur utrum memoria distinguatur ab intelligentia sicut potentia a potentia. Third, it is asked whether memory is distinguished from understanding as one power from another? Et videtur quod non: diversarum enim potentiarum sunt diversi actus; sed intellectus possibilis et memoriae, prout in mente ponitur, est idem actus qui est species retinere: hoc enim Augustinus memoriae, Philosophus autem intellectui possibili attribuit; ergo memoria non distinguitur ab intelligentia sicut potentia a potentia. Obj. 1: It seems that it is not, for different acts belong to different powers. But the potential intellect and memory, as part of the mind, are said to have the same act, to preserve the species. For Augustine assigns this function to memory and the Philosopher assigns it to the potential intellect. Therefore, memory is not distinguished from understanding as one power from another. Praeterea, accipere aliquid non concernendo aliquam temporis differentiam est proprium intellectus qui abstrahit ab hic et nunc; sed memoria non concernit aliquam differentiam temporis quia, secundum Augustinum 14 De Trinitate, memoria est communiter praeteritorum, praesentium et futurorum; ergo memoria ab intellectu non distinguitur. Obj. 2: To receive something without paying attention to any difference of time belongs properly to understanding, which abstracts from the here and now. But memory pays no attention to difference of time, for, according to Augustine, memory deals indifferently with things present, past, and future. Therefore, memory is not distinguished from understanding. Praeterea, intelligentia accipitur dupliciter secundum Augustinum 14 De Trinitate: uno modo prout dicimur intelligere illud quod actu cogitamus, alio modo prout dicimur intelligere illud quod non actu consideramus; sed intelligentia secundum quam illud tantum dicimur intelligere quod actu cogitamus est intelligere in actu, quod non est potentia sed operatio alicuius potentiae, et sic non distinguitur a memoria sicut potentia a potentia; secundum vero quod intelligimus ea quae non actu cogitamus, nullo modo a memoria distinguitur sed ad memoriam pertinet, quod patet per Augustinum 14 De Trinitate ubi sic dicit si nos referamus ad interiorem mentis memoriam qua sui meminit, et interiorem intelligentiam qua se intelligit, et interiorem voluntatem qua se diligit, ubi haec tria simul semper sunt, sive cogitarentur sive non cogitarentur, videbitur quidem imago Trinitatis ad solam memoriam pertinere; ergo intelligentia nullo modo distinguitur a memoria sicut potentia a potentia. Obj. 3: According to Augustine, intelligence can be taken in two ways. According to the first, we are said to understand that which we actually think. According to the second, we are said to understand that which we do not actually consider. But intelligence, in the meaning of understanding only that which we actually think, is understanding in act. This is not a power, but the activity of a power; hence, it is not distinguished from memory as a power from a power. But, in so far as we understand those things which we do not actually consider, understanding is not in any way distinguished from memory, but belongs to it. This is clear from Augustine: if we look to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, to the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three are always together, whether they are thought about or not, we will see that the image of the Trinity belongs only to the memory. Therefore, understanding is in no way distinguished from memory as a power from a power. Si dicatur quod intelligentia est quaedam potentia secundum quam anima est potens actu cogitare, et sic etiam intelligentia qua non dicimur intelligere nisi cogitantes, distinguitur a memoria sicut potentia a potentia. Obj. 4: Someone may say that intelligence is a power through which the soul is able actually to think, and so, also, that the intelligence through which we are said to understand only when we are thinking is distinguished from memory as one power from another.