Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum mens humana cognitionem accipiat a sensibilibus Whether the human mind receives knowledge from sensible things Sexto quaeritur utrum mens humana cognitionem accipiat a sensibilibus. Sixth it is asked whether the human mind receives knowledge from sensible things? Et videtur quod non: eorum enim quae non communicant in materia, non potest esse actio et passio, ut per Boetium in libro De duabus naturis patet et per Philosophum in 1 De generatione; sed mens nostra non communicat in materia cum rebus sensibilibus; ergo non possunt sensibilia agere in mentem nostram ut ex eis menti nostrae aliqua cognitio imprimatur. Obj. 1: It seems that it does not, for action and passion cannot take place between things unless both are material, as is clear from Boethius, and also from the Philosopher. But our mind does not share in matter with sensible things. Therefore, sensible things cannot act on our mind to imprint knowledge on it. Praeterea, obiectum intellectus est quid, ut dicitur in 3 De anima; sed quiditas rei nullo sensu percipitur; ergo cognitio mentis a sensu non accipitur. Obj. 2: What a thing is, is the object of intellect, as is said in On the Soul. But the quiddity of a thing is not perceived by any sense. Therefore, mental cognition is not received from sense. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit 10 Confessionum loquens de cognitione intelligibilium quomodo a nobis acquiratur ibi, inquit, erant, scilicet intelligibilia in mente nostra, et antequam ea didicissem, sed in memoria non erant; ergo videtur quod intelligibiles species non sint in mente a sensibus acceptae. Obj. 3: When speaking of the way in which we acquire cognition of intelligible things, Augustine says: they were there that is, intelligible in our mind, before I learned them, but they were not in my memory. Therefore, it seems that intelligible species are not received in the mind from the senses. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus probat in 10 De Trinitate, anima non potest amare nisi cognita; sed aliquis antequam aliquam scientiam addiscat amat eam, quod patet ex hoc quod multo studio eam quaerit; ergo antequam addiscat illam scientiam habet eam in notitia sua, ergo videtur quod non accipiat mens cognitionem a rebus sensibilibus. Obj. 4: Augustine proves that the soul can love only what it knows. But one loves a science before he learns it, as is clear from the eagerness with which he seeks this knowledge. Therefore, before he learns such a science, he has some acquaintance with it. So, it seems that the mind does not receive knowledge from sensible things. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit 12 Super Genesim ad litteram corporis imaginem non corpus in spiritu sed ipse spiritus in se ipso facit celeritate mirabili quae ineffabiliter longe est a corporis tarditate; ergo videtur quod mens non accipiat species intelligibiles a sensibilibus sed ipsa eas in se formet. Obj. 5: Augustine says: the body does not make the image of the body in the spirit. Rather, the spirit itself will a wonderful swiftness which is ineffably far from the slowness of the body makes in itself the image of the body. Therefore, it seems that the mind does not receive intelligible species from sensible things but constructs them in itself. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit 12 De Trinitate quod mens nostra de rebus corporalibus iudicat secundum rationes incorporales et sempiternas; sed rationes a sensu acceptae non sunt huiusmodi; ergo videtur quod mens humana non accipiat cognitionem a sensibilibus. Obj. 6: Augustine says that our mind judges about bodily things through non-bodily and eternal principles. But principles received from the senses are not of this kind. Therefore, it seems that the human mind does not receive knowledge from sensible things. Praeterea, si mens cognitionem a sensibilibus accipiat, hoc non potest esse nisi in quantum species, quae a sensibilibus accipitur, intellectum possibilem movet; sed talis species non potest movere intellectum possibilem: non enim movet ipsum in phantasia adhuc existens quia ibi existens nondum est actu intelligibilis sed potentia tantum, intellectus autem non movetur nisi ab intelligibili actu, sicut nec visus nisi a visibili in actu; similiter nec movet intellectum possibilem existens in intellectu agente qui nullius speciei est receptivus, alias non differret ab intellectu possibili; similiter nec existens in ipso possibili intellectu quia forma iam inhaerens subiecto subiectum non movet sed in ipso quodam modo quiescit; nec etiam per se existens cum species intelligibiles non sint substantiae sed de genere accidentium, ut dicit Avicenna in sua Metaphysica; ergo nullo modo esse potest ut mens nostra a sensibilibus accipiat scientiam. Obj. 7: If the mind receives knowledge from sensible things, it must do so because the species received from sensible things set the potential intellect in motion. But such species cannot influence the potential intellect. For, when they are in the imagination, they are not intelligible actually, but only potentially, and so cannot set the potential intellect in motion. The intellect, however, is moved only by something actually intelligible, just as the power of sight is moved only by something actually visible. Similarly, something existing in the agent intellect cannot move the potential intellect, because the agent intellect does not receive species. If it did, it would not differ from the potential intellect. Again, these representations do not actuate the potential intellect by existing in it, for a form already adhering in a subject does not set the subject in motion, but is, as it were, at rest in it. Finally, they do not cause movement in the potential intellect by existing of themselves, for intelligible species are not substances, but belong to the class of accidents, as Avicenna says. Therefore, in no way can our mind receive knowledge from sensible things. Praeterea, agens est nobilius patiente, ut patet per Augustinum 12 Super Genesim ad litteram, et per Philosophum in 3 De anima; sed recipiens se habet ad illud a quo recipit quasi patiens ad agens; cum ergo mens sit multo nobilior sensibilibus et sensibus ipsis, non poterit ab eis cognitionem accipere. Obj. 8: The agent is more noble than the patient, as is clear from Augustine and from the Philosopher. But the receiver is related to that which it receives, as a patient is related to the agent. Since, therefore, the mind is much more noble than sensible things and the senses themselves, it cannot receive knowledge from them. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit in 7 Physicorum quod anima in quiescendo fit sciens et prudens; sed anima non posset accipere scientiam a sensibilibus nisi moveretur aliquo modo ab eis; ergo anima non accipit scientiam a sensibilibus. Obj. 9: The Philosopher says that the soul comes to acquire knowledge and prudence by coming to rest. But the soul cannot receive knowledge from sensible things unless it be somehow set in motion by them. Therefore, the soul does not receive knowledge from sensible things. Sed contra, sicut dicit Philosophus et experimento probatur, cui deficit unus sensus deest una scientia, sicut caecis deest scientia de coloribus; hoc autem non esset si anima aliunde acciperet scientiam quam per sensus; ergo a sensibilibus per sensus cognitionem accipit. On the contrary (1), as the Philosopher says, and as experience proves, one who lacks a sense is deprived of one kind of knowledge, as the blind have no knowledge of colors. This would not happen if the soul received knowledge from a source other than the senses. Therefore, the soul receives knowledge from sensible objects through the senses. Praeterea, omnis nostra cognitio originaliter consistit in notitia primorum principiorum indemonstrabilium; horum autem cognitio in nobis a sensu oritur, ut patet in fine Posteriorum; ergo scientia nostra a sensu oritur. Furthermore (2), at first, all our cognition consists in the knowledge of first undeducible principles. But the cognition of these arises in us from sense, as is clear from the Posterior Analytics. Therefore, all our knowledge arises from sense. Praeterea, natura nihil facit frustra nec deficit in necessariis; frustra autem dati essent sensus animae nisi per eos cognitionem de rebus acciperet; ergo mens nostra a sensibilibus cognitionem accipit. Furthermore (3), nature does nothing to no purpose and does not fail in necessary matters. But senses would have been given to the soul to no purpose unless the soul received cognition from things through them. Therefore, our mind receives knowledge from sensible things. Responsio. Dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem multiplex fuit antiquorum opinio. Quidam enim posuerunt ortum scientiae nostrae totaliter a causa exteriori esse quae est a materia separata; quae in duas sectas dividitur: quidam enim, ut Platonici, posuerunt formas rerum sensibilium esse a materia separatas, et sic esse intelligibiles actu, et per earum participationem a materia sensibili effici individua in natura, earum vero participatione humanas mentes scientiam habere; et sic ponebant formas praedictas esse principium generationis et scientiae, ut Philosophus narrat in 1 Metaphysicae. Sed haec positio a Philosopho sufficienter reprobata est, qui ostendit quod non est ponere formas sensibilium rerum nisi in materia sensibili, cum etiam nec sine materia sensibili in universali formae naturales intelligi possint sicut nec simus sine naso. I answer that the views of the ancients on this question are manifold. Some held that our knowledge derived completely from an external cause separated from matter. There are two explanations of this position. Some, as the Platonists, held that the forms of sensible thing existed apart from matter and so were actually intelligible. According to them, real individuals come about through the participation by sensible matter in these forms, and the human mind has knowledge by sharing in them. Thus, these forms are the principle of generation and knowledge, as the Philosopher says. But the Philosopher has adequately confuted this position by showing that sensible forms must exist in sensible matter, and that sensible matter in general is necessary for the understanding of physical forms, just as there is no snub without nose. Et ideo alii, non ponentes formas sensibilium separatas sed intelligentias tantum quas nos angelos dicimus, posuerunt originem scientiae nostrae totaliter ab huiusmodi substantiis separatis esse. Unde Avicenna voluit quod, sicut formae sensibiles non acquiruntur in materia sensibili nisi ex influentia intelligentiae agentis, ita nec formae intelligibiles humanis mentibus imprimuntur nisi ex intelligentia agente quae non est pars animae sed substantia separata, ut ipse ponit; indiget tamen anima sensibus quasi excitantibus et disponentibus ad scientiam, sicut agentia inferiora praeparant materiam ad suscipiendum formam ab intelligentia agente. Sed ista etiam opinio non videtur rationabilis quia secundum hoc non esset necessaria dependentia inter cognitionem mentis humanae et virtutes sensitivas, cuius contrarium manifeste apparet tum ex hoc quod deficiente sensu deficit scientia de suis sensibilibus, tum etiam ex hoc quod mens nostra non potest actu considerare etiam ea quae habitualiter scit nisi formando aliqua phantasmata, unde etiam laeso organo phantasiae impeditur consideratio. Et praeterea, praedicta positio tollit proxima rerum principia si omnia inferiora ex substantia separata immediate formas consequuntur tam intelligibiles quam sensibiles. For this reason, others, bypassing separated forms of sensible things, demanded only intelligences, which we call angels, and made separated substances of this sort the sole source of our knowledge. Accordingly, Avicenna holds that just as sensible forms are not received into sensible matter except through the influence of the agent intelligence, so, too, intelligible forms are not imprinted on human minds except by the agent intelligence, which for him is not a part of the soul, but a separated substance. However, the soul needs the senses to prepare the way and stimulate it to knowledge, just as the lower agents prepare matter to receive form from the agent intelligence. But this opinion does not seem reasonable, because, according to it, there is no necessary interdependence of the human mind and the sensitive powers. The opposite seems quite clear both from the fact that, when a given sense is missing, we have no knowledge of its sensible objects, and from the fact that our mind cannot actually consider even those things which it knows habitually unless it forms some phantasms. Thus, an injury to the organ of imagination hinders consideration. Furthermore, the explanation just given does away with the proximate principles of things, inasmuch as all lower things would derive their intelligible and sensible forms immediately from a separated substance. Alia autem opinio fuit ponentium nostrae scientiae originem totaliter a causa interiori esse; quae etiam in duas sectas dividitur. Quidam enim posuerunt humanas animas in se ipsis continere omnium rerum notitiam, sed per coniunctionem ad corpus praedictam notitiam obtenebrari; et ideo dicebant nos indigere sensibus et studio ut impedimenta scientiae tollerentur, dicentes addiscere nihil aliud esse quam reminisci, sicut etiam manifeste apparet quod ex his quae audimus vel videmus reminiscimur ea quae prius sciebamus. Sed haec positio non videtur etiam rationabilis: si enim coniunctio animae ad corpus sit naturalis, non potest esse quod per eam totaliter naturalis scientia impediretur, et ita, si haec opinio vera esset, non pateremur omnimodam ignorantiam eorum quorum sensum non habemus. Esset autem haec opinio consona illi positioni quae ponit animas ante corpora fuisse creatas et postmodum corporibus unitas, quia tunc compositio corporis et animae non esset naturalis sed accidentaliter proveniens ipsi animae; quae quidem opinio et secundum fidem et secundum philosophorum sententias reprobanda iudicatur. A second explanation has been given by those who make an inferior cause the complete source of our knowledge. There are also two explanations; of this position. Some held that human souls had within themselves knowledge of all things, but that this cognition was darkened by union with the body. Therefore, they said that we need assiduous use of the senses to remove the hindrance to knowledge. Learning, they said, is nothing but remembering, as is abundantly clear from the way in which those things which we have seen and heard make us remember what we formerly knew. But this position does not seem reasonable. For, if the union of soul and body is natural, it cannot wholly hinder natural knowledge. And if this opinion be true, we would not be subject to the complete ignorance of those objects which demand a sense faculty of which one is deprived. This opinion would fit in with the theory that holds that souls were created before bodies and later united to them. Then, the conjunction d body and soul would not be natural, but only an accidental accretion to the soul. This opinion must be rejected on the score both of faith and philosophic tenets. Alii vero dixerunt quod anima sibi ipsi est scientiae causa: non enim a sensibilibus scientiam accipit quasi per actionem sensibilium aliquo modo similitudines rerum ad animam perveniant, sed ipsa anima ad praesentiam sensibilium in se similitudines rerum sensibilium format. Sed haec etiam positio non videtur totaliter rationabilis: nullum enim agens nisi secundum quod est actu agit; unde si anima in se format omnium rerum similitudines, oportet quod ipsa in se actu habeat omnes illas similitudines rerum, et sic redibit in praedictam opinionem quae ponit omnium rerum scientiam animae humanae naturaliter insitam esse. Other proponents of this second opinion said that the soul is the cause of its own knowledge. For it does not receive knowledge from sensible things as if likenesses of things somehow reached the soul because of the activity of sensible things, but the soul itself, in the presence of sensible things, constructs in itself the likenesses of sensible things. But this statement does not seem altogether reasonable. For no agent acts except in so far as it is in act. Thus, if the soul formed the likenesses of all things in itself, it would be necessary for the soul to have those likenesses of things actually within itself. This would be a return to the previous opinion which held that the knowledge of all things is naturally present in the human soul. Et ideo prae omnibus praedictis positionibus rationabilior est sententia Philosophi qui ponit scientiam mentis nostrae partim ab intrinseco et partim ab extrinseco esse, non solum a rebus a materia separatis sed etiam ab ipsis sensibilibus. Cum enim mens nostra comparatur ad res sensibiles quae sunt extra animam, invenitur se habere ad eas in duplici habitudine: uno modo ut actus ad potentiam, in quantum scilicet res quae sunt extra animam sunt intelligibiles in potentia, ipsa vero mens est intelligibilis in actu, et secundum hoc ponitur in anima intellectus agens qui faciat intelligibilia in potentia esse intelligibilia in actu; alio modo ut potentia ad actum, prout scilicet in mente nostra formae rerum determinatae sunt in potentia tantum quae in rebus extra animam sunt in actu, et secundum hoc ponitur in anima nostra intellectus possibilis cuius est recipere formas a rebus sensibilibus abstractas, factas intelligibiles in actu per lumen intellectus agentis, quod quidem lumen intellectus agentis in anima procedit sicut a prima origine a substantiis separatis et praecipue a Deo. Therefore, the opinion of the Philosopher is more reasonable than any of the foregoing positions. He attributes the knowledge of our mind partly to intrinsic, partly to extrinsic, influence. Not only things separated from matter, but also sensible things themselves, play their part. For, when our mind is considered in relation to sensible things outside the soul, it is found to be related to them in a twofold manner. In one way, it is related as act to potency, to the extent that things outside the mind are only potentially intelligible. The mind itself, however, is intelligible in act, and it is on this basis that the agent intellect, which makes potentially intelligible things actually intelligible, is held to be included in the soul. In another way, it is related to things as potency to act, inasmuch as determined forms of things are only potentially in our mind, but actually in things outside the soul. In this respect our soul includes the potential intellect, whose function it is to receive forms abstracted from sensible things and made actually intelligible through the light of the agent intellect. This light of the agent intellect comes to the soul from the separated substances and especially from God as from its first source. Et secundum hoc verum est quod scientiam mens nostra a sensibilibus accipit; nihilominus tamen ipsa anima in se similitudines rerum format in quantum per lumen intellectus agentis efficiuntur formae a sensibilibus abstractae intelligibiles actu, ut in intellectu possibili recipi possint. Et sic etiam in lumine intellectus agentis nobis est quodam modo originaliter omnis scientia indita mediantibus universalibus conceptionibus quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur, per quas sicut per universalia principia iudicamus de aliis et ea praecognoscimus in ipsis, ut secundum hoc etiam illa opinio veritatem habeat quae ponit nos ea quae addiscimus ante in notitia habuisse. Accordingly, it is true that our mind receives knowledge from sensible things; nevertheless, the soul itself forms in itself likenesses of things, inasmuch as through the light of the agent intellect the forms abstracted from sensible things are made actually intelligible so that they may be received in the potential intellect. And in this way all knowledge is in a certain sense implanted in us from the beginning, since we have the light of the agent intellect, through the medium of universal conceptions which are immediately known by the light of the agent intellect. These serve as universal principles through which we judge about other things, and in which we foreknow these others. In this respect, that opinion is true which holds that we previously had in our knowledge those things which we learn. Ad primum igitur dicendum quod formae sensibiles vel a sensibilibus abstractae non possunt agere in mentem nostram nisi quatenus per lumen intellectus agentis immateriales redduntur, et sic efficiuntur quodam modo homogeneae intellectui possibili in quem agunt. Reply Obj. 1: Sensible forms, those, namely, which are abstracted from sensible things, cannot act on our mind unless they are rendered immaterial through the light of the agent intellect, and thus in some way are made homogeneous with the potential intellect on which they must act. Ad secundum dicendum quod circa idem virtus superior et inferior operantur non similiter sed superior sublimius; unde et per formam quae a rebus recipitur, sensus non ita efficaciter rem cognoscit sicut intellectus, sed sensus per eam manuducitur in cognitionem exteriorum accidentium, intellectus vero pervenit ad nudam quiditatem rei secernendo eam ab omnibus materialibus dispositionibus. Unde non pro tanto dicitur cognitio mentis a sensu originem habere quod omne illud quod mens cognoscit sensus apprehendat, sed quia ex his quae sensus apprehendit mens in aliqua ulteriora manuducitur, sicut etiam sensibilia intellecta manuducunt in intelligibilia divinorum. Reply Obj. 2: A higher and lower power do not operate in the same way even in respect to the same thing, but the higher power acts more nobly. Thus, when sense knows a thing through a form received from things, it does not know it so effectively as the intellect. Sense is led through it to a knowledge of the external accidents; the intellect reaches to the bare quiddity of the thing, distinguishing it from all material dispositions. Thus, when the mental knowing is said to take its origin from sense, this does not mean that sense apprehends all that the mind knows, but that, from those things which sense apprehends, the mind is led on to something more, just as the intellectual knowledge of sensible things leads to knowledge of divine things. Ad tertium dicendum quod verbum Augustini est referendum ad praecognitionem qua particularia in principiis universalibus praecognoscuntur; sic enim verum est quod ea quae addiscimus, prius in anima nostra erant. Reply Obj. 3: The statement from Augustine refers to that precognition by which we know particulars in universal principles. In this sense it is true that what we learn is already in our soul. Ad quartum dicendum quod aliquis, antequam aliquam scientiam acquirat, amare eam potest in quantum eam cognoscit quadam cognitione universali, cognoscendo utilitatem illius scientiae vel visu vel quocumque alio modo. Reply Obj. 4: One can love scientific knowledge before he acquires it in so far as he has some general acquaintance with it by sight, or by knowing its usefulness, or in some other way. Ad quintum dicendum quod secundum hoc intelligenda est anima se ipsam formare quod per actionem intellectus agentis formae intelligibiles factae intellectum possibilem formant, ut dictum est, et secundum quod etiam vis imaginativa potest formare diversorum sensibilium formas; quod praecipue apparet dum imaginamur ea quae numquam sensu percepimus. Reply Obj. 5: The soul is to be understood to fashion itself in this sense, that the forms which arise from the activity of the agent intellect determine the potential intellect, as has been said. And in this sense, too, the imaginative power can fashion the forms of different sensible objects, as especially appears when we imagine things which we have never perceived by sense. Ad sextum dicendum quod prima principia quorum cognitio est nobis innata sunt quaedam similitudo increatae veritatis; unde secundum quod per ea de aliis iudicamus, dicimur iudicare de rebus per rationes incommutabiles vel per veritatem increatam. Hoc tamen quod Augustinus ibi dicit referendum est ad rationem superiorem quae aeternis contemplandis inhaeret; quae quidem, quamvis sit dignitate prior, est tamen eius operatio tempore posterior quia invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta, conspiciuntur, Rom. 1:20. Reply Obj. 6: The first principles of which we have innate cognition are certain likenesses of uncreated truth. When we judge about other things through these likenesses, we are said to judge about things through unchangeable principles or through uncreated truth. Nevertheless, we should refer this statement of Augustine to higher reason, which confines itself to the contemplation of eternal truths. Although this higher reason is first in dignity, its operation is subsequent in time: for the invisible things of him [God] . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom 1:20). Ad septimum dicendum quod in receptione qua intellectus possibilis species rerum accipit a phantasmatibus, se habent phantasmata ut agens instrumentale vel secundarium, intellectus vero agens ut agens principale et primum; et ideo effectus actionis relinquitur in intellectu possibili secundum condicionem utriusque et non secundum condicionem alterius tantum; et ideo intellectus possibilis recipit formas ut intelligibiles actu ex virtute intellectus agentis, sed ut similitudines determinatarum rerum ex cognitione phantasmatum, et sic formae intelligibiles in actu non sunt per se existentes neque in phantasia neque in intellectu agente, sed solum in intellectu possibili. Reply Obj. 7: In the reception through which the potential intellect receives species from phantasms, the phantasms act as instrumental and secondary agents. The agent intellect acts as the principal and first agent. Therefore, the effect of the action is received in the potential intellect according to the condition of both, and not according to the condition of either one alone. Therefore, the potential intellect receives forms whose actual intelligibility is due to the power of the agent intellect, but whose determinate likeness to things is due to cognition of the phantasms. These actually intelligible forms do not, of themselves, exist either in the imagination or the agent intellect, but only in the potential intellect. Ad octavum dicendum quod, quamvis intellectus possibilis sit simpliciter nobilior quam phantasma, tamen secundum quid nihil prohibet phantasma nobilius esse, in quantum scilicet phantasma est actu similitudo talis rei quod intellectui possibili non convenit nisi in potentia; et sic quodam modo potest agere in intellectum possibilem virtute luminis intellectus agentis, sicut et color potest agere in visum virtute luminis corporalis. Reply Obj. 8: Although the potential intellect is simply more noble than the phantasm, nothing prevents the phantasm from being more noble n a certain respect, namely, that it is actually the likeness of such a thing, whereas this likeness belongs to the potential intellect only potentially. Thus, in a certain sense, we can say that the phantasm acts on the potential intellect in virtue of the light of the agent intellect, just as color can act on sight in virtue of bodily light. Ad nonum dicendum quod quies in qua perficitur scientia, excludit motum materialium passionum, non autem motum et passionem communiter accepta secundum quod quodlibet recipere pati dicitur et moveri; sic enim Philosophus dicit in 3 De anima quod intelligere quoddam pati est. Reply Obj. 9: The rest in which knowledge is achieved eliminates the movement of material passions. It does not eliminate movement and passion in a general sense, inasmuch as all receiving is called passion and movement. In accord with this, the Philosopher says in On the Soul: intellection is a kind of passion. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum in mente sit imago Trinitatis secundum quod materialia cognoscit, non solum secundum quod cognoscit aeterna Whether the image of the Trinity is in the mind as it knows material things or only as it knows eternal things Septimo quaeritur utrum in mente sit imago Trinitatis secundum quod materialia cognoscit, non solum secundum quod cognoscit aeterna. Seventh, it is asked whether the image of the Trinity is in the mind as it knows material things or only as it knows eternal things? Et videtur quod non solum secundum quod cognoscit aeterna quia, ut dicit Augustinus 12 De Trinitate, cum quaerimus Trinitatem in anima, in tota quaerimus, non separantes actionem rationalem in temporalibus a contemplatione aeternorum; sed mens non est ad imaginem nisi secundum quod in ea Trinitas invenitur; ergo mens est ad imaginem non solum secundum quod inhaeret aeternis contemplandis, sed etiam secundum quod inhaeret temporalibus agendis. Obj. 1: It seems that it is not only as the mind knows eternal things, for as Augustine says: when we look for the Trinity in our soul, we look for it in the whole soul without separating the activity of reason concerning temporal things from the contemplation of things eternal. But mind has the character of image only as it has the Trinity in it. Therefore, the mind has the character of image not only in so far as it applies itself to the contemplation of eternal things, but also in so far as it engages in activity concerning temporal things. Praeterea, imago Trinitatis consideratur in anima in quantum in ea repraesentatur aequalitas personarum et earum origo; sed magis aequalitas personarum repraesentatur in mente secundum quod cognoscit temporalia quam secundum quod cognoscit aeterna cum aeterna in infinitum excedant mentem, mens autem non in infinitum temporalia excedit; origo etiam personarum repraesentatur in cognitione temporalium sicut et in cognitione aeternorum quia utrobique ex mente procedit notitia et ex notitia procedit amor; ergo imago Trinitatis non solum est in mente secundum quod cognoscit aeterna, sed etiam secundum quod cognoscit temporalia. Obj. 2: We consider the image of the Trinity in the soul in so far as the equality and origin of the persons are represented there. But the equality of the persons is better represented in the mind as knowing things of time than as knowing eternal things, since the latter are infinitely above the mind, whereas the mind is not infinitely above things of time. The origin of the persons, too, is displayed in cognition of things of time as well as in cognition of things eternal, for in both instances knowledge proceeds from the mind and love proceeds from knowledge. Therefore, it has the character of image of the Trinity not only in so far as it knows eternal things, but also in so far as it knows temporal things. Praeterea, similitudo est in potentia diligendi, sed imago in potentia cognoscendi, ut habetur in 2 Sententiarum 16 distinctione; sed mens nostra per prius cognoscit materialia quam aeterna cum ex materialibus in aeterna perveniat, et etiam perfectius cum materialia comprehendat non autem aeterna; ergo imago magis est in mente secundum quod comparatur ad temporalia quam secundum quod comparatur ad aeterna. Obj. 3: Likeness is in the power of loving, but the image is in the power of knowing, as is said in the Sentences. But our mind knows material things before it knows things eternal, since it goes from material things to eternal things. It also knows material things more perfectly, since it has a comprehensive grasp of temporal things, but not of things eternal. Therefore, the image is in the mind more according to temporal things than according to eternal things.