Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum mens seipsam per essentiam cognoscat, aut per aliquam speciem Whether the mind knows itself through its essence or through some species Octavo quaeritur utrum mens se ipsam per essentiam cognoscat aut per aliquam speciem. Eighth, it is asked whether the mind knows itself through its essence or through some species? Et videtur quod per aliquam speciem quia, ut Philosophus dicit in 3 De anima, intellectus noster nihil intelligit sine phantasmate; sed ipsius essentiae animae non potest accipi aliquod phantasma; ergo oportet quod per aliquam aliam speciem a phantasmatibus abstractam mens nostra se ipsam intelligat. Obj. 1: It seems that it knows itself through some species, for as the Philosopher says: our intellect understands nothing without a phantasm. But it cannot receive a phantasm of the very essence of the soul. Therefore, our mind must understand itself through some other species abstracted from phantasms. Praeterea, ea quae per sui essentiam videntur, certissime cognoscuntur sine errore; sed de mente humana multi erraverunt cum quidam dicerent eam esse aerem, quidam ignem, et multa alia de ea inepta sentirent; ergo mens non videt se per essentiam suam. Obj. 2: Those things which are seen through their essence are most certainly apprehended without error. But many err about the human mind, for some say it is air, others fire, and hold many other foolish opinions about it. Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its essence. Sed dicebat quod mens per essentiam suam videt se esse, errare tamen potest in inquirendo quid sit. Obj. 3: It was said that through its essence the mind sees that it exists, but can err in the investigation of its nature. Sed contra, scire aliquid per essentiam suam est scire de eo quid est cum essentia rei sit idem quod quiditas eius; si igitur anima videret se ipsam per essentiam, quilibet sine errore sciret de anima sua quid est, quod manifeste patet falsum esse. On the contrary, to know something through its essence is to know what it is, for the essence of a thing is the same as its quiddity. Therefore, if the soul saw itself through its essence, everyone would unerringly know the essence of his soul, which is obviously false. Praeterea, anima nostra est forma coniuncta materiae; sed omnis huiusmodi forma cognoscitur per abstractionem speciei a materia et materialibus condicionibus; ergo anima cognoscitur per aliquam speciem abstractam. Obj. 4: Our soul is a form joined to matter. But every form of this kind is known through abstraction of the species from matter and from material conditions. Therefore, the soul is known through an abstracted species. Praeterea, intelligere non est actus animae tantum sed actus coniuncti, ut dicitur in 1 De anima; sed omnis talis actus est communis animae et corpori; ergo oportet quod in intelligendo semper sit aliquid ex parte corporis; sed hoc non esset si mens se ipsam per essentiam suam videret sine aliqua specie a corporeis sensibus abstracta; ergo mens non videt se ipsam per essentiam. Obj. 5: Understanding is not an act of the soul alone, but of the composite, as is said in On the Soul. But every such act is common to soul and body. Therefore, there must always be something from the body in understanding. But this would not be if the mind saw itself through its essence without any species abstracted from the bodily senses. Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its essence. Praeterea, Philosophus dicit in 3 De anima quod intellectus intelligit se sicut et alia; sed alia intelligit non per essentiam suam sed per aliquas species; ergo nec se ipsam mens intelligit per suam essentiam. Obj. 6: The Philosopher says that the intellect understands itself just as it understands other things. But it does not understand other things through its essence, but through species. Therefore, it does not understand itself through its essence. Praeterea, potentiae cognoscuntur per actus et actus per obiecta; sed essentia animae non potest cognosci nisi potentiis eius cognitis cum virtus rei cognoscere faciat rem ipsam; ergo oportet quod essentiam suam per actus suos et per species obiectorum suorum cognoscat. Obj. 7: Powers are known through their acts, and acts through their objects. But the essence of the soul can be known only when its powers are known, for what a thing can do manifests the nature of the thing. Therefore, it has to know its essence through its acts and through the species of its objects. Praeterea, sicut se habet sensus ad sensibile, ita intellectus ad intelligibile; sed inter sensus et sensibile requiritur quaedam distantia ex quo provenit quod oculus se ipsum videre non possit; ergo et in intellectuali cognitione requiritur quaedam distantia ut numquam se per essentiam suam intelligere possit. Obj. 8: As sense is related to what is sensible, so understanding is related to what is intelligible. But there has to be some distance between sense and the sensible. For this reason, the eye cannot see itself. Therefore, there also has to be some distance in intellectual vision, with the result that mind can never understand itself through its essence. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in Posterioribus non est circulo demonstrare quia sequeretur quod aliquid per se ipsum notum fieret, et sic sequeretur quod aliquid esset prius et notius se ipso, quod est impossibile; sed si mens se ipsam per essentiam suam videt, erit idem quod cognoscitur et per quod cognoscitur; ergo sequitur idem inconveniens ut aliquid sit prius et notius se ipso. Obj. 9: According to the Philosopher, in a demonstration we should not proceed in a circle, because it would follow that a thing would become known through itself. Thus, it would follow that it would exist before itself and be better known than itself, which is impossible. But, if the mind sees itself through its essence, that which is known and that through which it is known will be the same. Therefore, the same untenable conclusion would follow, for something would exist before itself and be better known than itself. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit 7 cap. De divinis nominibus quod anima circulo quodam cognoscit existentium veritatem; circularis autem motus est ab eodem in idem; ergo videtur quod anima a se ipsa egrediens intelligendo per res exteriores ad sui ipsius cognitionem redeat, et sic non intelliget se per essentiam suam. Obj. 10: Dionysius says that the soul knows the truth of existing things in a sort of circle. However, a circular movement is from the same thing to the same thing. Therefore, it seems that the soul goes out from itself in its understanding, and through things outside returns to knowledge of itself. Thus, it does not understand itself through its essence. Praeterea, manente causa manet eius effectus; si igitur mens se per essentiam suam videret propter hoc quod essentia sua sibi est praesens, cum semper ei sit praesens semper ipsam videret; ergo cum impossibile sit simul plura intelligere, numquam aliud intelligeret. Obj. 11: While the cause remains, the effect remains. Therefore, if the mind saw itself through its essence because its essence is present to it, it would always see it, for it is always present to it. Therefore, since it is impossible to understand many things at once, the mind would never understand anything else. Praeterea, posteriora sunt magis composita prioribus; sed intelligere est posterius quam esse; ergo in intelligentia animae invenitur maior compositio quam in eius esse; sed in anima non est idem quod est et quo est; ergo nec in ea est idem quod intelligitur et quo intelligitur, et sic mens non se videt per suam essentiam. Obj. 12: Things that follow have more composition than those which come earlier. But understanding follows existing. Therefore, there is more composition in the understanding of the soul than in its existence. But, in the soul, that which exists is not the same as that by which it exists. Therefore, that in the soul by which it understands will not be the same as that which is understood. Thus, the mind does not see itself through its essence. Praeterea, non potest idem (esse) forma et formatum respectu eiusdem; sed intellectus, cum sit quaedam potentia animae, est quasi quaedam forma essentiae ipsius; ergo non potest esse quod essentia animae sit forma intellectus, sed id quo aliquid intelligitur est forma intellectus; ergo mens non videt se ipsam per essentiam suam. Obj. 13: The same thing under the same aspect cannot be form and that which is informed. But, since the understanding is a power of the soul, it is a kind of form of its essence. Therefore, the essence of the soul cannot be the form of the understanding. Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its essence. Praeterea, anima est quaedam substantia per se subsistens; formae autem intelligibiles non sunt per se subsistentes, alias scientia, quae ex huiusmodi formis intelligibilibus consistit, non esset de genere accidentis; ergo essentia animae non potest esse ut forma intelligibilis qua mens se ipsam videat. Obj. 14: The soul is a subsistent substance. However, intelligible forms are not of themselves subsistent. Otherwise, knowledge, which is made up of these intelligible forms, would not be classified as an accident. Therefore, the essence of the soul cannot have the character of intelligible form by which the mind sees itself. Praeterea, cum actus et motus penes terminos distinguantur, intelligibilia quae sunt unius speciei, eodem modo secundum speciem intelliguntur; sed anima Petri est unius speciei cum anima Pauli; ergo anima Petri eodem modo intelligit se ipsam sicut intelligit animam Pauli: sed animam Pauli non intelligit per eius essentiam cum ab ea sit absens; ergo nec se intelligit per essentiam suam. Obj. 15: Since acts and movements are distinguished in their terms, intelligible things which belong to the same species are understood according to their species in the same way. But the soul of Peter belongs to the same species as that of Paul. Therefore, the soul of Peter understands itself just as it understands Paul’s soul. But it does not understand Paul’s soul through its essence, for it is not present to it. Therefore, it does not understand itself through its essence. Praeterea, forma est simplicior eo quod per formam informatur; sed mens non est simplicior se ipsa; ergo non informatur se ipsa; cum igitur informetur eo per quod cognoscit, non cognoscet se ipsam per se ipsam. Obj. 16: Form is simpler than that which is informed through the form. But the mind is not simpler than itself. Therefore, it is not informed by itself. Consequently, since it is informed by that through which it knows, it will not know itself through itself. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit in 9 De Trinitate mens se ipsam per se ipsam novit quoniam est incorporea; nam si non se ipsam novit, non se ipsam amat. On the contrary (1), Augustine says: mind knows itself through itself because it is incorporeal. For, if it does not know itself, it does not love itself. Praeterea, 2 Cor. 12:2 super illud scio hominem etc. dicit Glossa hac visione quae dicitur intellectualis ea cernuntur quae non sunt corpora nec ullas gerunt formas similes corporum, velut ipsa mens et omnis animae affectio; sed, ut in eadem Glossa dicitur, intellectualis visio eas res continet quae non habent imagines sui similes quae non sunt quod ipsae; ergo mens non cognoscit se ipsam per aliquid quod non sit idem quod ipsa. Furthermore (2), the Gloss on the second Epistle to the Corinthians 12:2 reads: by that sight which is called intellectual, those things are known which are not bodies and do not have any forms like bodies, as mind itself and every disposition of the soul. The same Gloss adds: intellectual sight contains those things which have no likenesses not identical with themselves. Therefore, the mind does not know itself through something not identical with it. Praeterea, sicut dicitur in 3 De anima, in his quae sunt separata a materia idem est quod intelligitur et quo intelligitur; sed mens est res quaedam immaterialis; ergo per essentiam suam intelligitur. Furthermore (3), in On the Soul we read: in things separated from matter, that which understands and that by which it is understood are the same. But the mind is an immaterial thing. Therefore, it is understood through its essence. Praeterea, omne quod est praesens intellectui ut intelligibile ab intellectu intelligitur; sed ipsa essentia animae est praesens intellectui per modum intelligibilis: est enim ei praesens per suam veritatem, veritas autem est ratio intelligendi sicut bonitas ratio diligendi; ergo mens per essentiam suam se intelligit. Furthermore (4), everything which, as intelligible, is present to the understanding is understood by the understanding. But the essence of the soul is present to understanding in an intelligible manner, for it is present to it through its truth. Truth, however, is the reason for understanding, as goodness is the reason for loving. Therefore, the mind understands itself through its essence. Praeterea, species per quam aliquid intelligitur est simplicior eo quod per eam intelligitur; sed anima non habet aliquam speciem se simpliciorem quae ab ea abstrahi possit; ergo anima non intelligit se per aliquam speciem sed per essentiam suam. Furthermore (5), the species through which something is understood is simpler than that which we understand through it. But the soul does not have any species simpler than itself to be abstracted from it. Therefore, the soul does not understand itself through a species, but through its essence. Praeterea, omnis scientia est per assimilationem scientis ad scitum; sed nihil aliud est animae similius quam sua essentia; ergo per nihil aliud se intelligit quam per essentiam suam. Furthermore (6), all knowledge takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the thing known. But there is nothing else more like the soul than its essence. Therefore, it understands itself through nothing else but its essence. Praeterea, illud quod est causa cognoscibilitatis aliis, non cognoscitur per aliquid aliud quam per se ipsum; sed anima est aliis rebus materialibus causa cognoscibilitatis: sunt enim intelligibilia in quantum nos ea intelligibilia facimus, ut Commentator dicit in 2 Metaphysicae; ergo anima per se ipsam solum intelligitur. Furthermore (7), that which is a cause by which other things are made knowable is not known through anything other than itself. But the soul is a cause which makes other physical things knowable, for they are intelligible inasmuch as we make them intelligible, as the Commentator says. Therefore, the soul is understood only through itself. Praeterea, scientia de anima est certissima, secundum Philosophum in 1 De anima; sed magis certum non cognoscitur per minus certum; ergo de anima non habetur scientia per aliud a se ipsa. Furthermore (8), according to the Philosopher, knowledge about the soul is most certain. But that which is more certain is not known through that which is less certain. Therefore, we do not have knowledge of the soul through something other than itself. Praeterea, omnis species per quam anima nostra intelligit est a sensibilibus abstracta; sed nullum sensibile est a quo anima possit suam quiditatem abstrahere; ergo anima non cognoscit se ipsam per aliquam similitudinem. Furthermore (9), every species through which our soul understands is abstracted from sensible things. But there is no sensible thing from which the soul can abstract its own quiddity. Therefore, the soul does not know itself through any likeness. Praeterea, sicut lux corporalis facit omnia esse visibilia in actu, ita anima per suam lucem facit omnia materialia esse intelligibilia actu, ut patet in 3 De anima; sed lux corporalis per se ipsam videtur non per aliquam similitudinem sui; ergo et anima per suam essentiam intelligitur, non per aliquam similitudinem. Furthermore (10), as physical light makes all things actually visible, so the soul through its light makes all material things actually intelligible, as is clear from On the Soul. But physical light is seen through itself and not through any likeness of itself. Therefore, the soul, too, is understood through its essence and not through any likeness. Praeterea, sicut Philosophus dicit in 3 De anima, intellectus agens non aliquando quidem intelligit, aliquando autem non, sed semper intelligit; sed non intelligit semper nisi se ipsum, nec hoc etiam posset si per speciem a sensibus abstractam se intelligeret quia sic ante abstractionem non se intelligeret; ergo mens nostra intelligit se per suam essentiam. Furthermore (11), as the Philosopher says, the agent intellect does not at one time understand and at another not understand, but always understands. But it is only itself which it understands at all times. This would not be possible if it understood itself through a species abstracted from the senses, for thus it would not understand itself before the abstraction. Therefore, our mind understands itself through its essence. Responsio. Dicendum quod, cum quaeritur utrum aliquid per essentiam suam cognoscatur, quaestio ista dupliciter potest intelligi: uno modo ut hoc quod dicitur per essentiam referatur ad ipsam rem cognitam, ut illud intelligatur per essentiam cognosci cuius essentia cognoscitur, illud autem non cuius essentia non cognoscitur sed accidentia quaedam eius; alio modo ut referatur ad id quo aliquid cognoscitur, ut sic intelligatur aliquid per suam essentiam cognosci quia ipsa essentia est quo cognoscitur, et hoc modo ad praesens quaeritur utrum anima per suam essentiam intelligat se. I answer that when we ask if something is known through its essence, we can understand the question in two ways. In the first, “through its essence” is taken to refer to the thing known, so that we understand that a thing is known through its essence when its essence is known, and that it is not known through its essence when not its essence but only certain of its accidents are known. In the second way, it is taken to refer to that by which something is known, so that we thus understand that something is known through its essence because the essence itself is that by which it is known. It is in this sense that we ask here if the soul understands itself through its essence. Ad cuius quaestionis evidentiam sciendum est quod de anima duplex cognitio haberi potest ab unoquoque, ut Augustinus dicit in 9 De Trinitate: una quidem qua cuiusque anima se tantum cognoscit quantum ad id quod est ei proprium, alia qua cognoscitur anima quantum ad id quod est omnibus animabus commune. Illa igitur cognitio quae communiter de omni anima habetur, est qua cognoscitur animae natura; cognitio vero quam quis habet de anima quantum ad id quod est sibi proprium, est cognitio de anima secundum quod esse habet in tali individuo. Unde per hanc cognitionem cognoscitur an est anima, sicut cum aliquis percipit se animam habere; per aliam vero cognitionem scitur quid est anima et quae sunt per se accidentia eius. For a clear understanding of this question we should observe that each person can have a twofold knowledge of the soul, as Augustine says. One of these is the knowledge by which the soul of each man knows itself only with reference to that which is proper to it. The other is that by which the soul is known with reference to that which is common to all souls. This latter, which concerns all souls without distinction, is that by which the nature of the soul is known. However, the knowledge which each has of his soul, in so far as it is proper to himself, is the knowledge of the soul as it exists in this individual. Thus, it is through this knowledge that one knows whether the soul exists, as when someone perceives that he has a soul. Through the other type of knowledge, however, one knows what the soul is and what its proper accidents are. Quantum igitur ad primam cognitionem pertinet, distinguendum est quia cognoscere aliquid est habitu et actu. Quantum igitur ad actualem cognitionem qua aliquis se in actu considerat animam habere, sic dico quod anima cognoscitur per actus suos: in hoc enim aliquis se percipit animam habere et vivere et esse quod percipit se sentire et intelligere et alia huiusmodi vitae opera exercere; unde dicit Philosophus in 9 Ethicorum sentimus autem quoniam sentimus, et intelligimus quoniam intelligimus, et quia hoc sentimus intelligimus quoniam sumus. Nullus autem percipit se intelligere nisi ex hoc quod aliquid intelligit, quia prius est intelligere aliquid quam intelligere se intelligere; et ideo anima pervenit ad actualiter percipiendum se esse per illud quod intelligit vel sentit. Sed quantum ad habitualem cognitionem sic dico quod anima per essentiam suam se videt, id est, ex hoc ipso quod essentia sua est sibi praesens, est potens exire in actum cognitionis sui ipsius; sicut aliquis ex hoc quod habet habitum alicuius scientiae, ex ipsa praesentia habitus est potens percipere illa quae subsunt illi habitui. Ad hoc autem quod percipiat anima se esse et quid in se ipsa agatur attendat, non requiritur aliquis habitus, sed ad hoc sufficit sola essentia animae quae menti est praesens: ex ea enim actus progrediuntur in quibus actualiter ipsa percipitur. With reference to the first type of cognition we must make a distinction, because one can know something habitually or actually. Concerning the actual cognition by which one actually considers that he has a soul, I say that the soul is known through its acts. For one perceives that he has a soul, that he lives, and that he exists, because he perceives that he senses, understands, and carries on other vital activities of this sort. For this reason, the Philosopher says: we sense that we sense, and we understand that we understand, and because we sense this, we understand that we exist. But one perceives that he understands only from the fact that he understands something. For to understand something is prior to understanding that one understands. Therefore, through that which it understands or senses the soul arrives at actual perception of the fact that it exists. Concerning habitual knowledge I say this, that the soul sees itself through its essence, that is, the soul has the power to enter upon actual cognition of itself from the very fact that its essence is present to it. This is like the case of one who, because he has the habit of some knowledge, can by reason of the presence of the habit perceive those things which fall under that habit. But no habit is required for the soul’s perception of its existence and its advertence to the activity within it. The essence alone of the soul, which is present to the mind, is enough for this, for the acts in which it is actually perceived proceed from it. Sed si loquamur de cognitione animae, cum mens humana speciali aut generali cognitione diffinitur, sic iterum distinguendum videtur: ad cognitionem enim duo concurrere oportet, scilicet apprehensionem et iudicium de re apprehensa; et ideo cognitio qua natura animae cognoscitur potest considerari et quantum ad apprehensionem et quantum ad iudicium. Si igitur consideretur quantum ad apprehensionem, sic dico quod natura animae a nobis cognoscitur per species quas a sensibus abstrahimus. Anima enim nostra in genere intellectualium tenet ultimum locum, sicut materia prima in genere sensibilium, ut patet per Commentatorem in 3 De anima: sicut enim materia prima est in potentia ad omnes formas sensibiles, ita et intellectus possibilis noster ad omnes formas intelligibiles, unde in ordine intelligibilium est sicut potentia pura ut materia in ordine sensibilium; et ideo, sicut materia non est sensibilis nisi per formam supervenientem, ita intellectus possibilis non est intelligibilis nisi per speciem superinductam. Unde mens nostra non potest se intelligere ita quod se ipsam immediate apprehendat, sed ex hoc quod apprehendit alia devenit in suam cognitionem, sicut et natura materiae primae cognoscitur ex hoc ipso quod est talium formarum receptiva. Quod patet intuendo modum quo philosophi naturam animae investigaverunt: ex hoc enim quod anima humana universales rerum naturas cognoscit, perceperunt quod species qua intelligimus est immaterialis, alias esset individuata et sic non duceret in cognitionem universalis; ex hoc autem quod species intelligibilis est immaterialis, perceperunt quod intellectus est res quaedam non dependens a materia, et ex hoc ad alias proprietates cognoscendas intellectivae animae processerunt. Et hoc est quod Philosophus dicit in 3 De anima quod intellectus est intelligibilis sicut alia intelligibilia; quod exponens Commentator dicit quod intellectus intelligit per intentionem in eo, sicut alia intelligibilia, quae quidem intentio nihil aliud est quam species intelligibilis. Sed haec intentio est in intellectu ut intelligibilis actu, in aliis autem rebus non, sed ut intelligibilis in potentia. But, if we speak of the knowledge of the soul when the human mind is limited to specific or generic knowledge, we must make another distinction. For the concurrence of two elements, apprehension and judgment about the thing apprehended, is necessary for knowledge. Therefore, the knowledge by which the nature of the soul is known can be considered with reference to apprehension and with reference to judgment. If, then, we consider this knowledge with reference to apprehension, I say that we know the nature of the soul through species which we abstract from the senses. For our soul holds the last place among intellectual things, just as first matter does among sensible things, as the Commentator shows. For, as first matter is in potency to all sensible forms, so our potential intellect is in potency to all intelligible forms. Thus, it is, in fact, pure potency in the order of intelligible things, as matter is in the order of sensible reality. Therefore, as matter is sensible only through some added form, so the potential intellect is intelligible only through a species which is brought into it. Hence, our mind cannot so understand itself that it immediately apprehends itself. Rather, it comes to a knowledge of itself through apprehension of other things, just as the nature of first matter is known from its receptivity for forms of a certain kind. This becomes apparent when we look at the manner in which philosophers have investigated the nature of the soul. For, from the fact that the human soul knows the universal natures of things, they have perceived that the species by which we understand is immaterial. Otherwise, it would be individuated and so would not lead to knowledge of the universal. From the immateriality of the species by which we understand, philosophers have understood that the intellect is a thing independent of matter. And from this they have proceeded to a knowledge of the other properties of the intellective soul. Thus, the Philosopher says: the intellect is intelligible just as the other intelligible things are. The Commentator also affirms this in his explanation: intellect is understood through an intention in it, just as other intelligible things. This intention is nothing but the intelligible species. But this intention is in the intellect as actually intelligible. In other things, however, it is not actually but only potentially intelligible. Si vero consideretur cognitio quam de natura animae habemus quantum ad iudicium quo sententiamus ita esse ut deductione praedicta apprehenderamus, sic notitia animae habetur in quantum intuemur inviolabilem veritatem ex qua perfecte quantum possumus diffinimus, non qualis sit uniuscuiusque hominis mens sed qualis esse sempiternis rationibus debeat, ut Augustinus dicit 9 De Trinitate. Hanc autem inviolabilem veritatem (intuemur) in sui similitudine, quae est menti nostrae impressa, in quantum aliqua naturaliter cognoscimus ut per se nota, ad quae omnia alia examinamus, secundum ea de omnibus iudicantes. But, if we consider the knowledge which we have of the nature of the soul in the judgment by which we decide that it exists in such a way, as we had apprehended from the deduction mentioned above, we have knowledge of the soul inasmuch as we contemplate inviolable truth. This is the truth from which we define to the best of our power not the kind of mind each man has, but the kind of mind it ought to be according to eternal norms, as Augustine says. We see this inviolable truth in its likeness which is impressed on our mind to the extent that we naturally know some things as self-evident. We examine all other things with reference to these, judging of them according to these.