De mente On the mind Primo utrum mens prout in ea ponitur imago Trinitatis sit essentia animae. 1. Whether the mind, as containing within itself the image of the Trinity, is the essence of the soul or one of its powers? Secundo utrum in mente sit memoria. 2. Whether there is memory in the mind? Tertio utrum memoria distinguatur ab intelligentia sicut potentia a potentia. 3. Whether memory is distinguished from understanding as one power from another? Quarto utrum mens cognoscat res materiales. 4. Whether the mind knows material things? Quinto utrum mens nostra possit cognoscere materialia in singulari. 5. Whether our mind knows material things in their singularity? Sexto utrum mens humana cognitionem accipiat a sensibilibus. 6. Whether the human mind receives knowledge from sensible things? Septimo utrum in mente sit imago Trinitatis secundum quod materialia cognoscit. 7. Whether the image of the Trinity is in the mind as it knows material things or only as it knows eternal things? Octavo utrum mens se ipsam per essentiam cognoscat aut per aliquam speciem. 8. Whether the mind knows itself through its essence or through some species? Nono utrum mens nostra cognoscat habitus in anima existentes per essentiam suam. 9. Whether its through their essence or through some likeness that our mind knows habits which exist in the soul? Decimo utrum aliquis possit scire se habere caritatem. 10. Whether one knows that he has charity? Undecimo utrum mens in statu viae possit videre Deum per essentiam. 11. Whether the mind in this life can see God through his essence? Duodecimo utrum Deum esse sit per se notum menti humanae. 12. Whether God's existence is self-evident to the human mind, just as first principles of demonstration, which cannot be thought not to exist? Tertiodecimo utrum per naturalem rationem possit cognosci Trinitas personarum. 13. Whether the Trinity of persons in God can be known by natural reason? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum mens, prout in ea ponitur imago Trinitatis, sit essentia animae, vel aliqua potentia eius Whether the mind, as containing within itself the image of the Trinity, is the essence of the soul or one of its powers Quaestio est de mente in qua est imago Trinitatis. Et primo quaeritur utrum mens, prout in ea ponitur imago Trinitatis, sit essentia animae vel aliqua potentia eius. This question treats of the mind, which contains the image of the Trinity, and first, it is asked whether the mind, as containing within itself the image of the Trinity, is the essence of the soul or one of its powers? Et videtur quod sit ipsa essentia animae quia Augustinus dicit 9 De Trinitate quod mens et spiritus non relative dicuntur sed essentiam demonstrant, nonnisi essentiam animae; ergo mens est ipsa animae essentia. Obj. 1: It seems that it is the essence of the soul, for Augustine says: the terms mind and spirit are not taken relatively, but denote the essence, and nothing but the essence of the soul. Therefore, the mind is the essence of the soul. Praeterea, diversa genera potentiarum animae non uniuntur nisi in essentia; sed appetitivum et intellectivum sunt diversa genera potentiarum animae: ponuntur enim in fine 1 De anima quinque genera communissima potentiarum animae, scilicet vegetativum, sensitivum, appetitivum, motivum secundum locum et intellectivum; cum ergo mens comprehendat in se intellectivum et appetitivum, quia in mente ponitur ab Augustino intelligentia et voluntas, videtur quod non sit mens aliqua potentia sed ipsa essentia animae. Obj. 2: Different classes of powers of the soul are found only in its essence. But the appetitive and intellective are different classes of powers of the soul. For On the Soul gives five most general classes of powers of the soul: vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellective. But the mind includes within it appetitive and intellective powers, for Augustine puts understanding and will in the mind. It seems, then, that the mind is not a power, but the very essence of the soul. Praeterea, Augustinus 11 De civitate Dei dicit quod nos sumus ad imaginem Dei in quantum sumus, novimus nos esse et amamus utrumque; in 9 vero De Trinitate assignat imaginem Dei in nobis secundum mentem, notitiam et amorem; cum ergo amare sit actus amoris et nosse sit actus notitiae, videtur quod esse sit actus mentis; sed esse est actus essentiae; ergo mens est ipsa essentia animae. Obj. 3: Augustine says: we are in the image of God by the fact that we exist, that we know that we exist, and that we love this knowledge and this existence. He also bases the attribution of the likeness of God in us upon mind, knowledge, and love. Since, then, loving is the act of love, and knowing is the act of knowledge, it seems that existence is the act of the mind. But existence is the act of essence. Therefore, the mind is the very essence of the soul. Praeterea, eadem ratione invenitur mens in angelo et in nobis; sed ipsa essentia angeli est mens eius, unde Dionysius frequenter angelos nominat divinas vel intellectuales mentes; ergo etiam et mens nostra est ipsa essentia animae. Obj. 4: Mind has the same nature in angels and in us. But the very essence of an angel is its mind. For this reason Dionysius frequently calls angels divine or intellectual minds. Therefore, our mind, also, is the very essence of our soul. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit in 10 De Trinitate quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens, una essentia, una vita; ergo sicut vita ad essentiam pertinet, ita et mens. Obj. 5: Augustine says: memory, understanding, and will are one mind, one essence, one life. Therefore, as life belongs to the essence of the soul, so does mind. Praeterea, accidens non potest esse principium substantialis distinctionis; sed homo substantialiter distinguitur a brutis in hoc quod habet mentem; ergo mens non est aliquod accidens; sed potentia animae est proprietas eius, secundum Avicennam, et sic est de genere accidentis; ergo mens non est potentia sed est ipsa essentia animae. Obj. 6: An accident cannot be the source of a substantial distinction. But, by his possession of mind, man is substantially distinguished from brute animals. So, mind is not an accident. But a power of the soul is a property of the soul, according to Avicenna and so it belongs to the class of accident. Therefore, mind is not a power, but the very essence of the soul. Praeterea, ab una potentia non egrediuntur diversi actus secundum speciem; sed a mente egrediuntur diversi actus secundum speciem, scilicet memorari, intelligere et velle, ut patet per Augustinum; ergo mens non est aliqua potentia animae sed ipsa essentia eius. Obj. 7: Acts specifically different do not come from one power. But, as is clear from Augustine, acts specifically different—namely: remembering, understanding, and willing—come from the mind. Therefore, mind is not a power of the soul, but its very essence. Praeterea, una potentia non est subiectum alterius potentiae; sed mens est imaginis subiectum quae consistit in tribus potentiis; ergo mens non est potentia sed ipsa essentia animae. Obj. 8: One power is not the subject of another power. But mind is the subject of the image of the Trinity, which is constituted by the three powers. Therefore, mind is not a power, but the essence of the soul. Praeterea, nulla potentia comprehendit in se plures potentias; sed mens comprehendit intelligentiam et voluntatem; ergo non est potentia sed essentia. Obj. 9: No power contains in itself other powers. But the mind includes understanding and will. Therefore, it is not a power, but the essence. Sed contra, anima non habet alias partes nisi suas potentias; sed mens est quaedam pars animae superior, ut Augustinus dicit in libro De Trinitate; ergo mens est potentia animae. On the contrary (1), powers of the soul are its only parts. But mind is the higher part of the soul, as Augustine says. Therefore, mind is a power of the soul. Praeterea essentia animae communis est omnibus potentiis quia omnes in ea radicantur; sed mens non est communis omnibus potentiis quia dividitur contra sensum; ergo mens non est ipsa essentia animae. Furthermore (2), the essence of the soul is common to all the powers, because all are rooted in it. But mind is not common to all the powers, because it is distinguished from sense. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul. Praeterea, in essentia animae non est accipere supremum et infimum; sed in mente est supremum et infimum: dividit enim Augustinus mentem in superiorem et inferiorem rationem; ergo mens est potentia animae, non essentia. Furthermore (3), we cannot speak of highest and lowest in the essence of the soul. But there are highest and lowest in mind. For Augustine divides mind into higher and lower reason. Therefore, mind is a power of the soul and not its essence. Praeterea, essentia animae est principium vivendi; sed mens non est principium vivendi sed intelligendi; ergo mens non est ipsa essentia animae sed potentia eius. Furthermore (4), the essence of the soul is the principle of life. But mind is not the principle of life, but of understanding. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul, but one of its powers. Praeterea, subiectum non praedicatur de accidente; sed mens praedicatur de memoria, intelligentia et voluntate, quae sunt in essentia animae sicut in subiecto; ergo mens non est essentia animae. Furthermore (5), a subject is not predicated of an accident. But mind is predicated of memory, understanding, and will, which are in the soul as in a subject. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul. Praeterea, secundum Augustinum in libro 2 De Trinitate, anima non est ad imaginem secundum se totam sed secundum aliquid sui; est autem ad imaginem secundum mentem; ergo mens non nominat totam animam sed aliquid animae. Furthermore (6), according to Augustine, the relation of the soul to the image does not arise from the whole soul, but only from part of it, namely, the mind. Therefore, the mind does not denote the whole soul, but a part of it. Praeterea, nomen mentis ex eo quod meminit sumptum esse videtur; sed memoria designat aliquam potentiam animae; ergo et mens, et non essentiam. Furthermore (7), the name mind (mens) seems to have been attributed [to the soul] from the fact that it remembers (memini). But memory refers to a power of the soul. Therefore, mind also denotes a power and not the essence. Responsio. Dicendum quod nomen mentis a mensurando est sumptum; res autem uniuscuiusque generis mensuratur per id quod est minimum et principium primum in suo genere, ut patet in 10 Metaphysicae; et ideo nomen mentis hoc modo dicitur in anima sicut et nomen intellectus: solum enim intellectus accipit cognitionem de rebus quasi mensurando eas ad sua principia. Intellectus autem, cum dicatur per respectum ad actum, potentiam animae designat: virtus enim sive potentia est medium inter essentiam et operationem, ut patet per Dionysium in Caelestis hierarchiae 11 capitulo. Quia vero rerum essentiae sunt nobis ignotae, virtutes autem earum innotescunt nobis per actus, utimur frequenter nominibus virtutum vel potentiarum ad essentias designandas. Sed quia nihil notificatur nisi ex hoc quod est sibi proprium, oportet quod, cum aliqua essentia designatur per suam potentiam, quod designetur per potentiam sibi propriam. In potentiis autem hoc communiter invenitur quod illud quod potest in plus potest in minus sed non convertitur, sicut "qui potest ferre mille libras potest ferre centum", ut dicitur in 1 Caeli et mundi; et ideo si aliqua res per suam potentiam debeat designari, oportet quod designetur per ultimum potentiae suae; anima autem quae est in plantis non habet nisi infimum gradum inter potentias animae, unde ab ea denominatur cum dicitur nutritiva vel vegetabilis; anima autem bruti pertingit ad altiorem gradum, scilicet qui est sensus, unde ipsa anima vocatur sensitiva vel quandoque etiam sensus; sed anima humana pertingit ad altissimum gradum inter potentias animae et ex hoc denominatur, unde dicitur intellectiva et quandoque etiam intellectus, et similiter mens in quantum scilicet ex ipsa nata est effluere talis potentia, quia est sibi proprium prae aliis animabus. I answer that the term "mind" (mens) is taken from the verb measure (mensurare). For a thing of any genus is measured by that which is least and first in its genus, as is clear from the Metaphysics. So, the word "mind" is applied to the soul in the same way as "understanding" is. For understanding knows about things only by measuring them, as it were, according to its own principles. But, since it signifies reference to act, understanding designates a faculty of the soul. But a power or faculty lies between essence and activity, as Dionysius says. Since, however, the essences of things are not known to us, and their powers reveal themselves to us through their acts, we often use the names of the faculties and powers to denote the essences. But, since knowledge of a thing comes only from that which is proper to it, when an essence takes its name from one of its powers, it must be named according to a power proper to it. It is commonly true of powers that that which can do more can do less, but not conversely. So, a man who can carry a thousand pounds can carry a hundred, as is said in Heaven and Earth. Hence, if a thing is to be classified by its power, it must be classified according to the utmost of its power. Now, among souls, the soul in plants has only the lowest level of power, and so is classified according to this when it is called nutritive or vegetative. The soul of a brute animal, however, reaches a higher level, that of sense, and so its soul is called sensitive, or, sometimes, even simply sense. But the human soul reaches the highest level which there is among powers of soul and takes its name from this, being called intellective or, sometimes, also understanding and mind, inasmuch as from the intellective soul such power naturally arises, as is proper to the human soul above other souls. Patet ergo quod mens in anima nostra dicit illud quod est altissimum in virtute ipsius; unde cum secundum id quod est altissimum in nobis divina imago inveniatur in nobis, imago non pertinebit ad essentiam animae nisi secundum mentem prout nominat altissimam potentiam eius: et sic mens, prout in ea est imago, nominat potentiam animae et non essentiam; vel si nominat essentiam, hoc non est nisi in quantum ab ea fluit talis potentia. It is clear, then, that in us mind designates the highest power of our soul. And since the image of God is in us according to that which is highest in us, that image will belong to the essence of the soul only in so far as mind is its highest power. Thus, mind, as containing the image of God, designates a power of the soul and not its essence. Or, if we take mind to mean essence, it means it only inasmuch as such a power flows from the essence. Ad primum igitur dicendum quod mens non dicitur significare essentiam secundum quod essentia contra potentiam dividitur, sed secundum quod essentia absoluta dividitur contra id quod relative dicitur; et sic mens dividitur contra notitiam sui in quantum per notitiam mens ad se ipsam refertur, ipsa vero mens dicitur absolute.—Vel potest dici quod mens accipitur ab Augustino secundum quod significat essentiam animae simul cum tali potentia. Reply Obj. 1: Mind is not taken to mean essence, as essence is contrasted with power, but as absolute essence is distinguished from that which is relatively so called. Thus, mind is distinguished from knowledge of itself in this, that through knowledge mind is referred to itself, but mind itself is an absolute term. Or we can say that mind is taken by Augustine to mean the essence of the soul along with this power.