Sciendum est igitur quod aliquid est in fide ad quod omnes et omni tempore explicite credendum tenentur, quaedam vero sunt in ea quae omni tempore sunt explicite credenda sed non ab omnibus, quaedam vero ab omnibus sed non omni tempore, quaedam vero nec ab omnibus nec omni tempore. Quod enim oporteat omni tempore aliquid explicite credi a quolibet fideli, ex hoc apparet quia acceptio fidei se habet in nobis respectu ultimae perfectionis sicut acceptio discipuli de his quae sibi primo a magistro traduntur per quae in anteriora dirigitur; non posset autem dirigi nisi actu aliqua consideraret, unde oportet quod discipulus actualiter aliquid considerandum accipiat. Et similiter oportet quod fidelis quilibet aliquid explicite credat, et haec sunt duo illa quae Apostolus dicit Ad Hebr. 11:6 accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est et diligentibus se remunerator est; unde quilibet tenetur explicite credere, et omni tempore, Deum esse et habere providentiam de rebus humanis. We must note, accordingly, that there are some matters of faith which everyone is bound to believe explicitly in every age. Other matters of faith must be believed explicitly in every age but not by everyone. Still other matters everyone must believe explicitly, but not in every age. And, finally, there are things that need not be believed explicitly by everyone nor in every age. That all the faithful in every age must believe something explicitly is evident from the fact that there is a parallel between the reception of faith with reference to our ultimate perfection and a pupil’s reception of those things which his master first teaches him, and through which he is guided to prior principles. However, he could not be so guided unless he actually considered something. Hence, the pupil must receive something for actual consideration; likewise, the faithful must explicitly believe something. And these are the two things which the Apostle tells us must be believed explicitly: for he that comes to God must believe that he is, and is the rewarder to them that love him (Heb 11:6). Therefore, everyone in every age is bound explicitly to believe that God exists and exercises providence over human affairs. Non est autem possibile ut aliquis in statu viae explicite cognoscat omnem illam scientiam quam Deus habet in qua nostra beatitudo consistit, sed possibile est aliquem in statu viae explicite cognoscere omnia illa quae proponuntur humano generi in hoc statu ut rudimenta quaedam quibus se in finem dirigat, et talis dicitur habere perfectam fidem quantum ad explicationem; sed haec perfectio non est omnium, unde et gradus in Ecclesia constituuntur ut quidam aliis praeponantur ad erudiendum in fide. Unde non tenentur omnes explicite credere omnia quae sunt fidei, sed solum illi qui eruditores fidei instituuntur, sicut sunt praelati et habentes curam animarum. However, it is not possible for anyone in this life to know explicitly the whole of God’s knowledge, in which our beatitude consists. Yet it is possible for someone in this life to know all those things which are proposed to the human race in its present state as first principles with which to direct itself to its final end. Such a person is said to have faith which is completely explicit. But not all believers have this completeness; hence, there are levels of belief in the Church, so that some are placed over others to teach them in matters of faith. Consequently, not all are required explicitly to believe all matters of faith, but only those are so bound who are appointed teachers in matters of faith, such as superiors and those who have pastoral duties. Nec tamen isti etiam secundum omne tempus tenentur omnia explicite credere: sicut enim est profectus unius hominis in fide per successiones temporum, ita etiam et totius humani generis; unde dicit Gregorius per successiones temporum crevit divinae cognitionis augmentum. Plenitudo autem temporis, quasi perfectio aetatis humani generis, est in tempore gratiae, unde in hoc tempore maiores omnia quae sunt fidei explicite credere tenentur; sed temporibus praecedentibus etiam maiores non tenebantur ad credendum omnia explicite, plura autem explicite credebantur post tempus legis et prophetarum quam ante. In statu igitur ante peccatum non tenebantur explicite credere ea quae sunt de Redemptore quia adhuc necessitas redemptionis non erat; implicite tamen hoc credebant in divina providentia, in quantum scilicet Deum credebant diligentibus se provisurum de omnibus necessariis ad salutem. Sed ante peccatum et post omni tempore necessarium fuit a maioribus explicitam fidem de Trinitate habere, non autem a minoribus post peccatum usque ad tempus gratiae: ante peccatum enim forte talis distinctio non fuisset ut quidam per alios erudirentur de fide. Et similiter etiam post peccatum usque ad tempus gratiae maiores tenebantur habere fidem de Redemptore explicite, minores vero implicite, vel in fide patriarcharum et prophetarum vel in divina providentia. And even these are not bound to believe everything explicitly in every age. For there is a gradual progress in faith for the whole human race just as there is for individual men. This is why Gregory says that down the ages there has been a growing development of divine knowledge. Now, the fullness of time, which is the prime of life of the human race, is in the age of grace. So, in this age, the leaders are bound to believe all matters of faith explicitly. But, in earlier ages, the leaders were not bound to believe everything explicitly. However, more had to be believed explicitly after the age of the law and the prophets than before that time. Accordingly, before sin came into the world, it was not necessary to believe explicitly the matters concerning the Redeemer, since there was then no need of the Redeemer. Nevertheless, this was implicit in their belief in divine providence, in so far as they believed that God would provide everything necessary for the salvation of those who love him. Before and after the fall, the leaders in every age had to have explicit faith in the Trinity. Between the fall and the age of grace, however, the ordinary people did not have to have such explicit belief. Perhaps before the fall there was not such a distinction of persons that some had to be taught the faith by others. Likewise, between the fall and the age of grace, the leading men had to have explicit faith in the Redeemer, and the ordinary people only implicit faith. This was contained either in their belief in the faith of the patriarchs and prophets or in their belief in divine providence. Tempore vero gratiae omnes, maiores et minores, de Trinitate et de Redemptore tenentur explicitam fidem habere: non tamen omnia credibilia circa Trinitatem vel Redemptorem minores explicite credere tenentur sed soli maiores; minores autem tenentur explicite credere generales articulos, ut Deum esse trinum et unum, Filium Dei esse incarnatum, mortuum, et resurrexisse, et alia huiusmodi de quibus Ecclesia festa facit. However, in the time of grace, everybody, the leaders and the ordinary people, have to have explicit faith in the Trinity and in the Redeemer. However, only the leaders, and not the ordinary people, are bound to believe explicitly all the matters of faith concerning the Trinity and the Redeemer. The ordinary people must, however, believe explicitly the general articles, such as that God is triune, that the Son of God was made flesh, died, and rose from the dead, and other like matters which the Church commemorates in her feasts. Ad primum igitur dicendum quod non sequitur inconveniens posito quod quilibet teneatur aliquid explicite credere etiam si in silvis vel inter bruta animalia nutriatur: hoc enim ad divinam providentiam pertinet ut cuilibet provideat de necessariis ad salutem dummodo ex parte eius non impediatur. Si enim aliquis taliter nutritus ductum rationis naturalis sequeretur in appetitu boni et fuga mali, certissime est tenendum quod Deus ei vel per internam inspirationem revelaret ea quae sunt necessaria ad credendum vel aliquem fidei predicatorem ad eum dirigeret, sicut misit Petrum ad Cornelium, Act. 10:20. Reply Obj. 1: Granted that everyone is bound to believe something explicitly, no untenable conclusion follows even if someone is brought up in the forest or among wild beasts. For it pertains to divine providence to furnish everyone with what is necessary for salvation, provided that on his part there is no hindrance. Thus, if someone so brought up followed the direction of natural reason in seeking good and avoiding evil, we must most certainly hold that God would either reveal to him through internal inspiration what had to be believed, or would send some preacher of the faith to him as he sent Peter to Cornelius (Acts 10:20). Ad secundum dicendum quod, quamvis non sit in potestate nostra cognoscere ea quae sunt fidei ex nobis ipsis, tamen si nos fecerimus quod in nobis est, ut scilicet ductum rationis naturalis sequamur, Deus non deficiet nobis ab eo quod est nobis necessarium. Reply Obj. 2: Although it is not within our power to know matters of faith by ourselves alone, still, if we do what we can, that is, follow the guidance of natural reason, God will not withhold from us that which we need. Ad tertium dicendum quod ea quae sunt fidei non proponuntur simplicibus ut particulatim exponenda, sed in quadam generalitate; sic enim ea explicite credere tenentur, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Matters of faith are not presented to the uneducated for minute explanation, but in a general way, for in this way they have to believe them explicitly as has been said. Ad quartum dicendum quod angeli, secundum Dionysium et Augustinum, primo sciverunt incarnationis Christi mysterium quam etiam homines, cum de ipso per angelos prophetae etiam sint instructi; sed a Hieronymo dicuntur per Ecclesiam hoc mysterium discere in quantum, praedicantibus apostolis, mysterium salutis gentium implebatur; et sic quantum ad aliquas circumstantias plenius sciebant iam praesens videntes quod futurum ante praeviderant. Reply Obj. 4: According to Dionysius and Augustine, the angels knew the mystery of the Incarnation of Christ before men did, since it was through the angels that the prophets were told of the Incarnation. But Jerome says that the angels learned this mystery through the Church, in so far as the mystery of the salvation of the gentiles was fulfilled through the preaching of the apostles. In this way, their knowledge was more complete with reference to certain circumstances, since they now saw as present what they had foreseen as future. Ad quintum dicendum quod gentiles non ponebantur ut instructores divinae fidei, unde quantumcumque essent sapientes sapientia saeculari inter minores computandi sunt, et ideo sufficiebat eis habere fidem de Redemptore implicite, vel in fide legis et prophetarum vel etiam in ipsa divina providentia; probabile tamen est multis etiam gentilibus ante Christi adventum mysterium redemptionis nostrae fuisse divinitus revelatum, sicut patet ex sibyllinis vaticiniis. Reply Obj. 5: The Gentiles were not established as teachers of divine faith. Hence, no matter how well versed they were in secular wisdom, they should be counted as ordinary people. Therefore, it was enough for them to have implicit faith in the Redeemer, either as part of their belief in the faith of the law and the prophets, or as part of their belief in divine providence itself. Nevertheless, it is likely that the mystery of our redemption was revealed to many Gentiles before Christ’s coming, as is clear from the Sibylline prophecies. Ad sextum dicendum quod Iohannes Baptista, quamvis suo tempore inter maiores fuerit computandus quia praeco veritatis fuit a Deo institutus, non tamen oportebat quod explicite crederet omnia quae post Christi Passionem et Resurrectionem tempore gratiae revelatae explicite creduntur: nondum enim suo tempore veritatis cognitio ad suum complementum pervenerat, quod praecipue factum est in adventu Spiritus Sancti. Quidam tamen dicunt quod Iohannes hoc quaesivit non ex persona sua, sed ex persona discipulorum qui dubitabant de Christo; quidam etiam dicunt quod non fuit quaestio dubitantis, sed pie admirantis humilitatem Christi si dignaretur ad inferos descendere. Reply Obj. 6: Although John the Baptist should be counted among the greater persons of his time because God made him a herald of truth, it was not necessary for him to believe explicitly all the matters of revelation which are explicitly believed after Christ’s Passion and Resurrection in the age of grace. For, in his time, the knowledge of the truth had not reached the fullness which it received especially with the coming of the Holy Spirit. Some, however, say that in this passage John did not ask personally for himself, but for his disciples who doubted about Christ. Some also say that this was the question not of one who doubted but of one who had a holy admiration for the humility of Christ, that he would deign to descend into hell. Ad primum autem in contrarium dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de omnibus quae ad fidem pertinent: quaedam enim sunt aliis obscuriora et quaedam aliis sunt necessariora ad hoc quod homo dirigatur in finem; et ideo quosdam articulos prae aliis oportet explicite credere. Reply Sed Contra 1: All things which pertain to faith do not have the same rational connection with the direction of man to his final end, for some are more obscure than others and some are more necessary to it than others. Therefore, some articles rather than others must be believed explicitly. Ad secundum dicendum quod ille etiam qui non credit explicite omnes articulos potest omnes errores vitare quia ex habitu fidei retardatur ne assentiat contrariis articulorum quos etiam solum implicite novit, ut scilicet cum sibi proponuntur quasi insolita, suspecta habeat et assensum differat quousque instruatur per eum cuius est dubia in fide determinare. Reply Sed Contra 2: One who does not believe all the articles explicitly can still avoid all errors because the habit of faith keeps him from giving assent to things against the articles which he knows only implicitly. Thus, for instance, if something unusual is proposed, he is suspicious of it and delays assent until he gets instruction from him whose duty it is to decide about doubtful matters of faith. Ad tertium dicendum quod mandata Decalogi sunt de his quae naturalis ratio dictat; et ideo quilibet tenetur ea explicite cognoscere; nec est similis ratio de articulis fidei qui sunt supra rationem. Reply Sed Contra 3: The commandments of the Decalogue deal with things that are dictated by natural reason. Therefore, everyone is required to know them explicitly. A similar argument cannot be used for the articles of faith, which are above reason. Ad quartum dicendum quod diligere non distinguitur per implicite et explicite nisi quatenus dilectio fidem sequitur eo quod dilectio terminatur ad rem ipsam quae est extra animam quae in particulari subsistit, cognitio vero terminatur ad id quod est in apprehensione animae quae potest apprehendere aliquid vel in universali vel in particulari; et ideo non est simile de fide et caritate. Reply Sed Contra 4: Love is distinguished into implicit and explicit only in so far as it follows faith. For love terminates at some individual thing existing outside the soul, whereas knowledge terminates at that which is within the perception of the soul, which can perceive something in general or in particular. Therefore, faith and charity do not work in the same way. Ad quintum dicendum quod aliquis simplex qui accusatur de haeresi, non examinatur de omnibus articulis quia teneatur omnes explicite credere, sed quia tenetur non assentire pertinaciter contrario alicuius articulorum. Reply Sed Contra 5: An uneducated person who is accused of heresy is not examined on all the articles of faith because he must believe them all explicitly, but because he must not obstinately maintain the opposite of any of the articles. Ad sextum dicendum quod non est propter differentiam ex habitu fidei explicite credere quae aliis sufficit implicite credere, sed propter officium diversum; nam ille qui ponitur ut doctor fidei debet explicite nosse ea quae debet vel tenetur docere, et secundum quod est altior in officio debet etiam perfectiorem scientiam habere de his quae sunt fidei. Reply Sed Contra 6: That some of the faithful must believe explicitly what others have to believe only implicitly does not come from a difference in the habit of faith, but from different duties. For one who is made a teacher of the faith should know explicitly those things which he must or ought to teach. And the higher his position is, the more perfect a knowledge of matters of faith he should have. Ad septimum dicendum quod minores non habent fidem implicitam in fide aliquorum hominum particularium, sed in fide Ecclesiae quae non potest esse informis. Et praeterea unus non dicitur habere fidem implicitam in fide alterius propter hoc quod conveniat in modo credendi formate vel informiter, sed propter convenientiam in credito. Reply Sed Contra 7: Ordinary people do not have implicit faith in the faith of some particular men, but in the faith of the Church, which cannot be formless. Furthermore, one is said to have implicit faith in the faith of another, because of an agreement in belief, and not because they have the same mode of informed or formless faith. Articulus 12 Article 12 Utrum una sit fides modernorum et antiquorum Whether there is one faith for moderns and ancients Duodecimo quaeritur utrum una sit fides modernorum et antiquorum. Twelfth, it is asked whether there is one faith for moderns and ancients? Et videtur quod non: scientia enim universalis differt a scientia particulari; sed antiqui cognoscebant ea quae sunt fidei quasi in universali implicite credentes, moderni autem in particulari credentes explicite; ergo non est eadem fides modernorum et antiquorum. Obj. 1: It seems that there is not, for universal knowledge differs from particular knowledge. But the ancients knew the matters of faith as it were in general, believing them implicitly, whereas moderns believe them explicitly and in particular. Therefore, the faith of the ancients and moderns is not the same. Praeterea, fides est de enuntiabili; sed non sunt eadem enuntiabilia quae nos credimus et illi crediderunt, ut Christum nasciturum et Christum natum; ergo non est eadem fides nostra et antiquorum. Obj. 2: Faith concerns a proposition. But the propositions which we believe are not the same as the ones they believed, as, for instance, Christ will be born, and Christ has been born. Therefore, our faith is not the same as that of the ancients. Praeterea, determinatum tempus in his quae sunt fidei est de necessariis ad credendum: aliquis enim infidelis reputatur ex hoc quod credit Christum nondum venisse sed esse venturum; sed in fide nostra et antiquorum sunt tempora variata: nos enim credimus de praeterito quod ipsi credebant de futuro; ergo non est eadem fides nostra et antiquorum. Obj. 3: In matters of faith a definite time is a necessary element of belief. Thus, a man would be called an unbeliever if he believed that Christ had not yet come, but would come. But there is temporal variation in our faith and that of the ancients, for we believe about the past what they believed about the future. Hence, our faith and that of the ancients is not the same. Sed contra, Eph. 4:5 unus Dominus, una fides. On the contrary, in Ephesians 4:5 we read: one Lord, one faith, one baptism. Responsio. Dicendum quod hoc pro firmo est tenendum, unam esse fidem antiquorum et modernorum; alias non esset una Ecclesia. I answer that we must firmly hold that there is one faith for ancients and moderns; otherwise, there would not be one Church. Ad hoc autem sustinendum quidam dixerunt esse idem enuntiabile de praeterito quod nos credimus et de futuro quod antiqui crediderunt; sed hoc non videtur esse conveniens ut variatis essentialibus compositionis partibus eadem compositio maneat; videmus etiam compositiones per alia accidentia verbi et nominis variari. Unde alii dixerunt quod enuntiabilia sunt diversa quae nos credimus et illi crediderunt, sed fides non est de enuntiabili sed de re; res autem est eadem quamvis enuntiabilia sint diversa: dicunt enim quod hoc per se competit fidei ut credat Resurrectionem Christi, sed hoc est quasi accidentale ut credat eam esse vel fuisse. Sed hoc etiam falsum apparet quia credere, cum dicat assensum, non potest esse nisi de compositione in qua verum et falsum invenitur; unde cum dico "credo Resurrectionem", oportet intelligi aliquam compositionem et hoc secundum aliquod tempus quod anima semper adiungit in dividendo et componendo, ut dicitur in 3 De anima, ut scilicet sensus (sit) "credo Resurrectionem", id est credo Resurrectionem esse vel fuisse vel futuram esse. To support this position some have said that the proposition about the past which we believe and the one about the future which the ancients believed is the same proposition. But it does not seem right that the proposition should remain the same when its essential parts are changed. For we see that propositions are changed by reason of changes in the subject and verb. For this reason, others have said that the propositions which we believe and which they believed are different, but that faith does not concern propositions but things. The thing, however, is the same, although the propositions are different. For they say that it belongs intrinsically to faith to believe in the Resurrection of Christ, but only accidentally to faith to believe that it is or was. But this is obviously false, for, since belief is called assent, it can only be about a proposition, in which truth or falsity is found. Thus, when I say: “I believe in the Resurrection,” I must understand some union [of subject and predicate]. And I must do this with reference to some time which the soul always adds in affirmative and negative propositions, as is said in On the Soul. Accordingly, the sense of “I believe in the Resurrection” is this: “I believe that the Resurrection is, was, or will be.” Et ideo dicendum est quod obiectum fidei dupliciter potest considerari: vel secundum se, prout est extra animam, et sic proprie habet rationem obiecti et ab eo accipit habitus multitudinem vel unitatem; vel secundum quod est participatum in cognoscente. Dicendum est igitur quod, si accipiatur id quod est obiectum fidei, scilicet res credita, prout est extra animam, sic est una quae refertur ad nos et antiquos, et ideo ex eius unitate fides unitatem recipit; si autem consideretur secundum quod est in acceptione nostra, sic plurificatur per diversa enuntiabilia, sed ab hac diversitate non diversificatur fides. Unde patet quod fides omnibus modis est una. Therefore, we must say that the object of faith can be considered in two ways. First, we have the object in itself as it exists outside the soul. And it is properly in this sense that it has the character of object and is the reason why habits are one or many. Second, we have the object as it exists in the knower as participated by him. Accordingly, we have to say that, if we take as the object of faith the thing believed as it exists outside the soul, it is in this way that each thing is related to us and to the ancients. And faith gets its unity from the oneness of the object. However, if we consider faith as it is in our perception of it, it is multiplied according to different propositions. But faith is not differentiated by this diversity. From this it is evident that faith is one in every way. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod scire in universali et in particulari non diversificat scientiam nisi quantum ad modum sciendi, non autem quantum ad rem scitam qua habitus habet unitatem. Reply Obj. 1: To know in general and in particular differentiates knowledge only with reference to the manner of knowing, not with reference to the thing known, from which the habit has its unity. Ad secundum patet responsio ex dictis. Reply Obj. 2: The answer to the second difficulty is clear from what has been said. Ad tertium dicendum quod tempus non variatur secundum quod est in re, sed secundum diversum ordinem ad nos vel ad illos: unum enim est tempus in quo Christus passus fuit, sed secundum diversos respectus ad aliquos dicitur praeteritum vel futurum, respectu praecedentium vel sequentium. Reply Obj. 3: Time does not change because of something in the thing, but because of relation to us or the ancients. For there is one time in which Christ suffered. Under different aspects it is called past or future for some people in comparison with things which precede or follow. Quaestio 15 Question 15 De ratione superiori et inferiori On higher and lower reason Primo utrum intellectus et ratio sint diversae potentiae in homine. 1. Whether understanding and reason are different powers in man? Secundo utrum ratio superior et inferior sint diversae potentiae. 2. Whether higher and lower reason are different powers? Tertio utrum in ratione superiori vel inferiori possit esse peccatum. 3. Whether sin can exist in higher or lower reason? Quarto utrum delectatio morosa sit peccatum mortale. 4. Whether deliberate pleasure in bad thoughts (delectatio morosa), which exists in the lower part of reason through consent to the pleasure but without consent to the deed, is a mortal sin?