Ad quintum dicendum, quod ex illo argumento non concluditur quod conscientia erronea non liget ad peccatum si non impleatur; sed quod si impleatur, excusat a peccato. Unde non est ad propositum. Concludit autem verum, quando ipse error non est peccatum: utpote cum contingit ex ignorantia facti. Si autem ex ignorantia iuris, sic non concludit, quia ipsa ignorantia peccatum est; sic enim etiam apud saecularem iudicem non excusatur qui ignorantiam legis quam scire debet, allegat. Reply Obj. 5: We do not conclude from that argument that a false conscience does not bind under pain of sin if it is not followed, but that, if it is followed, it excuses from sin. Consequently, the argument is not to the point. When the error itself is not a sin, the conclusion is true, as when the error is due to ignorance of some fact. But, if it is ignorance of a law, the conclusion is wrong because the ignorance itself is a sin. For before a civil judge, also, one who thus appeals to ignorance of a law which he should know is not excused. Ad sextum dicendum, quod licet in ratione naturali sit unde possit procedi ad contrarium eius quod erronea conscientia dictat, sive sit error circa indifferentia, sive circa per se mala; tamen actu naturalis ratio non dictat; si enim dictaret contrarium, non erraret conscientia. Reply Obj. 6: Although in natural reason there is a basis for proceeding to the opposite of that which a false conscience dictates, whether the mistake is about indifferent things or things intrinsically evil, natural reason does not actually dictate the opposite. For, if it did dictate the opposite, conscience would not be mistaken. Ad septimum dicendum, quod quamvis opus indifferens, quantum in se est, ad utrumlibet se habeat; tamen huic qui exstimat hoc opus cadere sub praecepto, efficitur non indifferens propter suam aestimationem. Reply Obj. 7: Although an indifferent action, in so far as the act itself is concerned, can be accepted or rejected, still, when one thinks that such an action has been commanded, it loses its indifference because of his judgment. Ad octavum dicendum, quod ille qui habet conscientiam faciendi fornicationem, non est simpliciter perplexus, quia potest aliquid facere quo facto non incidet in peccatum, scilicet conscientiam erroneam deponere; sed est perplexus secundum quid, scilicet conscientia erronea manente. Et hoc non est inconveniens, ut aliquo supposito, homo peccatum vitare non possit; sicut supposita intentione inanis gloriae, ille qui tenetur eleemosynam dare, peccatum evitare non potest: si enim dat ex tali intentione, peccat; si vero non dat, transgressor est. Reply Obj. 8: One whose conscience tells him to commit fornication is not completely perplexed, because he can do something by which he can avoid sin, namely, change the false conscience. But he is perplexed to some degree, that is, as long as the false conscience remains. And there is no difficulty in saying that, if some condition is presupposed, it is impossible for a man to avoid sin; just as, if we presuppose the intention of vainglory, one who is required to give alms cannot avoid sin. For, if he gives alms, because of such an intention, he sins; but, if he does not give alms, he violates the law. Ad nonum dicendum, quod quando conscientia erronea dictat aliquid faciendum, dictat illud sub aliqua ratione boni, vel quasi opus iustitiae, vel quasi temperantiae, et sic de aliis; et ideo transgressor incurrit in vitium contrarium illi virtuti sub cuius specie conscientia illud dictat. Vel si dictat illud sub specie divini praecepti, vel alicuius praelati tantum, incurret peccatum inobedientiae conscientiam transgrediens. Reply Obj. 9: When a false conscience says that something must be done, it commands this under some aspect of good, either as a work of justice, or temperance, and so forth. Therefore, one who acts against such a conscience falls into the vice opposed to the virtue to which his conscience thinks it belongs when commanding it. Or, if such a conscience orders something under the guise of a command of God, or only of some superior, he commits the sin of disobedience by going against it. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum conscientia erronea in indifferentibus plus liget quam praeceptum praelati, vel minus Whether conscience in indifferent matters can bind more than the command of a superior, or less Quinto quaeritur utrum conscientia erronea in indifferentibus plus liget quam praeceptum praelati, vel minus. In the fifth article we ask: does conscience in indifferent matters bind more than the command of a superior, or less? Et videtur quod minus. Subditus enim religiosus vovit oboedire praelato suo. Sed tenetur votum reddere ut in Psal. dicitur: vovete et reddite. Ergo videtur quod tenetur praelato obedire contra conscientiam; et ita magis praelato quam conscientiae. Obj. 1: It seems to bind less, for a religious subject vows obedience to his superior. But he is required to keep his vow, as is said in Psalm 76:11: vow ye, and pay [them] to the Lord your God. Therefore, one seems to be obliged to obey a superior against his own conscience, and, thus, one is more obliged to obey a superior than conscience. Praeterea, praelato semper est obediendum in his quae non sunt contra Deum. Sed indifferentia non sunt contra Deum. Ergo in his tenetur obedire praelato; et sic idem quod prius. Obj. 2: A superior must always be obeyed in things which are not against God’s will. But indifferent things are not against God’s will. Therefore, one is obliged to obey a superior in these matters. We conclude as before. Praeterea, potestati superiori magis est obediendum quam inferiori, ut habetur in Glossa, Rom. XIII, 2. Sed anima praelati est superior quam anima subditi. Ergo magis ligatur subditus ex imperio praelati quam ex conscientia propria. Obj. 3: The higher power should be more obeyed than the lower power, as the Gloss says. But the soul of a prelate is higher than the soul of a subject. Therefore, the subject is bound more by the command of the superior than by his own conscience. Praeterea, subditus non debet iudicare de praecepto praelati, sed magis praelatus de actibus subditi. Iudicaret autem subditus de praelati praecepto, si propter suam conscientiam ab eius praecepto recederet. Ergo quantumcumque conscientia contrarium dictet in indifferentibus, magis est praelati praecepto standum. Obj. 4: A subject should not pass judgment on the command of a superior, but the superior should judge the acts of the subject. But the subject would judge the command of the superior if he refused the command because of his own conscience. Therefore, no matter what conscience dictates in indifferent matters, the command of the superior should prevail. Sed contra. Vinculum spirituale fortius est quam corporale, et intrinsecum quam extrinsecum. Sed conscientia est vinculum spirituale intrinsecum, praelatio autem est vinculum extrinsecum et corporale, ut videtur, quia secundum temporalem dispensationem omnis praelatio agitur; unde, cum ad aeternitatem ventum fuerit, evacuabitur, ut habetur ex Glossa, I Cor. XV, 24. Ergo, videtur quod magis est obediendum conscientiae quam praelato. On the contrary: A spiritual bond is stronger than a physical bond, and an intrinsic bond stronger than an extrinsic bond. But conscience is an intrinsic spiritual bond, whereas the office of the superior is physical and extrinsic, as it seems, because all his authority is based on a dispensation which is limited to time. Hence, when we reach eternity, it will cease, as the Gloss indicates. Therefore, it seems that one should obey his conscience rather than a superior. Responsio. Dicendum, quod huius quaestionis solutio satis ex his quae dicta sunt, potest apparere. Dictum est enim supra, quod conscientia non ligat nisi in vi praecepti divini, vel secundum legem scriptam, vel secundum legem naturae inditi. Comparare igitur ligamen conscientiae ad ligamen quod est ex praecepto praelati, nihil est aliud quam comparare ligamen praecepti divini ad ligamen praecepti praelati. Unde, cum praeceptum divinum obliget contra praeceptum praelati, et magis obliget quam praeceptum praelati: etiam conscientiae ligamen erit maius quam ligamen praecepti praelati, et conscientia ligabit, etiam praecepto praelati in contrarium existente. I answer that: the answer to this question is clear enough from what has been said. For it has been mentioned above that conscience binds only in virtue of a divine command, either in written law or in the law inherent in our nature. Therefore, to compare the bond of conscience with the bond resulting from the command of a superior is nothing else than to compare the bond of a divine command with the bond of a superior’s command. Consequently, since the bond of a divine command binds against a command of a superior, and is more binding than the command of a superior, the bond of conscience is also greater than that of the command of a superior. And conscience will bind even when there exists a command of a superior to the contrary. Tamen hoc diversimode se habet in conscientia recta et erronea. Conscientia enim recta simpliciter et perfecte contra praeceptum praelati obligat. Simpliciter quidem, quia eius obligatio auferri non potest, cum talis conscientia sine peccato deponi non possit. Perfecte autem, quia conscientia recta non solum hoc modo ligat, ut ille qui eam non sequitur peccatum incurrat, sed etiam ut ille qui eam sequitur sit immunis a peccato quantumcumque praeceptum praelati sit in contrarium. Sed conscientia erronea ligat contra praeceptum praelati etiam in indifferentibus secundum quid et imperfecte. Secundum quid quidem, quia non obligat in omnem eventum, sed sub conditione suae durationis: potest enim aliquis et debet talem conscientiam deponere. Imperfecte autem, quia ligat quantum ad hoc quod ille qui eam non sequitur, peccatum incurrit; non autem quantum ad hoc quod ille qui eam sequitur, peccatum evitet, cum praeceptum praelati est in contrarium, si tamen ad illud indifferens praeceptum praelati obliget: in tali enim casu peccat, sive non faciat, quia contra conscientiam agit, sive faciat, quia praelato inobediens est. Magis autem peccat si non faciat, conscientia durante, quod conscientia dictat; cum plus liget quam praeceptum praelati. Nevertheless, the situation is not the same in the case of a correct conscience and that of a false conscience. For a correct conscience binds absolutely and perfectly against the command of a superior. It binds absolutely, because one cannot be freed from its obligation, for such a conscience cannot be changed without sin. And it binds perfectly, because a correct conscience binds in the sense not only that one who follows it does not commit sin, but also that he is free from sin, no matter what command of a superior there is to the contrary. But a false conscience binds against the command of a superior even in indifferent matters with some qualification and imperfectly. It binds with some qualification, because it does not bind in every event, but on condition that it endures. For one can and should change such a conscience. It binds imperfectly, because it binds in the sense that the one who follows it does not commit a sin, but not in the sense that one who follows it avoids sin when there is a command of a superior to the contrary, and the command of the superior still binds to that indifferent thing. For in such a case he sins in not acting, because he acts against his conscience, and in acting, because he disobeys the superior. However, he sins more if he does not do what his conscience dictates, as long as that conscience remains, since it binds more than the precept of the superior. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod ille qui vovit obedientiam, tenetur obedire in his ad quae bonum obedientiae se extendit; nec ab ista obligatione absolvitur per errorem conscientiae, nec iterum a conscientiae absolvitur ligamine per istam obligationem: et ita manet in eo duplex contraria obligatio. Quarum una, scilicet quae est ex conscientia, est maior, quia intensior; minor vero quia solubilior; alia vero e contrario. Obligatio enim illa quae est ad praelatum, solvi non potest, sicut conscientia erronea potest deponi. Reply Obj. 1: One who vows obedience must obey in those things to which the vow of obedience extends. He is not freed from that obligation by a mistake of conscience, nor, on the other hand, is he freed from the bond of conscience by that obligation. Thus, there remain in him two opposite obligations. One of these, conscience, is greater, because more intense, and less, because more easily removed; the other is just the opposite. For the obligation to obey the superior cannot be removed, whereas a false conscience can be changed. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quamvis opus illud per se sit indifferens, tamen ex dictamine conscientiae fit non indifferens. Reply Obj. 2: Although of itself the work is indifferent, it loses its indifference because of the dictate of conscience. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis praelatus sit superior subdito, tamen Deus, sub cuius praecepti specie conscientia ligat, est maior quam praelatus. Reply Obj. 3: Although a superior is higher than a subject, God, in virtue of whose command conscience binds, is greater than the superior. Ad quartum dicendum, quod subditus, non habet iudicare de praecepto praelati, sed de impletione praecepti, quae ad ipsum spectat. Unusquisque enim tenetur actus suos examinare ad scientiam quam a Deo habet, sive sit naturalis, sive acquisita, sive infusa: omnis enim homo debet secundum rationem agere. Reply Obj. 4: The subject does not have the place to judge about the command of the superior, but only about its fulfillment, which is his concern. For each is bound to examine his actions according to the knowledge he has from God, whether natural, acquired, or infused. For every man should act according to reason. Quaestio 18 Question 18 De cognitione primi hominis in statu innocentiae On the knowledge of the first man in the state of innocence Primo utrum homo in statu innocentiae cognoverit Deum per essentiam. 1. Whether man in the state of innocence knew God through his essence? Secundo utrum homo in statu innocentiae Deum per creaturas viderit. 2. Whether man in the state of innocence saw God through creatures? Tertio utrum Adam in statu innocentiae fidem de Deo habuerit. 3. Whether Adam in the state of innocence had faith about God? Quarto utrum Adam in statu innocentiae habuerit omnium creaturarum notitiam. 4. Whether Adam in the state of innocence had knowledge of all creatures? Quinto utrum Adam in statu innocentiae angelos per essentiam viderit. 5. Whether Adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence? Sexto utrum Adam in statu innocentiae errare sive decipi potuerit. 6. Whether Adam in the state of innocence could be mistaken or deceived? Septimo utrum pueri qui ex Adam in statu innocentiae nascerentur, plenam rerum omnium scientiam haberent, sicut et Adam habuit. 7. Whether the children who were born of Adam in the state of innocence had full knowledge of all things, as Adam did? Octavo utrum pueri mox nati in statu innocentiae usum rationis plenarie habuissent. 8. Whether in the state of innocence, children have the full use of reason immediately at birth? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum in statu illo cognoverit Deum per essentiam Whether man in the state of innocence knew God through his essence Quaestio est de cognitione primi hominis in statu innocentiae. Et primo quaeritur utrum in statu illo cognoverit Deum per essentiam. The question concerns the knowledge of the first man in the state of innocence, and in the first article we ask: did man in that state know God through his essence? Et videtur quod sic. Dicit enim Magister in IV Sententiarum dist. 1, quod homo ante peccatum Deum sine medio vidit. Sed videre Deum sine medio, est videre per essentiam. Ergo in statu innocentiae vidit Deum per essentiam. Obj. 1: It seems that he did, for the Master says: before sin, man saw God independently of any medium. But to see God independently of any medium is to see God through his essence. Therefore in the state of innocence man saw God through his essence. Sed dicebat, quod Magister intelligit quod vidit Deum sine medio quoad nubilum culpae, non autem sine medio creaturae. Obj. 2: It was said that the Master means that man saw God without a medium as far as obscurity due to sin is concerned, but not that he saw God without using creatures as a medium. Sed contra est quod Magister ibidem dicit, quod quia nos per medium Deum videmus, oportet quod ex visibilibus creaturis in ipsum deveniamus. Ergo videtur quod intelligat de medio creaturae. Sed videre sine medio creaturae, est videre per essentiam. Ergo et cetera. On the contrary, in that same place the Master says that, since we see God through a medium, we must reach him by means of visible creatures. Therefore, he seems to mean the use of creatures as a medium. But to see without the use of creatures as a medium is to see through the essence. Therefore. Praeterea, Phil. IV, 7 dicitur: pax Dei quae exsuperat omnem sensum, hoc — secundum quod intelligitur de pace quam Deus facit in beatis in patria — Glosa ibid. sic exponit: omnem sensum, idest intellectum nostrum, non eorum qui semper vident faciem patris. Ex quo haberi potest quod pax sive gaudium beatorum excedit intellectum omnis illius qui gaudio illo non perfruitur. Sed Adam in statu innocentiae gaudia beatorum vidit: unde dicit Gregorius, IV Dialogorum: homo peccando extra semet ipsum fusus iam illa caelestis patriae gaudia quae prius contemplari solebat, videre non poterat. Ergo Adam in illo statu gaudio caelestis patriae fruebatur. Obj. 3: In Philippians 4:7 it is said: and the peace of God, which surpasses all understanding. But this means the peace which God gives the blessed in heaven. The Gloss explains it in this way: all understanding, that is, our understanding, not the understanding of those who always see the face of the Father. From this we see that the peace or joy of the blessed surpasses the understanding of all those who do not possess that joy. But Adam in his innocence saw the joys of the blessed. Hence, Gregory says: man, losing himself by sin, could not then see those joys of heaven which he was accustomed to contemplate before. Therefore, in that state Adam possessed the joy of heaven.