Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum in Deo sit scientia Whether there is knowledge in God Quaestio est de scientia Dei. Et primo quaeritur utrum in Deo sit scientia. This question treats of knowledge, and in the first article we ask: is there knowledge in God? Et videtur quod non. Illud enim quod se habet ex additione ad aliud, in simplicissimo inveniri non potest. Sed Deus est simplicissimus. Cum ergo scientia se habeat ex additione ad essentiam, quia vivere addit supra esse, et scire supra vivere, videtur quod scientia in Deo non sit. Obj. 1: It seems not, for that which is had by an addition to another cannot be found in a most simple being, and God is most simple. Therefore, since knowledge is had by an addition to the essence—for life adds something to the act of existence and knowledge adds something to life—it seems that knowledge is not in God. Sed dicebat, quod scientia in Deo supra essentiam non addit; sed nomine scientiae alia perfectio ostenditur in ipso quam nomine essentiae. Obj. 2: The answer was given that knowledge does not add anything to God’s essence, since knowledge merely indicates a perfection God has that is not indicated by essence. Sed contra, perfectio est nomen rei. Sed omnino una res est in Deo scientia et essentia. Ergo eadem perfectio ostenditur nomine scientiae et essentiae. On the contrary, perfection is the name of a thing. But in God, essence and knowledge are absolutely one thing. The same perfection, therefore, is indicated by both words, essence and knowledge. Praeterea, nullum nomen potest dici de Deo quod non significat totam perfectionem ipsius: quia si non significat totam, nihil ipsius significat, cum in Deo non inveniatur pars; et sic ei attribui non potest. Sed nomen scientiae non repraesentat totam perfectionem divinam, quia Deus est supra omne nomen quod nominatur, ut dicitur in lib. De causis. Ergo scientia Deo attribui non potest. Obj. 3: No noun can be used of God which does not signify the entire divine perfection; for if it does not signify his entire perfection, it signifies nothing about him, since parts are not found in God and cannot be attributed to him. Now, knowledge does not represent his entire perfection, for God is above all names which name him, as is stated in On the Causes. Therefore, knowledge cannot be attributed to him. Praeterea, scientia est habitus conclusionis, intellectus vero habitus principiorum, ut patet per philosophum in VI Ethic. Sed Deus non cognoscit aliquid per modum conclusionis: quia sic discurreret a principiis in conclusiones eius intellectus: quod etiam ab angelis Dionysius removet VII cap. De divinis nominibus; ergo scientia non est in Deo. Obj. 4: Moreover, science is the habit of conclusions, and understanding, the habit of principles—as is clear from what the Philosopher says. But God does not know anything as a conclusion: for this would mean that his intellect would proceed from premises to conclusions, though, as Dionysius has shown, this is not true even for the angels. Hence, science is not in God. Praeterea, omne quod scitur, scitur per aliquid magis notum. Sed Deo non est aliquid magis et minus notum. Ergo in Deo scientia esse non potest. Obj. 5: Whatever is known scientifically is known through something more known. For God, however, there is not anything more known or less known. Therefore, scientific knowledge cannot be in God. Praeterea, Algazel dicit, quod scientia est sigillatio scibilis in intellectu scientis. Sed sigillatio omnino a Deo removetur; tum quia importat receptionem, tum quia importat compositionem. Ergo Deo scientia attribui non potest. Obj. 6: Algazel says that knowledge is an impression of the known in the intellect of the knower. But an impression is entirely alien to God, for it implies receptivity and composition. Therefore, knowledge cannot be attributed to God. Praeterea, nihil quod sonat in imperfectionem, Deo potest attribui. Sed scientia sonat in imperfectionem: quia significatur ut habitus vel actus primus, et considerare ut actus secundus, ut dicitur in II De anima. Actus autem primus est imperfectus respectu secundi, cum sit in potentia respectu eiusdem. Ergo scientia in Deo inveniri non potest. Obj. 7: Nothing implying imperfection can be attributed to God. But knowledge implies imperfection, for it is regarded as a habit or first act—the operation of considering being regarded as second act, as is stated in On the Soul. But a first act is imperfect with respect to the second since it is in potency to the second. Therefore, knowledge cannot be in God. Sed dicebat, quod in Deo non est scientia nisi actu. Obj. 8: The answer was that there is only actual knowledge in God. Sed contra, scientia Dei est causa rerum. Sed scientia, si Deo attribuitur, ab aeterno in eo fuit. Si ergo scientia in Deo non fuit nisi in actu, ab aeterno res produxit in esse; quod est falsum. On the contrary, God’s knowledge is the cause of things. Therefore, if knowledge is attributed to God, it existed eternally in him; and if only actual knowledge is in God, he produced things from all eternity. This is false. Praeterea, in quocumque invenitur aliquid respondens ei quod nos concipimus ex nomine scientiae in intellectu, scimus de eo non solum quia est, sed etiam quid est, quia scientia aliquid est. Sed de Deo non possumus scire quid est, sed quia est tantum, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo conceptioni intellectus quam exprimit nomen scientiae, nihil respondet in Deo; ergo scientia non est in eo. Obj. 9: Whenever there is anything which corresponds to the concept we have of the word knowledge, of it we know not only that it is but also what it is, for knowledge is a distinct reality. But, as Damascene says, we cannot know what God is, but only that he is. Therefore, in God there is nothing corresponding to our concept expressed by knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, does not exist in God. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, quod Deus, qui subterfugit omnem formam, intellectui pervius esse non potest. Sed scientia est quaedam forma, quam intellectus concipit. Ergo hanc formam Deus subterfugit; non ergo scientia est in Deo. Obj. 10: Augustine states that God is not accessible to the intellect since he eludes every form. But knowledge is a form which the intellect conceives. Hence, God also eludes this form, and so there cannot be knowledge in God. Praeterea, intelligere est simplicius quam scire, et dignius. Sed, sicut dicitur in lib. De causis, cum dicimus Deum intelligentem, vel intelligentiam, non nominamus eum nomine proprio, sed nomine causati sui primi. Ergo multo fortius nomen scientiae Deo competere non potest. Obj. 11: To understand is more simple and of greater dignity than to know. But as stated in On the Causes, when we say that God understands or is an intelligence, we are not naming him with a proper noun but with the name of his first effect. Much less, then, can we use knowledge of God. Praeterea, qualitas maiorem compositionem importat quam quantitas, quia qualitas non inhaeret substantiae nisi mediante quantitate. Sed Deo non attribuimus aliquid quod sit in genere quantitatis, propter suam simplicitatem; omne enim quantum habet partes. Ergo, cum scientia sit in genere qualitatis, nullo modo debet ei attribui. Obj. 12: Quality implies a greater composition than quantity does, for quality inheres in a substance by means of quantity. We do not attribute anything of the genus of quantity to God because of his simplicity, for everything quantified has parts. Hence, since knowledge is in the genus of quality, it cannot be attributed to God. Sed contra. Est quod dicitur Rom. XI, 33: o altitudo divitiarum sapientiae, et scientiae Dei et cetera. On the contrary (1): The epistle to the Romans 11:33 says: o the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! Praeterea, secundum Anselmum in Monologio, omne quod simpliciter in omni melius est esse, quam non esse, Deo est attribuendum. Sed scientia est huiusmodi; ergo est Deo attribuenda. Furthermore (2): According to Anselm, we must attribute to God everything which in each thing it is better absolutely to have than not to have. Since knowledge is a perfection of this kind, it must be attributed to God. Praeterea, ad scientiam non requiruntur nisi tria: scilicet potentia activa cognoscentis, qua de rebus iudicat, res cognita, et unio utriusque. Sed in Deo est summa potentia activa, et sua essentia est summe cognoscibilis, et per consequens est ibi unio utriusque. Ergo Deus est summe sciens. Probatio mediae. Ut dicitur in lib. De intelligentiis, prima substantia est lux. Sed lux maxime habet virtutem activam, quod patet ex hoc quod seipsam diffundit et multiplicat; est etiam maxime cognoscibilis, unde et alia manifestat. Ergo substantia prima, quae Deus est, et habet potentiam activam ad cognoscendum, et est cognoscibilis. Furthermore (3): Only three things are required for knowledge: an active power in the knower by which he judges about things, a thing known, and the union of both. But in God there is the most active power possible and an essence that is most knowable; consequently, there is a union of both. God, therefore, knows in the highest degree. Our proof of the minor premise is drawn from the fact mentioned in the Intelligences, namely: the first substance is light. But light has active power most of all, as is shown from its diffusion and multiplication. It is, besides, highly knowable and, because of this, also makes other things known. Therefore, the first substance, God, has an active power to know and is himself also knowable. Responsio. Dicendum, quod ab omnibus scientia Deo attribuitur; diversimode tamen. Quidam enim suo intellectu modum creatae scientiae transcendere non valentes, crediderunt quod scientia sit in Deo quasi aliqua dispositio addita essentiae eius, sicut et in nobis est; quod est omnino erroneum et absurdum. Hoc enim posito, Deus summe simplex non esset; esset enim in eo compositio substantiae et accidentis; nec iterum ipse Deus esset suum esse: quia, ut dicit Boetius in libro de hebdomadibus, quod est, participare aliquo potest, sed ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo participat. Si ergo Deus participaret scientiam quasi dispositionem adiunctam, ipse non esset suum esse, et ita ab alio esse haberet, quod esset sibi causa essendi; et sic non esset Deus. I answer that: all attribute knowledge to God, but in different ways. Some, not being able by their own intellectual power to go beyond the manner of created knowledge, have believed that knowledge is in God like some sort of disposition added to his essence, as is the case with us. This is quite absurd and erroneous. For, if it were true, God would not be absolutely simple. There would be in him a composition of substance and accident, and, further, God would not be his own act of existence; for, as Boethius says: what exists can share in something else, but existence itself in no way shares in anything else. If God shared in knowledge as if it were a state added to his essence, he would not be his own act of existence, and, thus, he would have his origin from another who would be the cause of his existence. In short, he would not be God. Et ideo alii dixerunt, quod per hoc quod Deo scientiam attribuimus, vel aliquid huiusmodi, nihil in eo ponimus; sed significamus eum esse causam scientiae in rebus creatis: ut ex hoc dicatur Deus sciens, quia scientiam creaturis infundit. Sed quamvis haec possit esse aliqua ratio veritatis huius propositionis, qua dicitur: Deus est sciens, quia scientiam causat, ut Origenes et Augustinus dicere videntur; non tamen potest esse tota ratio veritatis, propter duo. Primo, quia eadem ratione de Deo praedicari posset quidquid in rebus causat, ut diceretur moveri, quia causat motum in rebus; quod tamen non dicitur. Secundo, quia ea quae dicuntur de causatis et causis, non ex hoc causis inesse dicuntur scilicet propter causata; sed magis causatis insunt propter hoc quod inveniuntur in causis: sicut ex hoc quod ignis est calidus, caliditatem aeri influit, et non e converso. Et similiter Deus ex hoc quod naturam scientificam habet, scientiam nobis infundit, et non e converso. For this reason others have asserted that, when we attribute knowledge or something of the same sort to God, we postulate nothing positive in him but merely designate him as the cause of knowledge in created things. In other words, God is said to be a knower merely because he communicates knowledge to creatures. Although a partial reason for the truth of the proposition “God is a knower” may be that he causes truth, and Origen and Augustine seem to say this, it is not the whole truth for two reasons. First, by the same reasoning we should have to predicate of God whatever he causes in creatures, and so we should have to say that he moves since he causes motion in things. This, of course, cannot be said. Second, those attributes which are predicated of both causes and effects are not said to be in the causes because of the effects. Rather, they are said to be in the effects because they are found in the causes. For example, because fire is hot, it induces heat into the air. The converse is not true. Similarly, because the nature of God is to have knowledge, he communicates knowledge to us, and not the other way about. Et ideo alii dixerunt, quod scientia et alia huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo per quamdam similitudinem proportionis, sicut attribuitur ei ira vel misericordia, aut huiusmodi ceterae passiones. Dicitur enim Deus iratus, in quantum facit effectum similem irato; quia punit, quod est effectus irae in nobis, quamvis in Deo passio irae esse non possit. Similiter dicunt, quod Deus dicitur sciens, quia effectum facit similem effectui scientis: sicut enim opera scientis procedunt ex determinatis principiis ad determinatos fines, ita opera naturae, quae divinitus fiunt, ut patet in II Physic. Sed secundum hanc opinionem, scientia attribueretur Deo metaphorice, sicut et ira, et cetera huiusmodi; quod dictis Dionysii et aliorum sanctorum repugnat. Still others have said that knowledge and the like are attributed to God in a certain proportionate likeness, as anger, mercy, and similar passions are attributed to him. For God is said to be angry in so far as he does something similar to what an angry man does, for he punishes. In us, this is the effect of anger. Properly speaking, of course, the passion of anger cannot be in God. In the same way, they say, God is said to be a knower because his effects resemble those of a knowing agent. For example, the works of one who has scientific knowledge proceed from determined principles to determined ends, and so do the divinely originated works of nature—as is clear from the Physics. But, according to this view, knowledge is attributed merely metaphorically to God, as are anger and other like things—an opinion contrary to the words of Dionysius and other saints. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod scientia Deo attributa, significat aliquid quod in Deo est, et similiter vita et essentia et cetera huiusmodi; nec differunt quantum ad rem significatam, sed solum quantum ad modum intelligendi. Eadem enim res penitus in Deo est essentia, vita, scientia et quidquid huiusmodi de ipso dicitur; sed intellectus noster diversas conceptiones habet intelligens in eo vitam, scientiam, et huiusmodi. Consequently, one must give another answer and say that, when knowledge is attributed to God, it signifies something which is in him. The same is true of life, essence, and the like. These attributes do not differ as regards the reality which is signified, but only in our manner of understanding them. For God’s essence, life, knowledge, and whatever else of this sort that may be predicated of him are all the same; but in understanding essence, life, and so forth in his regard, our intellect has different concepts for each. Nec tamen istae conceptiones sunt falsae; conceptio enim intellectus nostri secundum hoc vera est, prout repraesentat per quamdam assimilationem rem intellectam; alias enim falsa esset, si nihil subesset in re. Intellectus autem noster non hoc modo potest repraesentare per assimilationem Deum sicut repraesentat creaturas. Cum enim intelligit aliquam creaturam, concipit formam quamdam, quae est similitudo rei secundum totam perfectionem ipsius, et sic definit res intellectas; sed quia Deus in infinitum nostrum intellectum excedit, non potest forma per intellectum nostrum concepta repraesentare divinam essentiam complete, sed habet aliquam modicam imitationem eius; sicut etiam videmus in rebus quae sunt extra animam, quod quaelibet res imitatur aliquo modo Deum, sed imperfecte; unde et diversae res diversimode Deum imitantur, et secundum diversas formas repraesentant unam simplicem Dei formam, quia in illa forma perfecte unitur quidquid perfectionis distinctim et multipliciter in creaturis invenitur; sicut etiam omnes proprietates numerorum in unitate quodammodo praeexistunt, et omnes potestates ministrorum in regno aliquo uniuntur in potestate regis. Sed si esset aliqua res perfecte repraesentans Deum, non esset nisi una tantum, quia uno modo repraesentaret, et secundum unam formam; et ideo non est nisi unus filius, qui est perfecta imago patris. Similiter etiam intellectus noster secundum diversas conceptiones repraesentat divinam perfectionem, quia unaquaeque imperfecta est; si enim perfecta esset, esset una tantum, sicut est unum tantum verbum intellectus divini. Sunt ergo plures conceptiones in intellectu nostro repraesentantes essentiam divinam; unde essentia divina unicuique illarum respondet sicut res suae imagini imperfectae; et sic omnes illae conceptiones intellectus sunt verae, quamvis sint plures de re una (re). Et quia nomina non significant res nisi mediante intellectu, ut dicitur in I Periher.; ideo imponit plura nomina uni rei secundum diversos modos intelligendi, vel secundum diversas rationes, quod idem est; quibus tamen omnibus respondet aliquid in re. This does not mean that these concepts are false; for our intellectual conceptions are true inasmuch as they actually represent the thing known by a certain process of assimilation. Otherwise they would be false, that is, if they corresponded to nothing. Our intellect, however, cannot represent God in the same way that it represents creatures; for, when it knows a creature, it conceives a certain form which is the likeness of the thing according to its entire perfection; and in this manner defines the things understood. But since God infinitely exceeds the power of our intellect, any form we conceive cannot completely represent the divine essence, but merely has, in some small measure, an imitation of it. Similarly, extra-mental realities imitate it somewhat, but imperfectly. Hence, all different things imitate God in different ways; and, according to different forms, they represent the one simple form of God, since in his form are found perfectly united all the perfections that are found, distinct and multiple, among creatures. This is like the properties of numbers, which all, in a certain sense, pre-exist in unity, and like all the individual authorities of royal officials, which are all united in the authority of the king. If there were anything that could perfectly represent God, that thing would be unique, for it would represent him in one way and according to one form. For this reason, there is in God only one Son, who is the perfect image of the Father. Accordingly, our intellect represents the divine perfection by means of different conceptions, for each one of them is imperfect. If one were perfect, it would be the only one, just as there is only one Word in the divine intellect. There are, therefore, many conceptions in our intellect that represent the divine essence, and the divine intellect corresponds to each one of these as a thing corresponds to an imperfect image of itself. Thus, even though we have several intellectual conceptions about one thing, they are all true. Moreover, since names do not signify things without the mediation of the intellect, as is pointed out in Interpretation, the intellect applies several names to one thing according to the different ways in which it understands it, or, what comes to the same thing, according to different formal aspects. To all of these, however, there corresponds something in reality. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod scientia non se habet ex additione ad ens, nisi secundum quod intellectus accipit distinctim scientiam alicuius et essentiam eius; additio enim distinctionem praesupponit. Unde, cum in Deo non distinguatur scientia et essentia, ut ex dictis patet, nisi secundum modum intelligendi; nec scientia se habet in eo ex additione ad essentiam eius, nisi secundum modum intelligendi. Reply Obj. 1: Knowledge is not had by an addition to being, except in so far as our intellect grasps someone’s knowledge and essence as distinct; for addition presupposes distinction. In God, knowledge and essence are not really distinct, as is clear from our discussion. They are merely conceived in this way. Therefore, knowledge is not in God by an addition to his essence, except according to our way of understanding. Ad secundum dicendum, quod non potest vere dici, quod scientia in Deo significet aliam perfectionem quam essentiam, sed quod significatur per modum alterius perfectionis; secundum quod intellectus noster ex diversis conceptionibus quas de Deo habet, praedicta nomina imponit. Reply Obj. 2: One cannot correctly say that knowledge in God signifies a perfection other than his essence. It is merely signified as though it were another perfection, since our intellect applies to him the names referred to from the different concepts we have of him. Ad tertium dicendum, quod cum nomina sint signa intellectuum: secundum hoc se habet aliquod nomen ad totalitatem alicuius rei significandam, secundum quod se habet intellectus in intelligendo. Intellectus autem noster totum Deum intelligere potest sed non totaliter, totum quidem quia necesse est ut de ipso aut totum intelligatur, aut nihil, cum in eo non sit pars et totum; sed dico, non totaliter, quia non perfecte cognoscit ipsum, secundum quod ipse est in sui natura cognoscibilis; sicut ille qui hanc conclusionem diameter est asimeter costae, cognoscit probabiliter, ex hoc scilicet quod ab omnibus ita dicitur, non cognoscit eam totaliter, quia non pervenit ad perfectum modum cognitionis quo cognoscibilis est: quamvis totam cognoscat, nullam partem eius ignorans. Similiter ergo et nomina quae de Deo dicuntur, ipsum totum, sed non totaliter significant. Reply Obj. 3: Since names represent concepts, a name signifies the totality of a thing in direct proportion to the intellect’s understanding of it. Our intellect can understand the whole of God, but not wholly. With God, one must know the whole or nothing at all, since in him there is no question of part and whole. I say “not wholly,” however, since the intellect does not know him perfectly in so far as he is knowable by his very nature. Thus, our knowledge is like that of a man who knows with probability the conclusion, “the diameter is asymmetric to the side,” merely because all men assert it. He does not know this conclusion wholly, since he does not arrive at the perfect manner of knowing with which it is capable of being grasped. Yet he knows the entire conclusion and is ignorant of no part of it. So, too, the names which are applied to God signify the whole God, but not wholly. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quia illud quod in Deo est absque omni imperfectione, in creaturis cum aliquo defectu invenitur; propter hoc oportet ut si aliquid in creaturis inventum Deo attribuamus, separemus totum quod ad imperfectionem pertinet, ut solum maneat hoc quod perfectionis est, quia secundum hoc tantum creatura Deum imitatur. Dico igitur, quod scientia quae in nobis invenitur, habet quidem aliquid perfectionis, et aliquid imperfectionis. Ad perfectionem quidem eius pertinet certitudo ipsius, quia quod scitur, certitudinaliter cognoscitur; sed ad imperfectionem pertinet discursus intellectus a principiis in conclusiones, quarum est scientia; hic enim discursus non contingit nisi secundum quod intellectus cognoscens principia, cognoscit conclusiones in potentia tantum; si enim actu cognosceret, non esset ibi discursus; cum motus non sit nisi exitus de potentia ad actum. Dicitur igitur in Deo scientia ratione certitudinis de rebus cognitis, non autem ratione discursus praedicti, qui etiam nec in angelis invenitur, ut Dionysius dicit. Reply Obj. 4: What is in God without imperfection is found with some defect in creatures. Hence, if we attribute to God something found in creatures, we must entirely remove everything that smacks of imperfection so that only what is perfect will remain; for it is only according to its perfection that a creature imitates God. I point out, therefore, that our scientific knowledge contains both some perfection and some imperfection. Its certitude pertains to its perfection, for what is known scientifically is known with certainty. To its imperfection belongs its progression from principles to the conclusions contained in that science; for this progression happens only because the intellect, in knowing the premises, knows the conclusions only potentially. If it actually knew the conclusions, there would be no need of it to go further, since motion is simply the passage from potency to act. Knowledge is said to be in God, therefore, because of its certitude about things known, but not because of the progression mentioned above, for, as Dionysius says, this is not found even in angels. Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis Deo non sit aliquid magis et minus notum si consideretur modus cognoscentis, quia eodem intuitu omnia videt, tamen si consideretur modus rei cognitae, Deus cognoscit quaedam esse magis cognoscibilia in seipsis et quaedam minus; sicut inter omnia maxime est cognoscibilis sua essentia, per quam quidem omnia cognoscit, non quidem aliquo discursu, cum simul videndo essentiam suam omnia videat. Unde etiam quantum ad istum ordinem qui potest attendi in divina cognitione ex parte cognitorum, etiam salvatur in Deo ratio scientiae; ipse enim praecipue omnia per causam cognoscit. Reply Obj. 5: If we take into consideration the manner proper to God as a knower, there is nothing more known or less known in God, because he sees all with the same intuition. If we consider the condition of the things known, however, he knows some to be more knowable in themselves and some less knowable; for example, of all the things he knows, the most knowable is his own essence, through which he knows everything—not by a progression, however, since by seeing his essence he simultaneously sees all things. If this order of things known in the divine cognition is considered, the notion of science can also be verified in God, for he knows all things principally in their Cause. Ad sextum dicendum, quod verbum illud Algazelis intelligendum est de scientia nostra, quae in nobis acquiritur per hoc quod res imprimunt similitudines suas in animas nostras; sed in cognitione Dei est e converso, quia ab eius intellectu effluunt formae in omnes creaturas; unde sicut scientia in nobis est sigillatio rerum in animabus nostris, ita e converso formae rerum non sunt nisi quaedam sigillatio divinae scientiae in rebus. Reply Obj. 6: That statement of Algazel is to be understood of our knowledge, which is acquired by the impression upon our souls of the likenesses of things. The opposite is true of God’s cognition, for it is from his intellect that forms flow into creatures. Our knowledge is the impressing of things in our souls; but the forms of things are the impressing of the divine knowledge in things. Ad septimum dicendum, quod scientia quae ponitur in Deo, non est per modum habitus, sed magis per modum actus, quia ipse semper actu omnia cognoscit. Reply Obj. 7: The knowledge posited of God is not like a habit but rather like an act, since he always actually knows all things. Ad octavum dicendum, quod a causa agente non procedit effectus nisi secundum conditionem eius; et ideo omnis effectus qui procedit per aliquam scientiam, sequitur determinationem scientiae, quae limitat conditiones eius; et ideo res quarum scientia Dei est causa, non procedunt nisi quando determinatum est a Deo ut procedant; et ideo non oportet ut res sint ab aeterno quamvis scientia Dei fuerit ab aeterno in actu. Reply Obj. 8: Effects proceed from acting causes according to the condition of the causes. Hence, every effect which proceeds by reason of knowledge follows the determination of that knowledge, which limits its conditions. Therefore, the things which have God’s knowledge as their cause proceed only when it has been determined by God that they shall proceed. Consequently, it is not necessary that things actually exist from eternity, even though God’s knowledge is actual from all eternity. Ad nonum dicendum, quod tunc intellectus dicitur scire de aliquo quid est, quando definit ipsum, id est quando concipit aliquam formam de ipsa re quae per omnia ipsi rei respondet. Iam autem ex dictis patet quod quidquid intellectus noster de Deo concipit, est deficiens a repraesentatione eius; et ideo quid est ipsius Dei semper nobis occultum remanet; et haec est summa cognitio quam de ipso in statu viae habere possumus, ut cognoscamus Deum esse supra omne id quod cogitamus de eo; ut patet per Dionysium in I cap. De mystica theologia. Reply Obj. 9: The intellect is said to know what a thing is when it defines that thing, that is, when it conceives some form of the thing which corresponds to it in all respects. From our previous discussion, it is clear that whatever our intellect conceives of God falls short of being a representation of him. Consequently, the quiddity of God himself remains forever hidden from us. The most we can know of God during our present life is that he transcends everything that we can conceive of him—as is clear from Dionysius. Ad decimum dicendum, quod Deus dicitur omnem intellectus nostri formam subterfugere, non quin aliqua forma nostri intellectus ipsum aliquo modo repraesentet; sed quia nulla eum repraesentat perfecte. Reply Obj. 10: God is said to elude every form of our intellect, not because there is no form of our intellect that can represent him at all, but because there is no form that can represent him perfectly. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur IV Metaph.; et ideo illud est nomen proprie alicuius rei cuius significatum est definitio; et quia, ut dictum est, nulla ratio significata per nomen definit ipsum Deum, nullum nomen a nobis impositum est proprie nomen eius, sed est proprie nomen creaturae, quae definitur ratione significata per nomen; et tamen ista nomina quae sunt creaturarum nomina, Deo attribuuntur, secundum quod in creaturis aliqualiter similitudo eius repraesentatur. Reply Obj. 11: As is said in the Metaphysics: an intelligible character signified by a noun is a definition. Hence, the name of a thing is proper if its meaning is its definition. Now, since no intelligible character signified by a name defines God himself, no name we apply to God is proper to him. It is proper rather to the creature defined by the character signified by the name. These names, though the names of creatures, are attributed to God, however, in so far as a likeness of him is found in some way in creatures.