Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum bonum aliquid addat super ens Whether goodness adds something onto being Quaestio est de bono. Et primo quaeritur utrum bonum aliquid addat super ens. The question is on goodness. First, we ask whether goodness adds something to being. Et videtur quod sic. Unumquodque enim est ens per essentiam suam. Creatura autem non est bona per essentiam, sed per participationem. Ergo bonum addit aliquid secundum rem supra ens. Obj. 1: It seems that it does. For anything is a being according to its essence, but a creature is not good by essence but by participation. Therefore, goodness really adds something onto being. Praeterea, cum bonum in ratione sua includat ens, et tamen bonum secundum rationem distinguatur ab ente; oportet quod ratio boni addat supra rationem entis. Sed non potest dici quod addat super ens aliquam negationem, sicut unum, quod addit super ens indivisionem, quia tota ratio boni in positione consistit. Ergo aliquid positive addit bonum super ens; et ita videtur quod aliquid realiter addat. Obj. 2: Furthermore, since goodness includes being in its definition, and yet goodness is distinguished in its definition from being, the notion of goodness must add something onto the notion of being. But we cannot say that it adds a negation onto being, as does oneness, which adds onto being the notion of undividedness, for the whole idea of goodness consists in something positive. Therefore, goodness adds something positively onto being; and thus it seems that it really adds something. Sed dicebat, quod addit respectum ad finem.—Sed contra: secundum hoc enim bonum nihil aliud esset quam ens relatum. Sed ens relatum concernit determinatum genus entis, quod est ad aliquid. Ergo bonum est in aliquo uno praedicamento determinato; quod est contra philosophum in I Ethic., ubi ponit bonum in omnibus generibus. Obj. 3: However, one might say that it adds a relation to an end. But, on the contrary, in this view goodness would be nothing else than relative being. But relative being pertains to one particular genus of being, which is to be toward another. Therefore, goodness is in one determinate category, which is contrary to the Philosopher in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he puts goodness in every genus. Praeterea, ut potest accipi ex dictis Dionysii in IV cap. de Div. Nomin., bonum est diffusivum sui et esse. Ergo per hoc est aliquid bonum per quod est diffusivum. Sed diffundere importat actionem quamdam; actio autem ab essentia procedit mediante virtute. Ergo aliquid dicitur esse bonum ratione virtutis superadditae ad essentiam; et sic bonum addit aliquid realiter super ens. Obj. 4: Furthermore, as can be gathered from the sayings of Dionysius in the Divine Names 4.4, PG 3, 700A, goodness is diffusive of itself and of being. Thus, something is good inasmuch as it is diffusive. But, to diffuse implies an activity. However, an activity proceeds from an essence by means of a power. Therefore, something is said to be good by reason of a power super-added to essence. And thus goodness really adds something to being. Praeterea, quanto magis receditur ab uno primo simplici tanto maior in rebus differentia invenitur. Sed ens et bonum in Deo sunt unum re, et distinguuntur ratione. Ergo in creaturis distinguuntur plus quam ratione; et ita distinguuntur re, cum supra distinctionem rationis non sit nisi distinctio rei. Obj. 5: Furthermore, to the extent that one moves away from what is one, first, and simple, so much does one find a greater difference among things. But being and goodness are one thing in God and are distinguished according to reason. Therefore, these are more distinct among creatures than simply according to reason, and so these are really distinct, for there is only real distinction beyond the distinction of reason. Praeterea, accidentalia realiter addunt supra essentiam rei. Sed bonitas est rei creatae accidentalis; alias non posset bonitatem amittere. Ergo bonum addit aliquid realiter super ens. Obj. 6: Furthermore, accidental things really add something to the essence of a thing. But goodness is accidental for a creature, otherwise the creature could not lose goodness. Therefore, goodness really adds something onto being. Praeterea, omne illud quod dicitur per informationem alicuius, addit aliquid realiter super illud, eo quod nihil informatur seipso. Sed bonum dicitur per informationem, ut dicitur in commento libri de causis; ergo bonum addit aliquid supra ens. Obj. 7: Furthermore, anything predicated of another as informing it really adds something onto it, inasmuch as nothing is informed by itself. But goodness is predicated inasmuch as it informs, as is said in On Causes. Therefore, goodness adds something onto being. Praeterea, nihil determinatur se ipso; sed bonum determinat ens; ergo bonum addit aliquid super ens. Obj. 8: Furthermore, nothing is determined by itself. But goodness determines being. Thus, goodness adds something onto being. Sed dicebat, quod bonum determinat ens secundum rationem.—Sed contra: aut illi rationi respondet aliquid in re, aut nihil. Si nihil, sequetur quod ratio illa sit cassa et vana; si autem aliquid respondet in re, ergo habetur propositum, quod bonum aliquid realiter addat super ens. Obj. 9: However, one could say that goodness determines being with regard to some notion. But on the contrary, either something corresponds to that notion within the thing, or not. If not, then it would follow that the notion is empty and futile. But if there is something in the thing which does correspond, then the conclusion follows, that goodness really adds something onto being. Praeterea, relatio specificatur secundum id ad quod dicitur. Sed bonum dicit relationem ad determinatum terminum, scilicet ad finem. Ergo bonum dicit specificam relationem. Sed omne ens specificatum addit aliquid realiter super ens commune. Ergo et bonum realiter aliquid addit super ens. Obj. 10: Furthermore, a relation is specified with regard to that toward which it is predicated. But goodness denotes a relation toward a fixed boundary, namely toward an end. Thus, goodness denotes a specific relation. But every specific being really adds something onto common being. Thus, goodness really adds something onto being. Praeterea, sicut bonum et ens convertuntur, ita homo et risibile. Sed risibile, quamvis convertatur cum homine, addit tamen realiter super hominem; scilicet ipsam hominis proprietatem, quae est de genere accidentium. Ergo et bonum realiter addit super ens. Obj. 11: Furthermore, just as goodness and being are interchangeable, so also is man and risible. But, even though risible is interchangeable with man, it really adds something onto man, that is the property itself of manhood, which is in the genus of accidents. Therefore, goodness really adds something onto being. Sed contra. Est quod Augustinus dicit, quod in quantum Deus bonus est, sumus; in quantum vero sumus, boni sumus. Ergo videtur quod bonum non addat aliquid super ens. On the Contrary (1) is what Augustine says, that we exist because God is good, but we are good inasmuch as we exist Thus, it seems that goodness does not add something onto being. Praeterea, quaecumque ita se habent quod unum addit super alterum re vel ratione, unum eorum potest intelligi sine altero. Sed ens non potest intelligi sine bono. Ergo bonum non addit aliquid super ens nec re nec ratione. Probatio mediae. Plus potest facere Deus quam homo intelligere. Sed non potest Deus facere aliquod ens quod non sit bonum; quia hoc ipso quod est a bono, bonum est, ut patet per Boetium in Lib. de Hebdom. Ergo nec intellectus potest hoc intelligere. Furthermore (2), whenever things are such that one adds onto another in reality or in reason, one of them can be understood without the other. But being cannot be understood without goodness. Therefore, goodness does not add something onto being, neither in reality nor in reason. Proof of the middle term: God can do more than man can understand. But God cannot make any being which is not good, for anything is good insofar as it is from the Good, as is clear from Boethius in the Hebdomads. Therefore, the intellect cannot understand this. Responsio. Dicendum est, quod tripliciter potest aliquid super alterum addere. Uno modo quod addat aliquam rem quae sit extra essentiam illius rei cui dicitur addi; sicut album addit aliquid super corpus, quia essentia albedinis est praeter essentiam corporis. Alio modo dicitur aliquid addere super alterum per modum contrahendi et determinandi; sicut homo addit aliquid super animal: non quidem ita quod sit in homine aliqua res quae sit penitus extra essentiam animalis, alias oporteret dicere, quod non totum quod est homo esset animal, sed animal esset pars hominis; sed animal per hominem contrahitur, quia id quod determinate et actualiter continetur in ratione hominis, implicite et quasi potentialiter continetur in ratione animalis. Sicut est de ratione hominis quod habeat animam rationalem, de ratione autem animalis est quod habeat animam, non determinando ad rationalem vel non rationalem; ista tamen determinatio ratione cuius homo super animal addere dicitur, in aliqua re fundatur. Tertio modo dicitur aliquid addere super alterum secundum rationem tantum; quando scilicet aliquid est de ratione unius quod non est de ratione alterius: quod tamen nihil est in rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum, sive per illud contrahatur id cui dicitur addi, sive non. Caecum enim addit aliquid supra hominem, scilicet caecitatem, quae non est aliquid ens in natura, sed rationis tantum ens est comprehendentis privationes; et per hoc homo contrahitur, non enim omnis homo caecus est; sed cum dicimus talpam caecam, non fit per hoc additum aliqua contractio. I answer that: it must be said that something can be added onto a being in three ways. The first way is inasmuch as it adds something which is outside the essence of the thing to which it is added, just as white adds something onto body, for the essence of whiteness is outside the essence of a body. In another, way something is said to add onto another as contracting and determining it, just as man adds something onto animal, but not such that there is something in man completely outside the essence of animal, otherwise one would have to say that not the whole of man is an animal, and instead that animal was a part of man. However, animal is contracted by man, for what the notion of man contains determinately and in act is contained in the notion of animal implicitly and, as it were, in potency. For while it is in the definition of man that he have a rational soul, it is in the definition of animal that it have a soul which is not determined to either rational or non-rational. Nevertheless, this determination by which man is said to be added onto animal is grounded in some reality. In a third way, something is said to add onto another according to reason alone, when something is in the definition of one thing which is not in the definition of another, which indeed is nothing in reality but is in reason alone, whether that to which it is said to be added is contracted or not. For blind adds something onto man, namely blindness, which is not some being in reality but only a being of reason, including privations; and man is contracted by this, for not every man is blind. But when we say "a blind mole," there is no contraction because of this addition. Non autem potest esse quod super ens universale aliquid addat aliquid primo modo, quamvis illo modo possit fieri additio super aliquod ens particulare; nulla enim res naturae est quae sit extra essentiam entis universalis, quamvis aliqua res sit extra essentiam huius entis. However, it is not possible that something should add onto universal being in the first way, even though there can be an addition in that way to some particular being. For there is no real being existing outside the essence of universal being, even though there might be such a thing outside the essence of this being. Secundo autem modo inveniuntur aliqua addere super ens, quia ens contrahitur per decem genera, quorum unumquodque addit aliquid super ens; non quidem aliquod accidens, vel aliquam differentiam quae sit extra essentiam entis, sed determinatum modum essendi, qui fundatur in ipsa existentia rei. Sic autem bonum non addit aliquid super ens: cum bonum dividatur aequaliter in decem genera, ut ens, ut patet in I Ethicor. But, there are some things which add onto being in the second way, for being is contracted by the ten categories, each of which add something onto being, not indeed some accident or difference which is outside the essence of the being, but a determinate mode of existence, grounded in the very existence of the thing. However, goodness does not add something onto being in this way, since goodness, like being, is equally divided into the ten categories as is clear in the Ethics 1.6, 1096a19. Et ideo oportet quod vel nihil addat super ens, vel addat aliquid, quod sit in ratione tantum. Si enim adderet aliquid reale, oporteret quod per rationem boni contraheretur ens ad aliquod speciale genus. Cum autem ens sit id quod primo cadit in conceptione intellectus, ut Avicenna dicit, oportet quod omne aliud nomen vel sit synonymum enti: quod de bono dici non potest, cum non nugatorie dicatur ens bonum; vel addat aliquid ad minus secundum rationem; et sic oportet quod bonum, ex quo non contrahit ens, addat aliquid super ens, quod sit rationis tantum. Therefore, it must be that it adds nothing onto being, or that it adds something, which is in reason alone. For if it were to add something real, being would have to be contracted by the notion of goodness to some particular genus. But, since being is what first falls into the mind's concept, as Avicenna says, every other name must either be a synonym for being, which cannot be said of goodness since being is not uselessly called good, or else it adds something at least with respect to reason. And so goodness, inasmuch as it does not contract being, must add something onto being which belongs to reason alone. Id autem quod est rationis tantum, non potest esse nisi duplex, scilicet negatio et aliqua relatio. Omnis enim positio absoluta aliquid in rerum natura existens significat. Sic ergo supra ens, quod est prima conceptio intellectus, unum addit id quod est rationis tantum, scilicet negationem: dicitur enim unum quasi ens indivisum. However, that which pertains to reason alone can be only one of two possibilities, either a negation or some relation. For every unrestricted proposition signifies something existing in reality. Therefore, oneness adds onto being, which is the first concept of the mind, that which pertains to reason alone, namely a negation. For oneness is said to be, as it were, an undivided being. Sed verum et bonum positive dicuntur; unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum. Illa autem relatio, secundum philosophum in V Metaph., invenitur esse rationis tantum, secundum quam dicitur referri id quod non dependet ad id ad quod refertur, sed e converso, cum ipsa relatio quaedam dependentia sit, sicut patet in scientia et scibili, sensu et sensibili. Scientia enim dependet a scibili, sed non e converso: unde relatio qua scientia refertur ad scibile, est realis; relatio vero qua scibile refertur ad scientiam, est rationis tantum: dicitur enim scibile relatum, secundum philosophum, non quia ipsum referatur, sed quia aliud referatur ad ipsum. Et ita est in omnibus aliis quae se habent ut mensura et mensuratum, vel perfectivum et perfectibile. Oportet igitur quod verum et bonum super intellectum entis addant respectum perfectivi. But truth and goodness are predicated positively, hence, they can only add a relation which pertains to reason alone. However, according to the Philosopher (Metaphysics 5.17, 1020b26), a relation by which one thing is referred to another, which it does not depend upon, but this other depends upon it, is a relation of reason alone, since this relation is a certain dependence, as is clear in knowledge and the knowable or else sense and the sensible. For knowledge depends upon the knowable, but not conversely. Hence, the relation by which the knowable is referred to knowledge is of reason alone, for according to the Philosopher, knowledge is said to be related not because it itself is referred, but because another is referred to it. And this is likewise the case in all other things which relate as the measure and what is measured or as what perfects and the perfectible. Therefore, truth and goodness must add onto the idea of being the notion of that which perfects. In quolibet autem ente est duo considerare: scilicet ipsam rationem speciei, et esse ipsum quo aliquid subsistit in specie illa; et sic aliquod ens potest esse perfectivum dupliciter. Uno modo secundum rationem speciei tantum. Et sic ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui percipit rationem entis. Nec tamen ens est in eo secundum esse naturale; et ideo hunc modum perficiendi addit verum super ens. Verum enim est in mente, ut philosophus dicit in VI Metaphys.; et unumquodque ens in tantum dicitur verum, in quantum est conformatum vel conformabile intellectui; et ideo omnes recte definientes verum, ponunt in eius definitione intellectum. Alio modo ens est perfectivum alterius non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura. Et per hunc modum est perfectivum bonum. However, we must consider two things in any being, namely, the notion of form and the very act of existence by which it subsists in that form; and in this sense any being can be perfective in two ways: in one way with respect to the notion of the form alone. In this way the intellect that perceives the notion of being is perfected by it, but this being is not in the intellect by natural existence. Hence, this mode of perfecting adds truth onto being, for truth is in the mind, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 6.4, 1027b25, and any being is said to be true inasmuch as it is either conformed or conformable to the intellect. And thus, anyone who correctly defines truth puts the intellect in its definition. In another way, being is perfective of another not only with respect to the notion of form, but also with respect to the act of existence that it has in reality. Bonum enim in rebus est, ut philosophus dicit in VI Metaphys. In quantum autem unum ens secundum esse suum est perfectivum alterius et consummativum, habet rationem finis respectu illius quod ab eo perficitur; et inde est quod omnes recte definientes bonum ponunt in ratione eius aliquid quod pertinet ad habitudinem finis; unde philosophus dicit in I Ethicorum, quod bonum optime diffinierunt dicentes, quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Goodness is perfective in this way, for it is within things, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 6.4, 1027b25. But inasmuch as one being perfects and completes another with respect to its own act of existence, it has the notion of an end in relation to what is perfected by it; and it is for this reason that anyone who correctly defines goodness puts in its definition something that entails a relation to an end. Thus, the Philosopher says in the Ethics 1.1, 1094a3, that they defined goodness very well, saying that goodness is what all desire. Sic ergo primo et principaliter dicitur bonum ens perfectivum alterius per modum finis; sed secundario dicitur aliquid bonum, quod est ductivum in finem: prout utile dicitur bonum; vel quod natum est consequi finem: sicut et sanum dicitur non solum habens sanitatem, sed et faciens et conservans et significans. Therefore, the being which is perfective of another as an end is called good first and principally; but something is called good secondarily which either leads to the end, inasmuch as the useful is said to be good, or else it is such as to achieve the end, as when health is said not only of the one who has health but of what makes, preserves, and signifies it. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod, cum ens dicatur absolute, bonum autem superaddat habitudinem causae finalis; ipsa essentia rei absolute considerata sufficit ad hoc quod per eam aliquid dicatur ens, non autem ad hoc quod per eam dicatur aliquid bonum; sicut enim in aliis generibus causarum habitudo secundae causae dependet ex habitudine causae primae; primae vero causae habitudo non dependet ex aliquo alio; ita etiam est in causis finalibus, quod secundi fines participant habitudinem causae finalis ex ordine ad ultimum finem, ipse autem ultimus finis habet hanc habitudinem per seipsum. Et inde est quod essentia Dei, qui est ultimus finis rerum, sufficit ad hoc quod per eam Deus dicatur bonus; sed essentia creaturae posita nondum dicitur res bona nisi ex habitudine ad Deum, ex qua habet rationem causae finalis. Et pro tanto dicitur quod creatura non est bona per essentiam, sed per participationem. Uno modo scilicet in quantum ipsa essentia secundum rationem intelligendi consideratur ut aliud quid quam habitudo ad Deum, a qua habet rationem causae finalis, et ad quem ordinatur ut ad finem. Sed secundum alium modum creatura potest dici per essentiam bona, in quantum scilicet essentia creaturae non invenitur sine habitudine ad Dei bonitatem; et hoc intendit Boetius in libro de Hebdom. Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that since being is said unrestrictedly, but goodness adds onto this a reference to a final cause, the thing's very essence, considered without qualification, is sufficient for it to be called a being, but not sufficient for it to be called good. For just as in some kinds of cause the condition of the secondary cause depends upon that of the first, but that of the first does not depend on another, so also among final causes the secondary ends participate in the condition of the final cause from their order to that final end, but the final end has this condition in virtue of itself. It is for this reason that God's essence, which is the final end of things, suffices for God to be called good, whereas the essence of a creature is only called a good thing in relation to God from whom it has the notion of a final cause. And for this reason a creature is said to be good not by essence but by participation. For in one way the essence itself can be considered with regard to a notion of understanding as being something other than a relation to God, from whom it has the notion of final cause and to whom it is ordered as an end. But in another way the creature can be called good by essence inasmuch as the essence of the creature is never found without a relationship to the goodness of God, and this is what Boethius means in the Hebdomads. Ad secundum dicendum, quod non solum negatio dicit id quod est rationis tantum, sed etiam quaedam relatio, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that negation not only denotes that which belongs to reason alone, but also some relations, as has been said. Ad tertium dicendum, quod omnis relatio realis est in genere determinato; sed relationes non reales possunt circuire omne ens. Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that every real relation is in a determinate genus, but unreal relations can encompass any being. Ad quartum dicendum, quod diffundere, licet secundum proprietatem vocabuli videatur importare operationem causae efficientis, tamen largo modo potest importare habitudinem cuiuscumque causae sicut influere et facere, et alia huiusmodi. Cum autem dicitur quod bonum sit diffusivum secundum sui rationem, non est intelligenda diffusio secundum quod importat operationem causae efficientis, sed secundum quod importat habitudinem causae finalis; et talis diffusio non est mediante aliqua virtute superaddita. Dicit autem bonum diffusionem causae finalis, et non causae agentis: tum quia efficiens, in quantum huiusmodi, non est rei mensura et perfectio, sed magis initium; tum etiam quia effectus participat causam efficientem secundum assimilationem formae tantum, sed finem consequitur res secundum totum esse suum, et in hoc consistebat ratio boni. Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that although to diffuse seems to imply the action of an efficient cause with respect to what is proper to the word, yet if taken broadly, it can imply the condition of any cause, such as to flow into, to make, and the like. But, since goodness is said to be diffusive by definition, this diffusion should not be understood inasmuch as it implies the action of an efficient cause, but rather the condition of a final cause; and such a diffusion does not happen by means of any super-added power. However, goodness denotes the diffusion of a final cause and not that of an agent cause, both because an efficient cause, precisely as such, is not the measure and perfection of a thing, but is more its beginning, and also because an effect participates in its efficient cause with regard to the assimilation of its form alone, whereas a thing attains to the end with respect to its entire being, and in this consists the notion of goodness. Ad quintum dicendum, quod dupliciter aliqua possunt esse unum in Deo secundum rem. Uno modo ex parte eius in quo sunt, tantum, et non ex propria ratione, sicut scientia et potentia. Non enim scientia ex hoc quod scientia, est idem quod potentia secundum rem, sed ex hoc quod est divina. Et quae sic sunt unum re in Deo, in creaturis inveniuntur differre secundum rem. Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that things can be really one in God in two ways. In one way they can be one only on the part of that in which they are, and not from their proper notions, like knowledge and power. For knowledge, inasmuch as it is knowledge, is not the same as power in reality, but rather from the fact that it is divine. And so, what is one thing in God is found in creatures to be different in reality. Alio modo ex ipsa ratione eorum quae dicuntur esse unum realiter in Deo. Et sic bonum et ens sunt unum in Deo realiter, quia de ratione boni est quod non differat secundum rem ab ente; et ideo ubicumque invenitur bonum et ens, sunt idem secundum rem. In another way they can be one from their very definitions which are said to be really one thing in God. And in this way, since it pertains to the notion of goodness that it not differ in reality from being, goodness and being are really one thing in God; and therefore, wherever goodness and being are found, they are the same in reality. Ad sextum dicendum, quod sicut ens est quoddam essentiale, et quoddam accidentale; ita et bonum quoddam accidentale, et quoddam essentiale; et eodem modo amittit aliquid bonitatem sicut esse substantiale vel accidentale. Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that just as being is both something essential and accidental, so also goodness is both something essential and accidental; and it loses goodness in the same way, just like substantial or accidental existence. Ad septimum dicendum, quod ex habitudine praedicta contingit quod bonum secundum rationem dicatur ens informare vel determinare. Unde patet responsio ad octavum. Reply Obj. 7–8: To the seventh it must be said that, from the previously mentioned condition, it happens that goodness is said to inform or determine being according to reason. Hence, the response to the eighth objection is clear. Ad nonum dicendum, quod isti rationi aliquid respondet in re, scilicet realis dependentia eius quod est ad finem ad finem ipsum, sicut est et in aliis relationibus rationis. Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that something corresponds to this notion within the thing, namely a real dependence of what is for the sake of the end upon the end itself, as is also the case in other relations of reason. Ad decimum dicendum, quod quamvis bonum dicat aliquam specialem habitudinem, scilicet finis, tamen ista habitudo competit cuilibet enti, nec ponit aliquid secundum rem in ente; unde ratio non sequitur. Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that even though goodness denotes some special condition, that is of an end, this condition belongs to any being whatsoever, yet without positing anything real in the being. Thus, the argument does not follow. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod risibile quamvis convertatur cum homine, tamen addit aliquam naturam extraneam super hominem, quae est praeter essentiam hominis; sic autem nihil potest addi super ens, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that even though risible is interchangeable with man, nevertheless, it adds onto man an extraneous nature that is outside the essence of man. But nothing can be added onto being in this way, as has been said.