Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum voluntas aliquid de necessitate velit Whether the will wants anything by necessity Quinto quaeritur utrum voluntas aliquid de necessitate velit. Fifth, it is asked whether the will wants anything by necessity. Et videtur quod sic. Quia secundum Augustinum in 13 De Trinitate, beatitudinem omnes una voluntate expetunt. Sed quod ab omnibus communiter expetitur, de necessitate expetitur; si enim non de necessitate, contingeret ab aliquo non expeti. Ergo voluntas de necessitate aliquid expetit. Obj. 1: It seems that it does since, as Augustine says in On the Trinity, all things desire beatitude with one will. But whatever is commonly desired by all is is desired by necessity. For if it were not by necessity, it would happen that it not be desired by something. Therefore, the will desires something by necessity. Praeterea, omne motivum perfectae virtutis de necessitate movet suum mobile. Sed secundum Philosophum in 3 De anima, bonum est motivum voluntatis, secundum quod apprehenditur. Ergo, cum aliquid sit perfectum bonum, sicut Deus et beatitudo, ut etiam dicitur in 1 Ethicorum, aliquid erit quod voluntatem de necessitate movebit; et ita a voluntate aliquid necessario appetitur. Obj. 2: Furthermore, anything moving that possesses a perfect power moves its mobile by necessity. But, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul, goodness moves the will as apprehended. Therefore, since something is a perfect good, such as God and beatitude, as is also said in the Ethics, there will be something that moves the will by necessity, and so something will be desired by the will necessarily. Praeterea, immaterialitas est causa quare aliqua potentia cogi non possit; potentiae enim organis affixae coguntur, sicut patet praecipue de motiva. Sed intellectus est immaterialior potentia quam voluntas; quod patet ex hoc quod habet immaterialius obiectum, scilicet universale: cum bonum in rebus particularibus existens sit obiectum voluntatis. Cum igitur intellectus cogatur ut aliquid de necessitate teneat, ut dicitur in 5 Metaphysicae, videtur quod etiam voluntas de necessitate aliquid appetat. Obj. 3: Furthermore, immateriality is the reason why a power cannot be forced, for powers fitted with organs are forced, as is clear primarily with regard to the motive power. But the intellect is more immaterial than the will, which is clear from the fact that it has a more immaterial object, namely the universal, whereas goodness existing in particular things is the will's object. Therefore, since the intellect is forced to hold something by necessity, as said in the Metaphysics, it seems that the will also desires something by necessity. Praeterea, necessitas non removetur a voluntate nisi ratione libertatis, cui videtur necessitas opposita. Sed non omnis necessitas impedit libertatem: unde dicit Augustinus in 5 De civitate Dei: si illa definitur esse necessitas secundum quam dicimus: necesse est ut ita sit vel ita fiat; nescio cur eam timeamus ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis. Ergo voluntas de necessitate aliquid vult. Obj. 4: Furthermore, necessity is not removed from the will except by reason of freedom, to which necessity seems to be opposed. But not all necessity impedes freedom, hence Augustine says in the City of God, if those things are defined to be necessary in regard to which we say 'it is necessary that it be so or that it be done so,' I know not why we should fear that it would remove from us the will's freedom. Therefore, the will wants something by necessity. Praeterea, necessarium est quod non potest non esse. Sed Deus non potest non velle bonum, sicut non potest non esse bonus. Ergo necessario vult bonum: et ita aliqua voluntas necessario vult aliquid. Obj. 5: Furthermore, that is necessary which cannot not be. But God cannot not will goodness, just as he cannot not be good. Therefore, he wills goodness necessarily, and so there is a will that necessarily wills something. Praeterea, secundum Gregorium, peccatum quod per poenitentiam non deletur, mox suo pondere ad aliud trahit. Peccatum autem non committitur nisi voluntate, secundum Augustinum. Cum ergo tractio sit quidam motus violentus, ut patet in 7 Physicorum, aliquis potest violenter cogi ad aliquid de necessitate volendum. Obj. 6: Furthermore, according to Gregory, a sin that is not removed by penance quickly leads to others by its weight. However, a sin is not committed except by the will, according to Augustine. Therefore, since pulling is a certain violent motion, as is clear from the Physics, someone can be violently forced to will something by necessity. Praeterea, secundum quod Magister dicit in 25dist. 1 libri, et sumit ex verbis Augustini, in secundo statu, idest in statu culpae, non potest homo non peccare, ante reparationem, etiam mortaliter, post reparationem vero saltem venialiter. Sed tam peccatum mortale quam veniale est voluntarium. Ergo aliquis status hominis est, in quo non potest non velle id, in quo peccatum consistit; et sic de necessitate voluntas aliquid vult. Obj. 7: Furthermore, according to what the Teacher says in the Sentences bk. 1, d. 25, and which he takes from the words of Augustine, in the second state, that is in the condition of guilt, a man cannot but sin, even mortally, before reparation, but after reparation at least venially. But both mortal as well as venial sin is voluntary. Therefore, there is a condition of man in which he cannot but will that in which the state of sin consists, and so the will wills something by necessity. Praeterea, quanto aliquid magis natum est ad movendum, tanto magis natum est necessitatem inferre. Sed bonum magis potest movere quam verum; cum bonum sit in rebus, verum autem in mente tantum, ut dicitur in 6 Metaphysicae. Ergo, cum verum cogat intellectum, multo fortius bonum coget voluntatem. Obj. 8: Furthermore, to the extent that something is more apt to move, so much more is it apt to impose necessity. But goodness is more capable of moving than truth; for goodness is in things, but truth is only in the mind, as is said in the Metaphysics. Therefore, since truth forces the intellect, much more vigorously does goodness force the will. Praeterea, bonum fortius imprimit quam verum; quod patet ex hoc quod amor, qui est impressio boni, est magis unitivus quam cognitio, quae est impressio veri: amor enim, secundum Augustinum, est vita quaedam uniens amantem amato. Ergo bonum magis potest inferre necessitatem voluntati quam verum intellectui; et sic idem quod prius. Obj. 9: Furthermore, goodness impresses more forcefully than truth, as is clear from the fact that love, which is an impression of goodness, is more unitive than knowledge, which is an impression of truth. For love is a certain life uniting the beloved to the lover, according to Augustine. Therefore, goodness is more able to impose necessity upon the will than truth upon the intellect, and so the same conclusion follows as before. Praeterea, quanto aliqua potentia magis potest in sua obiecta, tanto minus potest ab eis cogi. Sed ratio magis potest in sua obiecta quam voluntas: ratio enim, secundum Augustinum, 12 De Trinitate, format in se species rerum, non autem voluntas; sed movetur ab appetibilibus. Ergo magis potest voluntas cogi ab appetibilibus quam ratio a cognoscibilibus; et sic idem quod prius. Obj. 10: Furthermore, to the extent that any power has more control over its objects, so much less can it be forced by them. But reason has more control over its objects than the will, for according to Augustine in On the Trinity, reason forms the species of things within itself, however, the will does not, but it is rather moved by desirable tings. Therefore, the will is more capable of being forced by desirable things than reason by knowable things, and so the same conclusion follows as before. Praeterea, quod per se inest, de necessitate inest. Sed velle aliquid, per se inest voluntati. Ergo voluntas de necessitate aliquid vult. Probatio mediae. Summum bonum est per se volitum. Ergo quandocumque in ipsum fertur voluntas, per seipsum vult. Sed semper in ipsum fertur, quia naturaliter fertur in ipsum. Ergo voluntas semper per se vult summum bonum. Obj. 11: Furthermore, whatever is in something essentially, is within it by necessity. But to will something is within the will essentially. Therefore, the will wills something by necessity. Proof of the middle term: the highest good is willed essentially. Thus, whenever the will is carried toward it, it wills essentially. But it is always carried toward it, for it is borne toward it naturally. Therefore, the will always wants the highest good essentially. Praeterea, in cognitione scientiae necessitas invenitur. Sed, sicut omnes homines naturaliter volunt scire, secundum Philosophum in 1 Metaphysicae, ita etiam naturaliter volunt bonum. Ergo in voluntate boni necessitas invenitur. Obj. 12: Furthermore, necessity is found to exist in the cognition of knowledge. But, just as all men naturally want to know according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics, so also do they naturally want goodness. Therefore, the necessity of goodness is found in the will. Praeterea, Glossa, Rom. 7:15 ss., dicit, quod voluntas vult naturaliter bonum. Sed ea quae insunt secundum naturam, sunt de necessitate. Ergo voluntas vult bonum de necessitate. Obj. 13: Furthermore, a Gloss on Rom. 8:15 says that the will wants goodness naturally. But anything that is within according to nature is so necessarily. Therefore, the will wants goodness by necessity. Praeterea, omne quod augetur et minuitur, potest etiam totaliter auferri. Sed libertas voluntatis augetur et minuitur: liberius enim arbitrium habuit homo ante peccatum quam post peccatum, secundum Augustinum. Ergo libertas voluntatis potest totaliter tolli; et ita voluntas potest de necessitate cogi. Obj. 14: Furthermore, anything that can be increased and diminished can also be completely removed. But the will's freedom is increased and diminished, for according to Augustine man had a freer will before sin than after sin. Therefore, free choice can be completely removed, and so the will can be forced by necessity. Sed contra. Secundum Augustinum in 5 De civitate Dei, si aliquid est voluntarium, non est necessarium. Sed omne quod volumus, est voluntarium. Ergo voluntas non vult aliquid de necessitate. On the Contrary (1), according to Augustine in the City of God, if something is voluntary it is not necessary. But all that we will is voluntary. Therefore, the will does not want something by necessity. Praeterea, Bernardus dicit, quod liberum arbitrium potentissimum est sub Deo. Sed quod est tale, non potest cogi ab aliquo; ergo voluntas non potest cogi ut aliquid de necessitate velit. Furthermore (2), Bernard says that free choice is most powerful under God, but whatever exists in such a way cannot be forced by another. Therefore, the will cannot be forced such that it would want something by necessity. Praeterea, libertas opponitur necessitati. Sed voluntas est libera. Ergo non de necessitate aliquid vult. Furthermore (3), freedom is opposed to necessity. But the will is free, thus, it does not want something by necessity. Praeterea, Bernardus dicit, quod liberum arbitrium ex ingenita nobilitate nulla necessitate movetur. Sed dignitas voluntatis auferri non potest. Ergo non potest voluntas de necessitate aliquid velle. Furthermore (4), Bernard says that from its inborn nobility, free choice is moved by no neccessity. But the will's dignity cannot be removed. Therefore, the will cannot want something by necessity. Praeterea, potestates rationales se habent ad opposita, secundum Philosophum. Sed voluntas est rationalis potentia; est enim in ratione, ut dicitur in 3 De anima. Ergo se habet ad opposita; et ideo non de necessitate determinatur ad aliquid. Furthermore (5), according to the Philosopher, rational powers are related to opposites. But the will is a rational power, for it is within reason, as is said in On the Soul, Therefore, it is related to opposites, and so it is not determined to something by necessity. Praeterea, quod de necessitate determinatur ad aliquid, naturaliter est determinatum ad illud. Sed voluntas contra naturalem appetitum dividitur. Ergo voluntas non de necessitate aliquid vult. Furthermore (6), whatever is determined to something by necessity is naturally determined to it. But the will is divided against natural appetite, therefore, the will does not want something by necessity. Praeterea, ex eo quod aliquid est voluntarium, dicitur esse in nobis ita quod nos domini illius simus. Sed illud quod est in nobis, cuius domini sumus, possumus velle et non velle. Ergo omne quod voluntas vult, potest velle et non velle; et ita non de necessitate aliquid vult. Furthermore (7), something is said to be within us as voluntary such that we are in command of it. But whatever is within us and over which we are in command we can either will or not will. Therefore, the will is capable of willing or not willing everything that it wants, and so it does not want something by necessity. Responsio. Dicendum, quod sicut potest accipi ex verbis Augustini, in 5 De civitate Dei 11 cap., duplex est necessitas: necessitas scilicet coactionis, et haec in voluntatem nullo modo cadere potest; et necessitas naturalis inclinationis, sicut dicimus Deum de necessitate vivere: et tali necessitate voluntas aliquid de necessitate vult. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod in rebus ordinatis oportet primum modum includi in secundo, et in secundo inveniri non solum id quod sibi competit secundum propriam rationem, sed etiam quod competit secundum rationem primi; sicut homini convenit non solum ratione uti, quod ei competit secundum propriam differentiam, quae est rationale, sed etiam uti sensu vel alimento, quod etiam ei competit secundum genus suum, quod est animal vel vivum. Et similiter etiam videmus in sensibus; quod cum sensus tactus sit quasi fundamentum aliorum sensuum; in organo uniuscuiusque sensus non solum invenitur proprietas illius sensus cuius est organum proprium, sed etiam proprietas tactus: sicut oculus non solum sentit album et nigrum, in quantum est organum visus, sed etiam sentit calidum et frigidum, et corrumpitur ab eorum excellentiis, secundum quod est organum tactus. I answer that: it must be said that, as can be gathered from the words of Augustine in the City of God, there is a twofold necessity, namely the necessity of coercion, and this can in no way be found in the will, and the necessity of natural inclination, as when we say that God lives by necessity: and the will necessarily wants something by such a necessity. In evidence of this, it must be known that among ordered things, the first must be contained within the second, and there is found in the second not only what belongs to it with regard to its proper notion, but also what belongs to it with regard to the notion of what is first; just as it belongs to man to not only use reason, which pertains to him with respect to the proper difference of rationality, but also to make use of sensation and food, which likewise belong to him on account of his genus, which is animal or living thing. And we also similarly see in the senses that since the sense of touch is like a foundation for the other senses, there is in the organ of each sense not only the properties of the sense whose organ it is, but also the properties of touch; just as the eye not only senses whiteness and blackness, inasmuch as it is an organ of sight, but it also senses hot and cold and is corrupted by their extremes inasmuch as it is an organ of touch. Natura autem et voluntas hoc modo ordinata sunt, ut etiam ipsa voluntas quaedam natura sit; quia omne quod in rebus invenitur, natura quaedam dicitur. Et ideo in voluntate oportet invenire non solum id quod voluntatis est, sed etiam quod naturae est. Hoc autem est cuiuslibet naturae creatae, ut a Deo sit ordinata in bonum, naturaliter appetens illud. Unde et voluntati ipsi inest naturalis quidam appetitus boni sibi convenientis. Et praeter hoc habet appetere aliquid secundum propriam determinationem, non ex necessitate; quod ei competit in quantum voluntas est. Sicut autem est ordo naturae ad voluntatem, ita se habet ordo eorum quae naturaliter vult voluntas, ad ea respectu quorum a seipsa determinatur, non ex natura. Et ideo, sicut natura est voluntatis fundamentum, ita appetibile quod naturaliter appetitur, est aliorum appetibilium principium et fundamentum. In appetibilibus autem finis est fundamentum et principium eorum quae sunt ad finem; cum quae sunt propter finem, non appetantur nisi ratione finis. Et ideo, id quod voluntas de necessitate vult quasi naturali inclinatione in ipsum determinata, est finis ultimus, ut beatitudo, et ea quae in ipso includuntur, ut esse, cognitio veritatis, et aliqua huiusmodi; ad alia vero non de necessitate determinatur naturali inclinatione, sed propria dispositione absque omni necessitate. However, nature and will are ordered in such a way that the will itself is a certain nature, for everything that exists within things is said to be a certain nature. And thus, one should find in the will not only what pertains to the will, but also what pertains to nature. However, it belongs to every created nature that it be ordered to goodness by God, desiring it naturally. Thus, there is within the will a natural desire for the good that is appropriate for it. And beyond this, it pertains to it from its own determination to desire something not out of necessity, which belongs to it inasmuch as it is a will. However, the order of nature is related to the will just as the order of what the will naturally wants is related to whatever in respect of which the will is not determined by nature. And thus, just as nature is the foundation of the will, so also is the desirable that is naturally desired the beginning and foundation of other desirable things. However, in desirable things the end is the foundation and the beginning of whatever is for the sake of the end, since whatever is for the sake of the end is not desired except by reason of the end. Therefore, whatever the will wants by necessity, as though determined to it by a natural inclination, is the final end, like beatitude and whatever is included within it, such as to exist, the knowledge of truth, and other such things. But it is not determined by necessity to other things from a natural inclination, but rather by a disposition that is without any necessity. Quamvis autem quadam necessaria inclinatione ultimum finem velit voluntas; nullo tamen modo concedendum est quod ad illud volendum cogatur. Coactio enim nihil aliud est quam violentiae cuiusdam inductio. Violentum autem est, secundum Philosophum in 3 Ethicorum, cuius principium est extra, nil conferente vim passo; sicut si lapis sursum proiiciatur; quia nullo modo, quantum est de se, ad hunc motum inclinatur. Sed cum ipsa voluntas sit quaedam inclinatio, eo quod est appetitus quidam, non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid velit, et inclinatio eius non sit in illud; et ita non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid coacte vel violente velit, etiam etsi aliquid naturali inclinatione velit. Patet igitur quod voluntas non necessario aliquid vult necessitate coactionis, vult tamen aliquid necessario necessitate naturalis inclinationis. However, even though the will wants the final end by a necessary inclination, in no way should it be conceded that it it is forced to want it. For force is nothing else than the application of a certain violence. However, the violent, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, is that whose principle is from outside, which suffers the violence, contributing nothing; as for example, a stone when thrown upward, for in no way is it inclined to this motion with respect to itself. But, since the will is a certain inclination, inasmuch as it is a certain appetite, it cannot happen that the will should want something and its inclination not be toward it. And so, it cannot happen that the will wants something by force or violence, even though it does want something by a natural inclination. Therefore, it is clear that the will does not necessarily want something by the necessity of force. Nevertheless, it necessarily wants something by the necessity of natural inclination. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod ille communis appetitus beatitudinis non procedit ex aliqua coactione, sed ex naturali inclinatione. Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, to the first it must be said that the common desire for beatitude does not follow from any force, but from a natural inclination. Ad secundum dicendum, quod quantumcumque aliquod bonum efficaciter moveat voluntatem, non tamen ipsam cogere potest: quia ex quo ponitur quod velit aliquid, ponitur inclinationem habere in illud quod est coactioni contrarium. Sed ex perfectione boni alicuius contingit quod voluntas determinatur ad illud inclinatione naturalis necessitatis. Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that however much a good thing efficaciously moves the will, it is nevertheless unable to force it, for inasmuch as one holds that it wills something, one holds that it has an inclination within it, which is contrary to being forced. But it follows from a certain perfection of that good that the will is determined to it by an inclination of natural necessity. Ad tertium dicendum, quod intellectus aliquid naturaliter intelligit, sicut et voluntas aliquid naturaliter vult; sed coactio non est contraria intellectui secundum suam rationem, sicut et voluntati. Intellectus enim etsi habeat inclinationem in aliquid, non tamen nominat ipsam inclinationem hominis, sed voluntas ipsam inclinationem hominis nominat. Unde quidquid fit secundum voluntatem, fit secundum hominis inclinationem, et per hoc non potest esse violentum. Sed operatio intellectus potest esse contra inclinationem hominis, quae est voluntas; ut cum alicui placet aliqua opinio, sed propter efficaciam rationum deducitur ad assentiendum contrario per intellectum. Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the intellect naturally understands something just as the will naturally wants something. But force is not contrary to the intellect with regard to its definition, as it is for the will. For although the intellect has an inclination toward something, yet it does not indicate the inclination itself of a man, but the will denotes the very inclination of a man. Hence, whatever happens with respect to the will happens with respect to a man's inclination, and in this sense it cannot be violent. But the act of the intellect can be contrary to the inclination of a man, which is the will, as when someone likes an opinion, but is led by the intellect because of the efficacy of arguments to assent to what is contrary. Ad quartum dicendum, quod Augustinus loquitur de necessitate naturali, quam a voluntate non excludimus respectu aliquorum: et haec etiam necessitas in divina voluntate invenitur, sicut et in divino esse; ipse enim est necessarium per seipsum, ut dicitur in 5 Metaphysicae. Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that Augustine spoke of natural necessity, which we do not exclude from the will with regard to some things. And this necessity is also found in the divine will and the divine being; for it is necessary through its very self, as is said in Metaphysics. Unde patet solutio ad quintum. Reply Obj. 5: Hence, the solution to the fifth is clear. Ad sextum dicendum, quod peccatum commissum non trahit cogendo voluntatem, sed inclinando: in quantum privat gratia, per quam homo fortificabatur contra peccatum, et in quantum etiam ex actu peccati relinquitur dispositio et habitus in anima inclinans ad sequens peccatum. Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that committed sin does not draw the will by force but rather by inclination, inasmuch as it removes the grace by which man was being strengthened against sin, and inasmuch as from an act of sin a disposition and habit is left in the soul, inclining it to further sin. Ad septimum dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod homo, quantumcumque sit in statu peccati mortalis, potest peccatum mortale vitare per libertatem voluntatis: et exponunt quod dicitur: non potest non peccare; id est non habere peccatum non potest; sicut et videre dicitur habere visum et uti visu; potest autem, secundum eos, non peccare, id est non uti peccato. Et secundum hoc patet quod nulla necessitas inducitur in voluntate ad consentiendum peccato. Alii autem dicunt, quod sicut homo in statu huius vitae non potest peccatum veniale vitare, non quin possit vitare hoc vel illud, sed quia non potest vitare omnia, ut scilicet nullum committat; ita est etiam et de mortalibus in eo qui gratiam non habet. Et secundum hoc etiam patet quod voluntas non habet necesse velle hoc vel illud, quamvis sine gratia inveniatur deficiens ab indeficienti inclinatione in bonum. Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that regarding this there are two opinions, for some say that howsoever much a man might be in a state of mortal sin, he can avoid mortal sin by the freedom of the will; and they expound on what is said: that he is not able not to sin; that is, that he is not able to have a sin, just as seesing is said to be a possession of sight and also the use of sight. However, according to this, he is able not to sin, that is not to use sin. And in the respect, it is clear that no necessity is imposed upon the will to make it consent to sin. However, others say that just as man in the state of this life cannot avoid venial sin, not indeed that he cannot avoid this or that sin, but that he cannot avoid all venial sin such that he would not commit any, so also is it the case regarding mortal sins in one who does not have grace. And it is also clear in this respect that the will has no necessity to want this or that thing, even though without grace it is found to fall short of an unfailing inclination toward goodness. Ad octavum dicendum, quod forma recepta in aliquo non movet illud in quo recipitur; sed ipsum habere talem formam, est ipsum motum esse; sed movetur ab exteriori agente; sicut corpus quod calefit per ignem, non movetur a calore recepto, sed ab igne. Ita etiam et intellectus non movetur a specie iam recepta, vel a vero quod consequitur ipsam speciem; sed ab aliqua re exteriori quae imprimit in intellectum, sicut est intellectus agens, vel phantasma, vel aliud aliquid huiusmodi. Et praeterea, sicut verum est proportionatum intellectui, ita et bonum affectui. Unde verum propter hoc quod est in apprehensione, non est minus natum movere intellectum quam bonum affectum. Et praeterea, hoc quod voluntas non cogitur a bono, non est ex insufficientia boni ad movendum, sed ex ipsa ratione voluntatis, ut ex dictis patet. Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that a form received into something does not move that in which it is received, but the very having of such a form is itself to be moved; but it is moved by an exterior agent, just as the body that is heated by fire is not moved by the received heat but by the fire. So also is the intellect not moved by an already received form or by the truth which follows upon that form, but rather by an exterior thing that impresses upon the intellect, such as the agent intellect, or a phantasm, or other such things. Furthermore, goodness is proportioned to the affection just as truth is to the intellect. Hence, inasmuch as truth is in the apprehension, it moves the intellect no less than goodness moves the affections. Likewise, that the will is not forced by goodness does not come from an insufficiency in goodness to move it, but from the very notion of the will, as is clear from what was said. Et per hoc patet responsio ad nonum. Reply Obj. 9: From this, the response to the ninth is clear.