Respondeo. Dicendum, quod aliud est dicere, posse abstinere a peccato, et posse perseverare usque ad finem vitae in abstinentia a peccato. Cum enim dicitur aliquis posse abstinere a peccato, potentia fertur super negationem tantum ut scilicet aliquis possit non peccare; et hoc potest quilibet in gratia existens, loquendo de peccato mortali, quia habenti gratiam non inest aliqua habitualis inclinatio in peccatum; quin potius inest ei habitualis inclinatio ad vitandum peccatum. Et ideo, quando occurrit ei aliquid sub ratione peccati mortalis, ex habituali inclinatione dissentit ab illo, nisi in contrarium nitatur, concupiscentias sequendo: quas tamen non necesse habet sequi, etsi non possit vitare quando aliquis motus concupiscentiae insurgit praeveniens totaliter actum liberi arbitrii. I answer that: it must be said that it is one thing to say that one is able to abstain from sin and another to say that one is able to persevere to the end of one’s life in abstinence from sin. For when someone is said to be able to abstain from sin, the ability is brought to bear upon the negation alone, namely, such that someone is able not to sin. Anyone in a state of grace is capable of this, speaking with regard to mortal sin, for there is no habitual inclination toward sin in the one possessing grace; much rather is there in him a habitual inclination to avoid sin. And thus, as soon as something occurs to him under the notion of mortal sin, he disagrees with it from a habitual inclination, unless he should strive to the contrary by following his desires; which are nevertheless not necessary to follow, even though he cannot avoid some motion of desire arising which wholly anticipates the act of free choice. Sic ergo, quia non potest facere quin aliquis motus concupiscentiae totaliter actum liberi arbitrii praeveniat, non potest omnia peccata venialia vitare. Quia vero nullus motus liberi arbitrii in eo praecedit plenam deliberationem pertrahens ad peccatum, quasi inclinatione habitus, ideo potest omnia peccata mortalia vitare. Sed cum dicitur: iste potest perseverare usque ad finem vitae in abstinentia peccati; potentia fertur ad aliquid affirmativum, ut scilicet aliquis ponat se in tali statu quod peccatum in eo esse non possit: aliter enim homo per actum liberi arbitrii non posset se facere perseverare, nisi se impeccabilem faceret. Hoc autem non cadit sub potestate liberi arbitrii, quia virtus motiva exequens ad hoc non se extendit. Et ideo homo causa perseverantiae sibi esse non potest, sed necesse habet perseverantiam a Deo petere. Thus, since he cannot make it that there be no motion of concupiscence wholly preceding the act of free choice, he is unable to avoid all venial sins; but since there is in him no motion of free choice preceding a full deliberation, and dragging him away toward sin as though by a habitual inclination, thus, he is able to avoid all mortal sins. But when it is said that he is able persevere to the end of his life in abstinence from sin; then 'ability’ pertains to something affirmative, namely that someone puts themselves in such a state that sin is not able to exist in him; for otherwise man is is not able to make himself persevere by an act of free choice unless he were to make himself unable to sin. But this does not fall within the power of free choice, for the motive power that carries it out does not attain to this. Therefore man is unable to be a cause of perseverance for himself, but it is necessary for him to beg for this perseverance from God. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod apostolus secundum hoc orabat ut nihil mali facerent, in quantum ad perseverandum in abstinentia mali sufficere non possent nisi divino auxilio assistente. Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that in this respect the Apostle was praying that they might not commit anything evil, inasmuch as they were unable to persevere in abstinence from evil except with the help of divine assistance. Et similiter dicendum ad secundum. Reply Obj. 2: One must respond similarly to the second. Ad tertium dicendum, quod perseverantia dupliciter dicitur. Quandoque enim est specialis virtus; et sic est quidam habitus, cuius actus est habere propositum firmiter operandi. Et sic perseverantiam habet omnis habens gratiam, quamvis non sit usque in finem perseveraturus. Alio modo accipitur perseverantia prout est circumstantia quaedam virtutis designans permanentiam virtutis usque in finem vitae. Et sic perseverantia non est in potestate habentis gratiam. Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that perseverance is said in two ways: for it is sometimes a particular virtue, and in this way it is a certain habit whose act is to possess the intention of persevering firmly; and in this way every one who possess grace has perseverance. In another way perseverance is understood inasmuch as it is a certain circumstance of virtue, denoting the virtue's permanence all the way to the end of life; and in this way perseverance is not within the power of the one who possesses grace. Ad quartum dicendum, quod sicut cum loquimur de natura, non excludimus ea per quae natura conservatur in esse: ita cum loquimur de gratia, non excludimus divinam operationem conservantem gratiam in esse; sine qua nec in esse naturae nec in esse gratiae aliquis persistere valet. Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that just as when we speak of nature we do not exclude that by which nature is preserved in being, so also when we speak of grace, we do not exclude the divine activity preserving grace in being, without which no one is capable of persisting either in the being of nature or the being of grace. Articulus 14 Article 14 Utrum liberum arbitrium possit in bonum sine gratia Whether free choice is capable of the good without grace Quartodecimo quaeritur utrum liberum arbitrium possit in bonum sine gratia. In the fourteenth place we ask whether free choice is capable of the good without grace. Et videtur quod sic. Quia praeceptum non datur de impossibili: unde Hieronymus, dicit: maledictus qui dicit, Deum homini aliquid impossibile praecepisse. Sed homini praecipitur ut bonum faciat. Ergo homo potest per liberum arbitrium bonum facere. Obj. 1: It seems that it is the case, for a command is not given to do what is impossible; hence, Jerome says that the one who says God has commanded something impossible is to be accursed; but it is commanded to man that he do good; therefore he is able to do good by free choice. Praeterea, nullus debet corripi si non faciat quod facere non potest. Sed homo iuste corripitur si omittat facere bonum. Ergo per liberum arbitrium homo bonum facere potest. Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one should be corrected for not doing what one cannot do; but man is corrected justly if he omits to do what is good; therefore man is able to do what is good by free choice. Praeterea, homo per liberum arbitrium aliquo modo peccatum vitare potest, ad minus quantum ad unum singularem actum. Sed vitare peccatum est aliquod bonum. Ergo homo per liberum arbitrium potest aliquod bonum facere. Obj. 3: Furthermore, by free choice man is able to avoid sin in some way, at least with respect to one individual act; but it is good to avoid sin; therefore man is able to do what is good by free choice. Praeterea, unaquaeque res magis potest in id quod est sibi naturale, quam in id quod est sibi contra naturam. Sed liberum arbitrium naturaliter ordinatur in bonum; peccatum autem est ei contra naturam. Ergo magis potest in bonum quam in malum. Sed potest in malum per seipsum. Ergo multo magis in bonum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, each thing is more capable of what is natural to itself than of what is contrary to its own nature; but free choice is naturally ordered to the good, whereas sin is for it against nature. Therefore, it is more capable of good than of evil. But it is capable of evil through itself; therefore, so much more is it capable of good. Praeterea, creatura in se creatoris similitudinem retinet ratione vestigii, et multo magis ratione imaginis. Sed creator potest per seipsum bonum facere. Ergo et creatura; et praecipue liberum arbitrium, quod est ad imaginem. Obj. 5: Furthermore, the creature retains a likeness of the Creator within it by reason of the vestige, and much more by reason of the image; but the Creator is able to do good through himself, and so also the creature, especially free choice, which has been made to the image. Praeterea, secundum philosophum in II Ethic., per eadem corrumpitur virtus et generatur. Sed per liberum arbitrium potest virtus corrumpi; quia peccatum mortale, quod homo potest per liberum arbitrium facere, virtutem corrumpit. Ergo per liberum arbitrium homo potest in generationem boni, quod est virtus. Obj. 6: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 2.1, 1103b6, virtue is begotten and corrupted by the same thing; but by free choice virtue is able to be corrupted, for mortal sin, which man is able to do from free choice, corrupts virtue; therefore man is also able by free choice to beget what is good, which is a virtue. Praeterea, I Ioan. cap. V, 3, dicitur: mandata eius gravia non sunt. Sed illud quod non est grave, potest homo ex libero arbitrio facere. Ergo homo potest ex libero arbitrio mandata implere: quod maxime bonum est. Obj. 7: Furthermore, in I John, 5:3 it is said that his commandments are not heavy; but man is able to do by free choice what is not heavy; therefore man is able to fulfill the commandments by free choice, which is most of all good. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium, secundum Anselmum in libro de libero arbitrio est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis: quae non servatur nisi bene faciendo. Ergo per liberum arbitrium potest aliquis bonum facere. Obj. 8: Furthermore, according to Anselm in the book On Free Choice, free choice is the power of preserving uprightness of will for its own sake; but uprightness of will is not preserved except by acting well; therefore someone is able to do good by free choice. Praeterea, gratia est fortior quam peccatum. Sed gratia non ita ligat liberum arbitrium quin homo possit facere peccatum. Ergo nec peccatum ita ligat liberum arbitrium quin homo existens in peccato absque gratia possit facere bonum. Obj. 9: Furthermore, grace is stronger than sin; but grace does not bind free choice in such a way that man is not able to commit sin; therefore, neither does sin bind free choice in such a way that a man who is in a state of sin is unable to do good without grace. Sed contra. Est quod dicitur Roman. cap. VII, 18: velle, adiacet mihi; perficere autem bonum, non invenio. Ergo homo per liberum arbitrium non potest facere bonum. On the contrary (1) is what it says in Romans 7:18, I can will what is right, but I cannot do it; therefore man is unable to do good by free choice. Praeterea, homo non potest facere bonum nisi vel actu interiori vel exteriori. Sed ad neutrum sufficit liberum arbitrium; quia, ut dicitur Rom. IX, 16, non est volentis, scilicet velle (quod pertinet ad interiorem actum), nec currentis, scilicet currere (quod pertinet ad exteriorem), sed miserentis Dei. Ergo liberum arbitrium sine gratia nullo modo potest facere bonum. Furthermore (2), man is unable to do good except by an exterior or an interior act; but free choice does not suffice for either, for as it says in Romans 9:16, it is not of the one who wills, namely to will, which pertains to an interior act, nor to the one who runs, namely to run, which pertains to what is exterior, but to God who has mercy; therefore free choice cannot do good in any way without grace. Praeterea, Rom. VII, 15, super illud: quod odi malum, illud facio, dicit Glossa: naturaliter quidem homo vult bonum; sed voluntas hoc semper caret effectu, si sine gratia Dei suum velle addiderit. Ergo sine gratia homo non potest efficere bonum. Furthermore (3), the Gloss says on that passage in Romans 7:15, what I hate this I do, that indeed man naturally wants what is good, but the will always lacks this in effect, unless it should augment its willing with God’s grace; therefore man without grace cannot do what is good. Praeterea, cogitatio boni operationem boni praecedit, ut patet ex philosopho in II Ethicorum. Sed homo non potest cogitare bonum per seipsum, quia dicitur II Corinth. cap. III, 5: non quod sufficientes simus cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis. Ergo non potest homo per seipsum bonum operari. Furthermore (4), the thought of the good precedes the activity of the good, as is clear from the Philosopher in the Ethics 2.4, 1105a31; but man is unable to think of the good by himself, for as it says in II Corinthians 3:5 not that we are sufficient to think any thing of ourselves, as of ourselves; therefore man is unable to do what is good by himself. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod nulla res agit ultra suam speciem; sed secundum exigentiam suae speciei unaquaeque res agere potest, cum nulla res propria actione destituatur. I answer that: it must be said that nothing acts outside its own species; but each thing is able to act according to the needs of its own species, for nothing is deprived of its own activity. Est autem duplex bonum: quoddam quod est humanae naturae proportionatum; quoddam vero quod excedit humanae naturae facultatem. Et haec duo bona, si de actibus loquamur, non differunt secundum substantiam actus, sed secundum modum agendi: utpote iste actus qui est dare eleemosynam, est bonum proportionatum viribus humanis, secundum quod ex quadam naturali dilectione vel benignitate homo ad hoc movetur; excedit autem humanae naturae facultatem, secundum quod ad hoc homo inducitur ex caritate, quae mentem hominis Deo unit. Ad hoc ergo bonum quod est supra naturam humanam, constat liberum arbitrium non posse sine gratia; quia, cum per huiusmodi bonum homo vitam aeternam meretur, constat quod sine gratia homo mereri non potest. Illud autem bonum quod est naturae humanae proportionatum, potest homo per liberum arbitrium explere; unde dicit Augustinus quod homo per liberum arbitrium potest agros colere, domos aedificare, et alia plura bona facere sine gratia operante. Quamvis autem huiusmodi bona homo possit facere sine gratia gratum faciente, non tamen potest ea facere sine Deo; cum nulla res possit in naturalem operationem exire nisi virtute divina, quia causa secunda non agit nisi per virtutem causae primae, ut dicitur in Lib. de causis. Et hoc verum est tam in naturalibus agentibus quam in voluntariis. Tamen hoc alio modo habet veritatem in utrisque. However, there exists a twofold good: one that is proportionate to human nature, but another that exceeds the capability of human nature. And these two goods, if we are speaking of actions, do not differ according to the substance of the act, but according to the mode of acting; as for example, the act of giving alms is a good that is proportionate to human powers inasmuch as man is moved to do this from a certain natural love or affability; however it exceeds the capability of human nature inasmuch as man is led to do this by charity, which unites man’s mind to God. Therefore, it is manifest that free choice is not capable of the good that is above nature without grace; and since man merits eternal life by a such a good, it is manifest that man cannot merit without grace. However, man is able by free choice to fulfill that good which is proportionate to human nature. Hence, Augustine says that man is able to cultivate fields, to build houses, and to do many other good things by free choice, but without operating grace. But although man is able to do these good things without sanctifying grace, yet he is unable to do them without God, for nothing is able to spring forth in natural activity without divine power, for a secondary cause does not act except in virtue of the primary cause, as is said in the book On the Causes. And this is true both in natural agents as well as in voluntary ones. But is true in different ways for each of them. Operationis enim naturalis Deus est causa, in quantum dat et conservat id quod est principium naturalis operationis in re, ex quo de necessitate determinata operatio sequitur; sicut dum conservat gravitatem in terra, quae est principium motus deorsum. Sed voluntas hominis non est determinata ad aliquam unam operationem, sed se habet indifferenter ad multas; et sic quodammodo est in potentia, nisi mota per aliquid activum: vel quod ei exterius repraesentatur, sicut est bonum apprehensum; vel quod in ea interius operatur, sicut est ipse Deus; ut Augustinus dicit in Lib. de gratia et libero Arbitr., ostendens multipliciter Deum operari in cordibus hominum. Omnes autem exteriores motus a divina providentia moderantur, secundum quod ipse iudicat aliquem esse excitandum ad bonum his vel illis actionibus. Unde, si gratiam Dei velimus dicere non aliquod habituale donum, sed ipsam misericordiam Dei, per quam interius motum mentis operatur, et exteriora ordinat ad hominis salutem; sic nec ullum bonum homo potest facere sine gratia Dei. Sed communiter loquentes utuntur nomine gratiae pro aliquo dono habituali iustificante. Et sic patet quod utraeque rationes aliquo modo falsum concludunt; et ideo ad utrasque respondendum est. For God is the cause of natural activity in natural things inasmuch as he gives and preserves the principle of natural activity within the thing, from which a determinate activity follows by necessity; as for example, when he preserves heaviness in the earth, which is the principle of downward motion. But man’s will is not determined to any one activity, but it stands indifferently to many things; and so it is in potency in some way, unless moved by something active, which is either represented to it exteriorly, such as is the apprehended good, or else which works interiorly within it, such as is God himself; as Augustine says in the book On Grace and Free Choice, showing in many ways that God works in the hearts of men. However, all exterior motions are also moderated by divine providence, inasmuch as he judges that someone should be incited to the good by these or those actions. Hence, if we do not wish to call God’s grace a habitual gift, but rather God’s mercy, by which he interiorly acts on the mind’s motion and orders exterior things to man’s salvation, then man is not capable of any good without God’s grace. But speaking commonly, we use the name "grace" for any justifying habitual gift. And so it is clear that in some way both arguments conclude something false; therefore, we must respond to each of them. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod illud quod praecipit Deus, non est impossibile homini ad servandum, quia et substantiam actus potest ex libero arbitrio servare, et modum quo elevatur supra facultatem naturae, prout scilicet fit ex caritate, potest servare ex dono gratiae, quamvis non ex solo libero arbitrio. Reply Obj. 1: Hence, to the first it must be said that what God commands is not impossible for man to observe, for he is able to observe the act’s substance by free choice, and he is able by the gift of grace to observe the mode by which it is elevated above nature’s capability, namely, inasmuch as it is done from charity, even though it is not from free choice alone. Ad secundum dicendum, quod recte homo corripitur qui praecepta non implet; quia ex eius negligentia est quod gratiam non habet, per quam potest servare mandata quantum ad modum; cum possit nihilominus per liberum arbitrium ea servare quantum ad substantiam. Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that a man who does not fulfill the commandments is rightly rebuked, for it is from his own negligence that he does not possess grace, by which he would have been able to observe the commandments even with regard to the mode, for he would be able nevertheless to observe them by free choie with respect to their substance. Ad tertium dicendum, quod faciendo actum de genere bonorum, homo vitat peccatum, quamvis non mereatur praemium; et ideo, licet per liberum arbitrium aliquod peccatum homo possit vitare, non tamen sequitur quod in bonum meritorium possit per liberum arbitrium solum. Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that a man avoids sin by performing an act in the genus of the good, even though he would not merit a reward; and so, although man is able to avoid some sin by free choice, yet it does not follow that he is capable of a meritorious good by free choice alone. Ad quartum dicendum, quod in bonum quod est connaturale homini, homo potest per liberum arbitrium; sed bonum meritorium est supra naturam eius, ut dictum est, in corp. art. Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that man is capable of the good that is connatural to him by free choice; but the meritorious good is above his nature, as has been said. Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis in creatura sit similitudo creatoris, non tamen perfecta; hoc enim solius filii est; et ideo non oportet quod quidquid in Deo invenitur, in creatura inveniatur. Reply Obj. 5: to the fifth it must be said that although the creature is a likeness of the Creator, yet it is not perfect; for this belongs to the Son alone; and therefore it is not necessary that whatever is found in God should also be found in the creature. Ad sextum dicendum, quod philosophus loquitur de virtute politica, quae ex actibus acquiritur, non autem de virtute infusa, quae sola est principium actus meritorii. Reply Obj. 6: to the sixth it must be said that the Philosopher is speaking of political virtue, which is acquired from acts, but not of infused virtue, which alone is the principle of a meritorious act. Ad septimum dicendum, quod sicut dicit Augustinus in Lib. de natura et gratia, praecepta Dei intelliguntur esse levia amori, quae sunt dura timori; unde non sequitur quod ea possit implere perfecte, nisi caritatem habens; non habens autem caritatem, etsi possit aliquod unum implere quantum ad substantiam et cum difficultate; non tamen potest implere omnia, sicut nec omnia peccata vitare. Reply Obj. 7: to the seventh it must be said that as Augustine says in the book On Nature and Grace, for love, God’s commands are understood to be light, but for fear, they are hard; hence it does not follow that one can fulfill them perfectly, without possessing charity; but although one not having charity is able to fulfill any one of them with regard to substance and with difficulty, yet one cannot fulfill all of them; just as neither can one avoid all sins. Ad octavum dicendum, quod etsi liberum arbitrium potest servare rectitudinem habitam, non tamen quando eam non habet. Reply Obj. 8: to the eighth it must be said that although free choice is able to preserve an upright habit, yet not when it does not possess it. Ad nonum dicendum, quod liberum arbitrium non indiget ligatione ad hoc quod in bonum meritorium non possit, quia eius naturam excedit; sicut homo, etiam si non ligetur, volare non potest. Reply Obj. 9: to the ninth it must be said that free choice does not require a binding for it not to be capable of a meritorious good, for it exceeds its nature, just as when a man, even though he might be bound, is unable to fly. Ad ea vero quae sunt in contrarium, patet solutio; quia vel procedunt de bono meritorio, vel ostendunt quod sine operatione Dei, homo nullum bonum facere potest. But the solution is clear concerning what was objected on the contrary, for they either proceed with regard to a meritorious good or they show that without God’s activity man is capable of no good thing. Articulus 15 Article 15