Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum liberum arbitrium sit in brutis Whether there is free choice in beasts Secundo quaeritur utrum liberum arbitrium sit in brutis. Second, it is asked whether there is free choice in beasts. Et videtur quod sic. Secundum hoc enim dicimur esse liberi arbitrii, quod actus nostri sunt voluntarii. Sed voluntario et pueri et bruta communicant, secundum Philosophum in 3 Ethicorum. Ergo liberum arbitrium est in brutis. Obj. 1: It seems that there is not, for we are said to have free choice inasmuch as our acts are voluntary; but both children and beasts share in the voluntary, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics. Therefore, there is free choice in beasts. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in 8 Physicorum, in omni eo quod movet seipsum, est moveri et non moveri. Sed bruta movent seipsa; ergo in eis est moveri et non moveri. Sed secundum hoc dicimur esse liberi arbitrii, quod in nobis est agere aliquid, ut patet per Gregorium Nyssenum et Damascenum. Ergo in brutis est liberum arbitrium. Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Physics, in anything that moves itself there is something that is moved and something that is not moved; but beasts move themselves; therefore, to be moved and not to be moved is found within them; but we are said to have free choice inasmuch as to do something exists within us, as is clear from Gregory of Nyssa and John Damascene; therefore, there is free choice in beasts. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium duo importat: scilicet iudicium et libertatem, quorum utrumque est invenire in brutis. Habent enim aliquod iudicium de agendis, quod patet ex hoc quod unum prosequuntur, et aliud fugiunt; habent etiam libertatem, cum possint movere et moveri. Ergo in eis est liberum arbitrium. Obj. 3: Furthermore, free choice implies two things, namely, judgment and freedom, both of which are found among beasts; for they have some judgment about what is to be done, which is clear from the fact that they pursue one thing and flee another. They also have freedom since they can be moved or not. Therefore, there is free choice within them. Praeterea, posita causa, ponitur effectus. Sed Damascenus posuit causam libertatis arbitrii hoc quod anima nostra a versione incipit; quia ex nihilo est, et ideo vertibilis est, et se habet ad multa in potentia. Sed anima bruti a versione incipit. Ergo in ea est liberum arbitrium. Obj. 4: Furthermore, if one posits a cause, then the effect is also to be posited; but John Damascene posits the cause of free choice as being that our soul originates from change, for it exists from nothing, and so it is changeable and is related potentially to many things; but the soul of a beast also originates from change, therefore, there is free choice within it. Praeterea, illud dicitur esse liberum quod non est obligatum alicui. Sed anima bruti non est obligata ad alterum oppositorum, quia potentia ipsius non est determinata ad unum, sicut potentia rerum naturalium, quae semper idem faciunt. Ergo anima bruti habet liberum arbitrium. Obj. 5: Furthermore, that is said to be free which is not bound to another; but the soul of a beast is not bound to either one of two opposites, for its potency is not determined to one thing as are the potencies of natural things, which always behave in the same way. Thus, the soul of a beast has free choice. Praeterea, poena non debetur nisi ei qui habet liberum arbitrium. Sed in Veteri Lege frequenter invenitur poena inflicta brutis, sicut Exodi 19, patet de bestia tangente montem, et 21, de bove cornupeta, et Lev. 20, de iumento cui mulier succubuit. Ergo bruta videntur esse liberi arbitrii. Obj. 6: Furthermore, punishment is only due to someone who has free choice; but in the Old Law punishments were frequently inflicted upon beasts, as is clear from Exodus 19:13 regarding the beasts touching the mountain, and 21:29 regarding the bull that gores with its horns, and Leviticus 20:16 regarding the mule under which a woman lies. Therefore, beasts seem to have free choice. Praeterea, hoc est signum quod homo sit liberi arbitrii, ut sancti dicunt, quia praeceptis ad bonum instigatur, et a malo retrahitur. Videmus autem bruta allici beneficiis, et moveri praeceptis, aut terreri minis ad aliquid agendum vel dimittendum. Ergo bruta sunt liberi arbitrii. Obj. 7: Furthermore, it is a sign that man possesses free choice that he is incited by commands to goodness and withdrawn from evil, as the saints attest. However, we see that beasts are enticed by favors and moved by commands or else frightened by threats to do or to stop from doing something. Thus, beasts have free choice. Praeterea, divinum praeceptum non datur nisi habenti liberum arbitrium. Sed divinum praeceptum datur bruto; unde Ion. cap. 4:7, secundum aliam litteram dicitur quod praecepit dominus vermi, et percussit hederam. Ergo bruta habent liberum arbitrium. Obj. 8: Furthermore, a divine precept is only given to someone having free choice; but a divine command is given to a beast, hence, in John 3:7 it says according to an alternate reading that God commanded the worm and it struck the vine. Thus, beasts have free choice. Sed contra. Ex hoc videtur homo esse ad imaginem Dei quod est liberi arbitrii, ut dicit Damascenus et etiam Bernardus. Sed bruta non sunt ad imaginem Dei. Ergo non sunt liberi arbitrii. On the contrary (1), it seems that man is made to the image of God inasmuch as he possesses free choice, as both Damascene and Bernard say; but beasts are not made to the image of God; thus, they do not have free choice. Praeterea, omne quod est liberi arbitrii, agit, et non solum agitur. Sed bruta non agunt, sed aguntur, ut Damascenus dicit in 2 libro. Ergo bruta non sunt liberi arbitrii. Furthermore (2), all that has free choice acts and is not only acted upon; but as Damascene says, beasts do not act but are acted upon. Therefore, beasts do not have free choice. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod bruta nullo modo sunt liberi arbitrii. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod cum ad operationem nostram tria concurrant, scilicet cognitio, appetitus, et ipsa operatio, tota ratio libertatis ex modo cognitionis dependet. Appetitus enim cognitionem sequitur, cum appetitus non sit nisi boni, quod sibi per vim cognitivam proponitur. Et quod quandoque appetitus videatur cognitionem non sequi, hoc ideo est, quia non circa idem accipitur appetitus et cognitionis iudicium: est enim appetitus de particulari operabili, iudicium vero rationis quandoque est de aliquo universali, quod est quandoque contrarium appetitui. Sed iudicium de hoc particulari operabili, ut nunc, nunquam potest esse contrarium appetitui. Qui enim vult fornicari, quamvis sciat in universali fornicationem malum esse, tamen iudicat sibi ut nunc bonum esse fornicationis actum, et sub specie boni ipsum eligit. Nullus enim intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit. I answer that: it must be said that beasts do not have free choice in any way. In evidence of this it must be known that since three things come together in our activities, namely, knowledge, desire, and the activity itself, the entire notion of freedom depends upon the manner of knowledge. For desire follows upon knowledge, since desire is only for the good that is proposed to oneself by the knowing faculty. If at some times the desire does not appear to follow upon knowledge, this is because the desire and the judgment of knowledge is not taken with regard to the same thing. For desire is concerned with the particular thing that is done, whereas reason's judgment is sometimes concerned with a universal, which is at times contrary to desire. For one who wishes to commit fornication, even though he knows that fornication is bad in general, yet he judges this act of fornication to be good for himself at that time, and he chooses it under the species of the good. For no one acts intending what is evil, as Dionysius says. Appetitum autem, si non sit aliquid prohibens, sequitur motus vel operatio. Et ideo, si iudicium cognitivae non sit in potestate alicuius, sed sit aliunde determinatum, nec appetitus erit in potestate eius, et per consequens nec motus vel operatio absolute. Iudicium autem est in potestate iudicantis secundum quod potest de suo iudicio iudicare: de eo enim quod est in nostra potestate, possumus iudicare. Iudicare autem de iudicio suo est solius rationis, quae super actum suum reflectitur, et cognoscit habitudines rerum de quibus iudicat, et per quas iudicat: unde totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta. Unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad rationem, sic se habet ad liberum arbitrium. Ratio autem plene et perfecte invenitur solum in homine: unde in eo solum liberum arbitrium plenarie invenitur. Bruta autem habent aliquam similitudinem rationis, in quantum participant quamdam prudentiam naturalem, secundum quod natura inferior attingit aliqualiter ad id quod est naturae superioris. Quae quidem similitudo est secundum quod habent iudicium ordinatum de aliquibus. However, if there is not something preventing it, then motion or activity follows upon desire. Hence, if reason's judgment is not in one's power but is determined by another, then not only will the desire not be in one's power, but as a consequence neither will the motion or operation be in one's power, absolutely speaking. Yet judgment is in the power of the one judging inasmuch as one can judge about one's own judgment, for we are able to judge what is in our power. However, to judge one's own judgment belongs to reason alone which reflects upon its own act, and which knows the conditions of the things about which and by which it judges. Hence, the entire root of freedom is constituted within reason. Thus, anything stands to free will as it stands to reason. But reason is only perfectly and fully found within man; thus in him alone free will is found to exist completely. However, brute animals have a certain likeness of reason inasmuch as they participate in a certain natural prudence, by which the lower nature attains to some extent to what belongs to a higher nature. There is a likeness inasmuch as they have a judgment that is directed by others. Sed hoc iudicium est eis ex naturali aestimatione, non ex aliqua collatione, cum rationem sui iudicii ignorent; propter quod huiusmodi iudicium non se extendit ad omnia, sicut iudicium rationis, sed ad quaedam determinata. Et similiter est in eis quaedam similitudo liberi arbitrii, in quantum possunt agere vel non agere unum et idem, secundum suum iudicium, ut sic sit in eis quasi quaedam conditionata libertas: possunt enim agere, si iudicant esse agendum, vel non agere, si non iudicant. But they have this judgment by means of a certain natural assessment and not by any comparison, since they do not know the reasons for their own judgment. It is for this reason that judgment of this kind does not extend to all things as does the judgment of reason, but to certain determinate things. There is similarly found in them a likeness of free choice inasmuch as they can perform or not perform one and the same thing according to their judgment, so that they possess something like a conditional freedom; for they can do something if they judge it should be done, or not do something if they judge it should not be done. Sed quia iudicium eorum est determinatum ad unum, per consequens et appetitus et actio ad unum determinatur; unde, secundum Augustinum, 11 Super Genesim ad litteram, moventur visis; et secundum Damascenum, aguntur passionibus, quia scilicet naturaliter de tali viso et de tali passione sic iudicant; unde necesse habent ab ipsa visione alicuius rei vel a passione insurgente moveri ad fugiendum vel prosequendum, sicut ovis viso lupo necesse habet timere et fugere; et canis insurgente passione irae, necesse habet latrare, et prosequi ad nocendum. Sed homo non necessario movetur ab his quae sibi occurrunt, vel a passionibus insurgentibus quia potest ea accipere vel refugere; et ideo homo est liberi arbitrii, non autem bruta. But since their judgment is determined to one thing, it follows that their desire and their action are determined to one thing. Thus, according to Augustine in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 11, they are moved by visible things; and they act by their passions, according to Damascene, for it is clear that they naturally judge about what is seen and about such passions. Thus, they must necessarily be moved by the sight of something or by some passion rising up, whether to run away or to pursue, as a sheep when seeing a wolf must by necessity be afraid and flee, and a dog when it becomes aroused with the passion of anger must necessarily bark and run to attack. But a man is not necessarily moved by the things that happen to him or by the passions that rise up, for he can accept them or refuse them; and thus man possesses free choice, but not brute animals. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod voluntarium ponitur a Philosopho in brutis, non secundum quod convenit cum voluntate, sed secundum quod opponitur violento; ut sic dicatur voluntarium esse in brutis vel pueris, quia, sua sponte aliquid faciunt, non propter usum liberae electionis. Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the voluntary is placed by the Philosopher in brute animals not inasmuch as it comes from the will but inasmuch as it is opposed to the will; such thus it is said that the voluntary is in brutes or in children since they do things spontaneously, but not because of the use of free choice. Ad secundum dicendum, quod potentia motiva brutorum secundum se considerata non magis inclinatur ad unum oppositorum quam ad alterum; et sic dicitur quod possunt moveri et non moveri. Sed iudicium quo applicatur potentia motiva ad alterum oppositorum, est determinatum; et sic non sunt liberi arbitrii. Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the motive power of brutes, considered in itself, is not inclined more to one opposite than to another; and so it is said that they are able to move and not to move. But the judgment by which the motive power is applied to either opposite is determined, and so they do not have free choice. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis in brutis sit quaedam indifferentia actionum, tamen non potest proprie dici quod sit in eis libertas actionum, sive agendi vel non agendi: tum quia actiones, cum per corpus exerceantur, cogi possunt vel prohiberi, non solum in brutis, sed in hominibus, unde nec ipse homo dicitur liber actionis suae; tum etiam, quia quamvis sit indifferentia ad agere et non agere in bruto, considerata ipsa actione secundum seipsam, tamen considerato ordine eius ad iudicium, a quo provenit quod est determinatum ad unum, etiam ad ipsas actiones obligatio quaedam derivatur, ut non possit in eis inveniri ratio libertatis absolute. Tamen, dato quod in eis esset libertas aliqua, et iudicium aliquod, non tamen sequeretur quod esset in eis libertas iudicii, cum iudicium eorum sit naturaliter determinatum ad unum. Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that even though there is in animals a certain indifference of action, yet it cannot properly be said that they possess freedom of action, whether for acting or for not acting. This is the case first of all because actions that are performed by means of the body can be forced or restrained not only in brute animals but also in men, and in this way not even man himself is said to be free in his actions; and secondly because even though there is indifference toward acting and not acting among brute beasts, considering the action in itself, yet if one considers the action's ordering to the judgment from which it comes, which is determined to one thing, then a certain binding is derived even to the actions themselves so that the notion of freedom cannot be found in them, speaking absolutely. But even granting that there is some freedom and some judgment found in them, it does not follow that they have the freedom of judgment, for their judgment is naturally determined to one thing. Ad quartum dicendum, quod incipere a versione, vel esse ex nihilo, non assignat Damascenus causam libertatis arbitrii, sed causam flexibilitatis liberi arbitrii in malum; causam autem liberi arbitrii assignat tam Damascenus quam Gregorius quam Augustinus rationem. Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that Damascene does not assign the cause of free choice as originating from change or from existing out of nothing, but rather that these are the cause of the changeableness of the will with respect to what is evil; however, Damascene, Gregory of Nyssa, and even Augustine assign reason as the cause of free choice. Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis potentia motiva in brutis non sit determinata ad unum, tamen iudicium eorum de agendis est determinatum ad unum, ut dictum est, in corp. et ad 3 arg. Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that even though the motive power in beasts is not determined to one thing, yet their judgment of what to do is determined to one thing, as has been said. Ad sextum dicendum, quod cum bruta sint facta in obsequium hominis, secundum hoc de brutis disponitur quod hominibus expedit, propter quos facta sunt. Puniuntur ergo bruta lege divina, non propter hoc quod ipsa peccent, sed propter hoc quod ex eorum poena homines puniantur in eorum possessione, vel terreantur ex ipsa poenae acerbitate, vel etiam instruantur ex mysterii significatione. Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that since brute beasts have been made for the service of man, beasts are disposed of inasmuch as it is useful for man, for whom they have been made. Thus beasts are punished by divine law not because they commit sin, but because by their punishment men are punished, being their possessors, or so that they might be frightened by the harshness of the punishment, and likewise so that they might be instructed regarding the meaning of the mystery. Ad septimum dicendum, quod tam homines quam bruta beneficiis inducuntur, et flagellis prohibentur, vel praeceptis et prohibitionibus; sed diversimode: quia in potestate hominum est ut eisdem rebus similiter repraesentatis, sive sint praecepta et prohibitiones, sive sint beneficia et flagella, eligant vel fugiant iudicio rationis; sed in brutis est iudicium naturale determinatum ad hoc quod id quod uno modo proponitur vel occurrit, eodem modo accipiatur vel fugiatur. Contingit autem ex memoria praeteritorum beneficiorum vel flagellorum ut bruta aliquid apprehendant quasi amicum, et prosequendum vel sperandum; et aliquid quasi inimicum, et fugiendum vel timendum: et ideo post flagella, ex passione timoris, quae inde eis insurgit, inducuntur ad obediendum nutui instructoris. Nec est necessarium huiusmodi brutis fieri propter libertatem arbitrii, sed propter indifferentiam actionum. Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that both men as well as brute beasts are induced by favors and restrained by blows, commands, and prohibitions; but in different ways, for it is in the power of man to choose or to refuse by the judgment of reason things similarly represented either as commands and prohibitions or as favors and afflictions. But in brutes there is a natural judgment determined by the fact that whatever is proposed or happens in one particular way is accepted or refused in that same way. But it happens that from the memory of past favors or afflictions that beasts perceive something as friendly and to be pursued or hoped for, or else as unfriendly and to be fled or feared. Thus, after being struck by the passion of fear that rises upon them, they are led to obey the will of the instructor; and it is not necessary that this happen to such beasts because of freedom of choice, but rather because of the indifference of their actions. Ad octavum dicendum, quod secundum Augustinum Super Genesim ad litteram, praeceptum divinum brutis factum, non ita factum esse credendum est ut vox aliqua iussionis de nube facta sit eis aliquibus verbis, quae rationales animae audientes, intelligere atque obedire solent: non enim hoc acceperunt ut possint bestiae vel aves. In suo tamen genere obtemperant Deo: non rationalis voluntatis arbitrio; sed, sicut movet illa omnia temporibus opportunis, non ipse temporaliter motus, moventur bruta temporaliter, ut iussa eius efficiant. Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, that the divine precept made to brutes is not to be believed to have been made to them like some voice of command coming down from the clouds with certain words, which rational souls are accustomed to understand and obey upon hearing; for they did not perceive this as did the birds and the beasts. But they submit to God according to their kind, not by the choice of a rational will, but in the way that he moves all things in their appropriate times without him being moved in time; brutes are moved in time such that they fulfill his command. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum liberum arbitrium sit in Deo Whether there is free choice in God Tertio quaeritur utrum liberum arbitrium sit in Deo. Third, it is asked whether there is free choice in God. Et videtur quod non. Liberum enim arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Sed ratio non competit Deo, cum nominet cognitionem discursivam; Deus autem simplici intuitu omnia cognoscit. Ergo Deo liberum arbitrium non competit. Obj. 1: It seems that there is not, for free choice is a faculty of the will and reason. But reason does not belong to God, since it denotes discursive knowledge. However, God knows all things by a simple glance, therefore, free choice does not belong to God. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium est facultas qua bonum et malum eligitur, ut per Augustinum patet. Sed in Deo non est facultas eligendi malum. Ergo in Deo non est liberum arbitrium. Obj. 2: Furthermore, free choice is a faculty by which goodness and evil are chosen, as is clear from Augustine; but in God there is no faculty for choosing evil, thus, free choice is not in God. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium est potentia ad oppositos actus se habens. Sed Deus non se habet ad opposita, cum sit immutabilis, nec in malum flecti possit. Ergo liberum arbitrium non est in Deo. Obj. 3: Furthermore, free choice is a power related toward opposite acts. But God is not related toward opposite acts, since he is unchangeable and cannot be changed to evil. Thus, free choice is not in God. Praeterea, actus liberi arbitrii est eligere, ut patet per definitionem inductam. Electio autem Deo non competit; cum sequatur consilium, quod est dubitantis et inquirentis. Ergo in Deo non est liberum arbitrium. Obj. 4: Furthermore, to choose is an act of free choice, as is clear from the given definition. But choice does not pertain to God, since it follows upon counsel, which pertains to one doubting and inquiring. Thus, free choice is not in God. Sed contra. Est quod dicit Anselmus: si posse peccare esset pars liberi arbitrii, et Deus et angeli liberum arbitrium non haberent; quod est absurdum. Ergo conveniens est dicere, quod Deus habeat liberum arbitrium. On the contrary (1) is what Anselm says, that if being able to sin is a part of free choice, God and the angels would not have free choice, which is most absurd. Thus, it is appropriate to say that God has free choice. Praeterea. 1 Cor. 12:11: haec omnia operatur unus atque idem Spiritus, dividens singulis prout vult; Glossa pro libero voluntatis arbitrio. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus habet liberum arbitrium, et eadem ratione Pater et Filius. Furthermore (2), Furthermore, on 1 Cor. 12:11 all these are inspired by one and the same Spirit, who apportions to each one individually as he wills, the Gloss has for the will's free choice. Therefore, the Holy Spirit has free choice, and likewise the Father and Son for the same reason. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod in Deo est invenire liberum arbitrium; alio tamen modo in eo, et in angelis, et in hominibus. Quod enim in Deo sit liberum arbitrium, hinc apparet quod ipse habet voluntatis suae finem, quem naturaliter vult, scilicet suam bonitatem; alia vero omnia vult quasi ordinata ad hunc finem: quae quidem, absolute loquendo, non necessario vult, ut in praecedenti quaestione ostensum est, eo quod bonitas eius his quae ad ipsam ordinantur, et manifestatio convenienter pluribus modis fieri potest; unde remanet ei liberum iudicium ad volendum hoc vel illud, sicut in nobis est. I answer that: it must be said that there is free choice in God, but it is in him in another way than is found in angels and in men. That there is free choice in God is clear from the fact that he possesses the end of his own will which he naturally wills, namely his own goodness; but he wills all other things as though ordered to this end, which indeed he does not will necessarily, speaking absolutely, as was shown in the preceding question, inasmuch as the goodness of the end does not require the things which are ordered to it. The demonstration of this fact can be suitably shown in multiple ways. Hence, there exists in him free judgment to choose this or that thing, as there is also in us. Et propter hoc oportet dicere, in Deo liberum arbitrium inveniri, et similiter in angelis: non enim ipsis ex necessitate volunt quidquid volunt; et hoc quod volunt, ex libero iudicio volunt, sicut et nos. Aliter tamen invenitur liberum arbitrium in nobis et in angelis et in Deo: variatis enim prioribus necesse est posteriora variari. Facultas autem liberi arbitrii duo praesupponit: scilicet naturam, et vim cognitivam. For this reason one must say that there is free choice in God, and likewise that it exists in the angels, for they also do not will what they will out of necessity; and whatever they will, they will by means of free judgment, just like us. Nevertheless, free choice is found differently in us, in angels, and in God; for if prior things are changed, it is necessary that posterior things change also. But, the faculty of free choice presupposes two things, namely nature and the knowing power.