Respondeo. Dicendum, quod bruta nullo modo sunt liberi arbitrii. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod cum ad operationem nostram tria concurrant, scilicet cognitio, appetitus, et ipsa operatio, tota ratio libertatis ex modo cognitionis dependet. Appetitus enim cognitionem sequitur, cum appetitus non sit nisi boni, quod sibi per vim cognitivam proponitur. Et quod quandoque appetitus videatur cognitionem non sequi, hoc ideo est, quia non circa idem accipitur appetitus et cognitionis iudicium: est enim appetitus de particulari operabili, iudicium vero rationis quandoque est de aliquo universali, quod est quandoque contrarium appetitui. Sed iudicium de hoc particulari operabili, ut nunc, nunquam potest esse contrarium appetitui. Qui enim vult fornicari, quamvis sciat in universali fornicationem malum esse, tamen iudicat sibi ut nunc bonum esse fornicationis actum, et sub specie boni ipsum eligit. Nullus enim intendens ad malum operatur, ut Dionysius dicit. I answer that: it must be said that beasts do not have free choice in any way. In evidence of this it must be known that since three things come together in our activities, namely, knowledge, desire, and the activity itself, the entire notion of freedom depends upon the manner of knowledge. For desire follows upon knowledge, since desire is only for the good that is proposed to oneself by the knowing faculty. If at some times the desire does not appear to follow upon knowledge, this is because the desire and the judgment of knowledge is not taken with regard to the same thing. For desire is concerned with the particular thing that is done, whereas reason's judgment is sometimes concerned with a universal, which is at times contrary to desire. For one who wishes to commit fornication, even though he knows that fornication is bad in general, yet he judges this act of fornication to be good for himself at that time, and he chooses it under the species of the good. For no one acts intending what is evil, as Dionysius says. Appetitum autem, si non sit aliquid prohibens, sequitur motus vel operatio. Et ideo, si iudicium cognitivae non sit in potestate alicuius, sed sit aliunde determinatum, nec appetitus erit in potestate eius, et per consequens nec motus vel operatio absolute. Iudicium autem est in potestate iudicantis secundum quod potest de suo iudicio iudicare: de eo enim quod est in nostra potestate, possumus iudicare. Iudicare autem de iudicio suo est solius rationis, quae super actum suum reflectitur, et cognoscit habitudines rerum de quibus iudicat, et per quas iudicat: unde totius libertatis radix est in ratione constituta. Unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad rationem, sic se habet ad liberum arbitrium. Ratio autem plene et perfecte invenitur solum in homine: unde in eo solum liberum arbitrium plenarie invenitur. Bruta autem habent aliquam similitudinem rationis, in quantum participant quamdam prudentiam naturalem, secundum quod natura inferior attingit aliqualiter ad id quod est naturae superioris. Quae quidem similitudo est secundum quod habent iudicium ordinatum de aliquibus. However, if there is not something preventing it, then motion or activity follows upon desire. Hence, if reason's judgment is not in one's power but is determined by another, then not only will the desire not be in one's power, but as a consequence neither will the motion or operation be in one's power, absolutely speaking. Yet judgment is in the power of the one judging inasmuch as one can judge about one's own judgment, for we are able to judge what is in our power. However, to judge one's own judgment belongs to reason alone which reflects upon its own act, and which knows the conditions of the things about which and by which it judges. Hence, the entire root of freedom is constituted within reason. Thus, anything stands to free will as it stands to reason. But reason is only perfectly and fully found within man; thus in him alone free will is found to exist completely. However, brute animals have a certain likeness of reason inasmuch as they participate in a certain natural prudence, by which the lower nature attains to some extent to what belongs to a higher nature. There is a likeness inasmuch as they have a judgment that is directed by others. Sed hoc iudicium est eis ex naturali aestimatione, non ex aliqua collatione, cum rationem sui iudicii ignorent; propter quod huiusmodi iudicium non se extendit ad omnia, sicut iudicium rationis, sed ad quaedam determinata. Et similiter est in eis quaedam similitudo liberi arbitrii, in quantum possunt agere vel non agere unum et idem, secundum suum iudicium, ut sic sit in eis quasi quaedam conditionata libertas: possunt enim agere, si iudicant esse agendum, vel non agere, si non iudicant. But they have this judgment by means of a certain natural assessment and not by any comparison, since they do not know the reasons for their own judgment. It is for this reason that judgment of this kind does not extend to all things as does the judgment of reason, but to certain determinate things. There is similarly found in them a likeness of free choice inasmuch as they can perform or not perform one and the same thing according to their judgment, so that they possess something like a conditional freedom; for they can do something if they judge it should be done, or not do something if they judge it should not be done. Sed quia iudicium eorum est determinatum ad unum, per consequens et appetitus et actio ad unum determinatur; unde, secundum Augustinum, 11 Super Genesim ad litteram, moventur visis; et secundum Damascenum, aguntur passionibus, quia scilicet naturaliter de tali viso et de tali passione sic iudicant; unde necesse habent ab ipsa visione alicuius rei vel a passione insurgente moveri ad fugiendum vel prosequendum, sicut ovis viso lupo necesse habet timere et fugere; et canis insurgente passione irae, necesse habet latrare, et prosequi ad nocendum. Sed homo non necessario movetur ab his quae sibi occurrunt, vel a passionibus insurgentibus quia potest ea accipere vel refugere; et ideo homo est liberi arbitrii, non autem bruta. But since their judgment is determined to one thing, it follows that their desire and their action are determined to one thing. Thus, according to Augustine in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 11, they are moved by visible things; and they act by their passions, according to Damascene, for it is clear that they naturally judge about what is seen and about such passions. Thus, they must necessarily be moved by the sight of something or by some passion rising up, whether to run away or to pursue, as a sheep when seeing a wolf must by necessity be afraid and flee, and a dog when it becomes aroused with the passion of anger must necessarily bark and run to attack. But a man is not necessarily moved by the things that happen to him or by the passions that rise up, for he can accept them or refuse them; and thus man possesses free choice, but not brute animals. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod voluntarium ponitur a Philosopho in brutis, non secundum quod convenit cum voluntate, sed secundum quod opponitur violento; ut sic dicatur voluntarium esse in brutis vel pueris, quia, sua sponte aliquid faciunt, non propter usum liberae electionis. Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that the voluntary is placed by the Philosopher in brute animals not inasmuch as it comes from the will but inasmuch as it is opposed to the will; such thus it is said that the voluntary is in brutes or in children since they do things spontaneously, but not because of the use of free choice. Ad secundum dicendum, quod potentia motiva brutorum secundum se considerata non magis inclinatur ad unum oppositorum quam ad alterum; et sic dicitur quod possunt moveri et non moveri. Sed iudicium quo applicatur potentia motiva ad alterum oppositorum, est determinatum; et sic non sunt liberi arbitrii. Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the motive power of brutes, considered in itself, is not inclined more to one opposite than to another; and so it is said that they are able to move and not to move. But the judgment by which the motive power is applied to either opposite is determined, and so they do not have free choice. Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis in brutis sit quaedam indifferentia actionum, tamen non potest proprie dici quod sit in eis libertas actionum, sive agendi vel non agendi: tum quia actiones, cum per corpus exerceantur, cogi possunt vel prohiberi, non solum in brutis, sed in hominibus, unde nec ipse homo dicitur liber actionis suae; tum etiam, quia quamvis sit indifferentia ad agere et non agere in bruto, considerata ipsa actione secundum seipsam, tamen considerato ordine eius ad iudicium, a quo provenit quod est determinatum ad unum, etiam ad ipsas actiones obligatio quaedam derivatur, ut non possit in eis inveniri ratio libertatis absolute. Tamen, dato quod in eis esset libertas aliqua, et iudicium aliquod, non tamen sequeretur quod esset in eis libertas iudicii, cum iudicium eorum sit naturaliter determinatum ad unum. Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that even though there is in animals a certain indifference of action, yet it cannot properly be said that they possess freedom of action, whether for acting or for not acting. This is the case first of all because actions that are performed by means of the body can be forced or restrained not only in brute animals but also in men, and in this way not even man himself is said to be free in his actions; and secondly because even though there is indifference toward acting and not acting among brute beasts, considering the action in itself, yet if one considers the action's ordering to the judgment from which it comes, which is determined to one thing, then a certain binding is derived even to the actions themselves so that the notion of freedom cannot be found in them, speaking absolutely. But even granting that there is some freedom and some judgment found in them, it does not follow that they have the freedom of judgment, for their judgment is naturally determined to one thing. Ad quartum dicendum, quod incipere a versione, vel esse ex nihilo, non assignat Damascenus causam libertatis arbitrii, sed causam flexibilitatis liberi arbitrii in malum; causam autem liberi arbitrii assignat tam Damascenus quam Gregorius quam Augustinus rationem. Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that Damascene does not assign the cause of free choice as originating from change or from existing out of nothing, but rather that these are the cause of the changeableness of the will with respect to what is evil; however, Damascene, Gregory of Nyssa, and even Augustine assign reason as the cause of free choice. Ad quintum dicendum, quod quamvis potentia motiva in brutis non sit determinata ad unum, tamen iudicium eorum de agendis est determinatum ad unum, ut dictum est, in corp. et ad 3 arg. Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that even though the motive power in beasts is not determined to one thing, yet their judgment of what to do is determined to one thing, as has been said. Ad sextum dicendum, quod cum bruta sint facta in obsequium hominis, secundum hoc de brutis disponitur quod hominibus expedit, propter quos facta sunt. Puniuntur ergo bruta lege divina, non propter hoc quod ipsa peccent, sed propter hoc quod ex eorum poena homines puniantur in eorum possessione, vel terreantur ex ipsa poenae acerbitate, vel etiam instruantur ex mysterii significatione. Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that since brute beasts have been made for the service of man, beasts are disposed of inasmuch as it is useful for man, for whom they have been made. Thus beasts are punished by divine law not because they commit sin, but because by their punishment men are punished, being their possessors, or so that they might be frightened by the harshness of the punishment, and likewise so that they might be instructed regarding the meaning of the mystery. Ad septimum dicendum, quod tam homines quam bruta beneficiis inducuntur, et flagellis prohibentur, vel praeceptis et prohibitionibus; sed diversimode: quia in potestate hominum est ut eisdem rebus similiter repraesentatis, sive sint praecepta et prohibitiones, sive sint beneficia et flagella, eligant vel fugiant iudicio rationis; sed in brutis est iudicium naturale determinatum ad hoc quod id quod uno modo proponitur vel occurrit, eodem modo accipiatur vel fugiatur. Contingit autem ex memoria praeteritorum beneficiorum vel flagellorum ut bruta aliquid apprehendant quasi amicum, et prosequendum vel sperandum; et aliquid quasi inimicum, et fugiendum vel timendum: et ideo post flagella, ex passione timoris, quae inde eis insurgit, inducuntur ad obediendum nutui instructoris. Nec est necessarium huiusmodi brutis fieri propter libertatem arbitrii, sed propter indifferentiam actionum. Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that both men as well as brute beasts are induced by favors and restrained by blows, commands, and prohibitions; but in different ways, for it is in the power of man to choose or to refuse by the judgment of reason things similarly represented either as commands and prohibitions or as favors and afflictions. But in brutes there is a natural judgment determined by the fact that whatever is proposed or happens in one particular way is accepted or refused in that same way. But it happens that from the memory of past favors or afflictions that beasts perceive something as friendly and to be pursued or hoped for, or else as unfriendly and to be fled or feared. Thus, after being struck by the passion of fear that rises upon them, they are led to obey the will of the instructor; and it is not necessary that this happen to such beasts because of freedom of choice, but rather because of the indifference of their actions. Ad octavum dicendum, quod secundum Augustinum Super Genesim ad litteram, praeceptum divinum brutis factum, non ita factum esse credendum est ut vox aliqua iussionis de nube facta sit eis aliquibus verbis, quae rationales animae audientes, intelligere atque obedire solent: non enim hoc acceperunt ut possint bestiae vel aves. In suo tamen genere obtemperant Deo: non rationalis voluntatis arbitrio; sed, sicut movet illa omnia temporibus opportunis, non ipse temporaliter motus, moventur bruta temporaliter, ut iussa eius efficiant. Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that Augustine says in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 9.14, that the divine precept made to brutes is not to be believed to have been made to them like some voice of command coming down from the clouds with certain words, which rational souls are accustomed to understand and obey upon hearing; for they did not perceive this as did the birds and the beasts. But they submit to God according to their kind, not by the choice of a rational will, but in the way that he moves all things in their appropriate times without him being moved in time; brutes are moved in time such that they fulfill his command. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum liberum arbitrium sit in Deo Whether there is free choice in God Tertio quaeritur utrum liberum arbitrium sit in Deo. In the third place we ask whether there is free choice in God. Et videtur quod non. Liberum enim arbitrium est facultas voluntatis et rationis. Sed ratio non competit Deo, cum nominet cognitionem discursivam; Deus autem simplici intuitu omnia cognoscit. Ergo Deo liberum arbitrium non competit. Obj. 1: It seems that there is not, for free choice is a faculty of the will and reason. But reason does not belong to God, since it denotes discursive knowledge. However, God knows all things by a simple glance, therefore, free choice does not belong to God. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium est facultas qua bonum et malum eligitur, ut per Augustinum patet. Sed in Deo non est facultas eligendi malum. Ergo in Deo non est liberum arbitrium. Obj. 2: Furthermore, free choice is a faculty by which goodness and evil are chosen, as is clear from Augustine; but in God there is no faculty for choosing evil, thus, free choice is not in God. Praeterea, liberum arbitrium est potentia ad oppositos actus se habens. Sed Deus non se habet ad opposita, cum sit immutabilis, nec in malum flecti possit. Ergo liberum arbitrium non est in Deo. Obj. 3: Furthermore, free choice is a power related toward opposite acts. But God is not related toward opposite acts, since he is unchangeable and cannot be changed to evil. Thus, free choice is not in God. Praeterea, actus liberi arbitrii est eligere, ut patet per definitionem inductam. Electio autem Deo non competit; cum sequatur consilium, quod est dubitantis et inquirentis. Ergo in Deo non est liberum arbitrium. Obj. 4: Furthermore, to choose is an act of free choice, as is clear from the given definition. But choice does not pertain to God, since it follows upon counsel, which pertains to one doubting and inquiring. Thus, free choice is not in God. Sed contra. Est quod dicit Anselmus: si posse peccare esset pars liberi arbitrii, et Deus et angeli liberum arbitrium non haberent; quod est absurdum. Ergo conveniens est dicere, quod Deus habeat liberum arbitrium. On the contrary (1) is what Anselm says, that if being able to sin is a part of free choice, God and the angels would not have free choice, which is most absurd. Thus, it is appropriate to say that God has free choice. Praeterea. 1 Cor. 12:11: haec omnia operatur unus atque idem Spiritus, dividens singulis prout vult; Glossa pro libero voluntatis arbitrio. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus habet liberum arbitrium, et eadem ratione Pater et Filius. Furthermore (2), Furthermore, on 1 Cor. 12:11 all these are inspired by one and the same Spirit, who apportions to each one individually as he wills, the Gloss has for the will's free choice. Therefore, the Holy Spirit has free choice, and likewise the Father and Son for the same reason. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod in Deo est invenire liberum arbitrium; alio tamen modo in eo, et in angelis, et in hominibus. Quod enim in Deo sit liberum arbitrium, hinc apparet quod ipse habet voluntatis suae finem, quem naturaliter vult, scilicet suam bonitatem; alia vero omnia vult quasi ordinata ad hunc finem: quae quidem, absolute loquendo, non necessario vult, ut in praecedenti quaestione ostensum est, eo quod bonitas eius his quae ad ipsam ordinantur, et manifestatio convenienter pluribus modis fieri potest; unde remanet ei liberum iudicium ad volendum hoc vel illud, sicut in nobis est. I answer that: it must be said that there is free choice in God, but it is in him in another way than is found in angels and in men. That there is free choice in God is clear from the fact that he possesses the end of his own will which he naturally wills, namely his own goodness; but he wills all other things as though ordered to this end, which indeed he does not will necessarily, speaking absolutely, as was shown in the preceding question, inasmuch as the goodness of the end does not require the things which are ordered to it. The demonstration of this fact can be suitably shown in multiple ways. Hence, there exists in him free judgment to choose this or that thing, as there is also in us. Et propter hoc oportet dicere, in Deo liberum arbitrium inveniri, et similiter in angelis: non enim ipsis ex necessitate volunt quidquid volunt; et hoc quod volunt, ex libero iudicio volunt, sicut et nos. Aliter tamen invenitur liberum arbitrium in nobis et in angelis et in Deo: variatis enim prioribus necesse est posteriora variari. Facultas autem liberi arbitrii duo praesupponit: scilicet naturam, et vim cognitivam. For this reason one must say that there is free choice in God, and likewise that it exists in the angels, for they also do not will what they will out of necessity; and whatever they will, they will by means of free judgment, just like us. Nevertheless, free choice is found differently in us, in angels, and in God; for if prior things are changed, it is necessary that posterior things change also. But, the faculty of free choice presupposes two things, namely nature and the knowing power. Natura quidem alterius modi est in Deo quam sit in hominibus et in angelis. Natura enim divina increata est, et est suum esse et sua bonitas; unde in eo non potest esse defectus aliquis nec quantum ad esse nec quantum ad bonitatem. Natura autem humana et angelica creata est, ex nihilo principium sumens; unde, quantum est de se, possibilis est ad defectum. Et propter hoc, liberum arbitrium Dei nullo modo flexibile est ad malum; liberum vero arbitrium hominis et angeli, in suis naturalibus consideratum, in malum flexibile est. Of course, nature exists in God in a different way than it does in men and in angels. For the divine nature is uncreated and it is its own being and goodness, hence there cannot be in it any defect, neither according to being, nor according to goodness. However, human and angelic nature is created, taking its beginning from nothing; hence, in itself, it is capable of lack. It is for this reason that God's free choice is in no way pliable toward evil, but the free choice of man and the angels, considered in their own natures, is pliable towards evil. Cognitio etiam alterius modi invenitur in homine quam in Deo et in angelis. Homo enim habet cognitionem obumbratam, et cum discursu veritatis notitiam sumentem; unde accidit ei dubitatio et difficultas in discernendo et iudicando, quia cogitationes hominum timidae, et incertae providentiae nostrae, ut dicitur Sap., cap. 9, vers. 14. Sed in Deo et in angelis suo modo est simplex notitia veritatis absque discursu et inquisitione; unde non cadit in eis dubitatio aut difficultas in discernendo vel iudicando. Et ideo Deus et angeli habent promptam electionem liberi arbitrii; homo vero in eligendo difficultatem patitur propter incertitudinem et dubitationem. Et sic patet quod liberum arbitrium angeli medium locum tenet inter liberum arbitrium Dei et hominis, participans aliqualiter cum utroque extremorum. However, knowledge is found to exist differently in man than in God and angels, for man possesses a darkened knowledge and receives notions by means of truth's discourse, and thus doubt and difficulty in discernment and judgment come upon him, for the thoughts of men are weak, and our designs are uncertain, as it says in Wisdom 9:14. But there is in God and in angels, according to their mode, a simple knowledge of truth without any discourse or inquiry, hence doubt or difficulty in discerning or judging does not occur in them. And therefore both God and the angels have a ready choice of free will, whereas man suffers difficulty in choosing because of uncertainty and doubt. From this it is clear that the angel's free choice holds a middle place between God's free choice and man's, participating equally in both extremes. Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ratio quandoque sumitur large pro omni immateriali cognitione: et sic ratio invenitur in Deo; unde Dionysius inter divina nomina rationem ponit, 6 cap. De divinis nominibus. Alio modo accipitur proprie pro vi cognitiva cum discursu: et sic ratio nec in Deo nec in angelis invenitur, sed in hominibus tantum. Potest ergo dici, quod ratio in definitione liberi arbitrii ponitur secundum primam acceptionem. Si vero sumatur in secunda acceptione, tunc definitur liberum arbitrium secundum illum modum quo est in hominibus. Reply Obj. 1: To the first, therefore, it must be said that reason is at times taken broadly to mean all immaterial knowledge, and it is in this way that reason is found in God; hence, even Dionysius places reason among the divine names in On the Divine Names, 7.4. It is taken in another way properly to mean the power that knows with discursion: and in this way reason is found neither in God nor in the angels, but in man alone. Thus, it can be said that reason is placed in the definition of free choice with regard to the first sense, but if it is taken in the second sense, then free choice is defined according to the way that it is found among men. Ad secundum dicendum, quod posse eligere malum, non est de ratione liberi arbitrii; sed consequitur liberum arbitrium, secundum quod est in natura creata possibili ad defectum. Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that to be able to choose evil does not pertain to the notion of free choice, but it follows upon free choice inasmuch as it exists in a created nature that is capable of failure. Ad tertium dicendum, quod voluntas divina se habet ad opposita, non quidem ut aliquid velit et postea nolit, quod eius immutabilitati repugnaret; nec ut possit velle bonum et malum, quia defectibilitatem in Deo poneret; sed quia potest hoc velle et non velle. Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that the divine will stands to opposites not, of course, in such a way that it wills and then later does not will, which would be opposed to its immutability; nor in such a way that it is able to will good and evil, since this would place the capacity for failure in God, but rather that he is able to will and not to will this thing. Ad quartum dicendum, quod hoc quod electio sequitur consilium, quod cum inquisitione agitur, accidit electioni secundum quod invenitur in natura rationali, quae veritatis notitiam capit per discursum rationis; sed in natura intellectuali, quae habet simplicem acceptionem veritatis, invenitur electio absque inquisitione praecedente. Et sic electio in Deo est. Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that choice follows upon counsel, which, when done together with inquiry, happens to choice inasmuch as it exists within the rational nature that grasps the knowledge of truth by means of reason's discursion. But in the intellectual nature that possesses a simple grasp of truth, choice exists without any preceding inquiry, and in this way choice exists in God. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia, vel non Whether free choice is a power, or not Quarto quaeritur utrum liberum arbitrium sit potentia, vel non. In the fourth place we ask whether free choice is a power, or not. Et videtur quod non. Liberum enim arbitrium, secundum Augustinum, facultas est voluntatis et rationis. Facultas autem dicitur quasi facilis potestas. Cum ergo potentiae facilitas ex habitu proveniat quia, secundum Augustinum, habitus est quo facile quis agere potest, videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit habitus. Obj. 1: It seems that it is not, for according to Augustine, free choice is a faculty of the will and reason. However, one calls something a faculty inasmuch as it is a capacity for doing easily. Thus, since the ease of any capacity comes from habit, since according to Augustine a habit is that by which someone can act easily, it seems that free choice is a habit. Praeterea, operationum quaedam sunt morales, quaedam naturales. Sed facultas quae est ad operationes morales, est habitus, non potentia, sicut patet de virtutibus moralibus. Ergo et liberum arbitrium, quod importat facilitatem ad operationes naturales, est habitus, non potentia. Obj. 2: Furthermore, some operations are moral, others are natural. But the faculty that is for moral actions is a habit, not a power, as is clear with regard to the moral virtues. Thus also free choice, which implies an ease for natural actions, is a habit and not a power. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in 2 Physicorum, si natura faceret navim, faceret eam sicut ars. Ergo facilitas naturalis est eiusdem conditionis cuius est facilitas quae fit per artem. Sed facilitas quae fit per artem, est habitus quidam ex operibus acquisitus, sicut patet in virtutibus moralibus; ut arte fieri dicamus omne id quod ratione agitur. Ergo et facultas, sive facilitas naturalis, quae est liberum arbitrium, erit habitus quidam. Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Physics 2.14, 199b28, if nature were to make a ship, it would make it just as does art. Therefore, natural ease has the same conditions as the ease that comes through art. But the ease that comes through art is a certain habit acquired from works, as is clear in moral virtues, as when we say that all things done by reason are done by art. Thus, the faculty or the natural ease which is free choice must be a certain habit. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in 2 Ethicorum, habitus sunt secundum quos nos aliqualiter agimus, potentiae vero secundum quas simpliciter agimus. Sed liberum arbitrium nominat non solum id quo agimus, sed id quo aliqualiter agimus, scilicet libere. Ergo liberum arbitrium nominat habitum. Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics 2.5, 11105b23, habits are what we act by in a certain respect, but powers are what we act by simply. However, free choice denotes not only that by which we act but that by which we act in a certain respect, that is freely. Thus, free choice denotes a habit.