Ad quartum dicendum, quod meritum Christi quantum ad sufficientiam aequaliter se habet ad omnes, non autem quantum ad efficaciam: quod accidit partim ex libero arbitrio, partim ex divina electione, per quam quibusdam misericorditer effectus meritorum Christi confertur, quibusdam vero iusto iudicio subtrahitur. Reply Obj. 4: To the fourth it must be said that Christ's merit is related to all men equally with regards to its sufficiency, but not with respect to its efficacy; which partly occurs from free choice, and partly from divine choice, by which the effect of Christ's merits are mercifully conferred on some, but from others it is withdrawn by a just judgment. Ad quintum dicendum, quod sicut mereri est viatoris, ita non nisi pro viatore aliquis mereri potest: quia oportet ut ei pro quo quis meretur, aliquid desit eorum quae sub merito cadunt. angeli autem non sunt viatores quantum ad praemium essentiale; et ideo quantum ad hoc nihil eis meruit. Sunt autem aliquo modo viatores respectu praemii accidentalis, in quantum nobis ministrant, ad quod valet eis meritum Christi: unde dicitur Ephes. I, 10, quod per eum restaurantur quae in caelis et quae in terra sunt. Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that since meriting pertains to a wayfarer, one cannot merit except for a wayfarer, for something which falls under merit must be lacking from the one for whom one merits. However, angels are not wayfarers with respect to the essential reward, and so he merited nothing for them in this respect; but they are wayfarers with respect to an accidental reward, inasmuch as they minister to us, because of which Christ's merit is also valid for them: hence, it says in Ephesians 1:10 that whatever is in heaven and whatever is on earth is restored through him. Ad sextum dicendum, quod licet quilibet actus Christi esset nobis meritorius, tamen ad satisfaciendum pro reatu naturae humanae quae erat morti ex divina sententia obligata, ut patet Gen. III, 19, oportuit quod loco omnium mortem sustineret. Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that although any act of Christ is meritorious for us, yet it was necessary that he should endure death in the place of all so as to make satisfaction for the guilt of human nature, which was liable to death by the divine sentence, as is clear in Genesis 2:17. Ad septimum dicendum, quod gratia quae alicui personaliter datur, sufficit quantum ad id quod ad personam ipsius pertinet, non tamen ad absolutionem reatus totius naturae; quod patet in antiquis patribus, qui gratiam habentes, propter reatum naturae ad gloriam pervenire non poterant, et ideo requirebatur meritum Christi et satisfactio, ut reatus ille tolleretur. Gratia etiam personalis nulli unquam post peccatum primi hominis data fuit, nisi per fidem mediatoris explicitam vel implicitam. Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that the grace which is personally given to someone suffices with respect to what pertains to the person himself, though not for absolving the guilt of the whole nature. This is clear in the case of the fathers of old who, while possessing grace, were not able to attain to glory because of nature's guilt; and thus Christ's merit and satisfaction was needed so that the guilt could be removed. Also, personal grace was never given to anyone after the first man's sin, except by explicit or implicit faith in the mediator. Ad octavum dicendum, quod meritum Christi sufficienter operatur ut quaedam causa universalis salutis humanae; sed oportet hanc causam applicari singulis per sacramenta, et per fidem formatam, quae per dilectionem operatur. Et ideo requiritur aliquid aliud ad salutem nostram praeter meritum Christi, cuius tamen meritum Christi est causa. Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that Christ's merit works sufficiently as a universal cause of human salvation, but this cause must be applied to each person by the sacraments and by formed faith, which works through love; and so something else is required for our salvation besides Christ's merit, yet of which Christ's merit is the cause. Ad nonum dicendum, quod similitudo non tenet, quia mereri non convenit nisi viatoribus. Christus autem ante passionem erat viator et comprehensor; nunc autem est tantum comprehensor. Et ideo tunc poterat mereri, licet nunc mereri non possit. Deficit etiam illa ratio quia nunc beatis, qui sunt membra Christi mystica, nihil deest ad gloriam, qui delectantur non solum de visa divina essentia, sed etiam de Christi humanitate glorificata. Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that the likeness does not hold, for meriting only pertains to wayfarers. But Christ was both a wayfarer and a possessor before the Passion; however, now he is only a possessor. Therefore, he was able to merit, although now he cannot merit. That argument is also deficient in that nothing of glory is lacking to the blessed, who are mystical members of Christ, and who delight not only the vision of the divine essence, but also in the glorified humanity of Christ. Ad decimum dicendum, quod post passionem Christi humana conditio est multum immutata; quia, iam expiato reatu naturae humanae, homines possunt libere ad patriam evolare; poenae etiam aeternae pro peccatis personalibus debitae per fidem passionis Christi remittuntur, et diminuuntur temporales virtute clavium, in quibus Christi passio operatur; Daemones etiam reprimuntur virtute passionis Christi, ut non possint tam violenter tentare; fidelibus auxilia multa dantur ad resistendum tentationibus; gratia etiam per virtutem passionis Christi datur in sacramentis ad merendum. Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that the human condition changed much after Christ's Passion, for now with the guilt of human nature being expiated, men can freely fly up to heaven; also, eternal punishments owed for personal sins are remitted by faith in Christ's Passion, and temporal ones are diminished by the power of the keys, in which Christ's Passion works; also, demons are repressed in virtue of Christ's Passion, so that they are unable to tempt so violently; also, many helps are given to the faithful to resist temptations; likewise, the grace to merit is given in the sacraments by the power of Christ's Passion. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod Christus et membra eius sunt una persona mystica, unde opera capitis sunt aliquo modo membrorum. Et sic, cum propter opera Christi aliquid nobis a Deo datur, non fit contra id quod dicitur in Ps. LXI, 13: tu reddes unicuique iuxta opera sua. Et tamen ita merita Christi nobis prosunt, ut in nobis per sacramenta gratiam causent, per quam ad opera meritoria incitamur. Reply Obj. 11: To the eleventh it must be said that Christ and his members are one mystical person, hence the works of the head belong in some way to the members; and so when something is given by God to us on account of Christ's works, this is not contrary to what it says in Psalm 61:13: you give to each according to his works. And yet Christ's works are profitable for us such that they cause grace in us by the sacraments, by which we are incited to meritorious works. Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod meritum Christi comparatur ad praemium nostrum sicut causa prima et remota, unde ei non commensuratur, sed illi merito quod est causa proxima; quod consistit in actu proprio illius cui praemium redditur. Reply Obj. 12: To the twelfth it must be said that Christ's merit is related to our reward as a first and remote cause; and so it does not measure up to his merit, but rather to that merit which is the proximate cause, which consists in the proper action of one to whom the reward is given. Ad decimumtertium dicendum, quod hoc ipsum gratis alicui nostrum a Deo confertur quod efficaciam meriti Christi consequatur; unde per hoc ratio gratiae non evacuatur. Reply Obj. 13: To the thirteenth it must be said that attaining the efficacy of Christ's merit is bestowed gratuitously upon any one of us; and so the essence of grace is not made void because of this. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis mereri potuerit Whether Christ was able to merit in the first moment of his conception Octavo quaeritur utrum Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis mereri potuerit. In the eighth place we ask whether Christ was able to merit in the first moment of his conception. Et videtur quod non. Ad meritum enim deliberatio requiritur. Sed deliberatio requirit tempus. Ergo in primo instanti suae creationis anima Christi mereri non potuit. Obj. 1: It seems not, for deliberation is required for merit; but deliberation requires time; therefore, Christ's soul was not able to merit in the first moment of its creation. Praeterea, sicut meritum, ita et demeritum in actu liberi arbitrii consistit. Sed angelus non potuit peccare in primo instanti suae creationis, quia sic in primo instanti suae creationis malus fuisset; quod est erroneum. Ergo nec anima Christi in primo instanti suae creationis mereri potuit. Obj. 2: Furthermore, merit and demerit both consist in an act of free choice; but an angel was not able to sin in the first moment of its creation, for then he would be evil in the first moment of his creation, which is wrong; therefore, neither was Christ's soul able to merit in the first moment of its creation. Praeterea, quandocumque sunt duo motus ordinati ad invicem, impossibile est quod in eodem instanti terminetur uterque. Sed creatio animae Christi et motus liberi arbitrii ipsius sunt quidam motus ordinati, nam motus liberi arbitrii creationem praesupponit. Ergo impossibile est quod motus liberi arbitrii terminetur in primo instanti in quo creatio terminatur, cum scilicet primo creata est anima. Obj. 3: Furthermore, whenever there are two motions ordered to one another, it is impossible that both of them should terminate in the same instant; but the creation of Christ's soul and his movement of free choice are certain ordered motions, for the movement of free choice presupposes creation; therefore, it is impossible that the movement of free choice should terminate in the first instant in which creation terminates, namely, when the soul is first created. Sed diceretur, quod anima Christi adiuvabatur ad merendum in primo instanti per gratiam.—Sed contra: nulla gratia creaturae collata trahit eam extra limites creaturae. Sed hoc convenit animae in quantum est creata, ut in primo instanti quo est, motum liberi arbitrii habere non possit; ut ex ratione inducta patet. Ergo per gratiam non potest ad hoc adiuvari ut in primo instanti mereatur. Obj. 4: But one might say that Christ's soul was assisted in meriting in the first moment by grace. But on the contrary, no grace conferred upon a creature draws it outside the limits of that creature; but it belongs to the soul inasmuch as it is created that it not be able to have a motion of free choice in the first moment in which it exists, as is clear from the argument given (obj. 3); therefore, it cannot be helped by grace to merit in the first moment. Praeterea, gratia perficit animam per modum cuiusdam habitus. Habitus vero, cum potentiam praesupponat, non dat animae posse agere simpliciter quod alias non posset agere; sed posse taliter agere, qualiter sine habitu non posset. Ergo si anima Christi secundum suam naturam non poterat usum liberi arbitrii in primo instanti suae creationis habere, videtur quod hoc ei gratia non contulit quod in primo instanti mereretur. Obj. 5: Furthermore, grace perfects the soul in the manner of a certain habit; but since a habit presupposes a power, it does not give to the soul the ability to simply do what it otherwise could not do, but rather, to be able to act in such a way as it otherwise could not act without a habit; therefore, if Christ's soul was not able to have the use of free choice in the first instant of his creation, it seems that grace did not bestow upon him that he should merit in the first instant. Praeterea, sicut se habet punctum ad lineam, ita se habet instans ad tempus. Sed secundum philosophum in libro VIII Physic., quando aliquod mobile utitur uno puncto ut duobus, scilicet ut principio unius lineae et fine alterius, de necessitate intercedit quies media, ut patet in motu reflexo. Cum ergo instans in quo anima Christi creata est, accipiatur ut terminus creationis, et ut principium motus liberi arbitrii, et sic uno instanti utimur ut duobus; videtur quod incidit tempus medium; et sic non in primo instanti suae creationis anima Christi merebatur. Obj. 6: Furthermore, a point is to a line as an instant is to time; but according to the Philosopher in the Physics 8:16, 262a12-b8, whenever a mobile uses one point as two, namely as the beginning of one line and the end of another, an intermediary rest necessarily intervenes, as is clear in reciprocating motion; therefore, since that moment in which Christ's soul was created is taken as the end of creation and as the beginning of the movement of free choice, so that one moment is used as two; it seems that a middle time intervenes, and so Christ's soul did not merit in the first moment of its creation. Praeterea, sicut se habet natura ad actum naturae, ita gratia ad actum gratiae. Sed natura non potest in actum gratiae. Ergo nec gratia potest in actum naturae. Ergo non potest esse quod per gratiam anima Christi habuerit actum in primo instanti suae conceptionis qui ei naturaliter competit, scilicet eligere. Obj. 7: Furthermore, nature is to an act of nature as grace is to an act of grace; therefore, by transposition, grace is to an act of nature as nature is to an act of grace: but nature is not capable of an act of grace; therefore, neither is grace capable of an act of nature; thus, it is not possible that Christ's soul had, by grace, an act in the first moment of his conception that belonged to him naturally, namely to choose. Praeterea, forma habet tres actus; quia dat esse, distinguit, et ordinat in finem. Hi autem actus ad invicem ordinati sunt; sicut ens, et unum, et bonum. Nam ens a primo actu relinquitur, unum a secundo, bonum a tertio. Ergo et res aliqua prius est ens quam ordinetur in finem. Anima autem Christi per actum meritorium in finem ordinabatur. Ergo non potest esse quod in primo instanti suae creationis in quo esse habuit, mereretur. Obj. 8: Furthermore, a form has three acts, for it gives existence, it distinguishes, and it orders to an end: however, these are ordered to one another in the same way as being, one, and goodness, for being results form the first act, one from the second, and goodness from the third; therefore, anything is a being before it is ordered to an end; however, Christ's soul was ordered to an end by a meritorious act; therefore, it is not possible that it merited in the first moment of its creation. Praeterea, meritum consistit in actu virtutis qui praecipue electione perficitur secundum philosophum. Sed anima Christi non potuit in primo instanti suae creationis actum electionis habere: nam electio praesupponit consilium cum sit appetitus praeconsiliati, ut dicitur in III Ethic.; consilium autem tempore indiget, cum sit inquisitio quaedam. Ergo anima Christi in primo instanti suae creationis mereri non potuit. Obj. 9: Furthermore, merit consists in an act of virtue, which is perfected especially by choice, according to the Philosopher; but Christ's soul was not able to have an act of choice in the first moment of his creation, for choice presupposes counsel, since it is a desire for what has been previously deliberated, as it says in the Ethics 3.6, 1112a15; however, counsel needs time, since it is a certain inquiry; therefore, Christ's soul was not able to merit in the first moment of its creation. Praeterea, imbecillitas organorum usum liberi arbitrii impedit, ut patet in pueris recenter natis. Sed hanc imbecillitatem Christus assumpsit, sicut et alias nostras passibilitates. Ergo in primo instanti suae creationis anima Christi non meruit. Obj. 10: Furthermore, weakness of the organs impedes the use of free choice, as is clear in newly born babies; but Christ assumed this weakness, as well as our other capabilities for suffering; therefore, Christ's soul did not merit in the first moment of its creation. Sed contra. Christus in instanti suae creationis fuit perfectissimus secundum animam. Sed maior perfectio est quae est secundum habitum et actum, quam quae est secundum habitum tantum. Ergo in Christo fuerunt virtutes in primo instanti suae creationis, non solum secundum habitum, sed secundum actum. Actus autem virtutum sunt meritorii. Ergo Christus in primo instanti suae creationis meruit. On the contrary (1), Christ was most perfect with respect to his soul in the moment of his creation; but a perfection that is according to both act and habit is greater than one which is according to habit alone; therefore, there were virtues in Christ in the first moment of his creation, not only according to habit but also according to act: however, the acts of the virtues are meritorious; therefore, Christ merited in the first moment of his creation. Praeterea, Christus in primo instanti suae creationis fruebatur ut verus comprehensor. Fruitio autem est per actum caritatis. Ergo in primo instanti suae creationis actum caritatis habuit. Actus autem caritatis erat in Christo meritorius. Ergo idem quod prius. Furthermore (2), Christ had enjoyment as a true possessor in the first moment of his creation; however, enjoyment is through an act of charity; therefore, he had an act of charity in the first moment of his creation; but an of charity in Christ was meritorious, and so the same conclusion as before. Sed diceretur, quod actus caritatis non erat meritorius nisi cum deliberatione.—Sed contra: deliberatio vel consilium non est de fine ultimo, sed de his quae sunt ad finem, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Sed motus caritatis praecipue est meritorius secundum quod tendit in ipsum finem ultimum. Ergo non requiritur, ad hoc quod sit meritorius, quod sit ibi aliqua collatio vel deliberatio. But one might say (3) that the act of charity was not meritorious unless it was together with deliberation. But on the contrary, deliberation or counsel is not of the final end but of the things ordered to the end, as it says in the Ethics 3.5, 1112b11; but a movement of charity is especially meritorious inasmuch as it tends toward the final end itself; therefore, it is not necessary for it to be meritorious that there be any comparison or deliberation. Sed diceretur, quod motus ille qui est in finem ultimum, non est meritorius, nisi secundum quod aliquis illum refert in finem; et sic est ibi aliqua collatio, quae non potest esse in instanti.—Sed contra: pars animae intellectiva potentior est in sua operatione quam sensitiva. Sed simul dum aliquis sentit, sentit se sentire. Ergo simul dum affectus fertur in Deum, potest fieri comparatio huius motus ad ipsum Deum. Et sic non est necessarium quod hoc fiat successive. But one might say (4) that the movement which is toward the final end is not meritorious except insofar as someone refers it to the end; and so there is a certain comparison there, which cannot happen in an instant. But on the contrary, the soul's intellectual part is more powerful in its own activity than the sensitive part; but one senses that one is sensing at the same time that one senses; therefore, at the same time that one's affection is borne toward God, one can make a comparison of this motion toward God himself, and so it is not necessary that this happen successively. Praeterea, quicumque intelligit aliquid, simul intelligit quod est de intellectu eius; sicut qui intelligit hominem, simul intelligit animal. Sed unum relativorum est de intellectu alterius. Ergo quicumque intelligit unum relativorum, simul intelligit alterum. Possibile est ergo ut in eodem instanti mens referat motum caritatis in Deum comparando unum ad alterum. Et sic non requiritur ibi tempus. Furthermore (5), whoever understands something understands at the same time what pertains to the understanding of that thing; as when someone understands animal at the same as he understands man; but one of two correlatives pertains to the understanding of the other; therefore, whoever understands one of two relatives immediately understands the other: thus, it is possible that in one and the same moment the mind should refer the movement of charity to God by comparing one to another, and so time is not needed there. Praeterea, Anselmus dicit, quod quidquid intelligitur esse perfectionis, totum Christo est attribuendum. Sed habere perfectam operationem in primo instanti suae creationis, ad perfectionem pertinet. Ergo Christo est attribuendum. Furthermore (6), Anselm says that whatever one understands to belong to perfection must all be attributed to Christ; but it pertains to perfection that it have a perfect activity in the first moment of its creation; therefore, this must be attributed to God. Praeterea, Christus iuxta animae meritum non habuit quo posset proficere. Habuisset autem, si in primo instanti suae creationis non meruisset. Ergo et cetera. Furthermore (7), Christ did not have any means to make progress with regard to the soul's merit; but he would have had this if he did not merit in the first moment of his creation; therefore, the same as above. Praeterea, potentia rationalis in Christo non fuit minus perfecta quam potentia naturalis alterius creaturae. Sed aliqua potentia alterius creaturae in primo instanti quo esse incipit, potest habere suam operationem; sicut patet in candela, quae in ipso instanti quo accenditur, aerem illuminat. Ergo anima Christi in primo instanti suae creationis habuit actum potentiae rationalis; et ita potuit mereri. Furthermore (8), the rational power in Christ was not less perfect than the natural power of another creature; but some power of another creature could have its own activity in the first moment in which it begins to exist; as is clear in a candle, which illuminate the air in the very instant that it is lit. Therefore, Christ's soul had an act of a rational power in the first instant of its creation; and so he was able to merit. Praeterea, Gregorius dicit in Homil. Pentecostes: amor Dei non est otiosus: nam operatur magna, si est; si vero desinit operari, amor non est. Sed Christus habuit perfectam caritatem in primo instanti suae creationis. Ergo in eo fuit aliquis actus dilectionis; et ita fuit in eo meritum in illo instanti. Furthermore (9), Gregory says in the Homily on Pentecost that God's love is not lazy, for if it exists, it does great things; but if it ceases to act, it ceases to be love; but Christ had perfect charity in the first moment of his creation; therefore, there was also an act of love in him, and so there was merit in him in that moment. Praeterea, illud quod est posterius natura, non potest esse prius tempore, sed forte simul. Meritum autem est prius natura quam praemium. Christus autem in primo instanti suae conceptionis habuit praemium, quia fuit verus comprehensor. Ergo saltem in eodem instanti habuit meritum. Furthermore (10), what is afterwards by nature cannot be before in time, though perhaps simultaneous; but merit is before reward by nature; however, Christ had a reward in the first moment of his conception, for he was a true possessor; therefore, he at least had merit in that same moment. Respondeo. Dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod Christus in primo instanti suae conceptionis non meruit, sed statim post primum instans mereri incepit. Alii vero dicunt, quod in ipso primo instanti meruit: quae quidem opinio videtur esse rationabilior. Nam quidquid perfectionis spiritualis est possibile alicui creaturae, totum creditur animae Christi esse collatum in primo instanti suae creationis. Quod enim in aliquo instanti meritum esse non possit, hoc dupliciter potest contingere: uno modo ex parte operantis; alio modo ex parte actus. Ex parte quidem operantis potest hoc contingere propter defectum duplicis facultatis: scilicet gratuitae, sicut si dicamus, quod in illo instanti quo aliquis mortaliter peccat, non potest mereri, quia gratiam non habet: et iterum ex defectu facultatis naturalis, sicut puer in primo instanti quo incipit esse, mereri non potest, quia non habet usum liberi arbitrii. I answer that: it must be said that there are two opinions on this matter: for some say that Christ did not merit in the first moment of his conception, but that he began to merit right after the first moment; but others say that he also merited in the very first moment: and this opinion seems to be more reasonable, for whatever pertaining to spiritual perfection is possible for any creature is believed to have all been conferred upon Christ's soul in the first moment of his creation. But that there should not be merit in any moment can happen in two ways: in one way on the side of the one acting, and in another way on the side of the act. This can happen on the part of the one acting because of a defect in two capacities: namely one of grace, as when we say that someone cannot merit in that moment in which one sins mortally, for he does not have grace; and again from a defect of a natural faculty, as when a child cannot merit in the first moment in which he is conceived, since he does not have the use of free choice. Neutrum autem horum potest dici in proposito. Christus enim in primo instanti habuit facultatem gratiae, utpote gratia plenus, et facultatem naturae, utpote plenarie usum liberi arbitrii habens; alias non potuisset esse comprehensor. Ergo non fuit ex parte operantis Christi aliquid quominus posset in primo suae conceptionis instanti mereri. But neither of these can be affirmed in the current matter: for Christ had a faculty for grace in the first moment, namely by being full of grace, and also a faculty of nature, namely as having the use of free choice to the fullest; otherwise he would not be a possessor. Therefore, there was not anything on the part of the acting Christ by which he would be less able to merit in the first moment of his conception. Similiter nec ex parte actus meritorii. Quod enim aliquis actus in aliquo instanti esse non possit, potest contingere dupliciter. Uno modo per hoc quod in actu illo successio invenitur, et sic in instanti compleri non potest. Secundo per hoc quod actus praesupponit quaedam quae non possunt praecedere instans aliquod determinatum; sicut non potest esse quod ignis primo instanti suae generationis, si est extra locum suum generatus, sit in proprio loco, quia motus praeexigitur, qui non potest esse ante primum instans generationis. Neutro autem istorum modorum impeditur quin Christus in primo instanti meruerit. Primo quidem, quia motus liberi arbitrii, in quo meritum consistit, non habet successionem, sed est simplex et instantaneus. Secundo vero, quia ad motum voluntatis non praeexigitur nisi actus apprehensivae virtutis: qui quidem motus in eodem instanti est cum actu voluntatis, eo quod bonum apprehensum movet voluntatem. Simul autem est motio moventis et motus mobilis. Ipsa vero apprehensio boni in Christo non praeexigebat aliquam inquisitionem ad hoc quod esset de bono certum iudicium; quia secundum certitudinem Christus statim de omnibus verum iudicium habuit. Similarly, neither is it the case on the part of the meritorious act. For it can happen in two ways that an act is not to be able to occur in any moment: in one way from the fact that there is succession in that act, and so it cannot be completed in a moment, just as local motion cannot exist in a moment; in a second way from the fact that an act presupposes things that cannot precede any determined moment; as when it cannot be the case that fire be in its own proper place in the first moment of its generation, if it is outside of its generated place, for it requires motion, which cannot exist before the first moment of generation. However, neither of these ways is impeded if Christ did not merit in the first moment. This is indeed the case first of all because the motion of free choice, in which merit consists, does not have succession, but is simple and instantaneous; but secondly, because nothing is required for the will's movement except an act of an apprehensive power, which motion exists in the same moment as the will's act, inasmuch as the perceived good moves the will. But the mover's motion and the mobile's motion are simultaneous. But in Christ, the apprehension of the good itself does not need any inquiry for there to be a sure judgment of the good, for Christ immediately had a true judgment of all things with respect to certitude.