Ad tertium dicendum, quod quamvis gloria non destruat naturam, elevat tamen eam ad id quod per se non poterat, hoc est ad hoc quod videat res per ipsam essentiam Dei sine aliqua similitudine media in visione illa. Reply Obj. 3: Even though the glory had in heaven does not destroy nature, it elevates it to a level which it could not reach by itself, namely, that level where it can see things through God’s very essence without any likeness acting as a medium in this vision. Ad quartum dicendum, quod verbum non est alicuius rei forma intra, ita quod sit pars essentiae rei; est tamen intellectui forma intrinseca ut intelligibile per ipsum. Reply Obj. 4: The Word is not the intrinsic form of a thing in the sense that it is part of a thing’s essence. It is, however, a form within the intellect, since it is intelligible of its very nature. Ad quintum dicendum, quod Paulus postquam desiit essentiam Dei videre, memor fuit rerum quae in verbo cognoverat, per similitudines rerum apud se remanentes. Reply Obj. 5: When Paul no longer saw God’s essence, he remembered the things he had known in the Word by means of likenesses of things that still remained with him. Ad sextum dicendum, quod similitudines illae quae remanserunt post absentiam verbi, imprimebantur etiam quando verbum per essentiam videbat; sed tamen illa visio qua videbat per verbum, non erat per illas impressiones, ut ex dictis, in corp. art., patet. Reply Obj. 6: Those likenesses which remained even when the Word had departed were imprinted when Paul saw the Word through his essence. But, as is clear from what has been said above, when Paul saw through the Word, the vision itself did not take place through these impressions. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum angelus cognoscat seipsum Does an angel know himself Sexto quaeritur utrum angelus cognoscat seipsum. In the sixth article we ask: does an angel know himself? Et videtur quod non. Quia, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. VI caelestis hierarchiae, angeli ignorant suas virtutes. Sed si cognoscerent se per essentiam, cognoscerent suas virtutes. Ergo angelus suam essentiam non cognoscit. Obj. 1: It seems not, for as Dionysius says, angels do not know their own power. Now, if they knew themselves by means of their essence, they would know their power. Consequently, angels do not know their own essence. Praeterea, si angelus cognoscit seipsum, hoc non est per aliquam similitudinem, sed per essentiam suam: quia in his quae sunt sine materia, idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sed per essentiam suam se cognoscere non potest, quia illud quo intelligitur, est forma intellectus. Essentia autem angeli non potest esse forma intellectus eius, cum magis intellectus insit essentiae ut proprietas quaedam, sive forma. Ergo angelus nullo modo cognoscit se. Obj. 2: If an angel knows himself, he knows himself, not through a likeness, but through his own essence; for, as is said in On the Soul, in those beings which exist without matter, the knower and the known are one and the same. But an angel cannot know himself by means of his own essence, since a thing is understood by means of a form within the intellect. Now, the essence of an angel cannot be the form of his own intellect, because the intellect itself inheres in his essence as its property or form. Consequently, an angel cannot know himself at all. Praeterea, idem non potest esse agens et patiens, movens et motum, nisi hoc modo quod una pars eius sit movens vel agens, et alia mota vel passa; ut patet in animalibus, ut probatur in VIII Physic. Sed intelligens et intellectum se habent ut agens et patiens. Ergo non potest esse quod angelus totum se intelligat. Obj. 3: The same thing cannot be both active and passive, mover and moved, unless one of its parts is a mover or active and its other part is moved or passive. This is clear in the case of animals, as is shown in the Physics. But the knower and the known are related as active and passive. Consequently, it is impossible for an angel to know all of himself. Praeterea, si angelus intelligit se per essentiam suam, oportet quod essentia sua sit actus intellectus eius. Sed nulla essentia per se subsistens potest esse actus alicuius, nisi sit actus purus: res enim materialis non potest esse alicuius forma; esse autem actum purum nulli essentiae convenit nisi divinae. Ergo angelus non potest se per essentiam suam cognoscere. Obj. 4: If an angel understands himself through his own essence, his essence must be the act of his intellect. But, unless it is pure act, no subsisting essence can be the act of anything else, for a material thing cannot be the form of another thing. Now, pure act of being belongs only to the divine essence. Consequently, an angel cannot know himself through his own essence. Praeterea, nihil intelligitur nisi secundum quod denudatur a materia et a conditionibus materialibus. Sed esse in potentia est quaedam materialis conditio, a qua angelus denudari non potest. Ergo angelus seipsum intelligere non potest. Obj. 5: A thing is understood only if it is stripped of matter and of the conditions of matter. But to be in potency is, in a way, a material condition which cannot be stripped from an angel. Consequently, an angel cannot understand himself. Praeterea, si angelus intelligit se per essentiam suam, oportet quod essentia sua sit in intellectu suo. Sed hoc esse non potest; quinimmo intellectus est in essentia: non enim potest esse aliquid esse in altero et e converso. Ergo angelus non cognoscit se per essentiam suam. Obj. 6: If an angel understands himself through his own essence, his essence must be in his intellect. This, however, is impossible; for, as a matter of fact, his intellect is in his essence, and if one thing is in another, this other cannot be in it. Consequently, an angel does not know himself by means of his own essence. Praeterea, intellectus angeli habet potentiam admixtam. Nihil autem de potentia in actum reducitur a seipso. Cum ergo intellectus reducatur in actum cognitionis per ipsum cognoscibile, impossibile erit quod angelus intelligat seipsum. Obj. 7: The intellect of an angel is mixed with potentiality. Now, nothing is reduced from potency to act by itself. Consequently, since an intellect is reduced to the act of knowing by the known, it will be impossible for an angel to understand himself. Praeterea, nulla potentia habet efficaciam agendi nisi ab essentia in qua radicatur. Ergo intellectus angeli est efficax ad intelligendum ex virtute essentiae suae. Sed non potest idem esse principium agendi et patiendi. Cum igitur id quod intelligitur, sit quodammodo ut passum, videtur quod angelus essentiam suam cognoscere non possit. Obj. 8: Every potency has the perfection of its activity determined by the essence in which it is rooted. Consequently, an angelic intellect can understand because of the power of its essence. Now, the same thing cannot be a principle of acting and of being acted upon; and, since that which is understood is, in a way, acted upon, it seems that an angel cannot know his own essence. Praeterea, demonstratio actus intellectus est. Sed non potest idem per idem demonstrari. Ergo non potest esse quod angelus per essentiam suam intelligatur a se. Obj. 9: Demonstration is an intellectual act. But a thing cannot be demonstrated by means of itself. Therefore, an angel cannot understand himself by means of his essence. Praeterea, qua ratione reflectitur in se intellectus, et affectus. Sed affectus angeli non reflectitur in se nisi per dilectionem naturalem, quae est quidam naturalis habitus. Ergo nec angelus se cognoscere potest nisi mediante aliquo habitu; et ita non cognoscit se per essentiam suam. Obj. 10: There is the same reason for holding that the will reflects upon itself as that the intellect does. But the will of an angel reflects upon itself only by means of its natural love, which is a kind of natural habit. Consequently, an angel can know himself only by means of some habit, and, therefore, he cannot know himself by means of his essence. Praeterea, operatio cadit media inter agens et patiens. Sed intelligens et intellectum se habent ut agens et patiens. Cum igitur nihil cadat medium inter rem aliquam et seipsam, impossibile videtur quod angelus seipsum intelligat. Obj. 11: Operation lies as a medium between what is active and what is passive. But the knower and the known are related as active and passive. Now, since there is nothing intermediate between a thing and itself, it seems impossible that an angel could know himself. Sed contra. Quod potest virtus inferior, potest et superior, ut dicit Boetius. Sed anima nostra seipsam cognoscit. Ergo multo fortius angelus. On the contrary (1): As Boethius says, what a lower power can do a higher power can. But our soul can know itself. Therefore, it is even more true that an angel can know himself. Praeterea, haec est ratio quare intellectus noster seipsum intelligit, non autem sensus, ut dicit Avicenna, quia sensus utitur organo corporali, non autem intellectus. Sed intellectus angeli magis est separatus ab organo corporali quam etiam intellectus noster. Ergo angelus etiam cognoscit seipsum. Furthermore (2): As Avicenna says, the reason why our intellect, but not our senses, knows itself is that the senses use a physical organ but the intellect does not. Now, an angelic intellect is even further removed from a physical organ than our intellect is. Therefore, an angel also knows himself. Praeterea, intellectus angeli, cum sit deiformis, maxime assimilatur intellectui divino. Sed Deus se per essentiam suam cognoscit. Ergo et angelus. Furthermore (3): Since the intellect of an angel is godlike, it greatly resemble God’s intellect. But God knows himself through his essence. Therefore, an angel knows himself also through his essence. Praeterea, quanto intelligibile est magis proportionatum intellectui, tanto magis potest ipsum cognoscere. Sed nullum intelligibile est magis proportionatum intellectui angelico quam sua essentia. Ergo essentiam suam maxime cognoscit. Furthermore (4): The more proportionate an intelligible is to an intellect, the more the intellect can know it. Now, there is no intelligible more proportionate to an angelic intellect than its own essence. Therefore, it know its essence in a very high degree. Praeterea, in Lib. de causis dicitur, quod omnis sciens scit essentiam suam, et redit ad essentiam suam reditione completa. Ergo et angelus, cum sit sciens. Furthermore (5): In The Book of Causes it is said: whoever knows intellectually know his own essence, and returns to it in a complete reflection. Therefore, angels can do this, for they know intellectually. Responsio. Dicendum, quod duplex est actio. Una quae procedit ab agente in rem exteriorem, quam transmutat; et haec est sicut illuminare, quae etiam proprie actio nominatur. Alia vero actio est, quae non procedit in rem exteriorem, sed stat in ipso agente ut perfectio ipsius; et haec proprie dicitur operatio, et haec est sicut lucere. Hae autem duae actiones in hoc conveniunt quod utraque non progreditur nisi ab existente in actu, secundum quod est actu; unde corpus non lucet nisi secundum quod habet lucem in actu; et similiter non illuminat. Actio autem appetitus et sensus et intellectus non est sicut actio progrediens in materiam exteriorem, sed sicut actio consistens in ipso agente, ut perfectio eius; et ideo oportet quidem quod intelligens, secundum quod intelligit, sit actu; non autem oportet quod in intelligendo intelligens sit ut agens, et intellectum ut passum. Sed intelligens et intellectum, prout ex eis est effectum unum quid, quod est intellectus in actu, sunt unum principium huius actus quod est intelligere. Et dico ex eis effici unum quid, inquantum intellectum coniungitur intelligenti sive per essentiam suam, sive per similitudinem. Unde intelligens non se habet ut agens vel ut patiens, nisi per accidens; inquantum scilicet ad hoc quod intelligibile uniatur intellectui, requiritur aliqua actio vel passio: actio quidem, secundum quod intellectus agens facit species esse intelligibiles actu; passio autem, secundum quod intellectus possibilis recipit species intelligibiles, et sensus species sensibiles. Sed hoc quod est intelligere, consequitur ad hanc passionem vel actionem, sicut effectus ad causam. Sicut ergo corpus lucidum lucet quando est lux actu in ipso, ita intellectus intelligit omne illud quod est actu intelligibile in ipso. I answer that: there are two types of action. One proceeds from the agent an goes out to an exterior thing, which it changes. An example of this type is illumination, which can properly be called an action. The second type of action does not go out to an exterior thing but remains in the agent as its perfection. Properly speaking, this is called operation. Shining is an example of this type. Now, these two actions are at one in this, that both issue only from a thing which is actually existing and only in so far as it is in act. Consequently, a body does not shine unless it actually has light; and the same is true of illuminating action. The action of appetite, sense, and intellect is not, however, like the action that goes out to exterior matter; it is like the action that remain in the agent as its perfection. Consequently, in so far as he knows, a knower must be in act. It is not necessary, however, for the knower in knowing to become an efficient cause and for the known to become something passive; but inasmuch as one thing results from the knower and known, namely, an intellect in act, these two are but one principle of this act, which is understanding. I say that one thing results from them inasmuch as what is understood is joined to the understanding either through its essence or through a likeness. Hence, a knower is not related as active or as passive except for another consideration; that is, activity or passivity is required to some extent in order that the intelligible be united to the intellect. Efficient causality is required, because the active intellect makes species actually intelligible; change is required because the potential intellect receives intelligible species, and the senses, sensible species. But understanding follows upon this change or efficient causality as an effect follows upon a cause. Consequently, just as a bright body shines when light actually exists in it, so also does the intellect understand everything that is actually intelligible in it. Sciendum est igitur, quod nihil prohibet esse aliquid actu unum et in potentia alterum, sicut corpus diaphanum est actu quidem corpus, sed potentia tantum coloratum; et similiter possibile est esse aliquid actu ens, quod in genere intelligibilium est potentia tantum. Sicut enim est gradus actus et potentiae in entibus, quod aliquid est potentia tantum, ut materia prima; aliquid actu tantum, ut Deus; aliquid actu et potentia ut omnia intermedia; sic est in genere intelligibilium aliquid ut actu tantum, scilicet essentia divina; aliquid ut potentia tantum, ut intellectus possibilis; quod hoc modo se habet in ordine intelligibilium sicut materia prima in ordine sensibilium, sicut dicit Commentator in III de anima. Omnes autem substantiae angelicae sunt mediae, habentes aliquid de potentia et actu, non solum in genere entium, sed etiam in genere intelligibilium. Sicut igitur materia prima non potest agere aliquam actionem nisi perficiatur per formam; et tunc actio illa est quaedam emanatio ipsius formae magis quam materiae; res autem existentes actu possunt agere actiones, secundum quod sunt actu; ita intellectus possibilis noster nihil potest intelligere antequam perficiatur forma intelligibili in actu. Tunc enim intelligit rem cuius est illa forma; nec potest se intelligere nisi per formam intelligibilem actu in se existentem. Intellectus vero angeli, quia habet essentiam suam quae est ut actus in genere intelligibilium, sibi praesentem, potest intelligere id quod est intelligibile apud ipsum, id est essentiam suam, non per aliquam similitudinem, sed per seipsam. We must note, however, that there is no reason why a thing cannot be one thing actually and another potentially. For example, a transparent body is actually a body, but it is colored only potentially. Similarly, it is possible for a thing to be in act in the order of existence but only in potency in the order of intelligibility. Now, in beings there are grades of act and potency. One being, prime matter, is in potency only. Another, God, exists only actually. All other intermediate beings exist both actually and potentially. Similarly, in the genus of intelligibles, one being, the divine essence, is in act only; another, the potential intellect, is only in potency, and for this reason the Commentator says that the potential intellect in the order of intelligibles is like prime matter in the order of sensibles. All the angelic substances lie in between; for they have something of potency and of act, not only in the genus of being, but also in the genus of intelligibility. Now, prime matter cannot perform any action unless it is perfected by some form (and even then that action is a kind of emanation from the form rather than from the matter); because things that actually exist can perform actions only in so far as they are in act. Similarly, our potential intellect can understand nothing before it is brought into act by an intelligible form. Only then can it understand that thing to which this form belongs. Moreover, it can understand itself only by means of an intelligible form that actually exists in itself. But, since the essence of an angel, which is in act in the genus of intelligibility, is present to it, an angelic intellect can understand this intelligible reality within itself, namely, its own essence—and not through any likeness of it but through the essence itself. Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod angeli cognoscunt virtutem suam, secundum quod in se consideratur, eam comprehendendo; non autem eam comprehendunt secundum quod deducitur ab exemplari aeterno; hoc enim esset ipsum exemplar comprehendere. Reply Obj. 1: Angels know their power by comprehending it as it is in itself. They do not comprehend it, however, in so far as it has been modeled upon the eternal archetype, for this would involve comprehension of the archetype itself. Ad secundum dicendum, quod essentia angeli, quamvis non possit comparari ad intellectum eius ut actus ad potentiam in essendo, comparatur tamen ad ipsum ut actus ad potentiam in intelligendo. Reply Obj. 2: Even though in the order of existence an angel’s essence cannot stand in the relation of act to potency with respect to his intellect, in the order of understanding it is related to it as act is to potency. Ad tertium dicendum, quod intellectum et intelligens non se habent ut agens et patiens; sed ambo se habent ut unum agens, ut patet ex dictis, in corp. art., quamvis quantum ad modum loquendi videantur ut agens et patiens significari. Reply Obj. 3: The knower and the known are not related as active and passive but as one principle of activity, as is clear from what has been said above, even though they may seem to be so related from our manner of speaking. Ad quartum dicendum, quod quamvis essentia angeli non sit actus purus, non tamen habet materiam partem sui; sed secundum hoc est in potentia quod esse non habet a seipso: et ideo nihil prohibet ipsum comparari ad intellectum ut actum in intelligendo. Reply Obj. 4: Although an angel’s essence is not pure act, it nevertheless is without matter. It is in potency merely in this respect, that it does not have its act of existence from itself. Consequently, there is no reason why it cannot be related to an angelic intellect as act in the order of understanding. Ad quintum dicendum, quod id quod intelligitur, non oportet denudari a qualibet materia. Constat enim quod formae naturales nunquam intelliguntur sine materia, cum materia in earum definitione cadat. Sed oportet quod denudetur a materia individuali, quae est materia determinatis dimensionibus substans; unde minus oportet quod separetur a potentia tali, qualis est in angelis. Reply Obj. 5: A thing that is understood need not be stripped entirely of matter; for it is evident that natural forms are never understood without matter, since matter is included in their definition. They must, however, be stripped of individual matter, that is, matter that lies under determinate dimensions. There is no reason, therefore, why angels need be separated from the kind of potency which they possess. Ad sextum dicendum, quod nihil prohibet aliquid esse in altero et illud in eo diversis modis, sicut totum in partibus, et e converso. Et similiter est in proposito: essentia enim angeli est in intellectu eius sicut intelligibile in intelligente, intellectus autem in essentia sicut potentia in substantia. Reply Obj. 6: There is no reason why one thing cannot be in a second and the second in the first if this is in different ways, such as the ways in which a whole is in its parts and the parts are in the whole. The same is true here: the essence of the angel is in his intellect as an intelligible is in a knower, and his intellect is in his essence as a power is in a substance. Ad septimum dicendum, quod intellectus angeli non est in potentia respectu essentiae suae, sed respectu eius est semper in actu. Respectu autem aliorum intelligibilium potest esse in potentia: nec tamen sequitur quod, quando intellectus est in potentia, quod per aliud agens reducatur in actum semper; sed solum quando est in potentia essentiali, sicut aliquis antequam addiscat. Quando autem est in potentia accidentali, sicut habens habitum dum non considerat, potest per seipsum exire in actum; nisi dicatur, quod reducitur in actum per voluntatem, qua movetur ad actu considerandum. Reply Obj. 7: The intellect of an angel is not in potency with respect to his essence. In this respect, it is always in act. But with respect to other intelligible objects his intellect can be in potency. It does not follow, however, that when his intellect is in potency it is always reduced to act by some other agent. This is true only when it is in essential potency, as a person is before he learns something. When it is in accidental potency, the potency a person is in who has habitual knowledge but. is not using it—then it can go into act by itself, except, that it might be said that his intellect is reduced to act by his will, which moves it to actual consideration. Ad octavum dicendum, quod illud quod intelligitur, non est ut passum, sed ut principium actionis, ut patet ex dictis, in corp. art., et ideo ratio non sequitur. Reply Obj. 8: As is evident from what we have said above, that which is understood is not like something passive but like a principle of action. Consequently, the argument does not hold. Ad nonum dicendum, quod aliquid potest esse cognitionis causa dupliciter. Uno modo ex parte ipsius cognoscibilis: et sic magis notum est causa cognoscendi minus notum. Et hoc modo medium demonstrationis est causa intelligendi. Alio modo ex parte cognoscentis: et sic causa cognitionis est illud quod facit cognoscibile esse actu in cognoscente. Et sic nihil prohibet aliquid per seipsum cognosci. Reply Obj. 9: A thing can be the cause of knowing in two ways. First, it can be what is known. Thus, what is more known is the cause of cognizing what is less known; and in this way the medium of demonstration is a cause of understanding. Second, it can be the one who knows. Then the cause of knowledge is that which makes the intelligible to be present actually in the knower. Taken in this way, there is no reason why a thing cannot be known by means of itself. Ad decimum dicendum, quod dilectio naturalis non est habitus, sed est actus. Reply Obj. 10: Natural love is not a habit but an act. Ad undecimum dicendum, quod operatio intellectualis non est media secundum rem inter intelligens et intellectum, sed procedit ex utroque, secundum quod sunt unita. Reply Obj. 11: The act of understanding is not a medium that stands as a reality between the knower and the known; it proceeds from the union of both.