Quodlibet I Quodlibetal Questions I De Deo, angelo et homine On God, Angels, and Man De Deo On God Quaestio 1 Question 1 Quantum ad naturam divinam Regarding the divine nature Quaesitum est de Deo, angelo et homine. There were questions about God, angels, and man. De Deo quaesitum est et quantum ad divinam naturam et quantum ad naturam humanam assumptam. Concerning God, there were questions regarding both the divine nature and the assumed human nature. Articulus unicus Article 1 Utrum beatus Benedictus in visione qua vidit totum mundum divinam essentiam viderit Whether blessed Benedict saw the divine essence in the vision by which he saw the whole world Quantum ad divinam naturam quaesitum est utrum beatus Benedictus in visione qua vidit totum mundum divinam essentiam viderit? Et ostendebatur quod sic. Regarding the divine nature, it was asked whether blessed Benedict saw the divine essence in the vision by which he saw the whole world. And it was shown that he did. Dicit enim Gregorius, de hac visione loquens: animae videnti Deum angusta fit omnis creatura; sed videre Deum est videre divinam essentiam; ergo beatus Benedictus vidit divinam essentiam. Obj. 1: For Gregory says when speaking of this vision: for the soul seeing God, every creature is made narrow. But to see God is to see the divine essence. Therefore, blessed Benedict saw the divine essence. Praeterea. Ibidem subdit Gregorius quod totum mundum vidit in divino lumine; sed non est aliud lumen vel claritas Dei quam ipse Deus, ut idem Gregorius dicit, et habetur in Glossa Exodi XXXIII, super illud: non videbit me homo, et vivet; ergo beatus Benedictus vidit Deum per essentiam. Obj. 2: In the same place Gregory adds that he saw the whole world in the divine light. But there is no other light or clarity of God than God himself, as the same Gregory says, and as the Gloss says on Exodus 33:20: man shall not see me, and live. Therefore, blessed Benedict saw God through his essence. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioannis I: Deum nemo vidit unquam, ubi dicit Glossa quod nullus in mortali carne vivens Dei essentiam videre potest. On the contrary, it is said in John 1:18: no one ever has seen God. The Gloss there says that no one living in mortal flesh can see the essence of God. Responsio. Dicendum quod corpus corruptibile aggravat animam, ut dicitur Sapientiae IX; summa autem elevatio mentis humanae est ut ad divinam essentiam videndam pertingat; unde impossibile est ut mens humana Dei essentiam videat, ut Augustinus dicit XII super Genesim ad litteram, nisi huic vitae mortali funditus homo intereat vel sic alienetur a sensibus ut nesciat utrum sit in corpore an extra corpus, sicut de Paulo legitur II ad Corinthios XII. Beatus autem Benedictus, quando illam visionem vidit, nec huic vitae funditus mortuus erat nec a corporeis sensibus alienatus, quod patet per hoc quod, dum adhuc in eadem visione persisteret, alium ad idem videndum advocavit, ut Gregorius refert. Unde manifestum est quod Dei essentiam non vidit. I answer that a corruptible body weighs down the soul (Wis 9:15). Yet the highest elevation of the human mind is to come to see the divine essence. Hence it is impossible that the human mind should see the essence of God, as Augustine says: unless man utterly be dead to this mortal life, or be so alienated from the senses that he knows not whether he is in the body or outside the body, just as it is read concerning Paul (2 Cor 12:2–3). Yet blessed Benedict, when he saw that vision, was neither utterly dead for this life nor alienated from bodily senses, which is clear through this: that, while remaining in the same vision, he called another person to see the same, as Gregory relates. Hence it is clear that he did not see the essence of God. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Gregorius ex quadam proportione argumentari intendit in verbis illis: si enim videntes Dei essentiam, in eius comparatione totam creaturam reputant parvum quid ad videndum, non est mirum si beatus Benedictus per lumen divinum aliquid amplius videre potuit quam homines communiter videant. Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that Gregory intended in those words to argue from a certain analogy: for if those seeing the essence of God consider all of creation a small thing to see in comparison with him, it is no wonder if blessed Benedict could see something greater through the divine light than men commonly see. Ad secundum dicendum quod lumen Dei quandoque dicitur ipse Deus, quandoque vero aliquod lumen derivatum ab ipso, secundum illud Psalmi: in lumine tuo videbimus lumen. Hic autem accipitur pro lumine derivato a Deo. Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the light of God sometimes means God himself, but sometimes the light derived from him, according to Psalm 36:9 [35:10]: in your light we shall see light. Yet here it is understood for light derived from God. Quaestio 2 Question 2 Quantum ad naturam humanam assumptam Regarding the assumed human nature Deinde quaerebantur duo circa humanam naturam in Christo; Then there were two questions about the human nature in Christ: primo, utrum fuerit in Christo una filiatio qua referretur ad Patrem et matrem, an duae; first, whether in Christ there was one sonship or two by which he was related to his Father and his mother; secundo de morte eius, utrum in cruce mortuus fuerit. second, concerning his death, whether he died on the cross. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum fuerit in Christo una filiatio qua referretur ad Patrem et matrem, an duae Whether in Christ there is one sonship by which he is related to his Father and his mother, or two Ad primum sic procedebatur. Videtur quod in Christo sint duae filiationes. To the first we proceed thus. It seems there are two sonships in Christ. Multiplicata enim causa relationum, multiplicantur relationes; generatio autem est causa filiationis; cum igitur alia sit generatio qua Christus natus est aeternaliter a Patre, alia qua natus est temporaliter a matre, erit etiam alia filiatio qua refertur ad Patrem et alia qua refertur ad matrem. Obj. 1: When the causes of relations are multiplied, the relations are multiplied. But generation is the cause of sonship. Therefore, since the generation by which Christ is born eternally from his Father is one thing, and the generation by which he is born temporally from his mother is another, there will likewise be one sonship by which he is related to his Father, and another by which he is related to his mother. Praeterea. Quod recipit ex tempore aliquid absolutum absque sui mutatione, multo magis absque sui mutatione potest recipere temporaliter aliquam proprietatem relativam. Sed Filius Dei ex tempore recipit aliquid absolutum absque sui mutatione, quia super illud Lucae: erit magnus et filius altissimi vocabitur, dicit Ambrosius: non ideo erit magnus quod ante partum Virginis magnus non fuerit, sed quia potentiam quam Dei Filius naturaliter habet, homo erat ex tempore accepturus. Ergo multo magis ex tempore potuit accipere Filius Dei absque sui mutatione novam filiationem, ut sic ei conveniant duae filiationes, una aeterna et alia temporalis. Obj. 2: What receives in time some absolute property without changing, even more can receive in time some relative property without changing. But the Son of God receives in time an absolute property without changing, for on Luke 1:32: he shall be great and shall be called the son of the Most High, Ambrose says: not for this reason shall he be great: that before the birth of the Virgin he was not great, but because the power which the Son of God naturally has, man was about to receive in time. Therefore, even more could the Son of God receive in time a new sonship without changing. Thus, two sonships are appropriate for him: one eternal and the other temporal. Sed contra. A quo aliquid habet quod sit tale, ab eius unitate habet quod sit unum tale; sed filiatione aliquis habet quod sit filius; ergo una filiatione est unus filius. Sed Christus est unus filius, et non duo. Ergo in Christo non sunt duae filiationes, sed una tantum. On the contrary: The unity which causes something to be such a thing, also causes it to be one such thing. But by sonship someone is a son. Therefore, by one sonship he is one son. But Christ is one son, and not two. Therefore, in Christ there are not two sonships but one only. Responsio. Dicendum quod relationes differunt in hoc ab omnibus aliis rerum generibus, quia ea quae sunt aliorum generum, ex ipsa ratione sui generis habent quod sint res naturae, sicut quantitates ex ratione quantitatis et qualitates ex ratione qualitatis. Sed relationes non habent quod sint res naturae ex ratione respectus ad alterum: inveniuntur enim quidam respectus qui non sunt reales, sed rationis tantum, sicut scibile refertur ad scientiam non aliqua reali relatione in scibile existente, sed potius quia scientia refertur ad ipsum, secundum Philosophum in V Metaphysicae. Sed relatio habet quod sit res naturae ex sua causa, per quam una res naturalem ordinem habet ad alteram, qui quidem naturalis et realis ordo est ipsa relatio; unde dextrum et sinistrum in animali sunt relationes reales, quia consequntur quasdam naturales virtutes, in columna autem sunt respectus rationis tantum, secundum ordinem animalis ad ipsam. I answer that relations differ in this from all other genera of things. For things which belong to other genera are, from the very character of their genus, things of nature, such as quantities from the account of quantity and qualities from the account of quality. But relations are not things of nature from the character of a relation to another thing. For there are certain relations which are not real but only of the mind, just as something knowable is related to knowledge not by some real relation that exists in the knowable thing, but rather because the knowledge is related to the knowable thing, according to the Philosopher in the fifth book of the Metaphysics. Yet a relation is a thing of nature from its cause, whereby one thing has a natural order to another thing, and this natural and real order is, indeed, the relation itself. Hence right and left in an animal are real relations because they follow certain natural powers, but in a column they are relations of the mind only, according to the animal's position in relation to the column. Ex eodem autem habet aliquid quod sit ens et quod sit unum, et ideo contingit quod est una relatio realis tantum propter unitatem causae. Sicut patet de aequalitate: propter unam enim quantitatem est in uno corpore una aequalitas tantum, quamvis sint multi respectus secundum quos diversis corporibus dicitur esse aequale; si autem secundum omnes illos respectus multiplicarentur realiter relationes in uno corpore, sequeretur quod in uno essent accidentia infinita vel indeterminata. Et similiter magister est una relatione magister omnium quos idem docet, quamvis sint multi respectus. Sic etiam et unus homo secundum unam realem relationem est filius patris sui et matris suae, quia una nativitate unam naturam ab utroque accepit. Yet something has being and unity from the same thing, and thus it happens that there is only one real relation because of the unity of the cause. This is clear in the case of equality: for since there is only one quantity in one body, there is only one equality, even though there are many references according to which it is said to be equal to different bodies. But if real relations in one body were multiplied according to all those references, it would follow that there would be infinite or indeterminate accidents in one thing. Similarly, a teacher is by a single relation the teacher of everyone he teaches even though there are many references. So also, one man is the son of his father and his mother according to a single real relation because by one birth he received one nature from both. Sequendo igitur hanc rationem, videretur dicendum quod alia sit filiatio realis in Christo qua refertur ad Patrem et alia qua refertur ad matrem, quia alia generatione nascitur ab utroque, et alia est natura quam habet a Patre et alia quam habet a matre. By following this reasoning, therefore, it seems we must say there is a real sonship in Christ by which he is related to his Father, and another by which he is related to his mother, for he is born from each by a different generation, and the nature which he has from his Father is one thing while that from his mother is something else. Sed alia ratio reformat pactum. But another reason alters this determination. Hoc enim est universaliter tenendum quod nulla relatio Dei ad creaturam realiter in Deo existit, sed est respectus rationis tantum, quia Deus est supra omnem ordinem creaturae et mensura omnis creaturae, a qua dependet omnis creatura et non e converso, multo magis quam haec conveniant scibili respectu scientiae, in quo propter has causas non est relatio realis ad scientiam. For it must be held universally that there is no relation between God and a creature that really exists in God. Rather, it is a relation only of the mind, since God is above every order of creatures and is the measure of every creature. Every creature depends on this relation but not conversely. Even more does this apply to a knowable thing in relation to knowledge, since in the knowable thing there is no real relation to knowledge because of these reasons. Est autem considerandum quod subiectum filiationis non est natura vel naturae pars aliqua: non enim dicimus quod humanitas sit filia, vel caput aut oculus. In Christo autem non ponimus nisi unum suppositum et unam hypostasim, sicut et unam personam, quod est suppositum aeternum, in quo nulla relatio realis ad creaturam esse potest, ut iam dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod filiatio qua Christus refertur ad matrem est respectus rationis tantum. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod Christus non sit realiter filius Virginis: sicut enim Deus realiter est dominus propter realem potentiam qua continet creaturam, sic realiter est filius Virginis propter realem naturam quam accepit a matre. Si autem essent in Christo plura supposita, oporteret ponere in Christo duas filiationes; sed hoc reputo erroneum, et in Conciliis invenitur damnatum. Nevertheless, we must consider that the subject of sonship is not a nature or some part of a nature: for we do not say that humanity is a daughter or a head or an eye. Yet in Christ we say there is only one supposit and one hypostasis, just as also one person—which is the eternal supposit—in which there cannot be any real relation to a creature, as has been said already. And thus, it stands that the sonship by which Christ is related to his mother is a relation only of the mind. Nor on account of this does it follow that Christ is not really the son of the Virgin: for just as God really is Lord on account of the real power by which he sustains a creature, so is he really the son of the Virgin on account of the real nature which he received from his mother. If there were many supposits in Christ, however, it would be necessary to say there were two sonships in Christ, but I consider this erroneous, and it is found condemned in the councils. Unde dico quod in Christo est una filiatio realis tantum, qua refertur ad Patrem. Hence I say that in Christ there is only one real sonship, that by which he is related to his Father. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non negamus non esse in Christo realem filiationem qua refertur ad matrem, quia causa relationis deficiat, sed quia deficit subiectum talis relationis, cum non sit in Christo aliquod suppositum creatum vel hypostasis. Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that we do not deny that a real sonship is in Christ by which he is related to his mother because the cause of the relation fails, but rather because the subject of such a relation fails, since there is not in Christ any created supposit or hypostasis. Ad secundum dicendum quod eo modo quo ille homo accepit ex tempore Dei potentiam, eo modo accepit filiationem aeternam, in quantum scilicet factum est ut una esset persona Dei et hominis, ut Ambrosius ibidem subdit. Hoc autem non est factum per aliquid realiter absolutum vel relativum temporaliter inhaerens Filio Dei, sed per solam unionem quae realiter existit in natura creata, non autem realiter in ipsa persona assumente. Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that in the same way that man received in time the power of God, so too he received eternal sonship, namely, inasmuch as this was done in order that there would be one person of God and of man, as Ambrose adds in the same place. Yet this was not done through something really absolute or relative inhering temporally in the Son of God but through the union alone which exists really in created nature, yet not really in the person assuming it.