Quodlibet III Quodlibetal Questions III De Deo, de angelis, de hominibus et de creaturis pure corporalibus On God, Angels, Men, and Purely Bodily Creatures De Deo On God Quaestio 1 Question 1 Quantum ad naturam divinam Regarding the divine nature Quaesitum est de Deo, de angelis, de hominibus et de creaturis pure corporalibus. There were questions concerning God, angels, men, and purely bodily creatures. De Deo quaesitum est et quantum ad naturam divinam, et quantum ad naturam assumptam. Concerning God there were questions both regarding the divine nature, and regarding the assumed nature. Circa naturam divinam quaesita sunt duo de potentia Dei; About the divine nature there were two questions concerning the power of God: primo, utrum Deus possit facere quod materia sit sine forma; first, whether God can make matter exist without form; secundo, utrum possit facere quod idem corpus simul localiter sit in duobus locis. second, whether he can make the same body be locally in two places simultaneously. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum Deus possit facere quod materia sit sine forma Whether God can make matter exist without form Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus possit facere quod materia sit sine forma. To the first we proceed thus. It seems that God can make matter exist without form. Sicut enim materia secundum suum esse dependet a forma, ita accidens a subiecto; sed Deus potest facere quod accidens sit sine subiecto, ut patet in sacramento altaris; ergo potest facere quod materia sit sine forma. Obj. 1: Just as matter depends upon form according to its being, so an accident depends upon a subject. But God can make an accident exist without a subject, as is clear in the sacrament of the altar. Therefore, he can make matter exist without form. Sed contra. Deus non potest facere contradictoria esse simul; sed materiam esse sine forma implicat contradictionem, eo quod esse materiae importat actum, qui est forma; non ergo Deus potest facere quod materia sit sine forma. On the contrary: God cannot make contradictories exist simultaneously. But for matter to exist without form implies a contradiction, since for matter to exist implies act, which is form. Therefore, God cannot make matter exist without form. Responsio. Dicendum quod uniuscuiusque rei virtus activa est aestimanda secundum modum essentiae, eo quod unumquodque agit in quantum est ens actu. Unde, si in aliquo inveniatur forma aliqua vel natura non limitata seu contracta, erit virtus eius se extendens ad omnes actus vel effectus convenientes illi naturae; puta, si intelligeretur esse calor per se subsistens, vel in aliquo subiecto quod reciperet ipsum secundum totum eius posse, sequeretur quod haberet virtutem ad producendum omnes actus et effectus caloris. Si vero aliquod subiectum non reciperet calorem secundum eius totum posse, sed cum aliqua contractione et limitatione, non haberet virtutem activam respectu omnium actuum vel effectuum caloris. Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens, manifestum est quod natura essendi convenit Deo infinite absque omni limitatione et contractione; unde eius virtus activa se extendit infinite ad totum ens et ad omne id quod potest habere rationem entis; illud ergo solum poterit excludi a divina potentia quod repugnat rationi entis, et hoc non propter defectum divinae potentiae, sed quia ipsum non potest esse ens, unde non potest fieri. I answer that the active power of each thing must be considered according to the mode of essence, since each thing acts inasmuch as it is a being in act. Hence, if a form or nature is found in something that is not limited or contracted, its power will extend itself to all acts or effects befitting that nature. For example, if heat were understood to subsist through itself, or in some subject that was to receive it according to its whole ability, it would follow that it would have power to produce all the acts and effects of heat. Whereas if some subject were not to receive heat according to its whole ability, but with some contraction and limitation, it would not have active power with respect to all the acts or effects of heat. Yet since God is subsisting being itself, it is clear that the nature of being befits God infinitely without any limitation and contraction. Hence his active power extends itself infinitely to the whole of being and to everything which can have the character of being. Therefore, only that which is repugnant to the character of being could be excluded from the divine power, and this not on account of a defect of divine power, but because it cannot be a being, and hence it cannot be made. Repugnat autem rationi entis non ens, simul et secundum idem, existens: unde quod aliquid simul sit et non sit, a Deo fieri non potest, nec aliquid contradictionem includens. Et de huiusmodi est materiam esse actu sine forma: omne enim quod est actu, vel est ipse actus, vel est potentia participans actum; esse autem actum repugnat rationi materiae, quae secundum propriam rationem est ens in potentia; relinquitur ergo quod non possit esse in actu nisi in quantum participat actum. Actus autem participatus a materia nihil est aliud quam forma; unde idem est dictu, materiam esse in actu et materiam habere formam. Dicere ergo quod materia sit in actu sine forma, est dicere contradictoria esse simul; unde a Deo fieri non potest. Yet it is repugnant to the character of being simultaneously to exist and not exist in the same respect. Hence for something to simultaneously exist and not exist cannot be made by God, nor something that includes some contradiction. And for matter to be actually without form is of this sort: for everything which is actual is either act itself or the power participating in act. Yet to be an act is repugnant to the character of matter, which according to its proper character is being in potency. Therefore, it remains that it cannot be able to be in act except inasmuch as it participates in act. Yet act participated in by matter is nothing else than form. Hence to say that matter is in act and that matter has form is the same thing. Therefore, to say that matter is in act without form is to say that contradictories exist simultaneously. Hence this cannot be made by God. Ad id ergo quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod accidens secundum suum esse dependet a subiecto sicut a causa sustentante ipsum, et quia Deus potest producere omnes effectus secundarum causarum absque ipsis causis secundis, potest conservare in esse accidens sine subiecto; sed materia secundum suum esse actuale dependet a forma in quantum forma est ipse actus eius; unde non est simile. Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that an accident according to its own being depends upon a subject just as upon the cause sustaining it. And because God can produce all effects of secondary causes without those secondary causes, he can conserve an accident in being without a subject. But matter according to its actual being depends upon form inasmuch as form is its very act. Hence it is not similar. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum possit facere quod idem corpus simul localiter sit in duobus locis Whether God can make the same body be locally in two places simultaneously Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus possit facere unum corpus simul esse localiter in duobus locis. To the second we proceed thus. It seems that God can make one body be locally in two places simultaneously. Difficilius enim est quod haec substantia mutetur in illam substantiam quam quod hoc accidens mutetur in illud accidens; sed in sacramento altaris ex hoc quod divina virtute substantia panis, remanentibus eius dimensionibus secundum quas commensuratur loco, convertitur in substantiam corporis Christi, sequitur quod idem corpus Christi sit, non localiter secundum commensurationem propriarum dimensionum, sed sacramentaliter, in pluribus locis simul; ergo Deus potest facere quod convertatur dimensio huius corporis in dimensionem alterius corporis; et sic erit idem corpus localiter in duobus locis simul. Obj. 1: It is more difficult for one substance to be changed into another substance than for one accident to be changed into another accident. But in the sacrament of the altar the substance of bread, with its dimensions remaining whereby it is commensurate with a place, is converted by divine power into the substance of the body of Christ. Thus, it follows that the same body of Christ is in many places simultaneously, not locally according to the commensuration of its proper dimensions, but sacramentally. Therefore, God can make it that the dimension of this body is converted into the dimension of another body. And thus, there will be the same body locally in two places simultaneously. Sed contra. Omnia duo loca distinguntur adinvicem secundum aliquam loci contrarietatem, quae sunt sursum et deorsum, ante et retro, dextrum et sinistrum; sed Deus non potest facere quod duo contraria sint simul: hoc enim implicat contradictionem; ergo Deus non potest facere quod idem corpus localiter sit simul in duobus locis. On the contrary: All two places are distinguished from one another according to some contrariety of place, which are up and down, in front of and behind, right and left. But God cannot make two contraries exist simultaneously since this implies a contradiction. Therefore, God cannot make the same body exist locally in two places simultaneously. Responsio. Dicendum quod aliquod corpus esse localiter in aliquo loco nihil est aliud quam corpus circumscribi et comprehendi a loco secundum commensurationem propriarum dimensionum; quod autem comprehenditur a loco aliquo, ita est in ipso loco quod nihil eius est extra locum illum; unde ponere quod sit localiter in hoc loco et tamen sit in alio loco, est ponere contradictoria esse simul; unde, secundum premissa, hoc a Deo fieri non potest. I answer that for some body to be locally in some place is nothing other than for a body to be circumscribed and contained by a place according to the commensuration of its proper dimensions. Yet that which is contained by some place is in this place such that nothing of it is outside that place. Hence to posit that it is locally in this place and, nevertheless, in another place, is to posit that contradictories exist simultaneously. Hence, according to the premises, this cannot be made by God. Ad id ergo quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod difficilius est hoc accidens mutari in illud accidens quam hanc substantiam mutari in illam substantiam, tum quia duae substantiae conveniunt in subiecto materiali, quod est pars essentialis utriusque substantiae, tum quia substantia habet individuationem per se ipsam, accidens vero non est individuabile per se ipsum, sed per subiectum, unde non potest ei convenire quod hoc accidens convertatur in hoc accidens. Dato tamen quod haec dimensio converteretur in illam dimensionem, non sequeretur quod idem corpus esset in duobus locis simul, sed in uno tantum, quia, sicut postquam substantia panis conversa est in substantiam corporis Christi, iam non sunt ibi duae substantiae, sed una tantum, ita etiam si haec dimensio huius corporis convertatur in illam dimensionem alterius corporis, iam non erunt duae dimensiones, sed una tantum, et sic non commensuraretur diversis locis, sed uni tantum. Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that it is more difficult for one accident to be changed into another accident than for one substance to be changed into another substance. This is both because two substances share the same material subject, which is an essential part of each substance, and because a substance has individuation through its very self, whereas an accident is not able to be individual through itself but through a subject. Hence it cannot accord with it for this accident to be converted into this accident. Nevertheless, given that one dimension is converted into another dimension, it would not follow that that body would be in two places simultaneously, but in one only. For, just as after the substance of bread has been converted into the substance of the body of Christ there are now not two substances, but one only, so also if one dimension of this body is converted into another dimension of another body, now there will not be two dimensions, but one only, and thus it would not be commensurate with diverse places, but with one only. Quaestio 2 Question 2 Quantum ad naturam assumptam Regarding the assumed nature Deinde quaesitum est de Deo quantum ad humanam naturam assumptam. Et circa hoc quaesita sunt tria: Then there were questions concerning God in regard to the assumed human nature. And there were three questions about this: primo quantum ad animam, utrum scilicet anima Christi sciat infinita; first, regarding the soul: namely, whether the soul of Christ knows infinite things; secundo quantum ad corpus, utrum scilicet oculus Christi post mortem dicatur equivoce oculus, vel univoce; second, regarding the body: namely, whether the eye of Christ after death is called an eye equivocally or univocally; tertio quantum ad actum coniuncti qui est comestio, utrum scilicet post resurrectionem Christus vere comederit incorporando sibi cibum. third, regarding the act of union which is eating: namely, whether after the Resurrection Christ truly ate by incorporating food into himself. Articulus 1 Article 1 Quantum ad animam Regarding the soul Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod anima Christi non possit scire infinita. To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the soul of Christ cannot know infinite things. Nullum enim donum creatum, cum sit finitum, potest elevare creaturam ad id quod est proprium Dei, quia tale est infinitum; sed gratia unionis est donum creatum, cognoscere autem infinita est proprium Dei, cuius sapientiae non est numerus; ergo anima Christi per gratiam unionis non potest elevari ad cognoscendum infinita. Obj. 1: For no created gift, since it is finite, can elevate a creature to that which is proper to God, since he is infinite. But the grace of union is a created gift, while to know infinite things is proper to God, of whose wisdom there is no number (Ps 147 [146]:5). Therefore, the soul of Christ through the grace of union cannot be elevated to knowing infinite things. Praeterea. Dionysius XI capitulo Caelestis hierarchiae ponit tria sibi proportionata, quae sunt substantia, virtus et operatio; sed substantia animae Christi non potest esse infinita; ergo neque virtus eius neque operatio potest esse infinita, ut infinita cognoscat. Obj. 2: Dionysius in the eleventh chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy posits three things proportionate to one another, which are substance, power, and activity. But the substance of the soul of Christ cannot be infinite. Therefore, neither can his power nor his activity be infinite such that he can know infinite things.