Si ergo aliquid quod secundum se non est contra legem Dei, ut levare festucam de terra, vel iurare, apprehendatur, conscientia errante, ut contra legem Dei existens et sic voluntas in ipsum feratur, manifestum est quod voluntas feretur, per se loquendo et formaliter, in id quod est contra legem Dei, materialiter autem in id quod non est contra legem Dei, immo forte in id quod est secundum legem Dei; et ideo manifestum est quod est ibi contemptus legis Dei, et ideo necesse est quod sit ibi peccatum. If, therefore, something which, according to itself is not against the law of God, such as to lift straw from the earth, or to swear an oath, should be thought, with conscience erring, as being against the law of God, and thus the will is borne to it, it is clear that the will is borne, speaking of itself and formally, to that which is against the law of God, while materially it is borne to that which is not against the law of God, nay, rather, perhaps to that which is according to the law of God. And for this reason, it is clear that contempt of the law of God is there, and for this reason, it is necessary that sin be there. Et ideo dicendum est quod omnis conscientia, sive recta sive erronea, sive in per se malis sive in indifferentibus, est obligatoria, ita quod qui contra conscientiam facit, peccat. And for this reason, it must be said that every conscience, whether right or erroneous, whether in things evil in themselves or in things indifferent, is obligatory, such that he who acts against conscience sins. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet hereticus qui iurat, conscientia erronea contradicente, materialiter loquendo non faciat contra legem Dei, tamen formaliter loquendo contra legem Dei facit, ut ostensum est. Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, although a heretic who swears an oath, with an erring conscience contradicting, materially speaking does not act against the law of God, nevertheless formally speaking he acts against the law of God, as has been shown. Ad secundum dicendum quod, si alicui dictat conscientia ut faciat illud quod est contra legem Dei, si non faciat, peccat, et similiter si faciat, peccat, quia ignorantia iuris non excusat a peccato, nisi forte sit ignorantia invincibilis, sicut est in furiosis et amentibus, quae omnino excusat. Nec tamen sequitur quod sit perplexus simpliciter, sed secundum quid: potest enim erroneam conscientiam deponere, et tunc faciens secundum legem Dei non peccat. Non est autem inconveniens quod, aliquo posito, aliquis homo sit perplexus, sicut sacerdos qui tenetur cantare, si sit in peccato, peccat cantando et non cantando, nec tamen est simpliciter perplexus, quia potest poenitenciam agere et absque peccato cantare; sicut etiam in syllogisticis, uno inconvenienti dato, alia contingunt, ut dicitur in I Physicorum. Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, if conscience dictates to anyone that he should do what is against the law of God, he sins if he does not do it, and similarly he sins if he does it, because ignorance of the law does not excuse from sin unless, perhaps, it is invincible ignorance, just as with the mad and insane, which altogether excuses. Nor, nevertheless, does it follow that he is perplexed absolutely, but in a certain way, for he can put aside his erroneous conscience, and then he does not sin in acting according to the law of God. Yet it is not unfitting that, with something posited, some man should be perplexed, such as a priest who is held to sing, sins by singing and by not singing if he is in sin; nor, nevertheless, is he perplexed absolutely, because he can repent and sing without sin, just as also in syllogistics, with one unfitting thing given, the others follow, as is said in the first book of the Physics. Quaestio 13 Question 13 De poenitentia On penance Deinde quaesitum est de poenitentia. Et circa hoc quaesita sunt duo: Then there were questions concerning penance. And about this there were two questions: primo, utrum si aliquis sacerdos poenitenti dicat: quicquid boni feceris, sit tibi in remissionem peccatorum, sit satisfactio sacramentalis; first, whether if some priest says to a penitent: whatever of good you do, may it be for you unto the remission of sins, there is sacramental satisfaction; secundo, utrum ei qui praetermisit divinum officium dicere cum teneretur ad ipsum, possit imponi alia poenitentia pro tali omissione, vel sit ei imponendum quod iteret quod omisit. second, whether, upon him who has omitted to say the divine office when held to it, other penances can be imposed for such an omission, or must it be imposed upon him that he repeat what he omitted. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum si aliquis sacerdos poenitenti dicat: quicquid boni feceris sit tibi in remissionem peccatorum, sit satisfactio sacramentalis Whether there is sacramental satisfaction if some priest says to a penitent: may whatever good you do be for the remission of your sins Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praedicta satisfactio non sit sacramentalis. To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the aforesaid satisfaction is not sacramental. Sacramentalis enim satisfactio ad aliquid ligat; sed ille cui praedictus modus satisfactionis indicitur, ad nihil ligatur; ergo videtur quod non sit sacramentalis satisfactio. Obj. 1: For sacramental satisfaction binds unto something. But that man to whom the abovementioned mode of satisfaction is declared is bound unto nothing. Therefore, it seems that there is not sacramental satisfaction. Sed contra. Illa videtur esse sacramentalis satisfactio qua perfecta ad nihil aliud homo tenetur; sed poenitens cui sic satisfactio iniungitur a sacerdote, nihil aliud tenetur implere, cum nihil sit aliud sibi mandatum; ergo huiusmodi satisfactio est sacramentalis. On the contrary: That seems to be sacramental satisfaction whereby, with it accomplished, a man is held unto nothing else. But a penitent upon whom satisfaction is enjoined thus by a priest is held to fulfill nothing else, since nothing else is mandated for him. Therefore, satisfaction of this sort is sacramental. Responsio. Dicendum quod hic est quadruplici distinctione utendum. Primo enim considerandum est quod peccator est debitor alicuius satisfactionis dupliciter: uno modo ex iniunctione sacerdotis, alio modo ex peccato commisso. Unde, si contingat quod sacerdos minorem satisfactionem imponat poenitenti quam sit illa ad quam obligatur ex quantitate sui peccati, subtracto eo quod remittitur virtute clavium et contritionis praecedentis, nihilominus poenitens ad aliquid ulterius obligatur, quod si in hac vita non perficiet, in purgatorio exsolvet. Et e converso, si sacerdos imponat maiorem poenitentiam quam poenitens facere teneatur, pensata remissione quae est facta per vim clavium et contritione praecedente, nihilominus poenitens tenetur facere quod sibi est iniunctum, si assit facultas. I answer that here a fourfold distinction must be used. For first it must be considered that a sinner is a debtor of some satisfaction in two ways: in one way from the injunction of a priest, in another way from the sin committed. Hence, if it happens that a priest imposes a lesser satisfaction upon a penitent than that to which he is obligated from the quantity of his sin, having subtracted that which is remitted by virtue of the keys and preceding contrition, nonetheless the penitent is obligated to something more, which if in this life he does not complete, he will pay in purgatory. And conversely, if a priest imposes a greater penance than the penitent is held to do, with the remission weighed which was made through the power of the keys and with contrition preceding, nonetheless the penitent is held to do that which has been enjoined upon him if the faculty is present. Secundo considerantum est quod opus quod quis facit ex iniunctione sacerdotis, dupliciter valet poenitenti: uno modo ex natura operis, alio modo ex vi clavium. Cum enim satisfactio a sacerdote absoluente iniuncta sit pars poenitentiae, manifestum est quod in ea operator vis clavium, ita quod amplius valet ad expiandum peccatum quam si proprio arbitrio homo faceret idem opus. Second, it must be considered that a work which anyone does out of the injunction of a priest prevails for a penitent in two ways: in one way from the nature of the work, in another way from the power of the keys. For since satisfaction enjoined by the absolving priest is a part of penance, it is clear that in it the power of the keys is working, such that it prevails more unto expiating sin than if a man were to do the same work by his own choice. Tertio considerandum est quod satisfactio ad duo valet: valet enim ad expiationem culpae praeteritae, valet etiam ad cautelam culpae futurae, sicut cum homo ieiunat, per hoc praebetur ei remedium contra futuras concupiscentias carnis. Third, it must be considered that satisfaction prevails unto two things: for it prevails unto the expiation of past fault, and it prevails also unto the caution of future fault, just as when a man fasts there is granted to him a remedy against future desires of the flesh. Item quarto considerandum est quod sacerdos potest poenitenti satisfactionem iniungere vel ex proprio arbitrio vel etiam ex consilio alieno. Fourth, it likewise must be considered that a priest can enjoin satisfaction upon a penitent either out of his own judgment or also out of another’s counsel. Est ergo dicendum quod, sicut potest sacerdos iniungere satisfactionem poenitenti ex arbitrio alieno, ita etiam ex arbitrio ipsius poenitentis, sicut si dicat: facias hoc, si potes; et si non potes, facias hoc. Et simile videtur cum sacerdos dicit: quicquid boni feceris, sit tibi in remissionem peccatorum. Videtur autem satis conveniens quod sacerdos non oneret poenitentem gravi pondere satisfactionis, quia, sicut parvus ignis a multis lignis superpositis de facili extinguitur, ita posset contingere quod parvus affectus contritionis in poenitente nuper excitatus propter grave onus satisfactionis extingueretur, peccatore totaliter desperante. Unde melius est quod sacerdos poenitenti indicet quanta poenitentia esset sibi pro peccatis iniungenda, et iniungat sibi nihilominus aliquid quod poenitens tolerabiliter ferat, ex cuius impletione assuefiat ut maiora impleat, quae etiam sacerdos sibi iniungere non attemptasset. Et haec quae praeter iniunctionem expressam facit, accipiunt maiorem vim expiationis culpae praeteritae ex illa generali iniunctione qua sacerdos dicit: quicquid boni feceris, sit tibi in remissionem peccatorum (unde laudabiliter consuevit a multis sacerdotibus hoc dici), licet non habeant maiorem vim ad praebendum remedium contra culpam futuram. Et quantum ad hoc talis satisfactio est sacramentalis, in quantum virtute clavium est culpae commissae expiativa. Therefore, it must be considered that, just as a priest can enjoin satisfaction upon a penitent out of another’s judgment, so also out of the judgment of the penitent himself, such as if he says: may you do this, if you are able; and if you are not able, may you do this. And it seems similar when a priest says: whatever of good you should do, may it be for you unto the remission of sins. Yet it seems fitting enough for a priest not to burden a penitent with a grave weight of satisfaction because, just as a small fire is extinguished easily by many pieces of wood put upon it, so it could happen that a small affect of contrition in a penitent recently excited on account of a grave burden of satisfaction would be extinguished, with the sinner totally despairing. Hence it is better for a priest to declare to a penitent how great a penance would have to be enjoined upon him for sins, but, nevertheless, should enjoin upon him something which the penitent can bear tolerably, and from whose fulfillment the penitent will become accustomed to fulfilling greater things, which even the priest had not attempted to enjoin upon him. And these things which he does beyond the expressed injunction receive greater power for the expiation of past fault from that general injunction by which the priest says: whatever of good you should do, may it be for you unto the remission of sins (hence laudably is this accustomed to be said by many priests), even though they do not have greater power unto granting a remedy against future fault. And regarding this such satisfaction is sacramental, inasmuch as by virtue of the keys it is expiative of committed fault. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum ei qui praetermisit divinum officium dicere cum teneretur ad ipsum, possit imponi alia poenitentia pro tali omissione, vel sit ei imponendum quod iteret quod omisit Whether, upon him who has omitted to say the divine office when held to it, there can be imposed another penance for such an omission, or must it be imposed upon him that he repeat what he omitted Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ei qui omisit dicere divinum officium sit iniungendum quod iterato dicat. To the second we proceed thus. It seems that upon him who has omitted to say the divine office it must be enjoined that he say it again. Qui enim tenetur ad aliquod debitum speciale implendum, non potest liberari nisi idem debitum solvat. Si igitur aliquis tenebatur ad hoc debitum, ut scilicet divinum officium diceret, videtur quod non posset absolvi nisi hoc debitum solvat. Obj. 1: For he who is held to fulfill some special debt cannot be freed unless he pay the same debt. If, therefore, someone was held to some special debt, namely, to say the divine office, it seems that he could not be absolved unless he paid this debt. Sed contra est quod poenitentiae sunt arbitrariae; ergo pro peccato talis omissionis, quaecumque poena secundum arbitrium sacerdotis potest imponi. On the contrary is that penances are arbitrary. Therefore, for a sin of such an omission, any punishment can be imposed according to the judgment of the priest. Responsio. Dicendum quod in omni divino officio est hoc commune quod pertinet ad laudem Dei et ad suffragium fidelium, sed distinguitur unum officium ab alio secundum diversitatem temporum et locorum. Rationabiliter enim institutum est ut diversimode Deus laudetur secundum congruentiam temporum et locorum. I answer that in every divine office there is this common thing: that it pertains to the praise of God and to the suffrage of the faithful, yet one office is distinguished from another according to the diversity of times and places. For rationally was it instituted for God to be praised in diverse ways according to the congruity of times and places. Et ideo, sicut in officiis divinis exsolvendis observanda est congruitas loci, ita etiam congruitas temporis; quae quidem observari non posset si oporteret iniungere omittenti quod horas diceret quas omisit: forte enim in Completorio diceret: iam lucis orto sidere, et in tempore paschali diceret officium Dominicae Passionis, quod esset absurdum. Et ideo non videtur esse iniungendum ei qui omisit divinum officium quod horas easdem repetat, sed aliquid ad laudem divinam pertinens, puta quod dicat Septem psalmos, vel unum psalterium, vel aliquid amplius secundum quantitatem delicti. And for this reason, just as in saying divine offices there must be observed congruity of place, so also congruity of time, which indeed could not be observed if it were necessary to enjoin upon one omitting that he say the hours which he omitted: for perhaps in Compline he would say: iam lucis orto sidere, and in Paschaltide he would say the office of the Lord’s Passion, which would be absurd. And for this reason, it does not seem that it must be enjoined upon him who omitted the divine office that he repeat the same hours, but rather something pertaining to divine praise: for example, that he say the seven psalms, or one psalter, or something more according to the quantity of the delict. Ad id vero quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod tempore debito officii praetereunte, iam est impotens ad solvendum tempore debito, et ideo, quia hoc non potest facere, iniungenda est ei alia poenitentia. Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that with the due time of the office passing by, he is now incapable of resolving at the due time, and for this reason, because he cannot do this, another penance must be enjoined upon him. De Creatura Pure Corporali On a Purely Bodily Creature Quaestio 14 Question 14 De creatura pure corporali On a purely bodily creature Deinde quaesitum est de creatura pure corporali. Et circa hoc quaesita sunt duo; Then there were questions about a purely bodily creature. And about this there were two questions: primo, de arcu nubium qui dicitur iris, utrum sit signum dilvuii non futuri; first, concerning the arc of clouds called a rainbow, whether it is a sign of no future flood; secundo, utrum possit demonstrative probari quod mundus non sit aeternus. second, whether it can be proven demonstratively that the world is not eternal. Articulus 1 Article 1 De arcu nubium qui dicitur iris On the arc of clouds called a rainbow