Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum liceat quod aliquis pro se petat licentiam in theologia docendi Whether it is licit for someone to seek for himself a license of teaching in theology Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nemini liceat pro se petere licentiam in theologia docendi. To the first we proceed thus. It seems that it is licit for no one to seek for himself a license of teaching in theology. Doctores enim Sacrae Scripturae adhibentur ministerio verbi Dei, sicut et praelati; sed non licet alicui petere praelationem, immo, ut Gregorius dicit in Registro, recusantibus dignitates ecclesiasticae sunt conferendae, petentibus autem sunt denegandae; ergo neque alicui licet petere cathedram magistralem ad docendum in Sacra Scriptura. Obj. 1: For teachers of Sacred Scripture exercise the ministry of the word of God just as prelates do. But it is not licit for someone to seek the prelacy; nay, rather, as Gregory says in his Register, ecclesiastical dignities must be conferred upon those refusing, yet must be denied to those seeking. Therefore, neither is it licit for someone to seek the magisterial chair to teach Sacred Scripture. Praeterea. Augustinus dicit, XIX De civitate Dei: locus superior, sine quo populus regi non potest, etsi . . . administretur ut decet, inconvenienter tamen appetitur; ergo et inconvenienter petitur; pari ergo ratione cathedra magistralis, quae est etiam locus superior. Obj. 2: Augustine says in On the City of God 19: the superior place, without which the people cannot be ruled, although it be administered as is becoming, nevertheless is desired unfittingly. Therefore, it is also unfittingly sought. The same reason, therefore, applies to the magisterial chair, which is also a superior place. Sed contra est quod Gregorius dicit in Pastorali, quod gradus magistrorum est periculosus, gradus autem discipulorum est securus; sed hoc videtur ad perfectionem pertinere ut aliquis propter aliquod bonum periculis se exponat; ergo videtur esse laudabile quod aliquis cathedram magistralem appetat et pro se petat. On the contrary (3) is that Gregory says in the Book of Pastoral Rule that the position of masters is more dangerous, yet the position of disciples is secure. But it seems to pertain to perfection for someone on account of some good to expose himself to dangers. Therefore, it seems laudable for someone to desire the magisterial chair and seek it for himself. Responsio. Dicendum quod ad evidentiam huius quaestionis oportet triplicem differentiam considerare cathedrae magistralis ad cathedram pontificalem. Quarum prima est quod ille qui accipit cathedram magistralem non accipit aliquam eminentiam quam prius non habuerat, sed solum oportunitatem communicandi scientiam quam prius habebat: non enim ille qui licentiat aliquem dat ei scientiam, sed auctoritatem docendi; ille vero qui accipit cathedram episcopalem, accipit eminentiam potestatis quam prius non habebat, sed quantum ad hoc in nullo ab aliis differebat. I answer that to answer this question it is necessary to consider a threefold difference between the magisterial chair and the pontifical chair. The first is that he who receives the magisterial chair does not receive any eminence which he did not have before, but only the opportunity of communicating the knowledge which he already had. For someone who licenses another does not give knowledge to him but the authority of teaching; whereas a man who receives the episcopal chair receives the eminence of power which before he did not have, but in no way did he differ from others in lacking it. Secunda differentia est quod eminentia scientiae quae requiritur ad cathedram magistralem, est perfectio hominis secundum se ipsum; eminentia vero potestatis quae pertinet ad cathedram pontificalem, est hominis per comparationem ad alium. The second difference is that the eminence of knowledge which is required for the magisterial chair is the perfection of man according to himself. But the eminence of power which pertains to the pontifical chair belongs to a man through comparison with another. Tertia differentia est quod ad cathedram pontificalem fit homo idoneus per caritatem excellentem, unde Dominus, antequam Petro suarum ovium curam committeret, quaesivit ab eo: Simon Iohannis diligis me plus his?, ut dicitur Iohannis ultimo; ad cathedram autem magistralem redditur homo idoneus ex sufficientia scientiae. The third difference is that a man is made fit for the pontifical chair through excellent charity. Hence the Lord, before he committed to Peter the care of his sheep, asked of him: Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these? (John 21:15). Yet a man is rendered fit for the magisterial chair from having sufficient knowledge. His igitur consideratis, manifestum est quod appetere aliquid quod pertinet ad perfectionem sui ipsius, est laudabile, unde appetitus sapientiae est laudabilis: dicitur enim Sapientiae VI quod concupiscientia sapientiae perducit ad regnum perpetuum. Appetitus autem potestatis super alios est viciosus, quia, ut Gregorius dicit: contra naturam superbire est, hominem homini velle dominari. Unde, si ille qui dat licentiam ad cathedram magistralem posset eminentiam sapientiae dare, sicut ille qui promovet ad cathedram pontificalem dat eminentiam potestatis, esset simpliciter exposcenda, cum tamen petere excellentiam potestatis sit turpe. Cum autem ille qui accipit licentiam ad cathedram magistralem accipiat solam oportunitatem communicandi quod habet, petere huiusmodi licentiam, quantum est in se, nullam videtur turpitudinem continere, quia communicare aliis scientiam quam quis habet laudabile est et ad caritatem pertinens, secundum illud Sapientiae VIII: quam sine fictione didici et sine invidia communico; et prima Petri IV, dicitur: unusquisque, sicut accepit gratiam, in alterutrum illam administrantes. With these things considered, therefore, it is clear that to desire something which pertains to the perfection of one’s own self is laudable. Hence the desire for wisdom is laudable: for it is said in Wisdom 6:21 that the desire of wisdom leads unto the perpetual kingdom. Yet the desire of power over others is vicious because, as Gregory says: to be proud is against nature, for a man to wish to dominate a man. Hence, if that man who gives license for the magisterial chair could give the eminence of wisdom, just as that man who promotes unto the pontifical chair gives eminence of power, then such a license would be worth seeking, even though it is, nevertheless, indecent to seek the excellence of power. Yet since a man who receives a license for the magisterial chair receives only the opportunity of communicating what he has, to seek a license of this sort, in and of itself, seems to contain no turpitude because to communicate to others knowledge which someone has is laudable and pertains to charity, according to Wisdom 7:13: which without fiction I taught and without envy I communicate; and 1 Peter 4:10: each one, just as he has received grace, administering it one to another. Potest tamen turpitudinem continere ratione praesumptionis, quae esset si ille qui non est idoneus ad docendum peteret docendi officium. Sed haec praesumptio non aequaliter est in petentibus licentiam ad docendum et in petentibus pontificatum; nam scientiam, per quam aliquis est idoneus ad docendum, potest aliquis scire per certitudinem se habere; caritatem autem, per quam aliquis est idoneus ad officium pastorale, non potest aliquis per certitudinem scire se habere. Et ideo semper est vitiosum pontificatum petere, non semper autem vitiosum petere licentiam docendi, quamvis honestius sit quod per alium petatur, nisi forte aliquando ex causa aliqua speciali. Nevertheless, it can contain turpitude by reason of presumption, which would be the case if a man who is not fit for teaching were to seek the office of teaching. But this presumption is not equally in those seeking a license for teaching and in those seeking the pontificate; for someone can know with certitude that he has the knowledge whereby he is fit for teaching. Yet someone cannot know with certitude that he has the charity through which he is fit for the pastoral office. And for this reason, it is always vicious to seek the pontificate, yet not always vicious to seek a license of teaching, even though it be more honorable for it to be sought through another, unless perhaps at some time for some special cause. Per hoc ergo patet responsio ad primas duas rationes. Reply Obj. 1–2: Through this, therefore, the response to the first two arguments is clear. Ad tertium dicendum quod quicumque non cavet pericula, videtur contemnere id cuius detrimentum pericula inducere possunt; et quia laudabile est quod homo contemnat bona corporalia propter bona spiritualia, laudabile est quod aliquis periculis corporalibus se exponat propter spiritualia bona; sed contemnere spiritualia bona est valde vitiosum, et ideo quod aliquis periculis spiritualibus se exponat, est valde vituperandum. Imminent autem pericula spiritualia his qui habent magisterii locum; sed pericula magisterii cathedrae pastoralis homo vitat <per> scientiam cum caritate, quam homo nescit se per certitudinem habere; pericula autem magisterii cathedrae magistralis vitat homo per scientiam, quam potest homo scire se habere. Unde non est similis ratio de utroque. Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that whoever does not fear dangers seems to spurn that whose detriment the dangers can induce. And because it is laudable for a man to spurn bodily goods on account of spiritual goods, it is laudable for someone to expose himself to bodily dangers on account of spiritual goods. But to spurn spiritual goods is greatly vicious, and for this reason, for someone to expose himself to spiritual dangers must be greatly reproached. Yet spiritual dangers threaten these men who have the place of master. But a pastoral man avoids the dangers of the magisterial chair through knowledge with charity, which a man does not know himself with certitude to have; yet a magisterial man avoids the dangers of the magisterial chair through knowledge, which a man can know himself to have. Hence there is not a similar reason concerning each. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum auditores diversorum magistrorum theologiae habentium contrarias opiniones, excusentur a peccato, si secuntur falsas opiniones magistrorum suorum Whether those who hear diverse masters of theology holding contrary opinions are excused from sin if they follow the false opinions of their masters Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod auditores diversorum magistrorum tenentium diversas opiniones, excusentur a peccato erroris si opiniones magistrorum suorum sequantur. To the second we proceed thus. It seems that those who hear diverse masters holding diverse opinions are excused from the sin of error if they follow the opinions of their masters. Dicit enim Dominus, Matthaei XXIII: super cathedram Moysi sederunt scribae et pharisaei; omnia quae dicunt vobis servate et facite; multo igitur magis servanda sunt illa quae traduntur a doctoribus Sacrae Scripturae; igitur non peccant qui eorum opiniones sequuntur. Obj. 1: For the Lord says: upon the seat of Moses sat the scribes and pharisees; observe and do all the things which they say to you (Matt 23:2). Much more, therefore, must those things be observed which are handed on by teachers of Sacred Scripture. Therefore, those who follow their opinions do not sin. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matthaei XV: caecus si caeco ducatum praestet, ambo in foveam cadunt; sed quicumque errat, caecus est, in quantum errat; ergo quicumque sequitur opinionem errantis magistri, in foveam peccati cadit. On the contrary is what is said in Matthew 15:14: a blind man if he should give lead to a blind man, both fall into the pit. But whoever errs is blind inasmuch as he errs. Therefore, whoever follows the opinion of an erring master falls into the pit of sin. Responsio. Dicendum quod diversae opiniones doctorum Sacrae Scripturae, si quidem non pertineant ad fidem et bonos mores, absque periculo auditores utramque opinionem sequi possunt; hic enim habet locum quod Apostolus dicit, Romanorum XIV: unusquisque in suo sensu abundet. I answer that if indeed the diverse opinions of the teachers of Sacred Scriptures do not pertain to faith and good customs, the hearers can follow either opinion without danger. For this relates to what the Apostle says: let each one abound in his own sense (Rom 14:5). In his vero quae pertinent ad fidem et bonos mores, nullus excusatur si sequatur erroneam opinionem alicuius magistri: in talibus enim ignorantia non excusat, alioquin immunes a peccato fuissent qui secuti sunt opinionem Arrii, Nestorii et aliorum heresiarcharum. Nec potest excusationem habere propter simplicitatem auditor, si in talibus erroneam opinionem sequatur: in rebus enim dubiis non est de facili praestandus assensus, quin immo, ut Augustinus dicit in libro III De doctrina Christiana, consulere debet quis regulam fidei, quam de Scripturarum planioribus locis et Ecclesiae auctoritate percepit. Qui ergo assentit opinioni alicuius magistri contra manifestum Scripturae testimonium sive contra id quod publicae tenetur secundum Ecclesiae auctoritatem, non potest ab erroris vitio excusari. Whereas in these things which pertain to faith and good customs, no one is excused if he follows an erroneous opinion of some master. For in such things, ignorance does not excuse, otherwise those who followed the opinion of Arius, of Nestorius, and of other heresiarchs would have been immune from sin. Nor can a hearer have an excuse on account of simplicity if in such things he follows an erroneous opinion: for in doubtful matters one must not give assent easily; nay, rather, as Augustine says in the third book of On Christian Doctrine, anyone should consult the rule of faith, which he perceived through the plainer places of the Scriptures and through the authority of the Church. Therefore, he who assents to the opinion of some master against the clear testimony of Scripture or against that which is publicly held according to the authority of the Church cannot be excused from the vice of error. Ad illud ergo quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod ideo praemisit: super cathedram Moysi sederunt scribae et pharisaei, ut quod postea subdit: omnia quae dixerint vobis servate et facite, de illis intelligatur quae ad cathedram pertinent, ad quam non pertinent ea quae sunt contra fidem vel bonos mores. Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that for this reason, it says first: upon the seat of Moses sat the scribes and Pharisees, such that afterwards it adds: observe and do all the things which they say to you; this should be understood concerning what pertains to the seat, and to this seat what is against faith or good customs does not pertain. Ad religiosos Regarding religious Quaestio 5 Question 5 Quantum ad ingressum religionis Regarding the entrance of religion Deinde quaesitum est de his quae pertinent ad religiosos; Then there were questions concerning what pertain to religious; et primo quantum ad ingressum religionis; and first, regarding the entrance of religion; secundo quantum ad ea quae conveniunt iam in religione existentibus. second, regarding what befits those already living in religion. Circa primum quaesita sunt quatuor: About the first, there were four questions: primo, utrum liceat iuvenes inducere ad religionis ingressum per obligationem voti vel iuramenti; first, whether it is licit to induce youths to enter religion through the obligation of a vow or oath; secundo, utrum sic obligati voto vel iuramento possint absque peccato in saeculo remanere; second, whether those thus obligated by vow or oath can remain in the world without sin; tertio, utrum liceat peccatores ad religionem inducere; third, whether it is licit to induce sinners to religion; quarto, utrum peccent qui aliquem iurare faciunt ne religionem ingrediatur. fourth, whether they sin who make someone swear that he will not enter religion. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum liceat iuvenes inducere ad religionis ingressum per obligationem voti vel iuramenti Whether it is licit to induce youths to enter religion through the obligation of a vow or oath Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat iuvenes inducere ad religionem voto vel iuramento. To the first we proceed thus. It seems that it is not licit to induce youths into religion by vow or oath. Illicitum enim est contra Ecclesiae prohibitionem agere; sed Innocentius IV prohibuit, in quibusdam litteris ad religiosos directis, huiusmodi voti susceptionem; ergo peccant qui voto vel iuramento aliquos ad religionem obligare praesumunt. Obj. 1: For it is illicit to act against a prohibition of the Church. But Innocent IV prohibited, in certain letters directed to religious, the undertaking of vows of this sort. Therefore, they sin who by vow or oath presume to obligate others to religion.