Ad tertium dicendum quod quicumque non cavet pericula, videtur contemnere id cuius detrimentum pericula inducere possunt; et quia laudabile est quod homo contemnat bona corporalia propter bona spiritualia, laudabile est quod aliquis periculis corporalibus se exponat propter spiritualia bona; sed contemnere spiritualia bona est valde vitiosum, et ideo quod aliquis periculis spiritualibus se exponat, est valde vituperandum. Imminent autem pericula spiritualia his qui habent magisterii locum; sed pericula magisterii cathedrae pastoralis homo vitat <per> scientiam cum caritate, quam homo nescit se per certitudinem habere; pericula autem magisterii cathedrae magistralis vitat homo per scientiam, quam potest homo scire se habere. Unde non est similis ratio de utroque. Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that whoever does not fear dangers seems to spurn that whose detriment the dangers can induce. And because it is laudable for a man to spurn bodily goods on account of spiritual goods, it is laudable for someone to expose himself to bodily dangers on account of spiritual goods. But to spurn spiritual goods is greatly vicious, and for this reason, for someone to expose himself to spiritual dangers must be greatly reproached. Yet spiritual dangers threaten these men who have the place of master. But a pastoral man avoids the dangers of the magisterial chair through knowledge with charity, which a man does not know himself with certitude to have; yet a magisterial man avoids the dangers of the magisterial chair through knowledge, which a man can know himself to have. Hence there is not a similar reason concerning each. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum auditores diversorum magistrorum theologiae habentium contrarias opiniones, excusentur a peccato, si secuntur falsas opiniones magistrorum suorum Whether those who hear diverse masters of theology holding contrary opinions are excused from sin if they follow the false opinions of their masters Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod auditores diversorum magistrorum tenentium diversas opiniones, excusentur a peccato erroris si opiniones magistrorum suorum sequantur. To the second we proceed thus. It seems that those who hear diverse masters holding diverse opinions are excused from the sin of error if they follow the opinions of their masters. Dicit enim Dominus, Matthaei XXIII: super cathedram Moysi sederunt scribae et pharisaei; omnia quae dicunt vobis servate et facite; multo igitur magis servanda sunt illa quae traduntur a doctoribus Sacrae Scripturae; igitur non peccant qui eorum opiniones sequuntur. Obj. 1: For the Lord says: upon the seat of Moses sat the scribes and pharisees; observe and do all the things which they say to you (Matt 23:2). Much more, therefore, must those things be observed which are handed on by teachers of Sacred Scripture. Therefore, those who follow their opinions do not sin. Sed contra est quod dicitur Matthaei XV: caecus si caeco ducatum praestet, ambo in foveam cadunt; sed quicumque errat, caecus est, in quantum errat; ergo quicumque sequitur opinionem errantis magistri, in foveam peccati cadit. On the contrary is what is said in Matthew 15:14: a blind man if he should give lead to a blind man, both fall into the pit. But whoever errs is blind inasmuch as he errs. Therefore, whoever follows the opinion of an erring master falls into the pit of sin. Responsio. Dicendum quod diversae opiniones doctorum Sacrae Scripturae, si quidem non pertineant ad fidem et bonos mores, absque periculo auditores utramque opinionem sequi possunt; hic enim habet locum quod Apostolus dicit, Romanorum XIV: unusquisque in suo sensu abundet. I answer that if indeed the diverse opinions of the teachers of Sacred Scriptures do not pertain to faith and good customs, the hearers can follow either opinion without danger. For this relates to what the Apostle says: let each one abound in his own sense (Rom 14:5). In his vero quae pertinent ad fidem et bonos mores, nullus excusatur si sequatur erroneam opinionem alicuius magistri: in talibus enim ignorantia non excusat, alioquin immunes a peccato fuissent qui secuti sunt opinionem Arrii, Nestorii et aliorum heresiarcharum. Nec potest excusationem habere propter simplicitatem auditor, si in talibus erroneam opinionem sequatur: in rebus enim dubiis non est de facili praestandus assensus, quin immo, ut Augustinus dicit in libro III De doctrina Christiana, consulere debet quis regulam fidei, quam de Scripturarum planioribus locis et Ecclesiae auctoritate percepit. Qui ergo assentit opinioni alicuius magistri contra manifestum Scripturae testimonium sive contra id quod publicae tenetur secundum Ecclesiae auctoritatem, non potest ab erroris vitio excusari. Whereas in these things which pertain to faith and good customs, no one is excused if he follows an erroneous opinion of some master. For in such things, ignorance does not excuse, otherwise those who followed the opinion of Arius, of Nestorius, and of other heresiarchs would have been immune from sin. Nor can a hearer have an excuse on account of simplicity if in such things he follows an erroneous opinion: for in doubtful matters one must not give assent easily; nay, rather, as Augustine says in the third book of On Christian Doctrine, anyone should consult the rule of faith, which he perceived through the plainer places of the Scriptures and through the authority of the Church. Therefore, he who assents to the opinion of some master against the clear testimony of Scripture or against that which is publicly held according to the authority of the Church cannot be excused from the vice of error. Ad illud ergo quod in contrarium obicitur, dicendum quod ideo praemisit: super cathedram Moysi sederunt scribae et pharisaei, ut quod postea subdit: omnia quae dixerint vobis servate et facite, de illis intelligatur quae ad cathedram pertinent, ad quam non pertinent ea quae sunt contra fidem vel bonos mores. Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that for this reason, it says first: upon the seat of Moses sat the scribes and Pharisees, such that afterwards it adds: observe and do all the things which they say to you; this should be understood concerning what pertains to the seat, and to this seat what is against faith or good customs does not pertain. Ad religiosos Regarding religious Quaestio 5 Question 5 Quantum ad ingressum religionis Regarding the entrance of religion Deinde quaesitum est de his quae pertinent ad religiosos; Then there were questions concerning what pertain to religious; et primo quantum ad ingressum religionis; and first, regarding the entrance of religion; secundo quantum ad ea quae conveniunt iam in religione existentibus. second, regarding what befits those already living in religion. Circa primum quaesita sunt quatuor: About the first, there were four questions: primo, utrum liceat iuvenes inducere ad religionis ingressum per obligationem voti vel iuramenti; first, whether it is licit to induce youths to enter religion through the obligation of a vow or oath; secundo, utrum sic obligati voto vel iuramento possint absque peccato in saeculo remanere; second, whether those thus obligated by vow or oath can remain in the world without sin; tertio, utrum liceat peccatores ad religionem inducere; third, whether it is licit to induce sinners to religion; quarto, utrum peccent qui aliquem iurare faciunt ne religionem ingrediatur. fourth, whether they sin who make someone swear that he will not enter religion. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum liceat iuvenes inducere ad religionis ingressum per obligationem voti vel iuramenti Whether it is licit to induce youths to enter religion through the obligation of a vow or oath Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non liceat iuvenes inducere ad religionem voto vel iuramento. To the first we proceed thus. It seems that it is not licit to induce youths into religion by vow or oath. Illicitum enim est contra Ecclesiae prohibitionem agere; sed Innocentius IV prohibuit, in quibusdam litteris ad religiosos directis, huiusmodi voti susceptionem; ergo peccant qui voto vel iuramento aliquos ad religionem obligare praesumunt. Obj. 1: For it is illicit to act against a prohibition of the Church. But Innocent IV prohibited, in certain letters directed to religious, the undertaking of vows of this sort. Therefore, they sin who by vow or oath presume to obligate others to religion. Praeterea. Extra. “De regularibus et transeuntibus ad religionem,” ch. I, dicitur: nullus tondeatur nisi legitima aetate et spontanea voluntate; sed quando adolescentes obligati voto vel iuramento ad religionem suscipiuntur, tonsorantur non in legitima aetate neque propria voluntate, sed necessitate obligationis voti vel iuramenti; ergo hoc videtur esse illicitum. Obj. 2: In the Liber extravagantium, “On the Regulars and Those Transferring unto Religion,” ch. 1, it is said: let no one be tonsured unless of legitimate age and free will. But when adolescents obligated by vow or oath are received into religion, they are tonsured not at a legitimate age nor by their proper will, but by necessity of the obligation of their vow or oath. Therefore, this seems to be illicit. Praeterea. Magis est necessarium ut aliqui adducantur ad fidem christianam quam ad aliquam religionem; sed ad fidem christianam non sunt aliqui inducendi necessitate, sed voluntate: dicitur XLV d., c. “De Iudeis,” quod non vi, sed libera animi voluntate et facultate ut convertantur suadendi sunt; ergo multo minus imponenda est necessitas voti vel iuramenti ut aliqui ad religionem adducantur. Obj. 3: It is more necessary for some men to be led to the Christian faith than to some religion. But no men should be induced to the Christian faith by necessity, but by will: it is said in the Decretum that not by force, but by the free will and faculty of the soul must they be persuaded that they should be converted (D. 45, canon “On the Jews”). Therefore, much less must there be imposed the necessity of a vow or oath in order for some men to be led into religion. Item. Hoc esse videtur contra honestatem religionis. Adolescentum enim sicut facilis est ingressus ad religionem, ita etiam facilis est egressus; sed ex hoc religio dehonestari videtur quod de facili recipiant eos qui de facili exeunt; ergo inconveniens videtur adolescentes ad religionem recipere. Obj. 4: This seems to be against the honor of religion. For the entrance of adolescents into religion is just as easy, as also their exit is easy. But religion seems to be dishonored from this: that they receive easily those who leave easily. Therefore, it seems unfitting to receive adolescents into religion. Praeterea. Non sunt facienda bona ut veniant mala; sed ex isto bono quod iuvenes inducuntur ad religionem, secuntur multa mala, quia apostatant et illegitimas nuptias contrahunt et multa alia illicita committunt; ergo non sunt ad religionem advocandi. Obj. 5: Good things must not be done that evil things may come. But from that good thing, that youths are induced to religion, there follow many evil things, because they apostatize and contract illegitimate nuptials and commit many other illicit things. Therefore, they must not be called into religion. Praeterea. Matthaei XXIII dicit Dominus: vae vobis scribae et pharisaei, qui circuitis mare et aridam ut faciatis unum proselitum, et cum fuerit factus, facitis eum filium iehenne duplo quam vos; quod proposito videtur competere: efficiuntur enim sic intrantes iehenne filii dupliciter, primo quidem quia male intrant, scilicet contra prohibitionem Ecclesiae, secundo etiam quia male exeunt apostatando; ergo qui eos inducunt, vae divinae maledictionis incurrunt. Obj. 6: In Matthew 23:15 the Lord says: woe to you scribes and Pharisees, who wander around sea and dry land in order that you may make one proselyte, and when you should have made one, you make him twice as much a son of Gehenna as yourselves. This seems to apply to the question at hand since those entering are made thus doubly sons of Gehenna: first, because they enter badly, namely, against the prohibition of the Church; second, because they leave badly by apostatizing. Therefore, those who induce them incur the woe of the divine curse. Item. Hoc videtur esse contra necessitatem probationis. Dicitur enim prima Iohannis IV: nolite omni spiritui credere, sed probate spiritus si a Deo sunt; hoc autem non videtur esse a Deo ut tales religionem ingrediantur, cum frequenter exeant post ingressum; dicitur enim Actuum V: si est ex hominibus consilium hoc et opus, dissolvetur; si vero ex Deo est consilium, non poteritis dissolvere eos; ergo videtur quod contra Deum faciant qui eos inducunt. Obj. 7: This seems to be against the necessity of probation. For it is said in 1 John 4:1: do not believe every spirit, but prove the spirits if they are from God. Yet it does not seem to be from God for such people to enter religion, since frequently they leave after entrance. For it is said in Acts 5:38: if this counsel and work is of men, it shall be dissolved; whereas if the counsel is of God, you shall not be able to dissolve them. Therefore, it seems that those who induce them act against God. Sed contra. Quicumque potest se obligare diabolo, potest etiam se obligare Deo; sed pueri possunt se obligate diabolo peccando, ut dicitur Extra. “De delictis puerorum,” c. “Pueris”; ergo etiam possunt se obligare voto vel iuramento ad serviendum Deo in religione. On the contrary (1): Whoever can obligate himself to the devil also can obligate himself to God. But boys can obligate themselves to the devil by sinning, as is said in the Liber extravagantium, “On the Delicts of Boys,” canon “Boys.” Therefore, they also can obligate themselves by vow or oath to serve God in religion. Praeterea. XX, q. I, dicitur quod firma erit virginitatis professio, ex quo adulta iam aetas esse coeperit, et quae solet apta nuptiis deputari; ergo possunt etiam in tali aetate aliqui obligari ad religionem voto vel iuramento. Furthermore (2): In the Decretum, it is said that firm shall be the profession of virginity, out of which adult age already shall have begun to be, and those things which it is customary to be deputed unto nuptials (C. 20, q. 1). Therefore, anyone in such an age also can be obligated to religion by vow or oath. Responsio. Dicendum quod humani actus propter diversos casus uniforme iudicium habere non possunt, nec tamen, si contingit aliquid in aliquo casu esse malum, propter hoc iudicandum est esse simpliciter illicitum. I answer that human acts cannot have a uniform judgment on account of the diversity of cases; nor, nevertheless, must it be judged absolutely illicit if something happens to be evil in a certain case. Posset igitur contingere aliquis casus in quo aliquem adolescentem ad religionem obligare vel etiam recipere, illicitum esset, puta si constaret vel probaliter crederetur de eius inconstantia, vel si quid aliud esset huiusmodi, quae diligenter considerantur in religionibus bene institutis. Therefore, some case could happen in which to obligate or even to receive some adolescent in religion would be illicit: for example, if his inconstancy was agreed upon or believed probable, or if there were anything else of this sort which is diligently considered in well instituted religions. Dicere autem quod recipere adolescentes ad religionem sit illicitum, est diabolicum, quia super illud Exodi V: quare Moyses et Aaron sollicitatis populum ab operibus suis?, dicit glossa Origenis: hodie quoque, si Moyses et Aaron, id est propheticus et sacerdotalis sermo, animam sollicitet ad servitium Dei, exire de saeculo, renunciare omnibus quae possidet, attendere legi et verbo Dei continue, audies unanimes et amicos Pharaonis dicentes: videte quomodo seducuntur homines et pervertuntur adolescentes, et postea: haec erant tunc verba Pharaonis, <haec> et nunc amici eius locuntur. Yet to say that to receive adolescents into religion is illicit is diabolical because in Origen’s gloss on Exodus 5:4: why do Moses and Aaron disturb the people from their works?, it says: today also, if Moses and Aaron, that is, the prophetic and priestly word, should disturb a soul unto the service of God, to go out from the world, to renounce all things which he possesses, to attend to reading and the word of God continuously, you shall hear the intimates and friends of Pharaoh saying: see how men are seduced and adolescents are perverted, and afterwards: these then were the words of Pharaoh, these also his friends speak now. Est etiam contra Christi praeceptum; dicitur enim Matthaei XIX quod oblati sunt ei parvuli ut manus eis imponeret et oraret; discipuli autem increpabant eos; Iesus autem ait eis: Sinite parvulos et nolite prohibere eos venire ad me. Quod exponens Origenes super Matthaeum dicit quod discipuli Iesu, priusquam discant rationem iustitiae . . . , reprehendunt eos qui . . . pueros et infantes offerunt Christo; Dominus autem exhortatur discipulos suos . . . condescendere utilitatibus puerorum. . . . Haec ergo attendere debemus ne aestimatione sapientiae excellentioris . . . contemnamus, quasi magni, pusillos Ecclesiae . . . , prohibentes pueros venire ad Iesum. It is also against the precept of Christ; for it is said in Matthew 19:13 that the little ones were offered to him in order that he would impose hands upon them and pray; yet the disciples rebuked them; yet Jesus said to them: allow the little ones and do not prohibit them to come unto me. Expounding on this, Origen says in his commentary on Matthew that the disciples of Jesus, before they learned the reasoning of justice . . . , blamed those who . . . offer children and infants to Christ; yet the Lord exhorts his disciples . . . to condescend to the utilities of the children. . . . Therefore, we ought to attend to these things lest we, as though great men . . . spurn by the estimation of more excellent wisdom, the little ones of the Church . . . , prohibiting children to come unto Jesus.